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a b s t r a c t
Nationality conflicts frequently contribute to political con­
frontations. Communists claim that these confrontations are merely 
reflections of class conflict. Yet, nationality conflicts have also 
taken place in communist systems. The dissertation examines the na­
tionality policies of two communist states, to determine whether or not 
ideological commitments can prevent such conflicts.
Focusing on the treatment of the Hungarian minorities in 
Transylvania and the Vojvodina, the dissertation seeks answers to a 
number of key questions concerning nationality relations. Is the 
communist workers' class solidarity a "solution" of the Rumanian and 
Yugoslav nationality problems? Why or why not? To what extent? What 
considerations guide the nationality policies of these states? How 
are the policies of these states similar? How are they different?
Why are they different?
The dissertation probes for answers by comparing statements of 
policy and ideology with actual political practices in both Tran­
sylvania and the Vojvodina. The comparison is carried out, first, by 
putting the problem into historical and ideological perspective.
Second, attention is focused on the constitutional and ideological 
"solutions" which were adopted with the advent of Communist control. 
This is followed by the examination of the political position of the 
Hungarians in both the party and governmental organizations of the two
xii
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
political systems and by the examination of the actual economic, social 
and cultural policies affecting the Hungarians. The analysis concludes 
by tying together the intra-national and international implications of 
the Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality policies.
The dissertation depends, in large part, on a content analysis 
of the Hungarian minority publications of Rumania and Yugoslavia. It 
relates observations gained through such content analysis to long-range 
trends which are discernible from an examination of aggregate data con­
cerning demographic, social, economic and cultural existence. These 
trends are in turn related to domestic and international developments 
which impinge on the problem in any way. In relation to the latter, 
the dissertation has also drawn extensively on the studies of Western 
observers.
The findings of the dissertation indicate that political con­
siderations rather than communist ideology guides the nationality 
policies of the two states. Ideology guides nationality policies only 
when its demands do not conflict with assumed national interests. In 
the Vojvodina the Hungarians are treated with tolerance because both 
the internal and external political needs of Yugoslavia are well 
served by such treatment. It enables Yugoslavia to act as a unified 
state in spite of its multi-national composition. In Transylvania, on 
the other hand, the Hungarians suffer outright discrimination. Rumania 
can afford such intolerant policies only because its political unity 
is already ensured by the party's successful appeal to the nationalism 
of the dominant Rumanian nationality.
As nationalism grows unabated in the polycentric setting of
xiii
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East-Central Europe, the outlook remains bleak for the Hungarians in 
Transylvania. However, Yugoslavia's more humane policies provide a 
standard for minority treatment from which all the peoples of East- 
Central Europe could learn and benefit.
xiv
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PROLOGUE
Little attention has been paid to the ethnic minorities in 
the Balkans and Eastern Europe since the end of World War II. This 
neglect can be explained by the area's communization aud the limited 
newsworthyness--until recently--of ethnic discord in that part of the 
world. These two reasons have complemented one another insofar as 
the area's incorporation into the Communist "camp" has also cut it off 
from easy access. In this way, East Europe's nationality conflicts 




The purpose of this study is to go behind the iron curtain of 
ideology and hegemony, to examine the solution of the nationality 
question claimed by Communist Rumanians in Transylvania and Communist 
Yugoslavs in the V o j v o d i n a . T h e  solution, according to these Com­
munists, is based on class solidarity and the concomitant relegation 
of national animosities to the "trash heap of history." In view of
■'■In this study reference to Transylvania includes the terri­
tories of the eastern half of the Banat, all of the Crisana (the 
Partium, composed of Arad and Bihar), all of Maramures (Maramaros) as 
well as "historical Transylvania," since in the popular mind all three 
were grouped together; by the Hungarians as the territory lost to 
Rumania through the Treaty of Trianon following World War I; by the 
Rumanians as the new areas acquired on the "other" (i.e., western and 
northern) side of the Carpathian mountain range.
The Vojvodina includes the western half of the Banat, all of 
the Ba£ka (Bacska), and most of Baranya (the Ddrda triangle).
1
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this claim, this study will examine the actual position of the Hungarian
inhabitants in Transylvania and the Vojvodina to determine to what
extent such claims have been realized in Rumania and Yugoslavia.
More specifically, it will attempt to isolate the factors which
have determined the nature of Rumanian and Yugoslavian nationalities
policies. To this end, particular attention will be given to ideo-
ological and power relationships.
Rumania and Yugoslavia are ideal subjects because both contain 
large Hungarian minorities whose treatment provides opportunities for 
comparison and contrast. In Yugoslavia there are about one-half
OnJnder ideological relationships I am thinking mainly of 
Communism. But, nationalism is also an "ideology." It is an ideology 
according to A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free
Press, 1964), p. 455, when it seeks "to justify the nation-state as 
the ideal form of political organization." When it does this, 
nationalism like Communism, becomes a pattern of beliefs and concepts 
which gives its adherents guide-lines for behavior. Of course, 
Communism is a much more complex and intellectualized ideology, but 
as a consequence, it is also less appealing to the masses.
In the present context, I will view both Communism and 
nationalism as non-physical political "forces" which are at the dis­
posal of ruling elites in Rumania and Yugoslavia. Unlike George W. 
Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New 
York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 5, I do not believe that
Communism "uses" nationalism or that nationalism "uses" Communism. 
Rather, I think that the new ruling elites in Rumania and Yugoslavia—  
those that run the Party organizations--use both Communism and 
nationalism, where one or the other of these "forces" best serves 
their political standing. These organization men of the Party, are 
after all, not only Communists but also nationals of their respective 
countries. They are, therefore, a product of both Communist and 
national traditions, and borrow freely from both to undergird their 
own positions of power. A very informative discussion of the conflict 
between nationalism and communism is provided by Ferenc Vali, Rift and 
Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961)
pp. 493-513.
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million Hungarians in the Vojvodina, while in Rumania there are nearly 
two million in Transylvania.
The selection of these two countries is also desirable because 
both have had some latitude in determining their "own" (i.e., national) 
policies vis-a-vis their respective ethnic minorities. The elimination 
of Soviet interference in Yugoslavia in 1948, and the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, have allowed both countries to map 
out their own solutions to their nationality problems. Both of them 
have done just that, with somewhat different consequences. While both 
Rumania and Yugoslavia pay homage to the same ideological authorities 
(i.e., Marx, Lenin) both countries have ended up with different, even 
conflicting nationality policies.
The purpose of this study is to examine these differences and 
similarities. In this way the status of minorities in Communist states 
will be better understood. It will be possible on the basis of such a 
comparison to determine whether Communism has or has not been able to 
overcome nationalism in these areas. Furthermore, it will also pro­
vide an indication of the conditions needed for a tolerant nationality 
policy as opposed to a repressive one.
II. SCOPE
The differences and similarities between Rumanian and Yugo­
slavian nationality policies will be examined within specific 
topical, geographical and historical limitations.
Topically we will be concerned with Communist nationality
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
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policies in Rumania and Yugoslavia as they relate to the Hungarian
inhabitants of these two countries. Furthermore, we shall treat this
subject in terms of post-World War II developments. References to 
pre-war aspects of the problem will be made only to provide a necessary 
background for understanding the present and more recent developments. 
In other words, references to pre-war ethnic relations will be made 
only to throw light on the problem's present state, and to emphasize 
the ideological and political rather than the historical implications 
of Yugoslav and Rumanian nationality policies.
The scope of our study will be further limited geographically
to the areas known as Transylvania in Rumania and the Vojvodina in
Yugoslavia. Transylvania includes the territory that lies east of
present-day Hungary and Yugoslavia and west and north of the former
province of Moldavia and Wallachia (the latter is divided into
Muntenia and Oltenia today) which had composed the "old" kingdom of
Rumania prior to World War I. (Figures I and II illustrate the
3geographic location and limits of Transylvania.) The Vojvodina, on 
the other hand, lies directly south of present-day Hungary and west 
of Rumania. It occupies the area of the great Hungarian plain which 
now makes up the north-central part of Yugoslavia. (Figures I and III
■’Transylvania means "land beyond the forest." This is the name 
by which the area is known internationally, but the Hungarians call it 
"Erdely" (wooded land) and the Rumanians call it "Ardeal." In the 
future, when reference is made to specific areas in Transylvania, the 
present Rumanian name will be given first, followed by the enclosed 
Hungarian name.
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illustrate the geographic location and limits of the Vojvodina.)^
This 1*aitation in scope does not mean that Transylvania and 
the Vojvodina will be studied in isolation from the surrounding areas. 
Rather, the limitation means only that the role of Rumania, Yugoslavia, 
Hungary or the Soviet Union (or any other state or area) will be con­
sidered only insofar as that role relates to nationality problems in 
the two areas which provide the focus for the present analysis.
III. PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OF THE PROBLEM
The nature and extent of ethnic discord, and the Communi;-st 
efforts made to solve them, have received insufficient attention even 
in serious treatments of East-Central Europe. However, the study of 
such discord in Transylvania and the Vojvodina has a voluminous 
literature. Of the two areas Transylvania fares somewhat better. 
Lamentably, most of this material relates to the period up to the 
Peace Treaties following World War II.** After that, there exist only 
fragments and a few scattered articles that touch on the subject in 
general.
The pre-Peace Treaty material, which composes the bulk of 
studies and other writings on the fate of ethnic minorities in
^Vojvodina means "duchy" in Serbian. In Hungarian the same 
name would be Vajdasdg. As in the case of Rumania, when reference is 
made to any area in the Vojvodina, its present Serbo-Croatian name will 
be given first with its former Hungarian name following enclosed.
^Pre-Peace Treaty source-material includes studies written 
after 1947, as long as the subject matter or the area of concern in 
such studies relates to pre-1947 affairs and developments.
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Transylvania and the Vojvodina, can be divided into three main groups; 
(1) non-partisan studies, (2) partisan studies, and (3) propaganda 
works. The first group includes the investigations of such scholars 
as C. A. Macartney, A. W. Palmer, L. S. Stavrianos, John Cabot Moors, 
Zoltan M. Szdz and Hugh Seton-Watson. Objectivity and thoroughness 
characterize these sources. The second group contains no less valuable 
studies, but studies that are to some degree partisan. These include 
such investigations as those of Louis Craig Cornish, Joseph S. Roucek, 
R. H. Markham, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and Charles Upson Clark. The 
third and last group is composed primarily of propaganda material.
Such writers on the problem as Andrew Fall, Hewlett Johnson, Sylvius 
Dragomir and Pavel Pavel fall into this category. Here objectivity is 
subordinated to propaganda objectives, thereby making these works of 
questionable value for a serious study of the problem. Nonetheless, 
such works are of interest as indications of the times, as well as the 
explosive nt-uure of the subject matter.^
The three categories provide some basis for criticism regard­
ing available sources. However, it should be kept in mind that the 
categories do not reflect differences that exist between works put into 
the same group nor do they draw sharp lines of demarcation between the 
groups. For example, in the third or propaganda category, the books 
written by Andrew Fall are relatively more moderate and historically 
sound than the absolutely race-baiting pamphlets of Pavel Pavel, which 
often resort to outright historical distortions. Or in the first cate­
gory, the studies of C. A. Macartney by far outweigh in depth of insight 
and thoroughness the book written by John Cabot Moors. Both investiga­
tors provide objective studies, but these are qualitatively different:. 
The differences noted for the first and third categories also find 
similar counterparts in the second category which includes partisan 
studies. Clark, for example, writes a more skillful partisan study 
than does Cornish, who at times veers from the cold facts and appeals to 
emotions. The above presentation is far from a complete analysis of 
available pre-1947 sources, but it does give a general outline.
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IV. SOURCES OF DATA
It has been noted above that most scholarly studies pertain to 
the years preceding 1947. The lack of any serious investigations since 
that date, particularly in English, necessitates the examination of 
other sources for the period from World War II to the present (1970).
As we have seen, the absence of such investigations is due, in large 
part, to the limitations imposed by an "iron curtain" upon the possi­
bilities and opportunities of analysis and investigation. The limita­
tion affects Communist scholars, Western scholars and also emigre 
scholars.
Among Communist scholars, Yugoslavs, Rumanians and Hungarians, 
the question of national minorities is ideologically determined. 
Accordingly, they treat the question as one that is no longer of major 
concern in Socialist countries since presumably it has been "solved." 
They usually refer to it only to demonstrate the "contrast" between 
the socialist and the capitalist approaches to the nationality ques­
tion and the oppression of colonies. However, there are some recent
nindications of change.7 While Rumanian scholars--and to a lesser 
extent Yugoslavian scholars— understandably want to gloss over the 
problem, the revival of nationalism as reflected by polycentrism and 
"separate roads to socialism" will, to some extent, make even Communist 
Hungarian scholars more restless and less willing to "hold their
^David Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist 
Drive," New York Times, July 14, 1964, p. 4; C. Daicoviciu, "Debates 
of Historians," Contemporanu1 (May 29, 1964), trans. in Rumanian Press 
Survey No. 446 (Radio Free Europe, July 8 , 1964), pp. 2-6.
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tongues" regarding the fate of their fellow nationals under Rumanian and 
Yugoslavian jurisdiction— particularly if that jurisdiction happens to
Qtake on revisionist and "bourgeois nationalist" overtones.
Western scholars are affected differently. The lack of coopera­
tion of the governments concerned and the difficulty of learning 
Rumanian, Serbo-Croatian and Hungarian (Magyar) make the problem seem 
more remote than it really is. Furthermore, the problem has not been 
considered "timely" until very recently, and therefore has aroused 
little interest. In fact, the only recent studies from a Western
source were written after the problem was "revived" by the press during
9the spring and summer of 1963.
The effects on emigre scholars are again of a different nature. 
Rumanian and Serbian emigre scholars, due to their status quo 
territorial perspectives, have more or less ignored the subject and 
have usually taken the view that the question of nationalities is now
OOne indication of the growth of such restlessness is the 
sending of complete bibliographies, on the Transylvanian ethnic 
discord, to Western universities and libraries. This would seem to 
show that some Hungarian scholars favor someone else speaking out on 
the issue even if they themselves cannot.
^J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The 
World Today. XIX (Nov., 1963), 498-506, is one of the articles being 
referred to. It appeared just a few months after Edward Crankshaw's 
reports concerning the ethnic minorities of Transylvania, as well as 
some articles by David Binder and Paul Underwood. Two more studies 
along this line are: Paul Shoup's "Yugoslavia's National Minorities
under Communism," Slavic Review, XXII (March, 1963), 64-81, and 
Ferenc A. Vali's "Transylvania and the Hungarian Minority," Journal 
of International Affairs, XX (No. 1, 1966), 32-44.
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c l o s e d . H u n g a r i a n  and Croatian emigre scholars, on the other hand, 
have hammered away at the problem under unfavorable conditions. Finan­
cial limitations as well as the lack of adequate information have, in 
general, kept many of their studies more in the nature of partisan 
polemics than of scholarly treatises. At any rate, Yugoslav, Rumanian 
and Hungarian emigre scholars, while unhindered by language difficul­
ties, are handicapped by emotional involvement by the lack of sources 
of information and data, and by the lack of financial means to carry 
out investigations.
Apparently, the limitations in this area of scholarly research 
are great, but they are not insurmountable. There is a great deal of 
source material that can be utilized for a better understanding of 
Communist nationality policies in Yugoslavia and Rumania. Six main 
source areas come immediately to mind.
(1) The Hungarian language Rumanian and Yugoslav periodicals 
which are published for Transylvanian and Vojvodinian consumption.
These include such journals and periodicals as Korunk, Utunk, Igaz Szo, 
and El6‘re for Rumania and Hid, Magyar Szo, Polgoz6k, and Kepes Ujs^g 
for Yugoslavia. English language periodicals meant for Western con­
sumption also reflect the official attitudes of the two countries 
regarding the nationalities question. These include periodicals like
^®Two examples of this type of scholarship are: Stephen
Fischer-Galati (ed.), Romania in East-Central Europe under the Com­
munists , Gen. Ed. Robert F. Byrnes (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., 1957), and Robert J. Kerner (ed.) Yugoslavia (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1949). Both books devote only 
a few pages to the nationality problem--merely acknowledging that the 
problem exists.
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Rumania Today, News from Rumania, Documents, Articles and Information 
on Rumania, Yugoslav Survey, Socialist Thought and Practice, and 
Review of International Affairs, These Hungarian and English language 
periodicals reflect the Communist Rumanian and Yugoslav positions on 
the issues of the day in the realm of art, literature, education, 
politics, economics, etc.
(2) The second source is provided by Communist Hungarian 
periodicals and papers appearing in Magyar and English. These include 
Szabad Ndp, Tarsadalmi Szemle, Foldrajzi K5zlemenyek, and The New 
Hungarian Quarterly. They all reflect the Communist Hungarian view, 
or lack of view, on the issues of the day.
(3) A  third source is provided by the Yugoslav and Rumanian 
constitutions, their revisions and any such other laws as deal with 
the problem of ethnic minorities. These legal documents, together 
with Party pronouncements and statements on the nationality issue, 
directly mirror the "official" attitudes of the governments concerned.
(4) The fourth source includes Rumanian, Serbian, Croatian and 
Hungarian exile periodicals and newspapers. Besides the distinctively 
Vojvodinian and Transylvanian exile publications like Ljtrmafa and 
Transsylvinia, consideration must be given to periodicals like Uj 
Litohatir, Nemzetor, Irodalmi Ujsag, Magyar Szabadshg, Katolikusok 
Vasirnapja, and VjeSnik Ujedinjenih Ameri&kih Hrvata.
(5) Western studies, press translations and newspaper reports 
compose the fifth source. These include recent books dealing with 
Rumania and Yugoslavia, some scattered studies in social science
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journals, and some news reports. Some scholarly journals that are 
particularly helpful include Central Europe Journal, Slavic Review, 
Balkania, East Europe, Survey, Journal of Central European Affairs, 
Problems of Communism, Balkan Studies, and Per Europaische Osten. How­
ever, this is also supplemented by information that can be obtained 
from the United States Department of State, Radio Free Europe, and some 
private church groups, particularly the Unitarians and the Roman 
Catholics,
(6 ) Government publications of Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary 
which in any way touch upon the nationality problem are the last and 
most limited source. They are mainly White Books, statistical compila­
tions, the texts of treaties and agreements between two or more Com­
munist states, and also some propaganda pamphlets. Here again care 
must be used in the analysis of the given material.
V. METHOD OF PROCEDURE
The preceding brief survey indicates the variety of sources 
available. Working with this type of source material, it is imperative 
that the problem be examined from all sides. Attention must be focused 
on the voices of Communist Yugoslavs, Rumanians and Hungarians as well 
as the voices of the exiles from the respective countries. The views 
of minority and majority nationalities must also be evaluated and com­
pared with the commentary of "aloof" Westerners who have taken an 
interest in the problem.
Objective examination of all facets of the issue, is merely a
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first step toward an analysis of our problem. It must be followed by 
an attempt at systematic reconstruction relating the points of national 
contention to their ideological implications. Only the relation of the 
actual situation of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina 
to the promises of Communist ideology can provide comparative and 
analytical opportunities.
This study will be concerned with the examination of the 
nationality policies of the two countries always in relation to some 
specific aspect of the Hungarian ethnic group's existence. For example, 
the employment or educational policies of the two countries will be 
compared in relation to their Hungarian inhabitants. First, the Yugo­
slav and Rumanian employment or educational policies will be described 
independently and only then will similarities and differences be 
pointed out. Therefore, each chapter will begin with a general state­
ment of the problem being dealt with. After such a statement, the 
Yugoslav and the Rumanian approaches and solutions will be treated 
separately, while the concluding portions will sum up the points of 
divergence and convergence. This will be followed by an evaluation of 
the respective policies and their implications for all concerned.
Comparing actual practices with Communist theoretical inter­
pretations, as they affect the Hungarians living under Rumanian and 
Yugoslavian jurisdiction, leads the analysis along a horizontal as well 
as a vertical plane. It will proceed vertically when ideological 
demands are compared with existential realities in. the respective coun­
tries. It will proceed horizontally when the policies of the two coun­
tries are compared to one another.
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The comparison on the lowest levels, where specific policies 
(e.g., educational, employment, etc.) are analyzed, will depend primar­
ily on aggregate data, content analyses and informal investigations of 
a personal nature. The conclusions and observations drawn from these 
sources will be checked against and supplemented by studies discussing 
Yugoslav and Rumanian nationality policies.
Aggregate data is readily available in the standard statistical 
enumerations of Rumania and Yugoslavia. These include census data and 
a variety of other governmental statistics. They provide a great deal 
of the supporting data indicating trends in economic or cultural 
policies. The correlation of there statistical trends with specific 
political events (e.g., Tito-Stalin split 1948, Hungarian Revolt 1956, 
Rumanian "rebellion" within Comecon 1963, invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
1968) provides one of the means of uncovering the "connections" between 
nationality policies and political developments.
The shifts in these policies will be followed also through a 
content analysis of a variety of sources. Content analysis of printed 
materials will be resorted to most frequently. Unlike the electronic 
news media, films and other instruments of communication, the printed 
sources (i.e., newspapers, periodicals, books) are more easily acces­
sible. Thus, textbooks will be examined to see whether or not "de­
nationalization" or "assimilation" is aimed at. Periodicals and 
newspapers will be examined for their cultural content. Through such 
content analysis it will be possible to isolate the dominant cultural 
and political symbols of the particular society in question. The
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frequency and the intensity of the use of such symbols will provide addi­
tional insights into the prevailing nationality policies.
Finally, personal observations of the student and other investi­
gators who have visited the areas of concern, provide yet another means 
of making evaluations. Personal visits to libraries, schools, cultural 
centers and economic enterprises compose the basis for these observa­
tions. These, together with studies extant on this problem, provide a 
check and a supplement to the use of aggregate data and content analyses.
VII. DEFINITION OF TERMS RELEVANT TO THE DISSERTATION
To begin, it will be necessary to define certain key terms, 
relating to the confrontation of nationalism and Communism in 
Transylvania and the Vojvodina. Included are those tenets of Communist 
ideology which pertain to questions of internationality cooperation.
Thus, clarification is required for the concepts of "proletarian inter­
nationalism," "socialist patriotism" and "bourgeois nationalism."
Nationalism is the first concept that demands attention. Ac- 
coring to Hans Kohn it is, above anything else, "a state of mind, an 
act of consciousness, which since the French Revolution has become more 
and more common to mankind."•*• This "state of mind" is determined by 
objective factors like common descent, a common language, common
■^Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (Fifth Edition; New York: 
The Macmillan Co,, 1951), pp. 10-11.
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customs and traditions, common religion and a common territory.^ For 
Kohn, the last mentioned is the most important objective factor;^ for 
Elie Kedourie, however, language plays this r o le.^ Nonetheless, both 
agree that "the most essential element is a living and active corporate 
w i l l . B e c a u s e ,  as Kedourie points out, nationalism is "largely a 
doctrine of national self-determination,"^ and this is, "in the final 
analysis, a determination of the will."-*-^ Thus defined, nationalism is
I *1 Oan idea, an "idee-force." °
IThe character of this idee-force is Janus-faced insofar as it 
promotes greater cooperation, homogeneity, and social solidarity 
intranationally, but leads to indifference, dissention or even conflict 
internationally. ^  Vested interests are in. large part responsible for 
this dual character of nationalism— vested interests not only of a 
political or economic nature, but of an emotional and intellectual
12Ibid., pp. 14-15; Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and 
Colonial Question trans. A. Fineberg, Ed. I. Tovstukha (New York; 
International Publishers [n.d.]), pp. 6-9, presents a very similar 
listing. However, he is much more dogmatic than Kohn in that he main­
tains: "It is only when all these characteristics are present that we
have a nation."
1 2XJKohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 15.
■^Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd.,
1960), p. 64.
■^Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 15.
■^Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 31.
•̂ I b i d ., p. 81.
■^Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 19.
19Ibid., p. 2 0 .
R eprod u ced  w ith perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
2 0.nature as well. Thus, it should come as no surprise that attempts to 
re-make the world along national lines have not increased the prospects 
of peace and cooperation. As Kedourie points out, the history of 
Europe since 1919 testifies to the "inherent" disruptive power of
O 1nationalism. Transylvania, and to a lesser extent the Vojvodina, are 
just two outstanding examples of the above observation, for they have 
become festering sores of political discontent since just about that 
time.
The Communist definition of nationalism is somewhat different, 
permitting Communists to claim--even in contradiction to existing con­
ditions— that no festering sore of national discontent exists in
OOTransylvania t o d a y . J u s t  what is the Communist (or as they prefer, 
Marxist-Leninist) interpretation of nationalism? The answer to this 
question can be found, in part, in the definition of some key terms 
used by Communists.
"Bourgeois nationalism" is used by Communists when they refer 
to the phenomenon described by Kohn as an idee-force. While they do 
not disagree with Kohn about the formation of nationalism through "the 
growth of social and intellectual factors at a certain stage of history,
^ I b i d ., pp. 21-2 2 .
^Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 138; Stalin, Marxism and the 
National and Colonial Question, p. 90, presents a similar conclusion.
22To avoid doctrinal embarrassment and to maintain a sound 
ideological footing Communists can always blame national discontent 
on manifestations of the class struggle.
^Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 6 .
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they see this development as a reflection of the productive forces of 
society, as the specific reflection of the capitalist "stage" of 
h i s t o r y . A c c o r d i n g  to the Marxist-Leninist definition, "bourgeois 
nationalism" is nothing more than the oppression of national minorities, 
encroachment on the territories of neighboring states, and the finan­
cial, economic, and military subjection of the smaller to the larger 
imperialist p o w e r s . A s  Stalin sums it up, "private property and 
capital inevitably disunite people, inflame national enmity and intensi-
O  (Lfy national oppression." °
The development of capitalism, which produced nationalism, is, 
however, also responsible for the demise of this phenomenon. At the 
dawn of capitalism the nation-state and nationalism emerged; but with 
the internationalization of capitalism, the nation-state has become an 
anachronism. While capitalism "unified" the world from the economic 
standpoint, this unity was politically negated by antagonistic 
nationalisms which dissected the world into innumerable quarreling 
political fragments.27
Only "Communist" or "proletarian internationalism" can resolve 
this contradiction. For "proletarian internationalism" is the exact
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opposite of "bourgeois nationalism" in the political arena. As such, it 
eliminates national enmity, oppression, and exploitation. Instead of 
dividing the masses according to their national origin, it unifies them 
through their class consciousness— through international proletarian
O Osolidarity. ° According to Stalin and his present successors, this 
international unification has already been achieved in the Soviet Union 
and in the Communist bloc (The Tito-Stalin split, the Sino-Soviet rift 
and the Czech-Soviet crisis, however, have played havoc with this inter­
pretation) .
The proponents of "proletarian internationalism" are not so
blind, however, as to ignore the dynamic nature of nationalism. In
order to take this dynamism into account a double standard has evolved
oqregarding the manifestations of nationalism. 7 In certain areas 
national revolutions (i.e., "wars of liberation") are considered pro­
gressive, while in other cases (i.e., wars among capitalists) they are
onregarded as the epitome of "black reaction." This double standard 
reflects the extent of flexibility in the interpretation of Communist 
ideology. It indicates that ideology can be used to rationalize 
political acts, even when such rationalizations seem contradictory.
Yet, this double standard has solid ideological foundations, since the
28Hans Kohn, Nationalism in the Soviet Union, trans. E. W.
Dickes (Second Edition; London: George Routledge & Sons, Lts., 1933),
pp. 33, 35, 72.
2Q7Ibid..» pp. 47, 52; Adam B. Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution 
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1960), p. 243; F. Borkenau, World
Communism (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1939), p. 285.
^^Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1958), pp. 71-72, 96-97.
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3 1development of nations toward Socialism is seen in stages. Thus, a 
national revolution in a colonial domain like Algeria or Vietnam is 
considered a "progressive" revolution, while the Hungarian revolt of 
1956 is characterized as a counter-revolutionary imperialist plot. Ac­
cording to this standard, the world must view all national revolts 
against the Western "imperialist" powers as "progressive," while forcing
it to view national discontent in the Communist bloc as "bourgeois 
32reaction."
To forestall any such "bourgeois reaction" citizens of Communist 
bloc countries are exhorted to be "socialist patriots." "Socialist 
patriotism" describes the loyalty and pride which should prevail among 
inhabitants of Communist countries. Evidently, it is supposed to be 
different from patriotism which exists in non-Communist states. Patri­
otism in this latter sense is nothing more than "bourgeois chauvinism" 
according to the Communists. "Socialist patriotism," on the other hand,
is not tied to nationality, it is supposed to transcend nationality for
3 3the greater good of the World Socialist movement. J Above all, it is
^^Borkenau, World Communism, pp. 290-291.
32"TeXt of C.P.S.U. Draft Program 1961," Ideology in Conflict, 
ed. Dieter Dux (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.,
1963), p. 175, contains a typical harangue against the dangers of 
nationalism in the bloc, and advises that, "Nationalism can gain the 
upper hand only where it is not consistently combated."
•^"Statement issued by the Conference of Representatives of 
Communist Parties: Moscow— November, 1960," Ideology in Conflict, p. 
141, states this obligation thus: "The common interests of the
peoples of the socialist countries and the interests of peace and 
socialism demand the proper combination of the principles of socialist
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loyalty and solidarity which motivates all peoples under the banner
of "proletarian internationalism" to heed the admonition, "proletarians
34of the world unite!"
"Socialist patriotism" and "proletarian internationalism" have
been invoked on numerous occasions in Communist Rumania and Yugoslavia
to describe the obligations of citizens in multi-national Transylvania 
3 5and Vojvodina. J The invective of "bourgeois nationalism" has also 
been invoked to circumscribe the rights of certain citizens in these 
areas. What is disturbing about the use of these terms is that they 
can be interpreted to mean the exact opposite of their "official" 
definitions by the Rumanian or Yugoslav ruling elites. This great
internationalism and social patriotism in politics. Every Communist 
party which has become the ruling party in the state, bears historical 
responsibility for the destinies of both its country and the entire 
socialist camp."
■^Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The U.S.S.R.: Monolithic Controls 
at Home and Abroad," Modern Political Parties, ed. Sigmund Neumann 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 233, 238, shows
that nationalities which had been found lagging in their support of 
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat during World War II, as the Volga 
Germans and Crimean Tartars had been, found themselves deported to the 
more remote areas of Siberia. A more thorough consideration of this 
side of Soviet nationalities policy can be found in Nikolai K. Deker 
and Andrei Lebed (eds.) Genocide in the USSR (New York; The Scare­
crow Press, Inc., 1958), Chs. II-III. This aspect of Soviet nationali­
ties is taboo to scholars in the Communist bloc. See for example, 
Istvan Dolmanyos, A Nemzetisdgi Politika Tortdnete A Szovjetunioban 
(Budapest; Kossuth Konyvkiadd, 1964).
•^Az Igaz Szd Szerkesztosdge, "A Szocialista ^pitds SzolgAlata- 
ban," Igaz Szo, X (Dec., 1962), 892.
■^It must be pointed out, however, that the Yugoslav leadership 
is in this respect much more circumspect. For the classic Yugoslav 
statement on the nationalities question see Edvard Kardelj-Sperans,
A Szlovdn Nemzeti Kdrdds FejlSddse trans. into Hungarian by IstvAn 
Bodrits, et al. (Novi Sad, Jugslavija: Forum K&nyvkiado, 1961).
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flexibility of definitions has become possible not because of the evolu­
tion of the meanings, but because of the evolution of the leadership in 
the Soviet Union and the changed nature of the Communist bloc.
While the Soviet Union was the sole Socialist state, the inter­
pretation of these terms was relatively s t a b l e . H o w e v e r ,  with the
expansion of the Communist camp the interpretations became more varied.
38For one thing, the right to interpretation now came into dispute. The 
demise of Stalin and the emergence of "polycentrism" brought about the 
possibility of numerous interpretations.39 Yet, there is still a 
surface obeisance to the meanings as presented above--even when local 
conditions "demand" alterations.^®
So it is in Transylvania and the Vojvodinal Now that "national" 
Communism has been strengthened by the policies of Gheorghe Gheorghiu- 
Dej--and more recently by Nicolae Ceausescu--in Rumania, the question
■^Through the Comintern and Cominform the Soviet Union set the 
pace which the parties in other countries had to follow. This way, 
these other parties often became nothing more than the willing tools 
of "Great Russian" nationalism. This was particularly the case as 
Russia was confronted by the possibilities of war with Hitler. Some 
revealing facets of this problem are examined by Ulam, The Unfinished 
Revolution, pp. 226-227, 230, 256, 262, 264, and Borkenau, World 
Communism, pp. 386-388.
3®Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.) Polycentrism (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), provide a thorough examina­
tion of this subject. The chapters written by Melvin Croan, Boris 
Levitski, G. R. Urban, and J. F. Brown proved particularly interest­
ing. See especially pp. 13, 15-17.
39Ibid.. p. 16.
^ A z  Igaz Sz<5 SzerkeztSsege, "A Szocialista iSpit^s Szolgllata- 
ban," p. 892.
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that remains to be answered is whether their policies are motivated by 
"socialist patriotism" and "proletarian internationalism," or whether 
they have reverted to time tested "bourgeois nationalism" under the 
guise of ideological platitudes? The answer to this question can be 
found in the treatment of Transylvania's Hungarian inhabitants and in 
the comparison of their treatment to that of the Hungarians living in 
Yugoslavia under totally different conditions but accounted for by the 
same platitudes.
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TRANSYLVANIA AND THE VOJVODINA IN THE 
PRE-COMMUNIST SETTING
The treatment of ethnic minorities in Transylvania and the
Vojvodina has a long and varied history. To understand the present
I
Communist Rumanian and Yugoslavian approaches to this problem, it will 
be necessary to examine this background. We will do just that by 
tracing the development of nationality conflicts to the eve of Communist 
ascendancy in the two areas.
I. Political Nature of the Disputes
The nationality conflicts center around areas which, although
inhabited by various nationalities often at odds with one another,^- are—
and were in the past--of great importance economically, geographically,
ostrategically and industrially. They provide the posessor states with 
tangible sources of power, including natural resources, geographic
■̂ The fact that these nationalities are at odds now (this is 
denied by most Communists) and in the recent past does not mean that 
this has always been the case. On the contrary, prior to the rise of 
modern nationalism, harmony rather than discord characterized relations 
among the peoples of Transylvania and the Vojvodina. Indeed, both areas 
encourage harmony and cooperation because of their interdependent geog­
raphy within the Carpathian Basin. For some consideration of this ques­
tion see: Paul Teleki, "Transylvania's Situation in Hungary and in
Europe," in Louis Craig Cornish, Transylvania, The Land Beyond the 
Forest (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, Inc., 1947), Appendix V,
p. 244; C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors (London: Oxford
University Press, 1937), pp. 1-3.
^This is less true for the Vojvodina than for Transylvania.
More will be said about these differences in the following description 
of the respective areas.
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3advantages, some industrial potential and additional population. Since 
both Transylvania and the Vojvodina can provide the possessor states 
with some of these power sources, Rumania and Hungary vie for Tran­
sylvania, and Yugoslavia and Hungary vie for the Vojvodina.^
These sources of power make both areas, but particularly 
Transylvania, of utmost importance in the power relationships of Central 
Europe and the B a l k a n s . I n  the case of Transylvania, both contenders 
have viewed it as necessary to their national survival vis-A-vis each 
other as well as pan-German and pan-Slav expansion.^ This is why it is 
almost impossible to find a "compromise" solution which would satisfy 
both of them.^ On the other hand, in the case of the Vojvodina, 
competition between Hungary and Yugoslavia never attained such intens­
ity, since survival was not in the balance. Here, it was more a 
question of gaining or losing an area which had desirable attributes 
and added to the economic wealth of the possessor state.
3Philip E. Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," Foreign Affairs, 
XIX (Oct., 1940), pp. 237, 241-242, discusses these factors in relation 
to the Rumanian-Hungarian dispute. His observations could also be 
applied to the Vojvodinian dispute, with qualifications.
^In the Banat, territorial disputes also arose between Yugo­
slavia and Rumania. For this controversy see: Macartney, Hungary and
Her Successors, pp. 279, 355; Joseph S. Roucek, Contemporary Roumania 
and Her Problem (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1932),
p . 141.
-’Zolt&i SzAz, "The Transylvanian Question: Romania and the
Belligerents July-October 1914," Journal of Central European Affairs, 
XXIII (Jan., 1954), 345.
^Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," p. 237.
/This unwillingness to compromise was also accentuated by the 
fact that the two countries often received backing from great powers 
opposed to one another (e.g., Italy versus France).
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
2 8
Yet, in the dispute over both areas, the concerned countries 
have put forward arguments which ignore power and stress other motives 
such as historical ties, justice, economic and geographic realism, or 
the desire to liberate fellow countrymen. While these considerations 
may also have been important in motivating the respective countries to 
compete for these areas, it has been considerations of power that have 
determined the outcome between the disputants. This is demonstrated in 
the way Transylvania and the Vojvodina have changed hands among the 
nations competing for their possession.
Transylvania's destiny was guided by Hungary from 895 to 1541 
and 1867 to 1918. During these periods preponderant power was on the 
side of Hungary. However, when Turkish (1541-1594, 1610-1698) and 
Habsburg (1594-1610, 1699-1867) power invaded the Carpathian Basin, 
Transylvania led a more or less independent existence, under Hungarian 
leaders, who acknowledged the "guardianship" at one time of the Otto­
man Empire, at another time that of the Habsburgs.® In 1918 the 
Rumanians obtained preponderant power in the form of Entente support.
With this backing they gained control of Transylvania and ruled it 
9until 1940. Then Hungary gained power (Italian support) and the
O°The dates given here are not above dispute. However, they do 
provide a simplified chronology of the power shifts in the Carpathian 
Basin. The nature of Hungarian influence in these periods is skill­
fully summarized by Eugene Horvath, Transylvania and the History of the 
Roumanians (Budapest: The Sarkdny Printing Company Ltd., 1935), pp.
30-64. Charles Upson Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania1s Case [n.p.; 
n.n., 1941], p. 12, disagrees with Horvath's presentation.
^Robert Joseph Kerner and Harry Nicholas Howard, The Balkan 
Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930-1935 (Berkeley, Calif.: 
University of California Press, 1936), pp. 36, 126, inadvertantly
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northern two-fifths of Transylvania was r e t u r n e d . A f t e r  the collapse 
of Hungary's basis of power, Rumania gained possession of Transylvania 
through Allied intercession.^
In the case of the Vojvodina's ownership, the decisive role of 
power is also apparent. Hungary controlled the destiny of this area 
from 895 (when the Magyars entered the Carpathian Basin) until 1526, 
when the Turks defeated the Hungarians at the Battle of Mohacs. Hungary 
also controlled the area from 1867 (after reaching the Ausgleich with 
Austria) until 1918, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed under 
the weight of defeat in World War 1 . ^  From 1526 to 1698 the Turks 
ruled the area. They in turn, were replaced as overlords by the Habs- 
burgs, who converted the area into a "military frontier" zone, and
disclose the great interest of France in an alliance system which out­
flanks German power. This is also evident in the description of the 
Treaty of Trianon preparations in Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian 
Frontiers Were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, VI (April, 1928), 434.
^•^Kerner, The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930- 
1935, pp. 130-31, 163; Nicholas Kallay, Hungarian Premier (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 56. Kallay emphatically maintains 
that Italian rather than German assistance was responsible for Hungary's 
improved power position (in this case referring to the Second Vienna 
Award).
•^In this case the support came mainly from the Soviet Union.
See Amelia C. Leiss and Raymond Dennett (Eds.), European Peace Treaties 
After World War II (Worcester, Mass.: The Commonwealth Press, 1954),
p . 102.
■^Z.A.B. Zeman, The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire 1914-1918 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 244.
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13ruled it directly from 1698 to 1867. In 1918, the birth of the King­
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and the intercession of the Entente, 
placed the Vojvodina under "Yugoslav" jurisdiction.^ In 1941 Hungary 
again regained some of the Vojvodina after Yugoslavia suffered defeat 
at the hands of the Axis. However, Hungary had to relinquish these gains 
after Russian armies defeated her in turn, in 1945.^
From the foregoing, it is apparent that appeals to justice, 
freedom, etc., have been of little consequence in determining the fate 
of Transylvania and the Vojvodina. Power, and power alone, will decide 
in the future— as it has in the past— to whom Transylvania and the 
Vojvodina will belong. At present, power is obviously on the side of 
Rumania and Yugoslavia.
II. The Two Disputed Areas
Underlying the changes in ownership which are reflected in the 
history— particularly the recent history— of Transylvania and the
•^Actually the military "zone" was not completely dissolved 
until 1881. However, after 1867, Hungary dominated the area politi­
cally. See Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Military Border of Croatia 1740- 
1881 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 167-196.
■^Although officially Yugoslavia was called the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until 1929, in this study "Yugoslavia" will 
also designate the pre-1929 Kingdom.
•^For this confused period of Hungarian-Yugoslavian relations 
the thoroughest and most objective discussions are in C. A. Macartney, 
October Fifteenth; A History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945 (Second Ed.; 
Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University Press, 1961), Vol. I, pp. 344-48,
385-86, 442-75, Vol. II, pp. 4-13.
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Vojvodina, are their geographic location, their economic potential and 
their constantly changing ethnic make-up. Before proceeding to the 
discussion of pre-Communist nationalities policies in these areas, a 
brief examination devoted to their material and human composition is 
in order.
Both Transylvania and the Vojvodina are integral parts of the 
Carpathian Basin. As such, they were outside the Balkans, strictly 
speaking, until World War I. Then, they were both attached to two 
Balkan states, thereby also extending the "Balkans" farther northward, 
into the Carpathian Basin. Or, to put it more simply, geographically 
both areas still remain outside the Balkans. Politically, on the other 
hand, their destinies, since the end of World War I, have be.en tied to 
that of Rumania and Yugoslavia— two Balkan states. This, of course, 
does not change the geographic fact, that both Transylvania and the 
Vojvodina are really already part of Central Europe. ^  Nor does it 
change the consideration, that as part of Central Europe, their history 
and culture has been under different influences from those which molded 
the countries of which they have now become extensions.
1 fi°As with other designations like "Central Europe," or "Northern 
Europe," there is little agreement over the exact limits of the "Balkans." 
Possibly the best way to define its northern limits is to take into 
account the designation's historical usage, the approximate boundary 
between Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic predominance, and the major 
geographic features which correspond to these other considerations. This 
would place the Balkans south of the Sava and Danube rivers (moving 
eastward from the Adriatic Sea) as far as the Iron Gates. From this 
point eastward, the Transylvanian Alps provide the dividing line. For 
a discussion of this question also see Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in 
Our Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 7-24.
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Transylvania
As Figure I indicates in the Prologue Transylvania occupies the
eastern end of the Carpathian Basin.^ Both Rumanians and Hungarians
maintain that Transylvania is a geographic entity--a natural fortress—
18which played an important part in their respective histories. The
Rumanians, basing their arguments on the "Daco-Roman" presupposition 
19maintain, that Transylvania was the cradle where the Rumanian people
20came into existence and where they were able to grow strong. The
■^Teleli, "Transylvania's Situation in Hungary and in Europe," 
pp. 244-45.
•*-®Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 251, gives a good 
description of Transylvania s physical and topographic features.
l^The "Daco-Roman" presupposition provides the basis for the 
Rumanian claim to prior settlement of Transylvania. Briefly, the 
Rumanians claim that they are the descendants of Romans and Dacians who 
came into contact with one another in the third century after Christ.
At this time Emperor Trajan had successfully subjugated the Dacians. A 
hundred years of Roman rule followed, which according to the Rumanians, 
also entailed intermixture with the Dacians. Consequently, when the 
Roman legions were withdrawn from the area to defend the Empire against 
Barbarian invasions, they left behind many of their progeny. The con­
sideration that makes this thesis doubtful--or hypothetical at least— is 
that there are no historical records of "Rumanians" (i.e., Wallachians) 
living in Transylvania until almost a thousand years later, when they 
appear in Hungarian documents. Even the name "Rumanian" is only a 19th 
century designation for them. Prior to the union of Moldavia and 
Wallachia in 1859, they were known as Wallachs or Wallachians. For the 
Rumanian side of this controversy see Roucek, Contemporary Rumania and 
Her Problems, pp. 3-6; Walter Hoffmann, Rumfinien Von Heute (Leipzig: 
Felix Meiner, 1942), pp. 32-35; and the Communist Rumanian reassertion 
of this claim by Constantin Daicoviciu and others, Rumania (Bucharest: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), pp. 92ff. For the Hungarian 
side see Eugene Horvath, Transylvania and the History of the Roumanians, 
pp., 5-16. For more detached opinions consult Macartney, Hungary and Her 
Successors, pp. 256ff; Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Rumanian Nationalism," The 
Annals, No. 232 (March, 1944), pp. 86-87.
20syivius Dragomir, The Ethnical Minorities in Transylvania 
(Geneva: Sonor Printing Co., 1927), p. 18, maintains this also. The
Hungarians deny that Transylvania was occupied by the "Rumanians" when
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Hungarians maintain that Transylvania has been the keystone of their 
own nation's thousand year existence in the Carpathian Basin. Take away 
Transylvania, the Magyars contend, and you destroy the unity and 
strength of the Carpathian Basin as a defensive system.^
In the past, considerations of defense and strategy were, per-
ophaps, most important in the struggle for Transylvania. More recently, 
considerations of the area's topography, its hydrographic network, its 
size and its natural resources have become just as important.
Transylvania (including the Crisana, Maramures and part of the 
Banat) is 39,903 square miles (102,787 square kilometres) in size.^3 
Since this area varies in its topography, historical Transylvania will 
be described separately from the other three areas now attached to it.
they settled the area; they do not deny that the Rumanians grew strong 
there. In fact, they stress that it was Hungarian rule that enabled 
Rumanians to develop their own culture in Transylvania in safety from 
Turkish attacks. Along this line, see Andrew Fall, Hungary's Right to 
Transylvania (Budapest: Sarkany Printing Company, Ltd., 1941), p. 54.
^Teleki, "Transylvania's situation in Hungary and in Europe," 
pp. 244-45; Stefan T. Possony, "Political and Military Geography of 
Central, Balkan, and Eastern Europe," The Annals, No. 232 (March, 1944), 
p. 5.
22John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (Paper­
back ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 96ff., indi­
cates some of the reasons for the decline of strategic considerations.
In his chapter entitled "The Decline of the Territorial State," he 
maintains that geographic boundaries are no longer as significant as in 
the past because they can be bypassed or made useless through air war, 
atomic war, ideological-political penetration and economic blockade.
The Territorial state, to use his word, has become "permeable."
2 qKallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 44.
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While Transylvania is in many ways a "natural fortress" on its 
own (this gave it the ability to preserve a certain amount of local 
autonomy in the past), it is still an integral part of the whole 
Carpathian system. This is particularly evident in the watershed line 
on the crest of the Carpathians and in the resultant hydrographic net­
work of the whole area. Thus, the Eastern Carpathians separate Tran­
sylvania from Moldavia and the Bukovina, while toward the south, the 
Transylvanian Alps separate it from Wallachia (today divided into 
Muntenia and Oltenia). Toward the west, its boundary is the less im­
posing "Island Mountain District," which separates it from the Crisana 
(Partium) and the Hungarian Puszta (lowlands or plains).^ Within this 
mountain enclosed area is the scenic Transylvanian Plateau. ^
Located between Hungary and the "Island Mountain District" are 
the areas of the Banat to the southwest (from Transylvania), Crisana to 
the west and Maramures to the north. The Banat and the Crisana are 
extensions of the Hungarian Puszta which slowly merge with the mountains 
toward the east. The Maramures is a somewhat more mountainous area 
which gives rise to the important river Tisza flowing into Hungary. 
Consequently, both the direction of rivers flowing through them and
^^Teleki, "Transylvania’s Situation in Hungary and in Europe," 
pp. 248-49.
o cJSome good descriptions of Transylvania can be found in 
Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 92ff., and J. Theodore Marriner, "Transylvania 
and Its Seven Castles," The National Geographic Magazine. XLIX (Mar., 
1926), 319-52. However, both these sources are biased, and the latter 
is also misinformed in the discussion of political questions as well 
as the history of the area.
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the absence of insurmountable mountains, gives all three of these areas
easy access westward.^
The direction of the rivers demonstrates even more forcefully
than the area's mountain ranges why Transylvania has oriented westward
in past history, rather than eastward or southward. The entire hydro-
graphic network of Transylvania, with the exception of only one river
(the Olt), is directed toward the west, where they empty into the Tisza
2 7in Hungary or the Danube in present-day Yugoslavia. Only the Olt 
crosses the Carpathians southward to join the Danube in Muntenia. This 
has great consequences for any system of communications. For while it 
is relatively easy to reach the Hungarian Puszta from Transylvania, it 
is more difficult to reach Moldavia or Wallachia because of the immense 
geographic barrier of the Carpathians.28
^Teleki, "Transylvania's Situation in Hungary and in Europe," 
pp. 248-49.
^ J e a n  Gottmann, "Geography and International Relations," in 
Politics and Geographic Relationships, Ed. W. A. Douglas Jackson 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 24-25, indi­
cates the conflict causing potential of shared hydrographic networks.
He shows how the conflicting interests of up- versus down-stream 
possessors can lead to constant friction. He observes on p. 25, that: 
"The unity of hydrographic basins seems to have been emphasized more 
recently in politics. This emphasis may be linked to the greater use 
which modern civilization makes of rivers— pumping up more water for 
ubran and industrial needs and harnessing streams for power production."
OOThis statement should be qualified, however, by the fact that 
the distance between south-eastern Transylvania and Bucharest is shorter 
than the distance between Budapest and the same area. Thus, if the 
communications systems improve (roads and railroads particularly) this 
factor will no longer be of great importance for south-eastern Tran­
sylvania. For western and north-western Transylvania it will still 
present a great obstacle.
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Rumania is determined to overcome these geographic obstacles, 
since ownership of Transylvania provides it with great economic wealth. 
The area is rich in natural resources of all kinds. It has extensive 
timberlands and fine farm-lands for corn and other cereals, as well as 
for orchards and vineyards. It is also rich in grazing lands. Further­
more, it is blessed with a wealth of mineral deposits of all sorts,
OQincluding coal, iron, gold, silver, salt and natural gasses. v These 
minerals plus the potential power of Transylvania's rivers enable the
O f ]possessor state to develop a substantial industry. u Both Rumania and 
Hungary have, therefore, a great interest in the area, as its ownership 
confers security, wealth and power.
Until very recently, Transylvania's economic features were more 
stable than its ethnic composition. The latter has always been at the 
mercy of historical circumstances. During Transylvania's long and
O 1colorful past, its demography has undergone great changes. As had 
been mentioned earlier, the Turkish occupation of Hungary, followed by 
Austrian hegemony, drastically altered its ethnic composition. While 
at the end of the 15th century the area was overwhelmingly Magyar
^George H. Bossy, "Mining," in Romania, Ed. Stephen Fischer- 
Galati (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 232-47.
■^George H. Bossy,'Industry," Ibid., pp. 280-85.
^^Stefan T. Possony, "Political and Military Geography of Central, 
Balkan and Eastern Europe," pp. 3-4, states that: "Differential birth
rates have been of extreme importance during the whole course of central 
and eastern European history, as they are the fundamental cause of the 
incessant change in the power position of nations. We know little about 
vital statistics of former times, but it is certain that some eastern 
European peoples, such as the Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians, 
once had a 'larger' population than today, comparatively speaking."
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(75-80%) by the end of the 18th, the Magyars composed less than 50% of 
the population.32 This radical change was a result of the phenomenal 
decimation of the Magyar population in the struggle against the Turks, 
as well as of the subsequent Habsburg policy of colonizing the depopulated
OOand war devastated areas with non-Magyars. The non-Magyar composition 
of certain areas of the country was also enhanced by a less systematic 
and artificial process, the great influx of refugees from Turkish 
oppression. Most of these refugees settled in Transylvania and Southern 
Hungary (i.e., the present Vojvodina).
Following the Turkish retreat from Central Europe, the most far- 
reaching changes in demographic structure were to be found in Transyl­
vania and the V o j v o d i n a . 34 jn Transylvania the Rumanians now composed 
a greater sector of the population than all three of the historic
3^See Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 57; Macartney, Hungary and 
Her Successors, pp. 9**10; Francis S. Wagner, "Szechenyi and the Nation­
ality Problem in the Habsburg Empire," Journal of Central European 
Affairs, XX (Oct., 1960), 294, footnote 17. Peter F. Sugar, "The Rise 
of Nationalism in the Habsburg Empire," Austrian History Yearbook, III, 
Part 1 (1967), p. 112, maintains that in 1787 the proportion of the 
Magyars was as low as 29 per cent.
09JJC. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe 
(London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1962), p. 3; C. A. Macartney,
National States and National Minorities (London: Oxford University
Press, 1934), p. 89.
^^Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 9-12, indicates 
these changes. On p. 9, he states: "The Turks not only made havoc of
Hungary's civilization; but the brunt of their attack and subsequent 
occupation fell full upon the unprotected central plains which were the 
stronghold of the Magyar population, the German, Slavonic, and Rou­
manian areas of the periphery escaping far more lightly. They thus 
altered the balance of the population . . .  to the disadvantage of the 
Magyars."
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
3 8
35"nationalities" combined. To this day the Rumanians have maintained 
their numerical majority in the area. However, this is only part of the 
story. For even if Rumanians compose the over-all majority, many 
geographic subdivisions of Transylvania are in turn overwhelmingly 
Magyar or German. This is the case in the border strip adjacent to 
present-day Hungary and the Szdkely districts in the eastern corner of 
the province.^
For the evaluation of the recent ethnic composition of Tran­
sylvania, three important--and a number of lesser--census results are 
available. The three most frequently cited census results are those of 
1910, 1930 and 1956. The first was taken while Transylvania was still 
under Hungarian jurisdiction, the second was taken under Rumanian
jurisdiction in the interwar period, and the last was taken under the
3 7present Communist Rumanian regime. While each one of these statis­
tical sources is biased in one way or another, it is possible to get a 
fairly good idea of the present ethnic composition of Transylvania by 
referring to all three of them. Table I presents the population of 
Rumania and Transylvania according to these, as well as some less often 
cited, census results.
•^The historic "nationalities" of Transylvania were the Magyars, 
Saxons, and Szdkelys (a people akin to the Magyars who occupy the eastern 
corner of the area).
36]tfacartney, National States and National Minorities, pp. 521- 
26; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 353-54.
37Each of these census returns has limitations; that of 1910 
because it was carried out under the auspices of a Magyarizing govern­
ment; that of 1930 because it was carried out under the auspices of a 
Rumanizing government; that of 1956 because it was carried out under a 
Communist government.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
3 9
TABLE I
THE POPULATION OF RUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA ACCORDING 
TO NATIONALITY (IN THOUSANDS)3
Nationality^ 1910 1920 1930 1948 1956 1966e
• • • . Transylvania0 . . • •
Rumanians 2,830 2,930 3,208 3,752 4,081 -----
Hungarians 1,664 1,306 1,353 1,482 1,616 -----
Germans 565 539 544 331 372 -----
Jews 182 181 178 30 30 -----
Others 201 337 444 197 170 -----
Total 5,260 5,112 5,549 5,792 6,232 6,737*
• • . . Rumania^. . . •
Rumanians 10,524 13,186 11,360 13,598 15,081 16,781*
Hungarians 1,823 1,362 1,553 1,500 1,654 1,603
Germans 829 593 636 344 395 377
Jews 820 873 260 139 34 -----
Ukrainians 1,032 576 45 38 68 -----
Bulgarians 340 261 64 14 13 -----
Turks 222 174 43* 29* 35* --
Slovaks & Czechs 25 32. 42 35 25 -----
Yugoslavs 66 53 47 45 43 -----
Tatars 32 35 — g — -g — g -----
Gypsies ___f ___f 90 53 67 --
Others 126 133 141 78 74 345
Total 15,723 17,641 14,281 15,873 17,489 19,105
aThis Table has been compiled on the basis of data obtained from 
Anuarul Statistic A1 R.P.R. 1963, Tables 16 and 17, pp. 88-89; Recensa- 
mintul Populatiei Din Zi Februarie 1956; Rezultate Generale. Tables 10, 
11, and 12, pp. XlXrXX; The Mid-European Research Institute (ed.) 
"Statistical Studies on the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe: 1867-
1967," [unpublished manuscript]; and Andras Ronai, "Romania Neprajzi 
Viszonyai," Foldrajzi Kozlemenyek. LXVIII (1940), 86-109.
bln this Table "nationality" means either the declared nation­
ality or the mother tongue of the respondent. The two have not been 
separated, since some of the censuses were based solely on declared 
nationality, while others have been based solely on mother tongue, and 
still others on both. The census data for 1910, 1930, 1948, and 1956, 
used in this Table are based on mother tongue.
cIncluding Maramures, Crisana, and the eastern half of the Banat.
^The statistics for 1910 and 1920 refer to the area of Rumania
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What the data of Table I fails to show is the distribution of 
the various nationalities geographically. To find out where the Magyars 
or Germans are strongest it is necessary to examine the area's popula­
tion statistics on the regional, or county level. An examination of this 
sort reveals that the western parts of the Crisana, Banat, and Maramures 
have a heavy Magyar population. As has already been noted, this makes 
the Rumanian border strip adjacent to Hungary, predominantly Magyar in 
population.
in the inter-war years. The statistics of 1930, 1948, 1956, and 1966, 
refer to the reduced area of present-day Rumania.
eComplete data for the 1966 census is not yet available. The 
statistics for 1966 in this Table are based on "Communigue on the 
Preliminary Results of the Population and Housing Census of March 15, 
1966," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania. No. 18 (Oct.
15, 1966), pp. 15-16.
^In this Table the Gypsies have been placed under the "other" 
category for the 1910 and 1920 censuses.
^For the 1930, 1948, and 1956 censuses, this Table enumerates 
the Tartars and Turks together.
OQJOPro-Rumanian writers try to blur this fact by using only abso­
lute figures for entire regions. They almost never break down the 
statistics to the "plasa" level (interwar administrative equivalent of 
the "judet" or county). See for example Roucek, Contemporary Roumania 
and Her Problems, pp. 186-97; Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania1s Case, 
p. 19; Pavel Pavel, Transylvania at the Peace Conference of Paris 
(London: Love and Malcomson Ltd., 1945), pp. 5-6; Alfred Malaschofsky,
Rum&nien (Berlin: Junker and Dunnhaupt Verlag, 1943), pp. 35-39. Only
in Roumania at the Peace Conference: Paris 1946 (Switzerland: Rumanian
Government Publication, 1946), pp. 76-78, are the statistics broken down 
to the "plasa" level. However, in this case two misleading factors are 
emphasized: (1) that the Magyars only have a relative majority
(plurality) in the border strip, and (2 ) that the other nationality 
groups living there would not favor Magyar rule. The latter contention 
ignores the fact that many of these "nationalities" are Magyarized 
Swabians and Jews who consider themselves to be Magyars regardless of 
how the Rumanians classify them.
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Other areas where the non-Rumanian elements are strong are the 
cities, the old "Saxon" and the more recent Swabian settlements, and 
the compact Magyar-Szdkely area in the eastern corner of Transylvania. 
Until recently, the Jewish settlements in the Maramures were not incon­
siderable. But there are innumerable other settlements of Jews, Germans 
and Hungarians scattered throughout the whole of Transylvania. In the 
western Banat, besides Germans and Hungarians there are also many Serbs.
In general, the Hungarians and Germans inhabit the river valleys and 
the lowlands, while the Rumanians compose the bulk of the population in 
the mountainous areas, and the Jews form an important segment of some
OQcity populations. ^
Since World War II, some changes have taken place in the ranks
of the non-Rumanian ethnic groups, particularly among the Germans and 
40the Jews. These changes were due to the dislocations of the war,
including deportations, territorial transfers and exterminations. The
net result of these changes has been to leave only the Hungarians as a
41strong minority (although they too have been weakened), and to accen­
tuate the predominant role of the Rumanians.
■^Dragomir, The Ethnical Minorities of Transylvania. p. 40; 
Macartney, National States and National Minorities, pp. 521-26.
^^Regarding the classification of Jews in the census of 1910,
1930, and 1956, it must be noted that the latter two place them in an 
ethnic category. This was not the case in the census of 1910. Accord­
ing to this early census a Jew could designate— on the basis of 
preference— what nationality he belonged to; only on religious grounds 
was he differentiated in statistics. The Rumanians have placed the Jews 
in a separate category in order to weaken the statistics of the Magyars, 
for in the past the Jews have on most occasions opted for that nationality.
^Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, pp. 346-47; Reuben H.
Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston; Meador Publishing 
Company, 1949), pp. 513-l4.
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The Jewish ethnic group suffered greatly during the war years.
At this time the Iron Guardists and the Antonescu dictatorship carried
to fulfillment the Nazi "solution" of the Jewish problem.^ Besides
outright extermination, the Jews also diminished in proportion to the
other minorities as a result of the cession of Bessarabia and Eukovina
to the U.S.S.R. and Dobruja to Bulgaria. More recently their numbers
have been further reduced by emigration to Israel.
In terms of percentages, the Germans were the greatest losers.
Their losses came mostly during the closing phase of World War II and
during the early post-war years.^ These losses were of various kinds.
44War losses took their toll among the male population. Deportations 
to Russia were responsible for a further reduction of the Germans.^ 
But, perhaps, the greatest reductions came when Hitler transferred 
Rumanian Germans to newly conquered areas in Poland and Czechoslovakia
42por the pre-war development of the problem see Oscar I. 
Janowsky, People at Bay; The Jewish Problem in East-Central Europe 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 68-71. For post-war
changes see sources in Randolph L. Braham, Jews in the Communist World;
A Bibliography 1945-1960 (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1961),
pp. 30-32.
^Theodor Schieder (ed.), The Expulsion of the German Population 
from Hungary and Rumania (A Selection and Translation from Dokumentation 
Per Vertreibung Per Deutschen Aus Ost-Mitteleuropa; Bonn: The Federal
Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1961), III, 42.
44Ibid., pp, 61-62.
45Ibid., pp. 78-79, 80-82; Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet 
Yoke, p. 410; Cornish, Transylvania, the Land Beyond the Forest, 
p . 148.
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as colonists. Later, these "colonists" suffered immense losses when 
the Poles and Czechs re-asserted their rule following the German 
collapse
Other ethnic minorities like the Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Tatars 
and Turks were also reduced in significance. These reductions came with 
the cessions of Bukovina. Bessarabia and Dobruja. Unlike the Germans 
and the Jews, however, these other minority reductions did not greatly 
affect the minority situation in Transylvania. But it did eliminate the 
problem posed by these lesser minorities. Consequently, it left the 
Rumanian regime more time to concentrate attention on its greatest
AOminority problem— the Magyars of Transylvania. °
The Vojvodina
Directly west, south-west, of Transylvania lies the Vojvodina.
The border between these two areas runs from north to south, dividing 
into two unequal parts the former Banat. This is why both Transylvania 
and the Vojvodina possess parts which are called the Banat. In
^Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, 347; Schieder, The Expulsion 
of the German Population from Hungary and Rumania, III, 49-50, 54-55.
In this same source also see Annex 6 and 7, pp. 136-47.
^ I b i d ., pp. 55, 96.
^Leszek Kosinski, "Changes in the Ethnic Structure in Countries 
of East-Central Europe," A Paper Presented at Louisiana State University, 
Feb. 29, 1968, as the first in a series of lectures devoted to East- 
Central Europe, sponsored by the Department of Geography and Anthro­
pology. In this paper Kosinski indicated that not only in Rumania, but 
in all of East-Central Europe, the Hungarians remain as the largest 
minority ethnic group.
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Transylvania the Banat refers to its westernmost territories, while in 
the Vojvodina it refers to its easternmost territories.^
Geographically the Vojvodina is an extension of the great Hun­
garian puszta (lowlands) which lies at the center of the Carpathian 
Basin. More precisely, it is the southernmost extension of these low­
lands. Because it is part of this greater plain, its history has 
usually been determined directly by the people who controlled the 
Carpathian Basin as a whole. Unlike Transylvania, it does not possess 
mountain barriers for frontiers. Both toward Rumania and Hungary it is 
an open plain. It possesses natural frontiers only in the south and 
the west, where the Danube performs this role.*’® Because the Vojvodina 
is such an exposed area, it has never had any autonomy that would be 
comparable to the past autonomy of Transylvania.^^-
In every respect, the Vojvodina is characterized more by acces­
sibility than by isolation or seclusion. It is "a region of wide valley 
basins, alluvial plains, sandy dune areas and crystalline hills covered
C Owith fertile loess." The entire region is dominated by the large 
rivers which are the most conspicuous features of the landscape. These
^ S e e  maps in Prologue, pp. 5-7.
■*®For a good discussion of this area from a geographic perspec­
tive see Jugoslavia; Physical Geography (B. R. 493, Geographical Hand­
book Series; Great Britain; Naval Intelligence Division, 1944), I, 
35-42; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 380-81.
^Ibid., pp. 382-90, 395-403; Jugoslavia: History, Peoples and
Administration ( B.R. 493A, Geographical Handbook Series; Great Britain: 
Naval Intelligence Division, 1944), II, 70-77, 177-79.
5 2J George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New 
Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 16.
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s ̂rivers divide the Vojvodina into its three component parts. Farthest
to the west, the Darda triangle (Baranya) is wedged in between the Drave
and the Danube. In the center, the Badka (Bacska) has the Danube as its
western and southern boundry and the Tisza as its eastern boundary. In
the east, across the Tisza, is the Banat.
The Vojvodina is predominantly an agricultural area. In the
Banat a great deal of land has been re-claimed through re-forestation
during the past 150 years. In the Badka a great deal has been reclaimed
by draining the marshes and by building canals. As a whole, the area
s spossesses only limited resources for industrial growth. Consequently, 
the industry that exf.sts is geared to the processing of agricultural 
goods. This includes mills, distilleries and processing plants, which 
are concerned primarily with canning, sugar refining, alcohol making 
and flour milling. Maize and wheat are the principal cereals of the
i;q-'■'Although the present-day administrative area of the Vojvodina 
includes the Srem and excludes the Baranya, in the present context the 
Baranya will be considered as part of it. Historical, ethnic and geo­
graphic considerations support such an inclusion. Furthermore, most 
past studies of the Vojvodina have included the Baranya in it. Thus, 
continuity of scholarship also supports its inclusion. As opposed to 
this, past studies have not always considered the Srem as part of the 
Vojvodina. See Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 380-81; 
Jugoslavia: History, Peoples and Administration, pp. 70-77.
-’̂ Ibid.; Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 16-17.
-’•’Minerals in the strict sense are almost completely non­
existent. In the Fruska Gora mountains there is some low grade coal 
and also some quarz sand for glass manufacturing, but aside from some 
very limited oil deposits in the Banat near the Rumanian border, there 
is nothing else. Ibid., p. 17.
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area, but sunflower and beets are also important crops. Animal husbandry 
and fishing is also wide-spread. In short, the Vojvodina has become 
Yugoslavia's chief food-producing region, just as it had been Hungary's 
prior to World War 1 .-^
Ethnically the Vojvodina has been, and is, even more diverse 
than Transylvania, although it is a much smaller area with a much smaller 
population. Table II indicates the ethnic composition of both Yugo­
slavia and the Vojvodina. The diversity presented by this table does 
not give a complete picture of the entangled nature of the area's 
ethnic settlement. As Macartney notes:
No words can, unfortunately, do justice to the distribution 
of the population. The Rumanians are mostly to be found in the 
east, the Magyars are strongest in the north, the Serbs in the 
south: but the three intermingle hopelessly, a wedge of Serbian 
settlements pushing in one place far northward, while Magyar 
advanced posts run to its right and left well to the south, and 
outlying Magyar islets are found, even in the countryside, in 
the extreme south, as well as in all the towns. The Sokac and 
Bunyevac settlements are near the northern frontier, islands in 
a non-Slavonic sea, the Slovaks and Ruthenes are rather farther 
south. The Germans are everywhere. The distribution can be 
appreciated, if at all, only from the map, and the reason for 
it can be learnt only from history. ^
Stefan Possony points out that the demographic make-up of East- 
Central Europe has reflected the political rise and decline of certain
56Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 380-81; Jugoslavia: 
Economic Geography, Ports and Communications (B.R. 493B, Geographical 
Handbook Series; Great Britain; Naval Intelligence Division, 1945),
III, 11-14, 164-67, 202, 212-17.
“̂ Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 381. This quote is 
now dated, since the German minority has been almost completely elimi­
nated. Still, it provides some insight into the ethnic mixture of the 
area.
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TABLE II
THE POPULATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE VOJVODINA 
ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY (IN THOUSANDS)3
Nationality^ 1910*** 1921*** 1931*** 1948 1953 1961
Serbs
• • • •
382)
The Vojvodinac . .
462 841 874 1,018
Croats 7) 502 16 134 128 145
Bunjevci & Sokci 63) 68 --
Slovenes -- 7 8 7 6 6
Macedonians -- -- -- 9 12 15
Montenegrins -- -- -- 31 31 35
Muslims -- -- -- 1 -- 2
Unspecified
Yugoslavs ___d _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — mm 11 3
Germans 301 317 317 32 35 --
Albanians -- -- -- 0 1 2
Hungarians 422 376 386 429 435 443
Turks ---d -- ri -- d 0 0 1Slovaks 58 65 71 72 73 74
Italians -- -- -- 0 0 0
Rumanians 76 70 72 59 57 57
Bulgarians d -- -- 4 4 4Czechs — — — -- -- 4 3 3
Others 12 9 16 40 41 48








Croats -- 3,200 3,529 3,784 3,976 4,294
Slovenes -- 1,025 1,222 1,415 1,487 1,589
Macedonians -- 750 780 810 893 1,046
Montenegrins -- 380 400 426 466 514
Muslims -- -- -- 809 -- 973
Unspecified
Yugoslavs _ at « » _ _ _ _ _ mm'm, — 999 317
Germans -- 513 496 55 54 53
Albanians -- 442 759 750 754 915
Hungarians -- 472 466 496 502 504
Turks -- 150 165 98 260 183
Slovaks -- 81 82 84 85 86
Italians -- 130. 150. 80 36 26
Rumanians -- 129 135* 64 60 61
Bulgarians -- 65 64 61 62 63
Czechs -- 34 38 39 35 30
Others -- -- -- 308 257 143
Total — — — 12,317 13,934 15,772 16,937 18,549
aThis Table has been compiled on the basis of data obtained 
from Jugoslavia: History, Peoples and Administration, p. 76; Schieder
(ed.), Das Schicksal Per Deutschen in Jugoslawien in Dokumentation
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nationalities.-*® This is especially true for the present northern parts 
of Yugoslavia, where vast demographic changes have signalled the rise 
and fall of peoples. It can be said that the Vojvodina's present ethnic 
composition is the consequence of the dominant role played there by
Per Vertreibung Per Peutschen Aus Ost-Mitteleuropa Band V, p. H E ;  
Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, Table 3-1, p. 29; Elemer 
Homonnay, "A P6lmagyarorsz^gi Teriiletek Nemzetisdgi Megoszlasa Az 
1948 - As Jugoszlav N^pszamlalas Adatai Szerint," Larmafa, X, No. 3, 
(1963), pp. 19-40; The Mid-European Research Institute (ed.), 
"Statistical Studies on the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe: 
1867-1967," [unpublished manuscript]; and Jugoslavia 1945-1964: 
Statisticki Pregled, Table 3-13, p. 45.
®In this Table "nationality" means either the declared nation­
ality or the mother tongue of the respondent. The two have not been 
separated, since some of the censuses were based solely on declared 
nationality, while others have been based solely on mother tongue.
cThe 1910, 1921, 1931 statistics of the Vojvodina pertain to 
the Badka, Banat and Baranya, whereas the post-war statistics of 1948, 
1953, 1961, pertain to the Badka, Banat and the Srem. This different 
territorial basis of the pre- and post-war statistics, accounts, in 
part, for the doubling of the Serbian population.
^In the 1910, 1921, and 1931 statistics for the Vojvodina, 
Czechs and Slovaks were enumerated together. All "unspecified" Slavs 
were enumerated together with the Serbs, Croats or the Slovaks.
Under "Other," the present Table includes mainly Gypsies.
eSince Yugoslavia is only a post-World War I creation, it has 
not been possible to ascertain its ethnic composition for 1910. The 
data for 1921 and 1931 refer to its inter-war area, while the 1948, 
1953, 1961, statistics refer to the enlarged area of present-day 
Yugoslavia.
■̂ In the 1921 and 1931 censuses for Yugoslavia, Rumanians and 
Vlachs were enumerated together. Post-World War II censuses have 
enumerated them separately.
COJ See footnote 31 above.
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Magyars, Turks, Serbs and Austrians during the past three hundred 
59years.J 7
Until the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, the area's population was 
predominantly M a g y a r E v e n  Belgrade (called Nandorfehervcir by the 
Magyars) was for a long time a Hungarian fortress. But the Turkish 
victory over the Hungarians at Mohacs led to a drastic ethnic change 
in what was then southern Hungary. Turkish depredations completely 
depopulated and devastated the area. Only after the ascendancy of 
Habsburg Austria did the area regain some of its population. However, 
the ethnic make-up of this new population was no longer predominantly 
Magyar. It had become mainly Serbian and German.
The Habsburg policy for this area was motivated by considera­
tions of defense as well as empire. It involved a re-colonization 
scheme that would provide an effective defense against the Turks, while 
at the same time it would strengthen Austrian hegemony within the 
empire. Habsburg policy favored Serbian and German colonists rather 
than Hungarians due to the potentially disruptive capacity of the
-̂ Jugoslavia; History. Peoples and Administration, pp. 70-77. 
Of all the peoples that have made history in this area, only the Turks 
failed to leave behind a minority of their own.
6°Ibid., p. 70.
61The re-population of the area by "soldier colonists" of Serb 
and German ethnic background receives extensive treatment in Rothen- 
berg, The Military Border of Croatia 1740-1881, pp. 6-17; Wayne S. 
Vucinich, "The Serbs in Austria-Hungary," Austrian History Yearbook, 
III, part 2 (1967), 8-17.
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6 2latter. Consequently, the population of the present-day Vojvodina 
became a patchwork of different nationalities, with the Serbs and 
Germans becoming particularly important. However, by the end of the 
18th century the Magyars again began to re-populate the area. Magyars 
filled up especially those areas which had recently been re-claimed 
through the drainage of swamps. Thus, when the Treaty of Trianon dis­
membered Hungary, the Vojvodina reflected a rough parity in population 
of South Slavs, Germans and Hungarians.^3
This three-way ethnic balance was upset by World War I I . ^  in 
the closing year of the war and immediately after the close of hostili­
ties, about 445,000 Volksdeutsche were expelled from Y u g o s l a v i a .65 
The majority of these Germans had been living in the Vojvodina. About 
40,000 Magyars were also exchanged at this time for an equal number of 
Serbs and Croats living in Hungary. The expulsion of these minorities 
opened the way for a new emigration of South Slavs to the Vojvodina. 
These changes have led to a completely new ethnic set-up in the area.
62por a time the Magyars were even officially banned from 
settling in the Vojvodina. See Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, 
p. 384.
63See Table II.
A AActually the ethnic balance was already eroded by Serbian 
inter-war policies which encouraged more South Slavs to move to the 
Vojvodina. This earlier shift can be seen in Macartney, Hungary and 
Her Successors, pp. 435-37.
^Theodor Schieder (ed.) Das Schicksal Per Deutschen in 
Jugoslawien (Dokumentation Per Vertreibung Per Deutschen Aus Ost- 
Mitteleuropa; Bonn: The Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and
War Victims, 1961), V, 119E-132E: Joseph B. Schechtman, "The Elimination of German Minorities m  Southeastern Europe," Journal of Central 
European Affairs, VI (July, 1946), 160-62.
66ODHoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 42.
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Now the Magyars and the Germans no longer outnumber the Croats and the 
Serbs. The latter now outnumber the Magyars by more than three to one. 
However, as in the case of Transylvania, so in the Vojvodina, there are 
areas and towns where the Magyars outnumber the South Slavs. This is 
the case in the northern half of the BScka and in a part of the Ddrda 
triangle.
Other ethnic changes have also taken place, but these had less 
bearing on the Vojvodina. Almost 150,000 Italians emigrated to Italy 
after the Julian March was transferred to Yugoslavia. The few Jews 
(about 8,000) who survived the war emigrated to Israel, and between 
1950 and 1959 over 100,000 Turks left for Turkey. ^
III. Development of the Disputes
The rise of nationalism among these different nationalities 
became evident in the early part of the 19th century. The Hungarians 
were now resolved to make the character of the Vojvodina and Transyl­
vania even more "Magyar." The South Slavs and the Rumanians reacted 
violently to this policy. When the Hungarians sought to throw off the 
yoke of Habsburg absolutism in 1848-49, most Serbs, Croats and Rumanians 
sided with the latter. This confirmed the Magyarizers in their belief 
that Vienna had been successful in playing the game of divide and con-
£ Oquer. It only inspired them to exert even more time and effort to win
^ I b i d ., p. 41.
68Wagner, "Szechenyi and the Nationality Problem in the Habsburg 
Empire," p. 309.
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over the national minorities. What many of these individuals failed to 
realize was that the minorities had by this time also tasted of the 
nationalism inspired by the French R e v o l u t i o n . T h i s  was particularly
true for the Serbs of southern Hungary and the Rumanians of Transyl-
• 70vania.'u
Since Hungary was unsuccessful in its war for independence, 
it was placed under direct Austrian administration. This temporarily 
ended Magyarization efforts. However, in 1867 Austria and Hungary 
buried their differences and the nationalities had to seek a modus 
vivendi with the Magyars.^-*- The price of this was a renewal and in­
tensification of Magyarization. Among some nationality groups it met 
with little or no r e s i s t a n c e B u t  among the Rumanians, Serbs and 
Croats, this policy provoked r e s i s t a n c e T h e  national consciousness 
of these ethnic groups had already "crossed the Rubicon." Many of them
6 9Ibid., pp. 289, 307, 309.
^ I b i d .; Rustem Vambery, "Nationalism in Hungary," The Annals,
No. 232 (March, 1944), p. 78.
^Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 76-77; Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolu­
tion of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1929), pp. 90-99, 108-18.
^Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors. pp. 18ff.
^Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 8 .
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could no longer look on themselves as "Hungarians of Rumanian or Slavic 
ancestry." At any rate, the First World War interferred with the 
realization of the Magyar nation-state within historic boundaries.
The Austro-Hungarian defeat brought about the collapse and disintegra­
tion of the empire.^ The disintegration, supposedly based on the 
principles of self-determination, culminated in the emergence of a 
totally fragmented Central Europe. The Treaty of Trianon legalized the 
subsequent political chaos.^ The fragments, the new nation-states, 
provided the setting for the next twenty years of Europe's confused and 
heated political history.
The Inter-War Years
Transylvania and the Vojvodina became the objects of dispute 
between Rumanians, Yugoslavs and Hungarians. This phase of European 
and Rumanian-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Hungarian history reflects best the 
"bourgeois nationalism" so frequently denounced by the Communist 
ideologues of today. According to them, this was the age when nation­
alism pushed into the background all ideas of "social reform" and 
diverted the attention of all, to "narrow and nationalist aims."
The ensuing twenty years did, indeed, see the no-holds-barred
^ F o r  a description of this disintegration consult Jaszi, The 
Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, Part V and VI, pp. 271-429;
Zeman, The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire 1914-1918.
75Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 4, 5, 21, provides a brief 
but concise summary of the loses suffered by Hungary as a result of 
this treaty.
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struggle of nationalisms. The foreign policy of Hungary was carried on 
in direct reference to the "injustice" of the Treaty of Trianon.^ All 
Hungarians hoped for the day when this detested treaty would be revised. 
Revisionism became, in effect, the outlook and faith of the total 
nation.^7 This was opposed by the equally fervently held Rumanian and 
Serbian policies, which had as their guiding star the rigid preservation 
of the "sacred" status q u o The formation of the Little and the 
Balkan Entente are but two manifestations that reflect the approach of 
Rumania, Yugoslavia and other "satisfied" powers to perpetuate the 
existing state of affairs.^
7^R. G. Waldeck, Athene Pa lace (New York; Robert M. McBride 
and Company, 1942), p. 135; Vambery, "Nationalism in Hungary," p. 81; 
Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 5.
^Grigore Gafencu, Last Days of Europe, trans. E. Fletcher- 
Alien (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 156, 163, 167-68,
and John 0. Crane, The Little Entente (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1931), p. 6 , describe this from a pro-Rumanian perspective. Robert 
Gower, The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States (London: 
Richards, 1937), p. 21, defends the Hungarians. He maintains that the 
". . . difference between the situation of the Hungarian minorities and 
that of other minorities is this: the Hungarian minorities are firmly
convinced that their present situation is due to the errors of a mis­
guided and ill-conducted Peace Conference, whereas the other minorities 
owe their existence to circumstances such as neither human foresight 
can avoid nor human skill control."
^Em i l  Ciurea, "The Background," Captive Rumania Ed. Alexandre 
Cretzianu (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 9-10;
Roucek, Contemporary Roumainia and Her Problems, p. 214; Macartney, 
Independent Eastern Europe, pp. 265-71; Waldeck, Athene Palace, pp. 
21-22.
?9Gower, The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States, 
p. 18; Crane, The Little Entente, pp. 6-7; Temperley, "How the 
Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," p. 434.
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In the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and 
the greatly enlarged post-World War I Rumania, the position of the 
Magyars underwent a drastic change. From a position of most favored 
they were pushed into the position of least favored. Their treatment 
was, of course, tied directly to both domestic and foreign policy 
developments.
As part of France's defense structure of the status quo, the 
new South Slav kingdom and the enlarged Rumania were placed in direct 
opposition to Hungary and Bulgaria. This opposition did not have to be 
encouraged since Rumania and Yugoslavia had gained territories at the 
expense of both Hungary and Bulgaria. The latter countries desired a 
revision of these gains. In the face of such desires Rumania and Yugo­
slavia looked to France and other satisfied countries, like Czecho­
slovakia, for assistance. In this conflict the Magyars of the Vojvodina 
and Transylvania— as well as the Bulgars of Dobruja and the pro-Bulgar 
Macedonians--became mere driftwood tossed hither and thither in the un­
certain stream of East European politics.
World War II and Its Aftermath
Events in both Transylvania and the Vojvodina became entangled 
with world events as Europe moved into World War II. As power relation­
ships altered, political changes gained momentum in Eastern Europe. 
Hungary saw in these changes the opportunity to regain Transylvania and 
the Vojvodina. As Yugoslavia disintegrated in the wake of Axis aggres­
sion, the dissatisfied powers of Europe had their chance to partake of 
the spoils. The country broke into two major parts. The western part
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became the independent state of Croatia under Italian hegemony, while 
the eastern part was German occupied Serbia. The remainder of the 
country was divided among Italy, Italian Albania, Germany, Bulgaria 
and Hungary. Hungary did not regain all of the Vojvodina. It did re­
gain the Medjumurje and the Prekomurje, as well as the Dirda triangle
O ftand the Bafika regions. The rest of the Vojvodina came under German
and Croatian jurisdiction. Germany occupied the Banat while the
Croatians took the Srem (the region between the Danube and Sava rivers
south of Novi Sad [Ujvid4k]).
With the collapse of the Little Entente, Rumania found itself
isolated between unfriendly Bulgaria, Hungary and the U.S.S.R. From
each of these countries it had gained extensive territories after World
War I. These countries demanded a restoration of their territories by
Rumania. Following the outbreak of World War II the U.S.S.R. confronted
it with a demand for the Bukovina and Bessarabia, while Bulgaria
81demanded Dobruja, and Hungary the province of Transylvania. The
cessions of Bukovina, Bessarabia and Dobruja went relatively 
82smoothly.0 The cession of the former two to the U.S.S.R., however,
OftJugoslavia: History. Peoples and Administration, I, 244.
81Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania1s Case, p. 1; Macartney, 
October Fifteenth. I, 387-89, 318-24, 429-30.
82Alexander Cretzianu, "The Soviet Ultimatum to Roumania (26 
June, 1940)," Journal of Central European Affairs, IX (Jan., 1950), 
396-403.
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drove Rumania into the arms of Germany.^ It sought German support 
against the demands for Transylvania. By 1940, war was threatening 
between Hungary and Rumania over this question.®^ This, Hitler wanted 
to prevent at all cost, since he was just preparing to launch the 
attack on the U.S.S.R. Moreover, for this attack he needed access to
Q rthe Rumanian oil fields as well as peace between his lesser allies. J 
He asked Rumania and Hungary to solve their problems peacefully by 
negotiating their differences.^^ When these talks broke down, Hungary 
threatened military action in spite of Hitler. At this point, King 
Carol II of Rumania asked for an arbitral decision from the Axis 
p o w e r s . T h e  result of that decision was the Second Vienna Award.
Although this Award was a compromise, neither Rumania nor 
Hungary was completely satisfied. Hitler used these dissatisfactions 
to urge the two countries on to greater efforts in the war against the 
U.S.S.R. He dangled before their eyes the prospects of the loss or
09Kallay, Hungarian Premier, pp. 58-61; Waldeck, Athene Palace, 
pp. 27, 37, 113, 124-25. Grigore Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian 
Campaign, trans. E. Fletcher-Allen (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd.,
1945), pp. 52, 64.
^^Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 389; Markham, Rumania Under 
the Soviet Yoke, pp. 114, 124-25; Macartney, Independent Eastern Europe, 
pp. 419-20.
^Ibid., pp. 421-22; Waldeck, Athene Palace, p. 39; Kallay, 
Hungarian Premier. p. 59.
^Waldeck, Athene Palace, p. 131.
87Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, 351; Leiss, European Peace 
Treaties After World War II, p. 102.
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gain of more territory according to their performance in the war.®® 
This tactic was by no means only confined to Hitler. Stalin, in 
particular, had approached the Hungarians on more than one occasion 
before and during the war, to convince them that cooperation would
onmean territorial gains later. y The Allies, too, were aware of the 
bargaining importance of Transylvania's future. They succeeded in 
approaching Rumania with the promise of this territory.^
Rumania did, in fact, switch sides as the armies of Germany 
were pressed back on every front. The defection came on August 23, 
1944. This came after the Allies promised to give Transylvania "or
®®As it has been demonstrated, the purpose of the Second 
Vienna Award was not to divide and conquer, but to bring about peace 
in the rear of Hitler's armies. On the other hand, this does not mean 
that Transylvania did not remain a potential reward to the state which 
performed its wartime duties better. See Macartney, October Fifteenth, 
II, 253, 319; Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 64. For a Communist 
Hungarian interpretation see Miklds Horvath, A. 2. Magyar Hadsereg 
Megsemmisuldse A Donndl (Budapest: Zrinyi Kiadd, 1959), pp. 9-10. For
a Rumanian view see Pavel, Transylvania at the Peace Conference of 
Paris, p. 37. That war achievements were considered important is also 
illuminated from another angle by Waldeck, Athene Palace, pp. 355-56. 
Compensation given on the eastern front (Bessarabia, Bukovina, Trans- 
nistria) is here regarded as partial payment from Hitler for losses 
sustained in the West (Northern Transylvania and Dobruja). For a 
thorough discussion of the Second Vienna Award see Appendix B.
89Kallay, Hungarian Premier, footnote 27. p. 58; Macartney 
October Fifteenth, II, 405. However, Stalin did net forget the 
Rumanians either. For his approaches in this direction, see Alexander 
Cretzianu, "The Rumanian Armistice Negotiations: Cairo, 1944,"
journal of Central European Affairs, XI (Oct., 1951), 251.
^^Eknil Ciurea, "The Background," Captive Rumania, ed.
Alexandre Cretzianu (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956),
pp. 18-19; Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke, p. 173;. Macartney, 
October Fifteenth, II, 191-92, 204-05, 216.
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the greater part thereof" to the Rumanians.^ However, this also re­
quired that they join the Allies in the expansion of the war against the 
German and Hungarian forces still fighting. This, too, was done. Thus, 
Rumania gained the Allied support which was to mean so much at the 
Conference table following World War II.
A great deal of juggling and diplomatic intrigue took place as 
the Peace Treaty was being drawn up. The Rumanians pressed their
Q Oclaims and backed them up with their prior defection. Hungary, too, 
attempted to save the unsavable. It carried on negotiations which had 
as their goal the preservation of as much of Transylvania as possible. 
The negotiators were especially concerned over the 30-mile Magyar- 
inhabited border strip which had been under Rumanian jurisdiction in
QOthe interwar period. J But these efforts failed to sway the Allies, 
who re-established the Trianon borders of Hungary.^
In the meantime, vast changes were taking place in Yugoslavia. 
After the front against the Axis had collapsed in 1941, the under­
ground began its operations.^5 Here, there is no room, nor need, to go
^Leiss, European Peace Treaties After World War II, pp. 101- 
102, 299; Cretzianu, "The Rumanian Armistice Negotiations; Cairo,
1944," pp. 243-58.
92Roumania at the Peace Conference, pp. 35-41, and Annex I, 
pp. 49-78.
^Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain (New York;
The Macmillan Company, 1948), pp. 204, 209-10, 218-19.
^^Leiss, European Peace Treaties After World War II, p. 94.
qcSchieder, Das Schicksal Per Deutschen in Jugoslawien, V,
59E-64E.
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into the details of the controversy concerning the role of Mihailovic 
led Cetniks and Tito led Partisans. What must be mentioned, however, 
is that the success of the Partisans and the failure of the Cetniks 
was in large part due to their respective positions on the nationali­
ties question.^
The Cetniks were, in effect, a continuation of the Serb ideal 
of Yugoslavia. This being the case, they favored a South Slav state 
dominated by the Serbs. They were motivated by a narrow ethnic nation­
alism not unlike that which inspired the Croatian Ustasa. As a conse­
quence, their influence was limited both from an ethnic and a territorial
perspective.97
The Partisans followed a different course. They attempted to 
appeal to all the nationalities of Y u g o s l a v i a . ^  They saw in national 
unity the key to successful resistance against the Germans. Such unity 
could be attained only if the program and objectives of the Partisans 
was divorced from the narrow ethnic squabbles of the past. Since Tito 
and the Yugoslav Communists dominated the Partisans, the ideological
96Dinko Tomasic, "Nationality Problems and Partisan Yugoslavia," 
Journal of Central European Affairs, VI (July, 1946), 112; Paul Shoup, 
"Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism," Slavic Review, XXII 
(Mar., 1963), 64-81.
97This is inadvertantly admitted even by Eric L. Pridonoff, a 
Cetnik sympathizer. See his Titov's Yugoslavia (Washington, D.C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1955), pp. 13-14, 50-57, 129-36, 228-31.
9®Danilo Kecic, "Figyelfi: A JKP Vajdasigban A Felkelds
Elttkdszitese'nek ]fs Megindit^sanak Napjaiban," trans. Jozsef Kollin,
Hid, XXV (Sept., 1961), 784-92.
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orientation of the leaders enabled the movement as a whole to transcend 
the ethnic nationalisms of the past. Liberation from the foreign 
German yoke provided the unifying ideal. Thus, Partisan groups came
QQinto existence in all parts of the country— even the Vojvodina—  
which fought for the common cause of national liberation.
For both Communist Rumania and Yugoslavia, the experiences of 
World War II have provided the legitimizing "myths"'*'^ on which they 
base their present rule. More will be said about these "myths" in
QQIbid. The terrain of the Vojvodina is, for the most part, 
unsuitable for guerrilla warfare. During the war the Partisans in this 
area were much less successful than in other areas of the country.
^®®In the present context "myth" designates a "world picture" 
held by a particular group. It performs the indispensable role of 
expressing and codyfying or stereotyping, the major characteristics of 
a particular group's culture by reference to specific formative his­
torical events, developments and traditions. This involves the group's 
entire value system, including safeguards and enforcements of standards 
of social morality, certain rituals and practical rules of guidance.
Myth is less precise and intellectual than an ideology, but as a conse­
quence is almost more pervasive. It is based on traditions, customs, 
folk-lore and mores, many of which have a mystical rather than a ra­
tional foundation. For a more precise definition see Arden R. King, 
"Myth," A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free
Press, 1964), p. 450. The definition of myth is very similar to the 
definition of legend (King, "Legend," Ibid., p. 384). Funk and 
Wagnalls New "Standard" Dictionary differentiates them by stating that: 
"Myth is the creation of a fact out of an idea," while legend is "the 
seeing of an idea in a fact." Thus, "myth is purely the work of 
imagination," while "legend has a nucleus of fact." According to this 
dichotomy, in the Yugoslavian "Partisan Myth" and in the "August 23 
Myth" and "Daco-Roman Myth" of the Rumanians, elements of both myth 
and legend are present. Consequently, in the present context myth 
will be given a broader meaning, as a belief including elements of 
both fact and imagination. Myth in this sense is what Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary calls, "a belief given uncritical acceptance 
by the members of a group esp. in support of existing or traditional 
practices and institutions (e.g., of racial superiority used to justify 
discrimination)."
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succeeding chapters. At present it is enough to note that in Yugo­
slavia the Partisan tradition has never been the monopoly of any one 
ethnic g r o u p . T h e  August 23rd myth of the Rumanians, on the other
hand, was from the beginning an act of the Rumanian people alone,
i n?against the imperialist Hungarians and Germans. u While both myths 
have sought their roots in "national" traditions, the Yugoslav varient 
has enabled the national minorities to partake of it. This has not 
been possible for the minorities in Rumania, particularly not for the 
Hungarians of Transylvania. Thus, the Rumanian myth has, from the 
beginning, developed along exclusivist lines, while its Yugoslavian 
counterpart has been inclusivist--at least from an ethnic standpoint.
■*-®̂ This needs some qualification. Before his imprisonment 
Milovan Djilas had for a long time maintained that the burden of 
liberation rested on the shoulders of the Slavic peoples. See his 
"A Szldv Ndpek Harca A B^kddrt ifs A Demokrdci^drt," Hid, XI (Jan.,
1947), 12-20, and "Jugoszl^via Nepeinek Harca l£s A Marxizmus-Leninizmus," 
Hid, XI (Dec., 1947), 873-83.
1 02Red Army participation in making the coup a success is also 
grudgingly admitted. See "The Great Anniversary," Rumania Today, No.
116 (1964), p. 1. August 23rd was the day when Antonescu was toppled 
from power and the Rumanians switched sides. Since the switch was 
against the Germans and the Hungarians, the latter immediately became 
the villains in the mythology surrounding the event. The switch was 
seen as a purely Rumanian achievement, eliminating thereby the possi­
bility of giving the other nationalities a share in the credit for 
liberation.
i rnThe Germans were the only ethnic group that were excluded 
from the Partisan myth. They replaced the Magyars as the scapegoat 
minority. The entire success of the Partisan myth has depended on the 
unity of all the peoples of Yugoslavia against the threat of a German 
political revival.
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IV. The Changed Nature of the Disputes Under Soviet 
Military Occupation
The myths touched on above have been important in the long run. 
From a short-term perspective the actual process of liberation was much 
more important. In Yugoslavia this was in all respects--excepting only 
parts of Serbia, Belgrade and the Vojvodina— a national achievement.
In Rumania, on the other hand, "liberation" was the result more of the 
advancing Red Army than of the belated coup d'etat which toppled 
Antonescu. Thus, Yugoslavia escaped the burden of Red Army occupation. 
In fact, Yugoslavia was viewed by all the Allies as part of the anti­
fascist coalition. This was not the case with Rumania. It fell under 
Red Army occupation and was considered and treated as a former enemy 
state. Thus, the end of World War II in Eastern Europe left Rumania 
and Hungary under Soviet military occupation and Yugoslavia under the 
rule of a government which was then considered the staunchest sup­
porter of Soviet policies .̂ -0̂
In these early years Tito's Yugoslavia did not need the Red 
Army either to guarantee for itself a Communist government, or to 
eradicate the remnants of fascist and collaborationist forces in the 
country. For both tasks the CPY was superbly qualified. In good
Stalinist fashion, its secret police (UBD) "tried" and exterminated or 
imprisoned all "war-criminals." These included about 150,000
•'•^Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 75-80, 81-85,
100- 102.
105Ibid., pp. 91-95.
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Volksdeutsche and 40,000 Hungarians.'*-®^ It also deported the bulk of
the country's German population and some of its Hungarians. But all
other ethnic groups suffered as well. It can be said that these
liquidations were--with the exception of the Germans, and possibly the 
108Hungarians-- uo motivated more by considerations of ideology and 
power, than by ethnic animosity. Whatever the motivation, in the case 
of the Hungarian liquidations, the result was the minority's decapita­
tion. It deprived the Vojvodinian Magyars of their leaders.
To seme extent, the Hungarians in Transylvania fared much 
better, at least in this immediate post-war period. This was due, in 
large part, to Soviet post-war policies. To be more specific, the 
Soviet occupation had different consequences for the various countries 
falling within the expanded empire. Two factors, in particular, 
determined the nature of the Soviet occupation. These were the former 
enemy status of conquered Hungary and occupied Rumania, and their non- 
Slavic ethnic composition. Being ex-enemy states, both Hungary and
•*-®®Hungaricus, "Az Elrabolt Horvat Vezdr Nyugaton Maradt 
Bizonyit^kai Leleplezik Titodk TSmeggyilkossagait," Amerikai Magyar 
Jllet, Feb. 9, 1968, p. 2. On the basis of personal interviews with a 
number of witnesses of some of these massacres, the extent of the 
exterminations quoted above seem not unlikely.
^^Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 40-41.
108The excesses committed against the Hungarians did not have 
"official" sanction. They were carried out mainly by bands of Partisans 
which may have committed them out of ethnic animosity. They were not 
reprimanded, because these liquidations also eliminated the poten­
tially most anti-Communist elements within the Hungarian community.
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Rumania were under obligation to pay reparations to the Soviet Union
(Hungary also had to pay reparations to Yugoslavia). Being non-Slavic
states, both Hungary and Rumania lacked the sympathy of the U.S.S.R. in
109any claims they might have had against Slavic states. This left the
two countries only the right to make claims against each other. This
they did by presenting their respective claims to Transylvania. ̂ ®
The Peace Treaties, as we have seen, transferred Transylvania
in toto to Rumania. This was, in the main, due to Soviet support.^
However, the Soviet Union did not give something for nothing. Besides
the reward for past defection, which was now past history and useless
to the Soviets, Stalin seemed to have seen the transfer of northern
Transylvania as the avenue to the rapid communization of Rumania. In
fact, the country was by this time well on its way to becoming a
satellite, while Hungary was still ruled by a "bourgeois" regime. Thus,
Transylvania was a reward for Communization. At the same time, it
conferred popularity to the new Rumanian Communist regime and reduced
112the prestige of a still existing bourgeois government in Hungary.
■*-^Hungary, for example, had some very legitimate claims to 
the purely Hungarian-inhabited Csalokbz Island and some other areas 
just north of the Hungarian border. Yet, because of its defeated and 
non-Slavic status, and because its gains would be at the expense of 
Slavic Czecho-Slovakia, the Hungarian claims were rejected outright.
See Leiss, European Peace Treaties After World War II, pp. 93-94.
110Ibid., pp. 101-102. 111Ibid.
112Hugh Seton-Watson, "The uanubian Satellites," International 
Affairs, XXII (Apr., 1946), 250.
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National Minorities and Communist Power Consolidation
The attitude of Soviet occupation authorities in Transylvania
seems to support the contention that the transfer was more than mere
gratitude for Rumania's defection. For one thing, the Red Army held on
to northern Transylvania and administered it until the spring of 1945,
113when the Groza government came to power. This lessened the number 
of atrocities that took place, since the Soviet troops defended the 
Magyar inhabitants of the area against the revenge-seeking Rumanians. 
This was done less out of compassion than out of Soviet design to 
utilize the Magyar ethnic element as a lever to bring about the more 
rapid incorporation of Rumania into the Soviet s p h e r e . T h e  Magyars 
had little choice but to acquiesce to such Soviet pressures.
1 -I OIbid.; Schieder, The Expulsion of the German Population from 
Hungary and Rumania, III, 85.
■^■^Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev (Paperback Edi­
tion; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), pp. 256-57, gives a
brief discussion of Czech versus Slovak animosities which were utilized 
by the Soviet Union and the local Communists. In a similar way, the 
Soviets also used Rumanian-Hungarian discord in Transylvania.
•'•-̂ Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke, pp. 215-17, blames 
the Hungarians for the success of Communism in Rumania. He fails to 
mention, however, that the Hungarians had acquiesced to Soviet pressures 
only because the bourgeois Rumanian leaders (i.e., Juliu Maniu, H i e  
Lazar and their "democratic" followers) were bent on revenge against 
the "disloyal" national minorities who had turned toward Hungary during 
1941-1944. The Hungarians had no alternative left but to support the 
Soviet-backed Petru Groza, who had promised tolerance and respect for 
the national minorities. See Seton-Watson, "The Danubian Satellites," 
p. 247; Schieder, The Expulsion of the German Population from Hungary 
and Rumania, III, 84-85.
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Thus, the national minorities were skillfully utilized by Stalin 
to weaken the anti-Communist forces in Rumania and to enable his puppets
1 1 f lto seize power. ■LD Using the policy of divide et impera, playing 
nationality against nationality, Stalin attained his aim. His success 
was due in no small measure to the near-sighted and narrow revenge- 
seeking attitude of some democratic Rumanian leaders. It was their hate 
and intolerance that drove the Magyars in desperation to support Groza.
By supporting him, they believed that his "proletarian internationalism" 
would defend them against the excesses of "bourgeois nationalism."
In the Vojvodina there was no similar utilization of the minori­
ties. The Partisans in this area relied mainly on the Serbian popula­
tion. For the most part, both the Germans and the Magyars were distrusted. 
Their capacity for any resistance was immediately broken after the 
Partisans replaced the Soviet troops. As has already been stated, this 
involved deportations, as well as mass executions and terror.
V. Similarities and Differences in the Two Cases
Certain similarities and differences are evident in the pre- 
Communist nationalities policies of Rumania and Yugoslavia. These can 
be summarized briefly in relation to three pivotal shifts in the inter­
national political positions of the two countries. The first was the 
cession of Transylvania and the Vojvodina to Rumania and Yugoslavia 
respectively, following World War I. This made both countries part of 
the East European alliance system constructed by France. The second
■*--̂ Ibid.; Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke, pp. 230, 249.
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major shift came with the break-up of the Little Entente and the poli­
tical re-allignment of Eastern Europe in the late 1930's and the early 
part of World War II. The last shift was a consequence of the involve­
ment of these countries in World War II and the politics of the imme­
diate post-war years.
In the first phase, which is the longest, both Rumania and 
Yugoslavia subscribed to nationalities policies which were motivated 
by the desire to assimilate the minority ethnic groups. These were, 
simply, policies of "Serbianization" and "Rumanization." In both cases 
the Hungarian minorities were subjected to a process which attempted 
to deprive them of their own nationality, while substituting for it a 
"Serbian" or "Rumanian" allegiance. The distinctive characteristic of 
these policies--as of the dominant form of M a g y a r i z a t i o n , w h i c h  they 
replaced--was that they were based on a narrow ethnic or "racial" 
nationalism.
Serbianization was often more brutal, direct and simple than 
its Rumanian counterpart. But it was also a less pretentious expression 
of national feeling. Rumanization, on the other hand, was based on the 
believed lofty affiliations of Rumanians with the Roman Empire. While 
their repression of the Magyars was never as overt as that of the 
Serbs, its expression was more prone to irritate and build resentment. 
The saving feature in Rumania was the corrupt officialdom, which, when 
bribed, would allow some laxity in the application of certain repressive
■^■^For a discussion of different manifestations of Magyarization 
see George Barany, "The Awakening of Magyar Nationalism Before 1848," 
Austrian History Yearbook, II (1966), 19-52.
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measures. Under Serbian jurisdiction such laxity was much less possible 
or probable.
With the break-up of the Little Entente and the growth of German 
and Italian power in the Balkans, a shift took place in the nationali­
ties policies of both Rumania and Yugoslavia. To placate Germany, both 
countries extended the privileges of the German minorities living within 
their frontiers. Toward the Magyar minorities, on the other hand, the 
two countries adopted unlike policies.
In Yugoslavia, the government relaxed its repressive policies 
and an actual rapprochement was in the making with Hungary, when the 
German attack on uhe former shattered this emerging a c c o r d . I n  
Rumania, ethnic policies took a different turn. As Hitler’s pet 
satellite, Rumania was intolerant and repressive toward all but its 
German minorities. Its persecution of the Jews and Magyars increased 
in severity. Much "unofficial" persecution, perpetrated by the Iron 
Guardists also flourished. This did not cease until Rumania actually 
switched sides in August, 1944. Only in northern Transylvania, Bessara­
bia, Bukovina and Dobruja did the Magyars and Jews gain some relief 
when these areas were removed from Rumanian jurisdiction at the 
beginning of World War II.
The last year of this war again led to drastic changes in the 
nationalities policies of both countries. In Yugoslavia, the now 
politically dominant CPY inspired most of these changes. In Rumania,
118J--LOThe most objective discussion of this attempted Yugoslav- 
Hungarian accord is to be found in Macartney, October Fifteenth, I,
151, 159, 197, 199-200, 318-33, 385-86, 446-50, 470.
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the changes were imposed by the Red Army of occupation. Both countries 
made a complete about-face as far as their formerly favored German 
minorities were concerned. Yugoslavia expelled almost all of its German 
inhabitants. Rumania began a similar course, but did not carry it out 
as extensively as Tito's Partisans had. The latter also made an exten­
sive purge among the Magyars of the Vojvodina. They went from town to 
town exterminating or imprisoning the leaders and potential leaders of 
this minority. In contrast to this, in Transylvania, the Red Army kept 
the Rumanians from following a similar course of vengence.
It is these war-time experiences, as well as the growing role 
of the Communist parties, that have determined the foundations of the 
nationalities policies in the "new" post-war Rumania and Yugoslavia.
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CHAPTER II
THE IDEOLOGICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION 
OF THE HUNGARIANS
Communist ascendancy in Rumania and Yugoslavia resulted in a 
complete re-formulation of the "nationalities question" on the basis 
of Marxist-Leninist nationalities theory.^ This changed ideological 
context provided Rumania and Yugoslavia with new guidelines for the 
treatment of their Hungarian and other minorities. Henceforth, the 
ethnic minorities of both countries were guaranteed an existence which 
was "national in form," but "socialist in content." In this chapter, 
we will examine the ideological and constitutional considerations 
involved in this formula and its application.
I. The Ideological Position of the National 
Minorities
The ideological position of Hungarians in Transylvania and the 
Vojvodina has undergone vast changes since the Communists first came 
to power. These changes have been a consequence of altered power 
relationships within the Communist bloc, as well as certain develop­
ments within the Communist parties of the respective countries.
■*-The "nationalities theory" and "policy" which has been taken 
over from the practice and experience of the Soviet Union, has been 
variously designated. Recently, the designation "Marxist-Leninist" 
has become more and more popular. In Yugoslavia this is the most 
commonly used. In Rumania, on the other hand, the designation is simply 
"Leninist." Prior to de-Stalinization, in Rumania this policy was 
always referred to as "Leninist-Stalinist." In Yugoslavia this was 
also the designation until the Tito-Stalin split of 1948.
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Within the bloc the tendency toward "polycentrism" has provided 
the opportunities for differing policies. Polycentrism designates the 
numerous centers of ideological authority which emerged following the 
Tito-Stalin split of 1948. This process of ideological fragmentation 
followed the expansion of Communist rule into East-Central Europe and 
Asia. It was a consequence of political developments within the 
expanded empire as well as changes within Soviet leadership.
Within the expanded Communist orbit the events most responsible 
were the Tito-Stalin split, the death of Stalin in 1953, the riots in 
Poland and revolt in Hungary in 1956, the rift between Communist China 
and the U.S.S.R., and the more recent Rumanian opposition to economic 
integration into COMECON. These events were closely tied to changes 
in the Party leadership of the U.S.S.R. Stalin's death was followed 
by an acceleration of these tendencies. His successors initiated 
policies which allowed more freedom of action to party leaders in the 
satellite states.^
Until Stalin's demise, satellite leaders simply mimicked 
Soviet nationalities policies as well as constitutional forms.^ Even
^For a good collection of essays dealing with "polycentrism," 
see Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), Polycentrism (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962).
^The over-all impact of these events will be considered in 
more detail in later chapters.
4]Joris Levitski, "Coexistence within the Bloc," Survey, No.
42 (June, 1962), 28-29, 33-34. A good example of such mimickry is I. 
Nistor, "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," under head­
ing "Rumania," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, IV (Feb. 7, 
1953), 18. The original article appeared in the December 27, 1953 
issue of Izvestia, p. 3.
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in Yugoslavia, the Soviet pattern was assiduously followed until 1949.^ 
However, as de-Stalinization unfolded within the bloc, the Soviet 
pattern was re-moulded to fit the national peculiarities within each 
state. This process affected both the ideological and the constitu­
tional context of nationality policies in Rumania and Yugoslavia.
Soviet Nationalities Policies
Before we examine the application of Soviet nationalities poli­
cies in Eastern Europe, a number of its major characteristics will be 
noted. Flexibility is, perhaps, its most obvious feature. It has 
been able to adapt itself to all sorts of political situations, among
various ethnic groups and nationalities, in drastically different
£economic and geographic settings. But this adaptability was always 
guided by the political interests of the Soviet Union. As a result, 
"proletarian internationalism" meant the subordination of all local and 
ethnic "nationalisms" to the interests of Soviet Russia as a whole.^
^George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New 
Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), pp. 81-85, 91-
102; Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Paperback Edition; New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 325, 329, 339, 352.
The History of this flexibility is traced sympathetically by 
Istvan Dolmanyos, A Nemzetis^gi Politika Tort^nete A Szovjetunloban 
(Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiadcf, 1964). A more objective analysis of
the early years of Soviet nationalities policies is Richard Pipes'
The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism (Revised
Edition; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).
^For a more precise definition of "proletarian international­
ism" and related terms see the Prologue of this study and consult the 
Soviet political dictionary Politicheskii Slovar1 (Russian Series No.
5; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1948), "bourgeois
nationalists," p. 70; "internationalism," p. 219; "patriotism," p. 410; 
"proletariat," pp. 451-52; "socialism," pp. 528-29.
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The theoretical right to "secession" and "self-determination" or the 
right to local "autonomy" within a federal constitutional context, 
were always contingent on the intra- and international political needs
Oof the Soviet Union. This was also the case for the Eastern European 
Communist states until Stalin's death.®
Since Marx had written very little on the "nationalities ques­
tion," Soviet policies in this regard were formulated mainly by Lenin 
and Stalin to meet the needs of power seizure and power consolidation. 
As such, Soviet nationalities theory incorporated the lessons learned 
by the Bolsheviks in the turbulent two decades which followed the 
1905 Revolution. These lessons reflected the particular character­
istics and problems of the multi-national Russian Empire, as seen by 
revolutionaries who desired to utilize existing contradictions (i.e., 
national conflicts) to further their own quest for power.
OFor some reflections on the opportunism of Soviet nationali­
ties policies, see Alfred D. Low, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the
New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," The Russian
Review, XXII (Jan., 1963), 12.
% n  relation to the satellites, this opportunism is reflected 
by Stalin's utilization of minority nationalities discontent against 
Tito. See: "Minorities in Eastern Europe— II," East Europe, VIII
(April, 1959), 9-11; Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1951), pp. 342-45; Wolff,
The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 459-61.
■*-®Low, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the New Program of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union," pp. 10-12.
■^Dolmanyos, A Nemzetis^gi Politika Tbrtenete A Szovjstur.ioban, 
pp. 5-36, gives a good summary of these early years of development. 
However, it is strictly a communist interpretation.
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This utilitarian and even opportunistic development of Soviet 
nationalities policy, allowed for theoretical as well as practical in­
consistencies and contradictions. As a consequence, the same ideo­
logical precepts were used to justify such vastly different events as
the Soviet acquiescence to Finnish independence and the bloody rein-
1 *)corporation of the Caucasian republics. Although present-day 
ideologues blame some of these admitted contradictions on the distor­
tions caused by the "Stalinist personality cult," in actuality the 
inconsistencies were already manifest before Lenin's death in 1924.^  
Stalin only exaggerated these contradictions by enabling Russian 
nationalism to re-surface in the 1930's, after an ineffective war of 
words against "great Russian chauvinism" and "local bourgeois na­
tionalisms."^
^Ibid., pp. 47-50, 83-104, 118-22; Pipes, The Formation of 
the Soviet Union, pp. 43, 56, 93-108, 193-241.
■*-̂ Low, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the New Program of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union," pp. 10-12; Dolm^nyos, A 
Nemzetis^gi Politika Torte'nete A Szovjetunicfoan, pp. 77-122; Pipes, 
The Formation of the Soviet Union.
^Continuity, rather than change, has characterized Soviet 
nationalities policies. Low, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the New 
Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," p. 10, points 
out that while de-Stalinization has affected most areas of Soviet 
life, it has not altered to an appreciable degree the country's 
nationality policy. For additional observations on this continuity, 
see Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1956), Ch. I; Program of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union: Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the
C.P.S.U. October 31, 1961 (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961),
pp. 114-18; Alex Inkeles, "Soviet Nationality Policy in Perspective," 
Problems of Communism. IX (May-June, 1960), 25-34; Frederick C. 
Barghoorn, "Nationality Doctrine in Soviet Political Strategy," The 
Review of Politics. XVI (July, 1954), 283-304.
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Both Rumania and Yugoslavia adopted Soviet nationalities theory 
to solve the problems of their own multi-national existence. In the 
case of Rumania this adoption was really Soviet imposed. But in Yugo­
slavia the adoption was a matter of international Communist solidarity 
as well as national necessity.^ In both cases, however, the nation­
alities policy so adopted, was fashioned after the prevailing theory in 
Stalin's Soviet Russia. While the Communist parties of both these 
countries had paid lip-service to this policy in the interwar years, 
their rise to power following W.W. II gave them the opportunity to 
practice that which they had been preaching.^
Rumania
In Rumania the Communists immediately applied the "national 
form" and "socialist content" of Soviet nationality policy. As in 
the Soviet Union, so in Rumania, the reason for adopting this policy 
was closely tied to considerations of power seizure and power^con­
solidation. The policy attempted to popularize the Communist Party, 
among the country's national minorities.^ It entailed guaranteeing
15The reasons for these national differences are discussed in 
Ch. I. Also see Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 267-74, 278-92.
16As Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 155, points 
out: "Communists . . . [Yugoslavs, Rumanians, and others] are essen­
tially theoretical beings. No greater mistake could be made than to 
assume that Communists do not believe their theories. This does not 
mean that Communist theories have not originated as little more than 
rationalizations. It does mean, however, that ideology provides a 
binding orientation for the direction of society, a view of both 
tactical and strategic goals and a guide to the thinking of at least 
the leadership."
•^Chapter I discusses this motive in more detail.
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to them the right to use their language in public discourse, in educa­
tion and in their relations with the government. It also guaranteed 
for them equality with the Rumanians in political, social and economic
relations. In fact , in the Sacuesc (Szekely) districts it even provided
18for "autonomy" in line with the Soviet example.
In the Stalinist years, the ideological justification for these
enlightened policies were simple and straightforward. "Proletarian
internationalism" (i.e., Soviet foreign policy) demanded such enlight- 
1 Qenment. * In the writings of Rumanians dealing with the question of 
nationalities policies, this was definitely the central concept. The 
concept of "patriotism" or "socialist patriotism," on the other hand, 
was treated only as an afterthought. It was viewed merely as an 
appendage of "proletarian internationalism." Consequently, pro-Soviet 
attitudes, expressions, and actions were both internationalist and 
patriotic, while any anti-Soviet manifestation was considered to be 
ipso facto "bourgeois nationalism" and "chauvinism.
1 8Nistor, "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," 
p. 18, enumerates these rights. Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question 
of Nationality (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), pp. 30-35,
points out, however, that for Lenin (and Stalin, we may add) such 
"rights" were really secondary. Lenin was . cool, indifferent,
even hostile to the national state and to nationality. But, in 
general, the proletariat and the Party have the solemn obligation to 
support the national liberation movement because democracy and 
socialism demand it."
■'•^Hadak Utjdn, "A Nemzeti Kdrdes ifs A Kommunizmus," A H^t,
III (April 7, 1967), p. 1.
20Nistor, "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light,"
p. 18.
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For this reason inter-war Rumania was condemned for its "mon-
21strous antipatriotic, antinational struggle against the Soviet Union.1,4i 
It was also described as a cruel oppressor of nationalities which 
inflamed "chauvinism and racial hatred" by its "brutal exploitation," 
wherein:
Workers belonging to national minorities were deprived of 
political and civil rights. Their native languages were pro­
hibited in government institutions. There were no government 
schools in the native languages. The culture of national 
minorities was persecuted and suppressed. The bourgeois- 
landlord government promulgated no fewer than 400 laws and 
decrees against the national minorities.22
For all these inequities, the "bourgeois-landlord" class basis of 
interwar Rumania was held r e s p o n s i b l e . ^
In the late 1950's the ideological discussion of the nationali­
ties question began to take on added dimensions. It began first as a 
change of emphasis, but ended in making Rumania a new dissident 
center within the polycentric Communist camp. Besides the policies 
of de-Stalinization in the CPSU, the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, provided the oppor­
tunity for asserting more ideological independence.^ It is ironic
2 Ijbid. 2 2j^bid.
23por some Communist Hungarian reflections on the class basis 
of such inequalities, see: Imre Nagy on Communism (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 233; Maty^s Rakosi, A  B^keert Es A 
Szocializmus Epite'sde'rt (Budapest: Szikra, 1951), p. 279; Jdnos Kadar,
Socialist Construction in Hungary: Selected Speeches 1957-1961
(Budapest: Corvina Press, 1962), pp. 107-8.
^"Magyarok Rom^niaban," L^rmafa, XI, No. 4 (1964), 9, and 
Gyula Zathureczky, Transylvania: Citadel of the West trans. and e d .
A. Wass DeCzege (Problems Behind the Iron Curtain Series No. 1; 
Gainesville, Florida; The A.H.L.G, Research Center, n.d.), p. 55, 
indicate that Gheorghiu-Dej!s policy statement of Feb. 19, 1959, 
inaugurated the change in Rumanian nationality policy.
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that more ideological independence for Rumanian Communists has led to 
less ideological and political freedom for the country's ethnic minori­
ties.
Recent Rumanian formulations of "proletarian internationalism" 
have stressed its inter-state rather than intra-state role. Thus, 
very little is said about the rights of national minorities.^5 Even 
when the rights of minorities are mentioned, it is only to show that 
their treatment has "cemented the unity of the nation," by "strengthen­
ing friendship and brotherhood between the Romanian working people and 
those belonging to the coinhabiting nationalities."^ In this way, 
the intra-state considerations of proletarian internationalism are 
all subsumed under the concept of socialist patriotism. The latter 
has now moved to the center of the Rumanian ideological stage. 
Nationalism, defined as the selfish prejudice which leads to imperi­
alism and discord, is still decried. But, it is contrasted against 
the positive force of "patriotism" which is the "intimate union of the
^-*Some characteristic indicators of this recent trend include: 
V. Iliescu, "Ensuring the Unity and Cohesion of the International 
Communist Movement— Major Imperative of Our Day," Documents, Articles 
and Information on Romania. XIX (Feb. 10, 1968), 11-14; Nicolae Corbu 
and Constantin Mitea, "Development of the Socialist Nation and 
Proletarian Internationalism," Documents. Articles and Information on 
Romania, XIX (Feb. 1, 1968), 14-17; Miklos Kallos, "A Dolgoz6k 
Szocialista Politikai Tudatdnak Kialakulasa Es FejlSddse Hazdnkban," 
Igaz Szd, XII (Aug., 1964), 266-77; Zoltan Farkas, "Allam, Nemzet is 
Szuverenitds A Szocializmusban," Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai 
(Cluj, Rumania: Series Philosophia, Anul XI, 1966), pp. 19-27.
26Corbu, "Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian 
Internationalism," p. 14.
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2 7ideas of socialism and national consciousness."
In recent ideological formulations "socialist patriotism" is 
definitely viewed as the constructive national force which animates 
Rumanians who follow the leadership of the CPR.^® It is the element 
necessary for achieving an inseparable unity and cohesion within 
Rumania. Such national unity is in turn a prerequisite for unity 
within the international communist movement, because concrete "socialist 
construction" goes on within national boundaries.29 It is a "national 
creation--because socialist revolution can neither be the object of 
import or export, a transplanted hybrid . . . [but] can only be an 
outcome of the struggle of each people."^®
By making unity within the international communist movement 
dependent on unity within each national communist party, the Rumanians 
have ventured so far as to say "that there is no national communism 
or international communism— but there is a unitary national . . . 
and . . . International [task] . . .  of carrying through socialist 
construction in good c o n d i t i o n s . S u c h  conditions are available
^®Kallos, "A Dolgozdk Szocialista Politikai Tudatanak 
Kialakulasa l£s Fejldddse Hazdnkban," pp. 272-76.
^Farkas, "Allam, Nemzet ]£s Szuverenitas A Szocializmusban," 
pp. 22-24.
30corbu, "Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian 
Internationalism," p. 16.
31Ibid.
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only—if all parties within the international communist movement "reso­
lutely defend [their] . . . autonomy."3^ This calls for an "interna­
tionalist solidarity" which is based on "the principles of independence, 
equal rights, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for the
right of each party to decide by itself its policy and practical activ- 
33ity." In short, "there cannot be parties 'standing above others' 
(parties)." On the international plane th* principle of democratic 
centralism is "absolutely inapplicable." It is only meant for "the 
inner [national] party plane."3^
For the Hungarians living in Transylvania this means that they 
have no alternative but to struggle "shoulder to shoulder" together 
with other "coinhabiting nationals" for the "freedom and prosperity 
of Romania."33 They cannot look for assistance from the international 
communist movement, since their problems of existence are considered 
ideologically to be strictly an internal Rumanian national matter.
If fact, they are not supposed to have interests which conflict 
with "the most sacred national interests" of Rumania. Such a 
conflict is theoretically inconceivable, since the unity, cohesion 
and solidarity of the entire people is "welded" by "the community of
3^Iliescu, "Ensuring the Unity and Cohesion of the Inter­
national Communist Movement— Major Imperative of Our Day," p. 12.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.. pp. 12-13.
33Corbu, "Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian 
Internationalism," p. 15.
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political and economic interests" of the developing socialist system 
of Rumania .^6
Yugoslavia
The Yugoslavian re-interpretation of Soviet nationality 
policies began much earlier than the Rumanian development outlined 
above, but it has provided the national minorities of the country 
somewhat more tangible safe-guards for their rights. Like the 
Rumanian re-interpretation, it has been developed to provide guidance 
in both intra- and inter-state relations. However, unlike the Rumanian 
nationality policy, the Yugoslavian has not become repressive as a 
consequence of the country’s greater ideological independence.
The major point of difference between the ideological stance 
of these two countries is that the Yugoslavs believe that unity in 
both intra- and inter-state relations is best served by a policy of 
tolerance for local variations and ethnic differences."^ The
"̂ I b i d ., p. 14. This exaggerated stress on unity, indivisi­
bility and sovereignty, is carried one step further by Farkas, "Xllam, 
Nemzet ^s Szuverenit^s A Szocializmusban," p. 23, when he states that; 
"Szocialista iCllamunk Egysdges Nemzeti Xllam. Teriileten, Egyetlen 
Nemzet ^1: A Romdn Szocialista Nemzet, Amely A Nemzetiscgekkel
Testvdri Egys^gben Fejlodik ffs l£piti A Szocialista Tarsadalmat." (Our 
socialist state is a unitary national state. It is inhabited by one 
nation: the Rumanian socialist nation, which develops and builds a
socialist society in brotherly unity with the coinhabiting nationali­
ties.)
"^Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 157-60, 162, 
168-70; Josip Broz Tito, "Concerning the National Question and 
Socialist Patriotism," Selected Speeches and Articles 1941-1961 
(Zagreb: Naprijed, 1963), pp. 97, 102-3.
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Rumanians, on the other hand, only believe in such tolerance on the 
international front. In intra-state affairs they definitely demand
OQunity through uniformity. °
The ideological position of both these countries is very 
similar on the international level.^ This similarity blurs the fact 
that in intra-state relations Yugoslavia and Rumania have vastly 
different interpretations of "proletarian internationalism." Because 
both of them now stress that "independent paths to socialism" are 
possible, they have changed the meaning of internationalism from a 
solidarity based on the leadership of the Soviet Union, to an ideo­
logical solidarity with equality among all socialist states and 
"progressive movements" in the w o r l d . W h i l e ,  both these states 
describe this relationship with similar formulas (e.g., equal rights, 
independence, non-interference in internal affairs, etc.), even in 
the international field there are some important differences. The 
Yugoslavs stress that their national minorities perform the role of
^Iliescu, "Ensuring the Unity and Cohesion of the Inter­
national Communist Movement— Major Imperative of Our Day," pp. 12-13; 
Corbu, "Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian Inter­
nationalism," pp. 16-17.
39"Yugoslav Visit by Romanian Party and State Delegation Led 
by Nicolae Ceausescu," Documents, Articles and Information on 
Romania, XI (Jun. 15, 1968), pp. 1, 5.
^^Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism,p. 162; Corbu, 
"Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian International­
ism," pp. 15-17; "Yugoslav Visit by Romanian Party and State Delega­
tion Led by Nicolae Ceausescu, p. 5.
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"bridges."4^ They link Yugoslavia with neighboring countries. They pro­
mote cooperation rather than discord between the countries of the area.42 
Rumanian theorists have also discussed this possibility— but only 
rarely in recent years.4^
In Yugoslavia the discussion of nationalities problems is 
frequent and candid.44 The same is not true cf Rumania. In the latter, 
it is assumed that the nationalities question has been solved.^ The 
Yugoslavs, on the other hand, openly admit that there are many problems 
in this area that require special attention and a great deal of effort
4% a u l  Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Commun­
ism," Slavic Review, XXII (March, 1963), 79; Floriin Kis, "Uj Szempon- 
tok A Nemzetisdgi Kdrddsekben," Magyar Kepes Uisdg, XV (July 1, 1966), 3.
42Ibid.
43ln Rumania this ideal was chiefly espoused by Petru Groza.
Since his death in 1958, only some writers rave paid lip-service to 
it. An example of this is Veronica Porumbacu, "Aranyhid," Igaz Sz6,
VII (Oct., 1959), 641.
44Some examples of this include: Kis, "Uj Szempontok A
Nemzetisdgi Kdrd^sekben," p. 3; Tito, "Concerning the National Ques­
tion and Socialist Patriotism," pp. 96-105; Tibor Minda, "A Nemzeti 
Kisebbsdgek Helyzete Vajdasdgban," Hid, XXVII (Jan., 1963), 102-7;
Dobrica Cosid, "A Korszeru Korszeriitlen Nacionalizmusrdl," Hid, XXVI 
(Jan., 1962), 21-31; L^szld Varga, "Figyeib: Kdtnyelvu Oktatas
Vajdasdgban," Hid. XXV (Feb., 1961), 157-65; Olga Pennavin, "A Magyar 
Tanszek," Hid. XXIV (July-Aug., 1960), 595-96; jdnos Kossa, "Az 
Anyanyelv Kdrddse Napjainkban," Hid. XX (Jan., 1956), 26-35; Edvard 
Kardelj, "A Nemzeti KdrddsrSl," Hid, XVIII (Jan., 1954), 31-40;
Edvard Kardelj-Sperans, A Szlovdn Nemzeti Kdrd^s Fej16ddse trans.
Istvin Bodrits, et al. (Novi Sad: Forum K8nyvkiado, 1961).
4^Igaz Szd Szerkeztosdge, "^letdnk Alaptttrvdnye," Igaz Szd,
XIII (Sept., 1965), 315-17; "Speech by Emil Bodnaras," Documents,
Articles and Information on Rumania, XVI (Aug. 10, 1965), 34; Nicolae 
Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Administrative 
Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania; 
Special Session of the Grand National Assembly, February 15-16, 1968," 
Documents. Articles and Information on Romania, Supplement No. 2 
(Feb. 17, 1968), pp. 13-15.
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L.fkand understanding. ° So they discuss these problems frequently and 
in detail. There is usually no attempt made to hide existing con­
flicts behind a facade of slogans. Instead, it is stressed that words 
are worthless even if written into the constitution, if they are not 
backed up with action. An every-day effort must be made to transform 
ideals into reality.47
According to the Yugoslavs this effort must be guided by 
national unity based on the free development of each and every nation­
ality living in the country. Real unity is unachievable unless the 
"individuality" of each nationality within the country is safe-guarded. 
"Yugoslavism" pre-supposes a diversity of national languages and cul- 
tures. In present-day Rumania there is little talk of individual
national developments. Instead, emphasis is always placed on common
4 9struggles and a "unitary" Rumanian national development. In the 
latter context there is no room for the type of statement, made by a 
Hungarian recently, in a Yugoslavian publication, that the Yugoslavian 
Hungarians support the present regime, because of its humane nation­
ality policy. In fact, that support of the government is contingent
4^Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetisdgi K^rdesekben," p. 3.
4 7Ibid.
^Yugoslavia's Way; The Program of the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia trans. Stoyan Pribechevich (New York; All Nations 
Press, 1958), p. 193.
49parkas, "Allam, Nemzet ifs Szuverenitds A Szocializmusban,"
p. 23.
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on its correct treatment of such national groups."*®
The Yugoslav nationality policy, like its Rumanian counterpart, 
has as its goal greater unity within the country. In both cases, 
nationalism is viewed as the greatest threat to such u n i t y . H o w e v e r ,  
the two countries have adopted different policies to combat this 
threat. In Yugoslavia the government sees nationalism as basically 
of two sorts. One is local or ethnic nationalism while the other is 
the nationalism of "bureaucratic centralism and hegemony. Both 
these forms are considered detrimental to the development of a truly 
unified Yugoslavia. "Bureaucratic centralism" or "superstate hege­
mony" harks back to the Serbian dominated Yugoslavia of inter-war 
days. Local nationalism, on the other hand, represents the disinte­
grative force which destroyed Yugoslavia on the eve of World War II. 
These two forms of nationalism feed upon one another. Consequently, 
the Communist League of Yugoslavia combats both.33
In Rumania no such distinction is made. Majority and minority 
nationalisms are not combatted equally, because "nationalism" per se 
is the e n e m y . T h u s ,  while theoretically nationalism is always
"*®Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetisdgi Kdrdesekben," p. 3.
3 1Yugoslavia's Way, pp. 195-96; Kallos, "A Dolgozok Szocial- 
ista Politikai Tudatdnak Kialakuldsa ifs Fejloddse Hazdnkban," p. 270.
■^Yugoslavia's Way, p. 195.
53Ibid.
3^Kallos, "A Dolgozdk Szocialista Politikai Tudatdnak 
Kialakuldsa ^s Fejldddse Hazankban," p. 270.
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decried, the socialist patriotism of the majority is never viewed as 
nationalism. Any sign of localism or "isolationism11 among ethnic mi­
norities, on the other hand, is immediately labelled as nationalistic.^^ 
Thus, the Rumanians lack the theoretical safe-guard of the Yugoslavs, 
which condemns both minority and majority nationalism, rather than 
just nationalism in the abstract.
Yugoslav and Rumanian Self-Images
Theoretical differences between communist states often do not 
indicate the actual nature of their policies. It is, therefore, neces­
sary to consider the "self-image" of the respective communist states 
to ascertain what is and what is not "nationalistic." These self- 
images are a consequence of the national setting, the party develop­
ments, and the ideological heritage.
We have already examined the ideological development of both 
Yugoslavian and Rumanian nationalities policies. Parallel to this, 
the "national image" in both these societies also underwent change.
In the immediate post-war years both countries drew on the experiences 
of the war and the process of "liberation" as their source of 
historical self-interpretation and legitimacy. The Yugoslavs still
55Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Rumania," East Central Europe and 
the World, ed. Stephen D. Kertesz (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1962), pp. 164-65,
It is, of course, impossible to say which came first. How­
ever, it was the power seizure by the respective Communist parties 
that made such a cultural-ideological transformation possible. For 
a general consideration of this East European development, see:
Francis S. Wagner, Cultural Revolution in East Europe (New York:
Danubian Research Service, 1955), pp. III-XII.
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use this event as their point of reference in defining their histori­
cal r o l e T h e  Rumanians, on the other hand, have recently reinter­
preted their own role in World War II and have drawn on pre-communist
COhistorical events to define their present self-image. °
Yugoslavia's self-image is based on what we have described in 
the preceding chapter as the "Partisan Myth."-^ Its purpose is two­
fold. First, to ensure the leading role of the Communists in the 
country. Secondly, it provides the country's numerous nationalities 
with a sense of common destiny. The "Partisan Myth" pervades their 
everyday existence. It is the criterion of both leadership and 
"Yugoslavism."^®
^Danilo Kedid, "Figyeld: A JKp Vaj.dasagban A Felkelds
Elokdszitdsenek Es Meginditdsdnak Napjaiban," trans. Jozsef Kollin 
in Hid. XXV (Sept., 1961), 784-92; Danilo Kedid, "Emldkalbum A 
Forradalom 20. Evforduldjdra: A Hdboru Es A Jugoszlav Nepek
Forradalma 1941-Tol 1945-Ig," trans. Jozsef Kollin in Hid, XXV (Nov., 
1961), 981-83.
-^Constantin Daicoviciu, et al., Rumania (Bucharest: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1959), p. 92f.; Keith Hitchins, "Book 
Review: Istoria Rominiei, Vol. I," Balkan Studies, IV (1963), 181-83;
G. Unc, "Book Review; E. I. Rubinshteyn: The Downfall of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy," and T. Lungu, "Book Review: History of Rumania,
Vol. 4," Analele Institutului De Istoria A Partidului De Pe Langa CC 
AL PMR. Vol. 10 (1964), trans. in Rumanian Press Survey No. 451 
(Radio Free Europe, Sept. 26, 1964), pp. 2-8; "New Books: 'Transyl­
vania in the History of the Romanian People'— C. C. Giurescu," 
Documents. Articles and Information on Romania, XIX (Jun. 30, 1968), 
14-15.
-^See chapter I.
^^Yugoslavia's Way, pp. 188-89, 192-93; Dennison I. Rusinow,
"A note on Yugoslavia," American University Field Staff Reports 
Service. Southeast Europe Series, XI, No. 5 (DIR-5-64), pp. 558-60; 
Bogdan Smiljevid and Horde Knezevid, A Legujabb Kor Tortdnete trans. 
Kdlmdn Csehdk (Subotica, Yugoslavia; Minerva Konyvkiadd Vdllalat, 
1965), pp. 221-24.
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The myth is based on the national liberation struggles of
World War II. This concrete historical experience consecrates the
Partisan leaders of the time as the saviors of national independence 
61and honor. It provides, at the same time, a common enemy, a common
danger, against which all Yugoslavs must unite. This outside threat
is German imperialism. Even in present-day Yugoslavia it is viewed
62as the foremost outside threat to the independence of the country.
It is played up in the press and in formal government foreign policy 
pronouncements. The persistence of anti-German sentiment, is one 
of the most effective means of uniting the country internally.
After the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, the danger of Comiformist 
intervention was also utilized in a similar w a y . 63 But, the "German 
threat" is more effective because it is based on a bloodier histori­
cal experience and at the same time is more easily fitted into the
6-^lbid., Ch. V, particularly pp. 206-16; Kedid, "Figyeld: A
JKP Vajdasagban A Felkelds ElSkdszitdsdnek Efs Meginditdsdnak 
Napjaiban," pp. 786-92.
62See particularly Jcsip Broz Tito, "What We Need is Peace," 
Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 22 (Apr.-Jun., 1966), p. 51.
Also see Punisa Perovic, "Twenty-five Years of the Yugoslav Revolu­
tion," Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 22 (Apr.-Jun., 1966), 
pp. 3-28; Koca Popovic, "Power-Politics--The Greatest Danger," 
Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 18 (Apr.-Jun., 1965), pp. 32-44.
^^smiljevid, A Legujabb Kor Tdrtdnete, pp. 244-48; Hoffman, 
Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 128-51; Wolff, The Balkans in 
Our Time, pp. 352-77.
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ideological prerequisites of Yugoslavia. ®‘+
The "Partisan Myth" is not just based on antagonism to Germany, 
but also contains a sense of mission, which gives the myth its supra­
national appeal. The Partisans in World War II had been fighting not 
just against Germany, but also against world reaction and racism.®®
The legacy of fighting both these retrogade tendencies, has given the 
present-day leaders of the country the reputation of being true 
internationalists. As leaders of the "progressive forces?1 of history, 
they have depended on the unity and solidatiry of all nationalities 
within the country. Partisans were not just Serbs, Croatians, or 
Macedonians, but primarily Yugoslavs. They wanted to rid the whole 
country of German occupation and not just certain parts of it.®®
One has to be in Yugoslavia only a few days to see and feel 
the everyday role of the Partisan myth. This distinctly Communist 
Yugoslavian "political culture" is manifest everywhere. One encoun­
ters this supra-ethnic glue not only in the Partisan dominance of the 
Government, but also in the everyday existence of the people. Radio 
programs devote a great deal of attention to it. For example, programs
®^"Proletarian internationalism" as such demands more under­
standing of Soviet errors than of the errors of "capitalist" West 
Germany. See Yugoslavia’s Way, pp. 65-67, 72-74, 76-79.
®®Ibid., pp. xviii-xix, 18-19; Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the 
New Communism, pp. 69-80.
®6Ibid.. pp. 71-77.
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called "Partisan Songs" are a part of the weekly schedule of most 
Yugoslav radio stations.67 Besides radio and television, the myth is 
propagated in the history books, schools, journals, and periodicals
of Yugoslavia.68
In Rumania, the country's political-cultural self-image is 
similarly disseminated by the ruling elite. However, the self-image 
of Rumania lacks the supra-national appeal of the "Partisan Myth." It 
is much more ethnocentric in its emphasis. However, even if it is 
more narrowly "socialist patriotic," it does not possess the coherence 
of its Yugoslavian counterpart. In Rumania, we encounter two, rather 
than just one, self-image myth. For the sake of brevity, we have 
called them the "August 23rd Myth" and the "Daco-Roman Myth" respec­
tively. 69
As we had occasion to indicate in Chapter I, the "August 23rd 
Myth" is based on the Rumanian switch from the Axis to the Allied 
camp.7® To the early 1960's this "heroic act" of the Rumanian people-- 
led by the Communist Party--was not used to belittle the role of other
6?Radio Belgrade has had "Partisan Songs" as a regular pro­
gram on Saturday mornings at 10:15 A.M. See "Belgradi Musor,"
Dolgozdk. XIX (July 22, 1966), p. 14,
68smiljevid, A Legujabb Kor TSrtdnete, Ch. V, pp. 146-224; 
Kedic, "Figyelfi: A JKP Vajdasrfgban A  Felkelds Eldkdszitesenek ^s
Meginditds^nak Napjaiban," pp. 784-92; Kedid, "Emldkalbum A 
Forradalom 20 Evforduldjdra: A Haboru tfs A Jugoszldv Ndpek
Forradalma 1941-Tdl 1945-Ig," pp. 981-83.
*For a definition of these myths, see Chapter I.
70Ibid.
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national groups in the country. But, it always had the potential of 
becoming the "progressive tradition" only of ethnic Rumanians. The 
reason for this was twofold. First, Rumania had been an active, and 
in some ways the most enthusiastic, supporter of the Nazi onslaught 
against the U.S.S.R. Thus, the Germans were never looked upon as "the 
enemy." In this way, the overthrow of Antonescu and the desertion of 
the German cause, became an indication of repentence rather than the 
unfolding of a great "national liberation struggle" as was the case in 
Yugoslavia.^ This made a scapegoat of Rumania's past rather than of 
German imperialism. The "August 23rd Myth" was, therefore, rooted in 
an intra-national purgation, a national "desire" for repentence.
This made it a distinctly Rumanian experience, since the nationali­
ties in Transylvania did not partake of this historic event.^
The second reason why the August event was more narrowly 
Rumanian, was its motivation. The realization that Germany was losing 
the war and that the Red Army was already on the country’s eastern 
borders, made it evident that only a switch would give Rumania the 
opportunity to diminish its territorial losses. As we pointed out in
■̂*\An example of this "guilt complex" is Nistor, "Example of 
the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," p. 18.
72while the switch as a whole was primarily a Rumanian under­
taking the nationalities were strongly represented in the Rumanian 
Communist Party. The latter, in turn, played an important role in 
engineering Antonescu's overthrow. See Wolff, The Balkans in Our 
Time, pp. 278-92. For an overstatement of this role also consult 
"Celebration of August 23," Documents, Articles and Information on 
Romania. XVIII (Sept. 5, 1967), 1.
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the preceding chapter, the ownership of Transylvania hung in the 
balance.^3 The switch, therefore, became symbolic of the Rumanian 
campaign to make territorial gains in Transylvania. This campaign was, 
of course, the exact opposite of what the Hungarians in Northern 
Transylvania desired.̂
The only consideration that kept the "August 23rd Myth" from 
becoming a purely Rumanian tradition, was the role of the Red A m y .
Its advance was the most direct reason for the overthrow of Antonescu 
and the re-deployment of the Rumanian army against the Germans and 
Hungarians in Transylvania. Furthermore, the Red Army carried the 
brunt of the fighting against both the Germans and the Hungarians.
It also kept the Rumanians from carrying out atrocities against the 
nationalities of Transylvania. Thus, the process of "liberation" 
was not a purely Rumanian achievement, but more a consequence of 
Soviet military might.^
More recent Rumanian interpretations of this event bear this 
out. While in the past the assistance of the Red Army was always
^ S e e  Chapter I.
^^This fear of Rumanian rule led many to welcome the Soviet 
occupation of the area, as well as to support the Communists. See 
Theodor Schieder (ed.), The Expulsion of the German Population from 
Hungary and Rumania (A selection and translation from Dokumentation 
Per Vertreibung Per Peutschen Aus Ost-Mitte1-Europa: Bonn: The
Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1961), III, 
85; Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston; Meador 
Publishing Company, 1949), pp. 215-17.
7  5 Schieder, The Expulsion of the German Population from 
Hungary and Rumania, III, 63-68, 77-78; Wolff, The Balkans in Our 
Time, pp. 239-42.
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acknowledged, recent statements on the significance of this event have 
de-emphasized the Soviet role. They have attempted to judge the event 
as a great national act of emancipation.76
Apparently this "myth" has not been enough to provide present- 
day Rumania with an adequate historical foundation. To make up for 
its deficiencies, it has been supplemented with the "Daco-Roman M y t h . "77 
The latter had provided the foundations for the pre-Communist Rumanian 
self-image. This does not seem to disturb the present leaders of the 
country. While the re-adoption of this national myth was gradual, it 
is at present at least as important as the "August 23rd Myth." Al­
ready in the middle of the 1950's there were indications that this 
myth would be re-suscitated, but it was only in the early 1960's that 
its re-adoption was complete.78 Ever since, it has been incorporated
7%hile in 1959, Daicoviciu, et al., Rumania, p. 143, praised 
the role of the "glorious Soviet Armies" in the liberation of the coun­
try, by the summer of 1964— on the occasion of the 20th anniversary 
of Rumania's "liberation"— the role of the Red Army was ignored or 
merely mentioned. See for example, "The Great Anniversary" and "It 
Happened in August 1944," Rumania Today, 116 (1964), pp. 1-5; David 
Binder, "Bucharest Plays Down Arrival of Mikoyan for Liberation Fete," 
New York Times (Aug..21, 1964), p. 2; David Binder, "Rumania Enjoys 
Being Red Mecca," New York Times (Aug. 24, 1964); George Bailey, 
"Trouble Over Transylvania," The Reporter. XXXI (Nov. 19, 1964), 27.
^7por a definition, see Chapter I.
78paicoviciu, et al., Rumania, pp. 92ff., presents one of the 
earlier reiterations of the Daco-Roman pre-supposition. Since 1959, 
the theme has become more and more popular in historical interpreta­
tions. See Hitchins, "Book Review: Istoria Rominiei, Vol. I," pp.
181-83; "New Books: 'Transylvania in the History of the Romanian
People'— C.C. Giurescu," pp. 14-15; "Party and State Leaders in 
Hunedoara Region," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, XVII 
(Nov. 5, 1966), 6 ; Short Document on Rumania (Bucharest: Agerpres,
1964), pp. 7-8.
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into Party statements, university studies, historical education, and
every other phase of Rumanian life where self-consciousness is
7 9developed and inculcated. 7 This has gone so far that Party leaders 
tdking about agricultural development, for example, will refer to the 
"flourishing agriculture" of "our ancestors, the Dacians."®®
The growing importance of the "Daco-Roman" myth is particu­
larly menacing for the non-Rumanian inhabitants of Transylvania, 
because it is based on purely ethnic Rumanian beliefs and traditions. 
At least in the case of the "August 23rd" myth, the role of Communist 
solidarity was not completely lost from sight. This, however, is 
completely missing from the "Daco-Roman" myth. Thus, the non- 
Rumanians become, in effect, "foreigners" in the land.®-*-
National self-images in both Rumania and Yugoslavia, provide 
the citizens with a simplified and symbolic definition of their 
origins, their present state of development, and their glorious
7 9/7As an example see "Culture, Art, Science: Premiere of the
Film 'The Dacians,'" Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, 
XVIII (Feb. 20, 1967), 8-9.
o n "Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Romanian Communist party," Documents,
Articles and Information on Romania, XVII (March 15, 1966), 2.
81Oi0fficially they are designated as "co-inhabiting nationali­
ties." While this designation is neutral enough in meaning, the 
context in which it is frequently used gives the impression that these 
non-Rumanians were late-comers in Transylvania. In actuality both 
the Magyars and Saxons have a longer recorded history in the area than 
the Rumanians. This "mistake" is inadvertantly picked up and per­
petuated by some Western reports. See for example Kenneth Ames, 
"Rumania is Home for 15 Different 'Nationalities,'" The Washington 
Post, Nov. 26, 1967, p. H5.
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future. These self-images are less precise than the ideological basis 
of the two countries. But, at the same time these "myths" orient the 
everyday behavior of the man in the street. This has far-reaching im­
plications for the national minorities of both countries. In Yugo­
slavia, the "Partisan" myth guarantees for the Vojvodinian Hungarians 
a part of the past, present, and future of the country. In Rumania, 
on the other hand, both the "Daco-Roman" and the "August 23rd" myths
opdeny them a part of the past. This means, in effect, that they will 
have a present and a future only insofar as they assimilate them­
selves into the traditions of the "indivisible" and "unitary"
Rumanian nation-state.
Up to this point we have pointed out some of the major differ­
ences in the ideological and political-cultural self-images of both 
Rumania and Yugoslavia. Similarities have also been indicated. But, 
perhaps, the most important similarity has not been adequately 
stressed. This is, the dependence of both countries on an ideology, 
which when translated into practice, always demands centralization; 
a centralization, which is based on the respective Communist parties'
82to be fair, the nationalities are given a place in Rumania's 
history. Whenever "class unity" is stressed, the role of the nation- 
alities--"fighting shoulder to shoulder" with their Rumanian brothers-- 
is always mentioned in peasant uprisings as well as in the revolutions 
of 1848. Along this line see Pdl Binder, "Avram Lancu Levelezdse," 
Korunk, XXIII (Mar., 1964), 425-27; Tibor OlAh, "Moldva is Kavasalfbld 
Egyesul^s^nek Centen^riuma," Igaz Szd, VII (Jan., 1959), 7; "Party and 
State Leaders' Visit to the Mures Magyar Autonomous Region," Documents, 
Articles and Information on Romania, XVII (Sept. 6 , 1966), 13.
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monopolies of interpretation regarding the "true faith.
II. The Constitutional Position of the 
National Minorities
In the case of both Yugoslavia and Rumania, the constitutions 
concretely reflect these ideological, political-cultural similarities 
and differences. For the Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina 
it is these overt constitutional statements, that define both their 
obligations and rights.
In Rumania
As changes have taken place in the interpretation of "prole­
tarian internationalism" and "bourgeois nationalism," the government 
has been quick to register these changes in its p o l i c i e s . T h i s  is, 
perhaps, best illustrated by the constitutional evolution of Rumania 
since World War II. All three postwar constitutions (1948, 1952, 1965) 
and their major revisions, demonstrate how political re-interpretations
^ F o r  this ideological centralization see Seton-Watson, The 
East European Revolution, pp. 339-40.
OAOHIn examining the "legal" basis of modern Rumania one should 
keep in mind Randolph L. Braham's statement in "The Rumanian Constitu­
tion of 1952," Journal of Central European Affairs, XVIII (July,
1958), 178, that the Rumanian state "like the Soviet state, is not a 
juridical state in the true sense of the word. Its government is not 
based upon a compromise of rules of law to which all citizens, irrespec­
tive of their ideological conceptions or political affiliations, are 
equally submitted. In Marxist terminology the Soviet state, like the 
state of People’s Democracy, is a 'class state,1 a state of class 
dictatorship. Since in such a state, the people as a whole are iden­
tified with the Party, if not with its leading hierarchy, the consti­
tution of the People's Republic must be considered primarily from 
its political and propaganda aspect rather than from a strictly 
formalistic or legalistic point of view."
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have altered the legal obligations and rights of the Hungarians in 
Transylvania.
Two major kinds of rights have been guaranteed to the inhabi- 
tants of Rumania by their constitutions.00 These have been individual 
and group r i g h t s . T h e  guarantees provided for individuals, affect 
all inhabitants of Rumania. These include certain civil, social and 
political rights.
All three constitutions provide Rumanian citizens, "irrespec­
tive of nationality or race, . . . equal rights in all fields of
QCJThe evolution of the Rumanian Constitution can be traced 
through four major documents. These include: The Constitution of the
People's Republic of Romania (Washington, D.C.: Rumanian Legation,
1948); "Constitution of the Rumanian People's Republic 1952" in 
Constitutions of Nations, ed. Amos J. Peaslee (Second Edition; Hague, 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 1956), III; Constitution of the
Rumanian People's Republic, As Amended Up to 1958 (Bucharest: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1958); "Draft Constitution of the Socialist 
Republic of Rumania" (A Supplement to Documents, Articles and Informa- 
tii-i on Romania; [Bucharest: "Agerpres," 1965]). Regarding early
post-war constitutional developments also see Braham, "The Rumanian 
Constitution of 1952," pp. 160-62; Stephen Fischer-Galati, "The 
Constitutional System," Romania (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
1957), pp. 106-8; Short Document on Romania, pp. 12, 15-16.
Preceding any Constitutional guarantees, the Peace Treaty 
of 1947, demanded that the rights of the minorities be respected by 
Rumania. Regarding this, see Amelia C. Leiss and Raymond Dennett 
(eds.) European Peace Treaties After World War II (Worcester, Mass.:
The Commonwealth Press, 1954), p. 299; "The Hungarian Minority 
Problem in Rumanis," Bulletin of the International Commission of 
Jurists, No. 17 (Dec., 1963), p. 73.
87since special privileges are not to be tolerated for any 
group, "group rights" are not specifically designated in the Consti­
tution.
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QOeconomic, political and cultural activity."00 This includes the 
right to work, "that is, the right to guaranteed employment and pay­
ment for their work in accordance with the quantity and quality."®^
It also includes the right "to rest and leisure"; " . . .  the right to 
maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability";
. the right to education"; and the right of "freedom of con-
..90 science."
Besides these social and economic rights, citizens are also 
guaranteed certain civil rights which are familiar in Western demo-
Q 1cracies. These include: freedom of speech, press, and assembly.
Not only are they guaranteed, but they are also "ensured by placing 
at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations, 
printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets
^"Constitution of 1952," Art. 81, p. 249; "Draft Constitution 
of 1965," Art. 17, p. 7. (Note: In the discussion that follows, most
citations will be based on the Constitutions of 1952 and 1965 respec­
tively. Reference to the Constitution of 1948 or the Constitution as 
amended to 1958, will be made only when there are important or inter­
esting changes to be taken into account.)
®^Ibid., Art. 18, pp. 7-8; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 77,
p. 249.
^®For these rights see: Ibid., Arts. 78. 79 and 84, pp. 249-
50; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Arts. 19, 20, 21 and 30, pp. 8 , 11; 
Short Document on Rumania, p. 15.
^Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," pp. 173-74; 
"Constitution of 1952," Art. 85, p. 250; "Draft Constitution of 1965," 
Art. 28, p. 11.
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Q2communications facilities and other material requisites . . .113 In 
this way, Rumanians are able to organize, they have "the right to 
unite in public organizations, trade unions, cooperative societies, 
women and youth organizations, sports organizations and cultural, 
technical and scientific societies." Furthermore, they are guaranteed 
inviolability of person; and their homes and "privacy of correspond­
ence are protected by law,,"^ Closely related are their right to the
Q Aballot, their right to public trial and equality before the law.
In practice these rights are more illusory than real. Their 
existence extends only a paper guarantee to the Rumanians of the 
Regat and nationalities of Transylvania. Their constant viola­
tion weighs heavily on majority and minority nationalities alike. 
However, while both suffer, the minorities usually bear the brunt of 
these violations. Not only are these paper guarantees frequently 
violated, but they are qualified and hedged in by <te jure stipulations 
as well. These we will consider later.
^ "Constitution of 1952," Art. 85, p. 250. This is missing 
from later documents. As Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," 
p. 174, points out, "Freedom of the press, of speech, and the like, 
is consequently conceived no longer as a right of the citizen, but 
as a purveyance of the state. The right and freedom of the citizen 
to write, to publish, or otherwise express his views— as conceived 
in the classical theory— has now been reduced to the right to express 
views that are in line with the propaganda, or tactical needs of the 
Party."
^ I b i d .; "Constitution of 1952," Arts. 86-88, pp. 250-51; 
"Draft Constitution of 1965," Arts. 25, 27, 31-36, pp. 9-12.
^ I b i d .; "Constitution of 1952," Arts. 65, 69, 81, 93, pp. 
248-51. The Constitution of 1948, Art. 16, p. 5, expressed these 
rights in clearer language than the later documents.
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Group rights, as such, supposedly do not exist in Communist
Rumania. Theoretically, there are no privileged elements; and all are,
95therefore, under the auspices of the same socialist legality. Yet 
in spite of this contention, many of the laws and constitutional 
guarantees are aimed at the enhancement or restriction of certain 
groups. One need only refer to the special position of the CPR to 
appreciate this point.^
Besides the CPR and its satellite organizations, the post-war 
constitutions have all recognized the existence of churches and 
"cults."97 However, this recognition has involved less rights and 
more restrictions. The only concrete guarantees are two. We have 
already mentioned one, the "freedom of conscience" statement, which 
is listed among social rights. The only further concession in this 
area, relates to the right of churches to "special schools for train­
ing the personnel of the cult."^® While these "rights" are meager,
95"(jonstituti&.i of 1952," Arts. 65, 81, pp. 248-50; "Draft 
Constitution of 1965," Arts. 13, 17, pp. 6-7.
^ Ibid., Art. 26, p. 10, states that; "The Rumanian Communist 
Party expresses and loyally serves the aspirations and vital interests 
of the people, implements the role of leader in all fields of socialist 
construction, and directs the activity of the mass and public 
organizations and of the state bodies." "Constitution of 1952," Art. 
8 6, p. 251, stated almost exactly the same thing.
97The guarantees to women may also be viewed as "group" 
rights, although in this case, as in the case of the nationalities, 
the rights are given not to set them off with special privileges, 
but to equalize their position with that of the rest of the popula­
tion. Ibid., Art. 83, p. 250; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 23, 
p. 9
^ I b i d ., Art. 30, p. 11; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 84, p.
250.
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by defining the position of the churches they indirectly also define 
the restrictions placed on the spiritual life of the nationalities in 
T r a n s y l v a n i a . ^^ Aside from religious services in their own language, 
the Hungarians can no longer rely on their churches for the protec­
tion of their national culture.
The development of the national cultures of the respective 
minorities is, however, guaranteed. This "right" of nationality 
groups is sanctioned as long as it is provided with a "socialist 
content." To this end, the constitution provides the national minori­
ties with the guarantee of "the free use of their own language, tui­
tion of all categories in their own language, and books, newspapers,
X COand theatres in their own language." It also obligates the 
Rumanian state to ensure "the development of the culture of the 
Rumanian people and of . . . the national minorities . . ."101 While 
these guarantees are supposed to apply throughout Transylvania 
(throughout Rumania for that matter), they have been applied in prac­
tice mainly in the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region (prior to 1960 
called Magyar Autonomous Region and since January 1968 called
^Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time. pp. 550, 559-63, describes 
briefly the significance of the interrelationships between church 
membership and nationality, and their affect on Communist anti- 
religious campaigns.
^^''Constitution Df 1952," Art. 82, p. 250; "Draft Constitu­
tion of 1965," Art. 22, p. 9.
l^lBraham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 176; 
"Constitution of 1952," Art. 17, paragraph j, p. 242.
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Hargita and Covasna Counties.1^2
Parallel to these cultural rights, the Hungarians are also 
guaranteed equal treatment before the law irrespective of "national-
1 A Oity or race." This is underscored by the stipulation that judi­
cial procedure "in the regions and districts inhabited by a 
population of another nationality than Rumanian, the use of the mother 
tongue of that population is a s s u r e d . T h o s e  unfamiliar with the 
language of the judicial proceedings are guaranteed an interpretation 
and a summary in their own language.
In the former Magyar Autonomous Region, these rights were for 
a time put into practice. The special character and unique constitu­
tional position of this area, made the practical application of 
these rights possible. The Rumanian Constitution of 1952, attempted 
to make this region the model of Leninist-Stalinist "proletarian
•^^Ibid., Preamble, p. 239; Arts. 58, 82, pp. 247, 250.
Later documents skirt the question of local "autonomy." In this they 
are reverting to the position of the earliest post-war Constitution.
See Constitution of 1948, Arts. 75-85, p. 20. For the territorial 
alterations of the Magyar Autonomous Region, see; Gyula Miklds, "A 
Roman Nepkdztdrsasagban 1950 6ta Vdgrehajtott Kozigarzgatdsi- 
Gazdasdgi Kdrzetbeosztdsok Ndhdny Tapasztalata," Fdldrajzi KOzlemdnyek, 
IX [LXXXV] (1961), 307-25; Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement 
of the Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist 
Republic of Romania," pp. 1-30.
•'•̂ Short Document on Rumania, p. 4; "Constitution of 1952," 
Art. 81, p. 249; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Arts. 17, 102, pp. 7-30.
^^Tbid., Art. 102, p. 30; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 6 8 , p.
248.
•*~̂ I b i d .; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 102, p. 30.
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internationalism,"*-®8 It stipulated that: "In the Rumanian People's
Republic, administrative territorial autonomy is ensured to the 
Magyar population of the Szekely districts, where it forms a compact 
mass."*-®^ Herein, the "compact Magyar Szdkely population . . . has 
its autonomous administrative body elected by the population of the 
Autonomous Region."-*-®® This had ensured the local population "self- 
government," at least to the extent that they were governed by in­
dividuals of their own nationality, or individuals who could speak 
109their language.
This, of course, is no longer the case today. The administra­
tive "reforms" of 1960 and 1968, as well as the Constitution of 1965, 
have ended all local "autonomy" in the area. The administrative re­
organization of 1960, re-drew the boundaries of this compact Magyar 
settled area in such a way that it became ethnically more diverse.*-*-® 
Its new name--Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region--signified this as well. 
The crowning blow to Magyar "self-rule" came with the adoption of the 
Constitution of 1965. This document no longer even mentions the
*-®8Daicoviciu, et al., Rumania, pp. 149-50, 859; Braham, "The 
Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 164; Nistor, "Example of the Soviet 
Union is a Guiding Light," p. 18.
-'-^"Constitution of 1952," Preamble, p. 239.
108Ibid.. Art. 58, p. 247.
109Ibid.. Art. 82, p. 250.
-*"-*-®J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The 
World Today. XIX (Nov., 1963), 506.
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111existence of an "autonomous" or a "Magyar inhabited" region. Yet,
the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region continued to exist for three more
years, when the administrative re-organization of January 1968, swept
112it out of existence.
In reality, this abolition of "Magyar autonomy," was more
important symbolically than in terms of practice. From its beginnings
the "autonomy" of the area had meant very little aside from propaganda
value. The very idea of "autonomy" within the "unitary" and "indivis-
113able" Rumanian People's Republic, seemed a contradiction. Had 
Rumania been a federal state (even a pseudo federal state like the 
U.S.S.R.), the "autonomous" label would have caused much less mis­
understanding. But, in the context of the country's avowed unitary 
organization, it was no more than a label which did confuse and mis-
■*-^0nly Art. 15 admits, that one of the regions composing the 
territory of the Socialist Republic of Rumania is called the "Mures- 
Magyar Autonomous" region. See "Draft Constitution of 1965," p. 7. 
Aside from this one mention nothing else is said about this region, 
its powers, or its purpose. As opposed to this, the 1952 document 
devoted Arts. 18-21 and 57-58, to an elaborate, even propagandistic, 
description of this region. See "Constitution of 1952," pp. 242, 247.
112"Qrand National Assembly Session: New Administrative-
Territorial Organization of Romania," Documents, Articles and Informa­
tion on Romania, XIX (Feb. 24, 1968), 3-4, and map of new subdivisions 
on pp. 8-9; Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Admin­
istrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania," pp. 1-30.
^-^"Constitution of 1952," Art. 17, p. 241; Fischer-Galati, 
"The Constitutional System," Romania, p. 108; Daicoviciu, et al,, 
Rumania, p. 85.
^Daicoviciu, Ibid., p. 860, reflects this confusion of terms 
when he states that: "The special feature of the Magyar Autonomous
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The deceiving nature of the autonomy was evident from the 
Region’s powers and from its relations with the central authority.
Like its Soviet counterparts, it was completely dependent on the cen­
tral authority. The autonomous region's position was the same vis-a- 
vis Bucharest as that of any other r e g i o n . i t s  only claim to 
distinction was that both Rumanian and Hungarian were official 
languages. In the other regions Rumanian was the only official 
language. Otherwise, the autonomous region's grant of powers and 
form of government was identical with the other regions of the country. 
Its People's Council was responsible for the local administration of 
economic and cultural matters and it ensured "the maintenance of 
public order, the observance of the law and the protection of the 
rights of citizens it also drew up the local budget and
Region— which is an integral part of the Rumanian People's Republic—  
is its autonomous administration, whose official languages are the 
Hungarian and the Rumanian and which is elected by the people of the 
region." But this description is only as misleading as the constitu­
tional provisions for its existence. As the article "Erddly- 
Transylv^nia IX." Szabad Magyarsag. IV (Aug. 16, 1959), 1, maintains: 
"The so-called 'Hungarian Autonomous Territory . . . (is) but a mis­
leading name designed for foreign consumption."
■̂ ■’"Constitution of 1953," Arts. 18-21, 51-63, pp. 242, 247- 
48; A Former Member of the Bucharest Bar, "The R.P.R. Constitution," 
Captive Rumania, ed. Alexandre Cretzianu (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 292, gives the official definition of a 
region as an "administrative and economic unit, circumscribed terri­
torially, that carries out the policy of the party and government." 
Compare these statements and articles with Constitution (Fundamental 
Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; As Amended and Added 
to at the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.j>.j3 .R. Fifth 
Convocation (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), Arts.
13-28, 79-88a, 89-101, pp. 23-33, 73-90.
^--^"Constitution of 1952," Arts. 53, 57, 58, p. 247.
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organized "the active participation of the working people in the 
management of state and public affairs, and in the building of 
Socialism. " H ?
While these powers seem to be far-reaching, it should not be 
forgotten that the People's Councils have never had an independent 
basis of power. They are merely the organs of state power in the
I I Qregions. Furthermore, the Rumanian Constitution states that de­
cisions and orders of the People's Councils are limited by the rights 
vested in them by it and the central government. In the case of 
the autonomous region, this restriction was carried even further by 
the demand that statutes, "drawn up by the People's Council of the
Autonomous Region," must be submitted to and approved by the Grand
120National Assembly of the R.P.R. It was also stated that: "The
Ibid., Arts. 53, 54, p. 247. According to Endre Istv^nfy, 
"Asszimilalddas Erd^lyben," Lirmafa, III (Oct.-Dec., 1956), 11, 
"building socialism" was (and is), the major function of the "autonomy" 
of the Magyar region and of the educational-cultural concessions to 
the minorities.
USsraham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 170, seems 
to imply in his reference to Soviet constitutional theory, that the 
People's Councils have directive power. While Braham does not clarify 
the nature of this "directive power," it is clear that all such power 
is derived from the central authority, the Party, rather than the 
local constituency.
H9"Constitution of 1952," Art. 55, p. 247; "Draft Constitu­
tion of 1965," Art. 70 paragraph 10 and 11, Art. 92, pp. 23, 28.
^^"Constitution of 1952," Art. 21, p. 242, presents a sig­
nificantly different wording from the newer version of Art. 21 to be 
found in Constitution of 1952 as Amended to 1958, p. 22. The latter 
document presents the wording above, using the word "statutes" to 
designate legislative enactments of the local People's Council. The 
old version, as presented in the former document, refers to "Statute"
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laws of the R.P.R. and the decisions and orders of the central organs 
of the state are compulsory on the territory of the Magyar Autonomous 
Region."
The extent of the region's "autonomy" was, perhaps, most
dramatically demonstrated by the recent alterations (December, 1960
122and January, 1968) of its borders and composition. Unlike the 
States of the federal United States system, the Magyar Autonomous 
Region had no right to any specific border. The boundaries of all 
regions are determined in Bucharest. The Constitution states, that 
the Grand National Assembly (which is the supreme organ of state 
power) has direct competence "to amend the division into regions
in capital letters, implying that theMagyar Autonomous Region had a 
sort of "constitution" which was to be drawn-up locally and to be 
approved later by the Grand National Assembly. As the amended version 
indicates, however, by 1958, any such plan for a separate "Statute" 
had been abandoned.
^-"Constitution of 1952," Arts. 20, 46, pp. 242, 245-46.
^•^Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," p. 506; 
Ceausescu,"Exposition on the improvement of the Administrative 
Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania," 
pp. 1-30; "Grand National Assembly Session; New Administrative- 
Territorial Organization of Romania," pp. 3-4, 8-9.
123iiQonstjLtution of 1952," Art. 22, p. 243; "Draft Constitu­
tion of 1965," Arts. 42, 43, pp. 13-15; Short Document on Rumania, p.
15. This "supremacy," however, should be accepted with a grain of 
salt, for as Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 167, 
points out, the Party alone is supreme. This is demonstrated by the 
Party's complete control over the nomination of candidates to the 
Grand National Assembly. As Braham states, ", . . i n  spite of the 
constitutional primacy of the Assembly in legislative matters, its 
main function, like that of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., is 
the ratification of governmental decrees. It is also the forum 
through which governmental policies are publicized and rubber-stamped 
for public approval,"
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of the territory of the Rumanian People's R e p u b l i c T h i s  leaves 
very little substance either to autonomy or to self-government.
The powers of the Presidium (now called State Council) of the 
Grand National Assembly and those of the Prosecutor-General, also 
circumscribe local rule. The powers of the Presidium or State Council, 
"to proclaim a state of emergency in certain localities or throughout 
the country in order to maintain public order and state security,"^5 
certainly indicates the insignificance of the former regional autonomy. 
The provisions which delineate the powers of the Prosecutor-General, 
do likewise. As Art. 76 of the amended 1952 Constitution stated:
"The organs of the Prosecutor's Office carry out their functions 
independently of any local body and are subordinate only to the 
Prosecutor-General of the Rumanian People's Republic."126
Besides these de jure restrictions on regional governments, 
there are also constitutional restrictions on individuals, private 
groups and religious institutions. Individual rights are circumscribed 
by obligations as well as outright restrictions. The obligation to 
obey the laws passed by the Grand National Assembly, or decreed by the 
Presidium (State Council), or by the Council of Ministers--is
^^■"Constitution of 1952," Art. 24, paragraph h, p. 243;
"Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 43, paragraph 7, p. 14.
^^Ibid., Art. 64, paragraph g, p. 21; "Constitution of 1952," 
Art. 37, p. 245. Emphasis not in original.
^ ^Constitution of 1952 as Amended to 1958, p. 52. More recent 
statements of these powers are less specific. See "Draft Constitution 
of 1965," Arts. 106-109, pp. 31-32. Emphasis not in original.
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127compulsory for everyone throughout the country. ' Military obliga­
tions and loyalty to the state are also stated unequivocally. But 
even the guaranteed rights of free organization, assembly, speech and 
press are qualified. Breaches of socialist legality through the abuse 
of these rights are provided for. An example of this is the restric­
tion regarding membership in "any association of a fascist or anti­
democratic character."129 party interpretation determines when such 
a breach of socialist legality has taken place.
Individual rights are inadequately defended by the Rumanian 
constitutional order for a number of reasons. One is that the 
judiciary is not independent. Furthermore,an individual can be
130easily arrested "upon the decision of [any] Court or Prosecutor." 
Decisions to arrest or to try individuals are based on "the Courts'
127"constitution of 1952," Arts. 27, 37 paragraph b, 46, pp. 
243-46; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 39, pp. 12-13.
^ ^Ibid., Art. 40, p. 13; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 91, p.
251.
•*~̂ I b i d .. Art. 86, p. 251; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art.
29, p. 11; Short Document on Rumania, p. 15, points out that the 
advocacy of war is also punishable by law.
^ ^ " C o n s t i t u t i o n  Qf 1952," Art. 87, p. 251; "Draft Constitu­
tion of 1965," Art. 31, p. 11; Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 
1952," p. 177, maintains that: "The constitutional provisions re­
garding the inviolability of the person are rendered meaningless by 
virtue of two legal stipulations. They are the exclusive privilege 
of the Communist Party or its affiliated organizations to nominate 
candidates in the election of judges, and the extra-judicial power of 
the Prosecutor-General to order arrests. Since there can be no writ 
of habeas corpus against the Prosecutor-General--always a loyal 
servant of the Party— it evidently follows that the arrest of any 
individual is left to the Prosecutor's discretion.
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role as defender of the people's democratic system and the conquests 
of the working people."-*-^ In the case of the rights of individuals 
belonging to minority nationalities, such a base for interpretation 
means that any guarantee of rights is at the same time also a restric­
tion. For example, one constitutional provision states that any dis­
crimination on the basis of "race or national membership, as well as 
any demonstration of chauvinism, race hatred, national hatred or 
nationalist chauvinist propaganda is punishable by laws."-*-^ This 
provision has a double edge. But, since Rumania no longer combats 
majority nationalism with the same vigor as minority nationalism, the 
provision acts adversely only on the latter. Thus, a provision
originally intended for the defense of minorities, has now become a
1 ̂tool for their oppression.
On the group level a similar use has been made of the restric­
tion against associating with a group that is "fascist or anti­
democratic ."134 xhis has placed the churches of the Hungarians into
■^--^"Constitution of 1952," Preamble, p. 239; Art. 65, p. 248;
A Former Member of the Bucharest Bar, "The R.P.R. Constitution," 
p. 289; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 95, p. 29.
•'••̂Ibid., Art. 17, p. 7; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 81, pp.
249-50.
Another limitation affecting both groups (e.g., German 
minority) and individuals, is the one placed on voting rights. See 
Ibid., Art. 94, pp. 251-52; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 25, 
pp. 9-10; Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 165, foot­
note 28.
134"Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 29, p. 11; "Constitution 
of 1952," Art. 8 6, p. 251.
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a particularly adverse position, since their contacts are mainly with
the "reactionary and imperialist anti-democratic" West. The churches
have, therefore, become the object of persecution. They have been
135denied any role in education as well as in social work. Only in 
the training of their own "religious staff," may the churches partici­
pate in education. Their remaining denominational organizations and 
functions are also strictly regulated.^6 This spells the end of the 
churches as effective breaks on the totalitarian nature of the regime. 
This also destroys them as independent sources of cultural support 
for the nationalities of Transylvania.
Rumania's legal definition of the place of minorities is any­
thing but clear. Nonetheless, certain tendencies are apparent in its 
constitutional development. They parallel the ideological and cul­
tural-political evolution of the country's self-image. In the legal 
position, too, it is possible to discern the drive toward a more 
unitary and centralized conception of Rumanian statehood. This more 
integral conception, leaves less opportunities to the nationalities of 
Transylvania to develop their respective cultures unhindered.
Communist Rumanians contend that each one of their post-war
^^Ibid., Art. 84, p. 250; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art.
30, p. 11.
^^Ibid., "Constitution of 1952," Art. 84, p. 250.
137To project a better image of Rumania, some of the pressure 
has been removed from the churches. For a limited indication of this, 
see "State Council President Nicolae Ceausescu Receives Chiefs of 
Cults of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania,
XIX (Mar. 15, 1968), 6-10.
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constitutions reflects a higher stage of development on the road to a
communist society. Thus, the constitution of April 13, 1948, is
viewed as corresponding to the needs of the nation in "the stage of
138formation . . .  of the socialist system." It, in effect, laid the 
foundations for the new Rumania. However, the growth of socialist 
state property and the "consciousness of the working people" made it 
necessary to adopt in September 24, 1952, "the second constitution of 
people's power."139 document reflected the stage of the expanding
"building of socialism."^®
The latest Rumanian constitution goes even further. It is a 
socialist constitution. While its two predecessors had made the 
country into a people's-democratic state, it has gone one giant step 
forward to "establish . . .  a higher stage, of the process of complet­
ing the building of socialism . . . the preparation of the prerequisites 
for the transition to c o m m u n i s m . I t  has transformed Rumania from a 
People's Republic into a Socialist Republic.
For the Hungarians of Transylvania this constitutional
1-^Traian Ionascu, "The Constitution of the Socialist Republic 
of Rumania," Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, XVI (Sept.
15, 1965), 7.
•*~̂ I b i d .; "The Fundamental Law of Socialist Rumania," Docu­
ments , Articles and Information on Rumania, XVI (July 10, 1965), 4.
^^Tbid., p. 5; Ionascu, "The Constitution of the Socialist
Republic of Rumania," p. 7; Nistor Prisca, "The Basic Law of Socialist
Rumania," Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, XVI (Aug.
20, 1965), 5.
^■^Ionascu, "The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of 
Rumania," p. 7.
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metamorphosis represents a more thorough integration of their existence 
into the life of the country as a whole. It also represents a 
diminution of their ability to defend their cultural heritage by re­
ferring to constitutional guarantees. The Socialist Constitution of 
1965, provides them with no "autonomy" and negligible "self-govern­
ment." It places them within the framework of a "unitary" and 
"indivisible" state, which provides them with some generalized guarantees 
of nationality rights. These rights, in turn, are counterbalanced with 
restrictions and obligations that make the original guarantees almost 
meaningless.
In Yugoslavia
A comparison of the constitutional developments of the two 
countries presents an interesting contrast. While both countries 
claim that their successive constitutions indicate higher and higher 
levels of socialist development toward communism, they are heading for 
this goal in opposed directions. In Rumania each successive constitu­
tion has led to more and more centralization. In Yugoslavia it has 
led to more and more de-centralization.
The Yugoslavian constitution has stressed decentralization, 
in large part, as a means of minimizing the recurrence of "super-state 
hegemony" and "bureaucratic c e n t r a l i s m . j n it represents a
reaction against both inter-war nationalism and post-war Stalinism.
While the Constitution of 1946 laid the foundations for a Stalinist- 
type state, its two successors, have been uniquely Yugoslavian. The
• ^ Yugoslavia’s Way, pp. 193, 195.
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document of 1946, made of Yugoslavia a People's Republic not unlike 
the emerging people's republics of satellite Eastern Europe. The one 
important difference was that it was a federal, rather than a unitary 
state system.
The 1953 Constitutional Law, although officially only a modi­
fication of the earlier document, was in actuality a completely new 
constitution. It aimed to create a "socialist democracy."144 jts 
interesting deviation from the 1946 constitution was that it did not 
guarantee either "sovereignty" or the "right of secession" to any of 
the Republic governments of the f e d e r a t i o n . A t  the same time, it 
increased the importance of the lowest levels of government (i.e., 
the commune level). For all the nationalities of the country this
^^Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 211-13; 
"Edvard Kardelj's Report on the Constitution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia," Documents: The Constitutional System of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Beograd; Review of Inter­
national Affairs, 1963), pp. 29-30. The evolution of the modern 
Yugoslavian Constitution can be traced through three major documents. 
These are: "Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo­
slavia [of Jan. 30, 1946]," Constitutions of Nations, ed. Amos J. 
Peaslee (Concord, New Hampshire: The Rumford Press, 1950), III,
522-41; "Fundamental Law Pertaining to the Bases of the Social and 
Political Organization of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 
and of the Federal Organs of State Authority [of Jan. 13, 1953], 
Constitutions of Nations, ed. Amos J. Peaslee (Second Edition; The 
Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 111,766-90; "Consti­
tution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Collection 
of Yugoslav Laws, ed. Borislav T. Blagojevic (Beograd: Institut of
Comparative Law, 1963).
■'•^Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 213.
■*^Compare "Constitution of 1946," Art. I, p. 522, with "Funda­
mental Law of 1953," Art. I, p. 766.
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meant more self-government on the local level, yet less self-government 
as corporate entities, or as distinct nationalities.
The Constitution of 1963, has continued to extend decentraliza­
tion. It, too, provides more "self-government" on the local level, 
while restricting the possibility of ethnic groups acting in concert 
against the interests of the federation as a whole. This makes the 
new document a "unifying" instrument, without making a "unitary" solu­
tion necessary.
According to Yugoslav legal experts, the Constitution of 1963,
"is the expression of a socialist society which is a humane democratic 
14.8community." It has transformed the Federal People's Republic of
149Yugoslavia into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The
meaning of this change is considered as part of "the withering away of 
1 SOstatehood." The two earlier constitutions had been merely "state
146Compare "Constitution of 1946," Arts. 90-114, pp. 535-38, 
with "Fundamental Law of 1953," Arts. 3, 4, 6 , 7, 100-114, pp. 767-68, 
788-90. Also see Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 211-14.
■^^"Socialist Constitution of 1963," Arts. 1, 6-9, 71-112, pp. 
12-14, 32-45. The result of this excessive decentralization has been 
to reduce the importance of Republican and Provincial governments.
These levels had given the nationalities (i.e., the Slavic "majority" 
nationalities) the possibility to act as corporate entities within 
the federation. For the non-Slavic nationalities this possibility 
had never really existed.
•^^Jovan Djordjevic, "Preface" to "Socialist Constitution of 
1963," p. IV.
^^Compare "Fundamental Law of 1953," Art. 1, p. 766, with 
"Socialist Constitution of 1963," Art. 1, p. 12.
•^^Djordjevid, "Preface," p. IV.
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Law." The new constitution, on the other hand, reduces the contradic­
tions existing between state and society. It "establishes a society" 
which is not separated according to social and political functions,
but is instead founded on "the whole social-political system of the
1.151country."
For the Hungarians of the Vojvodina, these changes indicate 
increased opportunities to participate in the social and political life 
of the country. However, such participation is open to them as indi­
viduals rather than as a group. This is born out by the specific 
parts of the present Constitution which discuss nationality rights. 
Unlike the Rumanian constitution of 1965, the Yugoslav document goes 
into a great deal of detail in its discussion of purpose, rights and 
governmental institutions in general, as well as in relation to 
nationality rights and obligations.
Already in the introductory part of the document, certain
1 5 2"Basic Principles" are enumerated. J Incorporating the Partisan 
tradition and some of Yugoslavia's own ideological innovations, the 
first such "principle" states:
The peoples of Yugoslavia, on the basis of the right of 
every people to self-determination, including the right to 
secession, on the basis of their common struggle and their will 
freely declared in the People's Liberation War and Socialist 
Revolution, and in accord with their historical aspirations 
. . . have united in a federal republic of free and equal
•̂ I b i d . 
•'•■^"Socialist Constitution of 1963," pp. 3-11.
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peoples and nationalities . . .̂ -*3 
The substance of this statement goes far beyond anything in the present 
Rumanian constitution. To be fair, it goes beyond anything that the 
Yugoslavs themselves consider feasible or desirable. For this reason, 
both the right to secession and the right to self-determination, are 
avoided in the body of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . S t i l l ,  their propagandis­
t s  use in the introduction, indicates confidence in the durability of 
Yugoslavia's unity. This type of confidence is nowhere evident in 
Rumania, where "indivisability" is tirelessly inveighed.
Article 1, stresses that the federation is based on the volun­
tary unity of "equal peoples."155 This unity involves the socialist 
republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Slovenia.-*-56 While no mention is made, at this point, of 
the Vojvodina, Chapter V, Article III, states that; "A republic may 
found autonomous provinces in accordance with the constitution in 
areas with distinctive national characteristics or in areas with other 
distinguishing features, on the basis of the express will of the 
population of these areas."157
• ^ Ibid., pp. 3-4.
■*--̂ See footnote 145 above.
■̂-’-’"Socialist Constitution of 1963," p. 12.
• ^ Ibid., Art. 2, p. 12.
^ ^ Ibid.. p. 45. Earlier discussions of "autonomy" in the 
Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija, contained somewhat more extensive 
guarantees. See "Constitution of 1946," Arts. 2, 103-106, pp. 522, 
536-37; "Fundamental Law of 1953," Arts. 44-49, 113-114, pp. 776-77, 
790.
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The Republic of Serbia has founded two such autonomous prov­
inces. Both the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo and Metohija were established in 1 9 4 5 . The 
existence of these "autonomous" provinces does not mean that either 
the Albanians or the Hungarians possess self-government as national 
groups. It means merely, that in the areas in which they live as com­
pact groups, the Serbian republican government has seen fit to meet 
local peculiarities and needs through the delegation of some of its 
administrative p o w e r s . T h i s  delegation or sharing of powers is not 
a federal, but a republican matter. -^0 xhe autonomous provinces are 
not parts of the federation, but only of one of its republics. It is 
the republican constitution that determines the "rights and duties
and the basic principles of organization in the autonomous provinces 
,.161
• • •
The rights of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina are, therefore, 
more explicitly spelled out in the Constitution of the Serbian Social­
ist Republic and the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. 
These two documents were adopted only a few days after the federal 
constitution went into effect.^ 2  jn Articles 41, 42, and 43, the
•*--^"Socialist Constitution of 1963," Art. Ill, p. 45.
■*"^L£szlo Rehak, "A Vajdas^gi Nemzetis^gek Helyzete Jugoszl^via 
Uj Alkotmdnyos Rendjdben," Hid, XXVII (May, 1963), 572-75.
160"Socialist Constitution of 1963," Art. 112, p. 45.
161lbid.
l^Rehdk, "A Vajdasdgi Nemzetisdgek Helyzete Jugoszldvia Uj
Alkotmdnyos Rendjdben," p. 567.
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federal constitution guarantees citizens "the freedom to express 
[their] . . . nationality and culture . . through their own lan­
guages and scripts, and to develop them in schools where instruction 
is carried on in their own language. The Serbian republican consti­
tution elaborates on these rights in Article 82, emphasizing the
equality of all nationalities in regard to rights as well as obliga- 
1 (\Lltions. The statute of the autonomous Vojvodina, goes even further
by naming explicitly the Hungarians, Slovaks, Rumanians and Ruthenians.
These nationalities, according to Article 32 of the statute, are
guaranteed the right to use all modern means of communication to ex-
1 fi spress their thoughts and desires in their own languages.
Article 83 of the republican constitution also guarantees that
in areas where any nationality is represented in substantial numbers,
instruction in elementary schools will be carried on in the language
of “that nationality. Where two nationalities live together in sub-
1 fifistantial numbers instruction is to be bi-lingual. While the 
Statute of the Autonomous Province fails to mention this right, it 
does direct the provincial administrative organs to support and develop 
institutions of learning among the nationalities (Article 37).
163"Socialist Constitution of 1963," p. 25.
^^Reh^tk, "A Vajdasdgi Nemzetisdgek Helyzete Jugoszlavia Uj 
Alkotmdnyos Rendj^ben," p. 573.
165Ibid. 166Ibid.
167Ibid., pp. 573-74.
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One of the most interesting innovations on the federal level, 
which has had far-reaching repercussions on the republic and local 
level, has been a change in constitutional terminology. The ethnic 
minorities are no longer officially called "national minorities," but 
are designated simply "nationalities." This change represents a 
symbolic elimination of inequality. There are officially no longer 
any "minorities" or "majorities,!1 all nationalities are now equal. 00 
In concrete terms, this equality means that in the Vojvodina 
government agencies and administrators must be able to communicate in 
the languages of the nationalities. 169 a ],so means that in workers' 
councils and other self-governing bodies the language of the minority 
ethnic groups is to be used in deliberations when they are represented 
in substantial numbers.^70 Furthermore, translations, in the lan­
guages of the nationalities, are to be provided of such deliberations, 
as well as of all important government directives which affect the 
Vojvodina.^71 These guarantees are incorporated in Articles 84, 85, 
and 86, of the Serb Socialist Republican Constitution and Articles 
33, 34, 35, and 36, of the Statute of the Autonomous Province of 
Vojvodina.^72
p . 3.
^®Ibid., p. 571; Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetisegi Kerdesekben,"
169Rehak, "A Vajdasagi Nemzetisdgek Helyzete Jugoszlavia Uj 
Alkotmanyos Rendjeben," pp. 574-75.
170Ibid., p. 575.
171Ibid. 172Ibid.
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Up to this point, we have discussed "group" rights enjoyed by 
ethnic minorities. However, as in the case of Rumania, so in Yugo­
slavia, these rights have been conferred not to make of the minori­
ties a privileged part of the population, but in order to give them 
equal opportunities and rights with the rest of the inhabitants. This 
is reflected in the statement that all nationalities are guaranteed the 
same rights and obligations, regardless of their place of domicile.
In other words, they need not reside in an "autonomous" province in 
order to develop and live their own cultures. The nature of Yugo­
slavian federalism, as well as the rights and duties of individuals 
as "humans" and "citizens," places all people on an equal footing "re­
gardless of differences in nationality, race, religion, sex, language, 
education or social position."174
This equality is in reality undercut by the fact that some 
nationalities are "more equal" than others. While the "minority- 
majority" dichotomy no longer accentuates this inequality, the consti­
tuent republics of the federation reflect it. The Yugoslav (i.e.,
South Slav) nationalities, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, 
etc., are each allotted a republic of their own.-*-^ xhe non-South
■*-^Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetisdgi K^rd^sekben," p. 3;
Reh^k, "A Vajdasagi Nemzetisdgek Helyzete Jugoszl^via Uj Alkotminyos 
Rendj^ben," p. 567; "Socialist Constitution of 1963," Arts. 41, 42,
43, pp. 25-26.
174Ibid., Art. 33, p. 22.
175Ibid., Art. 2, p. 12.
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Slav nationalities, Turks, Albanians, Hungarians, etc., are at the 
same time lucky if they fall within the borders of one or other of 
the autonomous provinces. Thus, while the half-million Montenegrins 
of the country have a republic of their own, the half-million Hunga­
rians and the one-million Albanians must be content with "autonomous" 
provinces within the Republic of Serbia. The meaning of this differ­
ence is forcefully expressed by Articles 108, 109, 111, and 112, 
which define the basis of republican and provincial governments.176
Article 108 states that: "The rights and duties of the repub­
lic shall be determined by the republican constitution in accordance 
with the principles of . . .[the federal] Constitution."'*'^
Furthermore, the " . . .  territory of a republic shall not be altered 
without the consent of the republic concerned."^78 leaves the
largest political subdivisions of the country, with sane sovereignty. 
Like the states of the United States, and unlike the regions (or 
counties) of Rumania, the republics of Yugoslavia are members of a real 
federation.
The autonomous provinces of the Serbian republic, lack such 
features of sovereignty. The Constitution of Yugoslavia makes their 
existence an optional matter that is totally within the powers of the 
republics, to grant or to deny. As Article III states a ". . . republic
•*~̂ Ibid., pp. 44-45.
^ ^Ibid., p. 44.
^ I b i d .
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may found autonomous provinces."179 not obligated to do so.
If it deigns to do so, the republic still controls every aspect of the
province's autonomy. Article 112 defines autonomous provinces as
"social-political communities within the republic." As such, their
rights and duties, as well as "the basic principles of organization in
the autonomous provinces shall be determined by republican constitu- 
i sntion." This consideration determines that the basic law of the 
Vojvodina is only a "Statute," while for the Republic of Serbia it is 
a "Constitution."
In the area of "human" and "citizen" rights and obligations, 
the Yugoslavian Constitution differs from the Rumanian in a number of 
ways. The former devotes thirty-nine Articles on ten pages to the 
enumeration of such rights, while the latter accomplishes the same 
task with twenty-five Articles on six pages. The lengthier Yugo­
slavian treatment, differs from the Rumanian guarantees in at least two 
ways. First, it puts a great deal of emphasis on the "right of 
citizens to social self-government."^8^ Second, it is less equivocal 
in the statement of rights. The adjectives "inalienable" and "invio­
lable" are frequently appended to such rights. In the Rumanian Consti­
tution this is not the case.
■*-^Ibid., p. 4 5 . Emphasis added.
180Ibid.
•*~8~*~Ibid. , Arts. 32-70, pp. 22-32; "Rumanian Draft Constitution 
of 1965," Arts. 17-41, pp. 7-13.
■ ^ " S o c i a l i s t  Constitution of 1963," Arts. 34, 73-76, 96, pp.
22, 32, 41.
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In most other respects, the listing of rights and duties is
very much alike in both documents. Like its Rumanian counterpart, the
Yugoslavian Constitution lists economic and social rights as well as
political ones. This encompasses such traditionally democratic
rights as freedom of speech, association and assembly, as well as the
"right and freedom . . .  to work," "freedom of movement," "protection
of health," "protection of mother and child," "protection of the
family," and "the right of inheritance."^-83 It also includes certain
guarantees against arbitrary treatment in the courts and excessive
1 ftAinterference in people's personal lives. Accordingly, "religious
confession shall not be restricted," while scientific and artistic
creativity are encouraged.^83
Equality before the law and the right to vote, are two guar-
1 86antees which the constitution also contains. The right to suffrage 
enables the voters of the Vojvodina, as those of all Yugoslavia, to 
send representatives of their own nationality to the Chamber of Nation­
alities.'*'^ This right ensures them of the representation of their
188interests and needs in the Federal Assembly. Since this body is
183Ibid., Arts. 36, 51, 55-58, pp. 23, 29-30.
184Ibid., Arts. 47-50, 52-53, 66-69, pp. 27-29, 31-32.
•*~83Ibid., Arts. 45-46, p. 26.
186Ibid., Arts. 35, 67, 157, pp. 23, 31, 56-57.
187Ibid., Arts. 34-35, 82, 165-166, pp. 22-23, 35, 61-62. 
188Ibid., Arts. 190-191, pp. 68-69.
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considered "the supreme organ of power . . . and social self-govern­
ment,"^®^ the respective nationalities theoretically have a voice in 
the policy-making of the country.
Their rights to participate in government, as well as all 
their other rights, are counter-balanced by certain obligations and 
restrictions. Not only are they commended to "abide by the Constitu­
tion and law,"^9® but they must also participate in the defense of 
their c o u n t r y . N u m e r o u s  other such obligations exist in the Yugo­
slav Constitution. In this respect as well, it is very similar to 
the Rumanian Constitution. Another similarity can be found in the 
paragraph of Article 40 which states that:
These freedoms and rights shall not be used by anyone to 
overthrow the foundations of the socialist democratic order 
determined by the Constitution, to endanger the peace, inter­
national cooperation on terms of equality, or the independence 
of the country, to disseminate national, racial, or religious 
hatred or intolerance, or to incite to crime, or in any manner 
that offends public decency. -^2
This statement delineates the limits of "rights" and "free­
doms." At the same time, it contains an admonition against ethnic 
strife and national hatreds. While such admonitions also appear in 
the Rumanian Constitution, they seem to serve somewhat different 
purposes from their Yugoslavian counterparts. In Rumania the
•*~®9Ibid., Art. 163, p. 60.
190Ibid.. Arts. 61-63, pp. 30-31.
191Ibid.. Arts. 60, 252-253, pp. 30, 88-89.
192Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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de-emphasis of diversity is the end, while in Yugoslavia it is the 
toleration of such diversity.
* * *
The divergent purposes of these two constitutions is much more
apparent in their application than in their wording. Yet, in the
foregoing comparison even the wording of the two documents pointed to
differences in the treatment of their respective national minorities.
In conclusion, the comparison can be carried one step further by
quoting Article 1 of the respective constitutions. The Rumanian
Constitution states:
The Socialist Republic of Rumania is a sovereign, inde­
pendent and unitary state of the working people of the towns 
and villages. Its territory is inalienable and indivisible. -*-93
In the Yugoslavian Constitution, the corresponding Article maintains:
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal 
state of voluntarily united and equal peoples and a socialist 
democratic community based on the powers of the working people 
and on self-government.194
True, these self-definitions are to a great degree propaganda.
But, not completely so. They are also statements of certain ideals
toward which the two countries are striving. Considered in this
light, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina possess greater constitutional
defense of their national culture than the Hungarians of Transylvania.
^•^"Rumanian Draft Constitution of 1965," p. 3. Emphasis
added.
194m socialist Constitution of 1963," Art. 1, p. 12. Emphasis
added.
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Although neither Yugoslavia nor Rumania give their Hungarian inhabi­
tants "group" or "corporate" recognition and rights, the tendency 
toward decentralization and self-government in Yugoslavia provides 
those of the Vojvodina with more opportunities and less restrictions 
than those of Transylvania. The following chapters will discuss how 
these theoretical and legal differences correspond to the everyday 
practical existence and treatment of the Hungarians in both countries.
Before turning to these practical considerations, some addi­
tional observations are in order. As in the case of ideology, so in 
the constitutions of the two countries, it is possible to discern 
distinctive and different approaches to the nationality question.
While both documents are based on the understanding that nationalism 
is the greatest threat to the cohesion and unity of the country, they 
have developed in different directions to meet this threat. These 
different directions are a consequence of three major changes in the 
constitutional structure of both countries. These changes, in turn, 
reflect changes in the political balances within and without the two 
countries.
In Yugoslavia, the intra-national heterogeneity makes no one 
nationality a majority of the population. Consequently, the interests 
and needs of all nationalities have been balanced against one another. 
This has been achieved by granting self-government on the local level, 
without tying it to "national self-government."
In Rumania, the exact opposite has happened. While the 1948 
and 1953 constitutions had guaranteed many Hungarians self-government
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as a group in the "Autonomous Magyar Region," the 1965 constitution 
has taken from them all such self-government. It has placed them 
directly under the central government of the unitary Rumanian state. 
Thus, the inbalance of Rumania’s ethnic make-up, has led to the sub­
jugation of the minority to the majority. The balance of nationali­
ties in Yugoslavia, on the other hand, has tried to keep them from 
becoming subject to one another--at least in theory.
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CHAPTER III
THE POLITICAL POSITION OF THE HUNGARIANS 
The most direct way to examine the position of the Hungarians 
in Yugoslavia and Romania is to consider their respective "power 
positions" within the two countries. This requires an evaluation of 
their potential power (economic strength, social prestige, etc.), their 
access to positions of power (Party and Government leaders), and their 
actual policy-making influence. This is the main concern of the 
present chapter.
I
In both Rumania and Yugoslavia the Communist Party is the core 
of the power structure. By examining these respective centers of power, 
it will be possible to ascertain the relative strength of the Hungarians 
vis-h-vis the majority nationalities of the two political systems. The 
major assumption underlying this approach is that the distribution of 
political influence within these Communist parties reflects, in part, 
the treatment of ethnic minorities. By examining the evolution, 
organization and membership of both the Rumanian and Yugoslavian 
Communist parties it will be possible to confirm the above assumption 
and to shed light on the treatment of the Hungarian minorities.
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In Rumania and Transylvania
Background and Evolution
From its beginnings the Rumanian Communist Party has had the 
problem of adapting to and overcoming both material and mental 
obstacles. The material obstacles are tied directly to the political, 
economic and social structure of the country. As a political entity 
Rumania can be described as a "new" nation. It received statehood 
only because some of the great powers— particularly Russia— saw it to 
their advantage to weaken an already disintegrating Ottoman Empire.^ 
Thus, the Treaty of St. Stefano in 1877 and the following Congress of 
Berlin, enabled Rumania to take its place among the "independent" 
nation-states of Europe.
The political legacy of the country was, however, reflected in 
both its economic and social development. Turkish subjugation, 
Phanariot exploitation, and the Boyar dominated feudal structure of 
former Wallachia and Moldavia, bequeathed to the new kingdom serious
Osocial and economic, as well as political problems.
At first glance this would indicate that the precursors of 
Communism would have a fertile field to exploit in Rumania. This,
lAs opposed to Russia, Great Britain attempted to bolster the 
Ottoman Empire. The English saw more danger in the aggressive Russian 
attempts to expand toward the Mediterranean, than in the tottering 
empire of the Turks which was hard-pressed even to maintain the status 
quo as the nationalism of its subject peoples grew in intensity.
OStephen Fischer-Galati (ed . ) , Rumania (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 3-9.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
1 3 2
however, is misleading. The stark fact that they had to face, was
Rumania's backward and overwhelmingly agricultural make-up, which was
3weighed down by a semi-feudal social structure. The country lacked
industry and an "industrial proletariat" from which the Party could
recruit adherents. Thus, most Rumanian problems were agrarian and the
Party or its forerunners had to take this into account in the face of
Marxist orthodoxy.
Though these material obstacles were great in themselves for
early "left" political movements, the political and social attitudes of
the land were no more hospitable. In this realm, Socialist and other
radical-left elements had to contend with the country's dual intellec-
4tual development, i.e., an Eastern versus a Western orientation.
^The agrarian setting of Rumania has been described in numerous 
ways. Dobrogea-Gherea termed it "neo-serfdom," while Virgil Madgearu, 
the theoretician of the National Peasant Party, described the country 
as "a semi-capitalist state with a peasant economic structure." Even 
with the annexation of the more industrialized provinces (e.g., Tran­
sylvania, Banat) in 1919, workers represented only 107o of the total 
population. See Ghita Ionescu, Communism in Rumania 1944-1962 (London; 
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 3, 29.
^By dividing intellectual development into two major schools 
(i.e., Western and Eastern) the study engenders some over-simplification. 
Therefore, it should be kept in mind that these major schools contain 
within themselves lesser "schools" and intellectual groupings. The 
Eastern outlook may be said to have been predominant until the nine­
teenth century. Since then it has had to contend with influences 
which have their origins in Western Europe. The Eastern orientation 
was determined by the Balkan location of Wallachia and Moldavia in 
close proximity to the Byzantine world. These principalities were, 
furthermore, subject either to Russian or Turkish hegemony throughout 
most of their existence. In addition, the religious ties of the people 
were either with Greece or Russia due to their allegiance to the Eastern 
(Rumanian) Orthodox Church. The Eastern orientation was also reinforced 
by two political events; (1) the country's liberation from Turkish rule 
by Russia (rather than a Western Power) and (2) Rumanian annexation of 
Bessarabia following World War I. For a discussion of the development
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This factor entailed problems of approach vis-&-vis the populace, as 
well as problems of internal organizational cohesion. Since two major 
intellectual tendencies prevailed in the country, these divisions were 
also mirrored in the development of early left-radical movements.
Pre-World War I Beginnings
Early "left-democratic," Socialist and Communist groups re­
flected this dual intellectual orientation. The "old" kingdom, also 
known as the Regat, developed separately its subversive "left" groups 
from similar organizations in Transylvania or Bessarabia. Socialist and 
Communist groups in the latter two areas were directly tied to the 
earlier "left" developments in Hungary and Russia respectively.^ The 
origins of the Rumanian or Regat wing of Communism can be traced back 
to 1875 and the activities of Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea (alias 
Nathan Katz of Cass), who had fled to Rumania from Bessarabia to avoid 
the Czarist police.^
Dobrogeanu-Gherea provided the precursors of Rumanian Communism 
with its first leadership. He was soon joined in this undertaking by 
another ethnically non-Rumanian, the Bulgarian Christian Rakovsky.^
of these differing schools of thought see Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 
3-10, and D. A. Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," Slavic 
Review, XX (October, 1961), 477.
^Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 4-10.
£LIbid., p. 3; Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 
477; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve of Its Third Congress 
(Special Report; Radio Free Europe, Munich, Germany, May, 1960), p. 1.
^Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 2-5.
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Under the direction of these two as well as some lesser "socialist 
lights," the Social Democratic Party was formed in 1893.® From the 
beginning this party suffered dissentions and factions which were based 
on social, geographic and ideological differences. There evolved for 
example, such factions as "the maximalists," "the generous" and the 
Odessa group under Rakovsky.^ The Odessa group and "the maximalists" 
were to provide the organizational core for the Communist Party follow­
ing World War I.
In the pre-war setting, however, the dissention within the 
Social Democratic Party and its lack of appeal for the population in 
general, kept it impotent and uninfluential. The reasons for this 
weakness can be attributed to external as well as internal factors. 
Internally the Party was made up of "foreigners" and ethnic minorities 
rather than "native" Rumanians.^ Furthermore, the internationalist 
doctrines of the Party were in complete disharmony with the rise of a 
fanatical Rumanian nationalism which accompanied the independence of 
Rumania in 1877. In addition, the country's social setting was in no 
way conducive to such a "left-radical" movement based on the "proletar­
iat" and the "progressive intellectuals
World War I, the Comintern and the Inter-War Years
The world conflagration that broke out in 1914 in no way
®Ibid., pp. 1-2 .
QIbid., pp. 2-10; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve, p. 1.
•^Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 477.
•^Ibid.
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enhanced the political position of the Rumanian Social Democratic Party. 
Throughout the war the Party was torn asunder by disagreements over 
participation in this "imperialist" struggle.^ The Party's equivocal 
stance regarding participation widened even further the gulf between it 
and the population in general. Thus, the war and the outbreak of the 
cataclysmic Soviet Revolution only strengthened the Rumanian Social 
Democratic party's sense of urgency for action, but not its power to 
act.
In the closing years of World War I and the immediate post-war 
reordering, the Party too underwent portentious changes. The events 
that make these changes inevitable were the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia, the Communist Revolution of Bela Kun in Hungary, the creation 
of the Comintern, the annexation of Bessarabia and Transylvania by 
Rumania and the popularization of the dictum of "self-determination of 
peoples." These events not only caused the further fragmentation of 
the Rumanian Social Democratic Party, but they were in large part 
responsible for the birth and early development of the Rumanian Commu­
nist Party which rules Rumania today.
Lenin's Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 inspired the
"maximalist" faction to exert every effort to seize control of the
13Rumanian Social Democratic Party. Its inability to attain this end 
was in large part due to the Bolshevik interpretation of the principle 
of "self-determination" and the faction's failure to gain the support
i oIonescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 4-9.
~Tbid., pp. 12-18; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve,
pp. 1-2.
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of the workers.^ These two reasons are inter-related insofar that the
policy demanded by the Bolsheviks through "self-determination" offended
the nationalist pride of most segments of the Rumanian population,
including the workers.
The two specific developments which point out the faction's
alienation from the population were directly tied to the question of
Rumanian expansionism and its conflict with Bolshevik interests in
Bessarabia and the Communist International's interests in Transylvania.
The Comintern--which had come into existence shortly after the Soviet
October Revolution— demanded that the Rumanian Communists oppose the
annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania.^  It also demanded that they
oppose and sabotage in every possible manner the Rumanian military
moves of General Averescu that were being directed against Bela Kun
16and the Communist regime in Budapest. Since both these moves would 
have demanded the denial of the greatest of nationalist gratifications 
in an era of rampant nationalism, the "maximalists" lost all touch 
with the Rumanian ethnic element.
The formalization of the successful annexations and the ful­
fillment of "Great Rumanian" expansionism, released an even more fervent 
and fanatical nationalism among the "successors of the Roman
■*-^Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 478; Ionescu, 
Communism in Rumania, pp. 24-25.
15Ibid., pp. 12, 22-25.
^ I b i d ., pp. 14-17.
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E m p i r e . T h i s  attitude among the populace left the "maximalists" 
out in the cold. However, the Comintern gave its "Rumanian" lackeys 
no respite and demanded a purge of unreliable members in the ranks, re­
organization and strict discipline, as well as unflinching allegiance 
to the International. To further these ends, the "maximalists" brought 
into existence the CPR in 1 9 2 1 . But a second Party Congress in 1922 
was required in order to breathe life into the organization. In spite
of this, the CPR remained weak and ineffective in the inhospitable
19atmosphere of Rumanian chauvinism. ^
Comintern directives contributed to this continued weakness of
the CPR. They demanded the utilization of the "self-determination"
principle in the newly acquired areas of Rumania and the exploitation
20of ethnic and economic discord to the fullest. These demands were 
carried out with some success in Bessarabia during 1924. However, the 
only real result of these efforts was to put the CPR under government
■^The Rumanians claim to be the descendants of Trajan's Roman 
legions which conquered Dacia in the second century after Christ. 
While this claim has often been called into question, the present-day 
Rumanians do speak a Romance language--although somewhat Slavicized. 
However, it must be emphasized that the name "Rumanian" is only of 
recent vintage. No state or people existed under that name prior to 
1859 when the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were united to 
form the country of "Rumania."
■^Fischer-Galati, Romania, p. 68; Ionescu, Communism in 
Rumania, pp. 18-19.
^Ibid., p. 19.
^®Ibid., pp. 24-25. It should be noted, however, that "self- 
determination" was never considered an end in itself. During these 
early years as the real answer to the problem of ethnic minorities. 
See Evangelos Kofos, "Balkan Minorities under Communist Regimes," 
Balkan Studies, II (1961), 29.
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O  *1ban in that same year. Henceforth, the Party had to resort to more 
subtle tactics, dividing its activities between an underground as well 
as "legal" apparatus.
Succeeding years of Party activity revealed its weakness and in­
ability to reach the masses. Only among the national minorities did
the Party register some "successes," but here too the depth and signif-
22icance of these successes could be called into question. Nevertheless, 
the relative successes among the minorities and the Party's failure 
among the ethnic Rumanians, determined the policies which it was to 
follow. The "legal" and "front" organizations of the party became 
particularly active among the nationality groups, while the "under­
ground" or "illegal" apparatus tried to infiltrate the labor movement
2 3and to foster economic discontent. This dual tactical approach of 
the CPR reflected also the dual ethnic make-up of the Party.
The "legal" and "front" organizations of the Party prospered
2 1Fischer-Galati, Romania, p. 68; Ionescu, Communism in Rumania,
p. 23.
^ T h e  major reason why these Communist "successes" among the 
minority nationalities--particularly among the Hungarians--should be 
viewed with skepticism, is that the Rumanian "bourgeois" government of 
the inter-war years maintained a double-standard regarding Communist 
activity. While it severly repressed Communist activity among ethnic 
Rumanians, it allowed the Party a great deal of freedom among the 
ethnic minorities. The reason for this was that the "bourgeois" 
government wanted to destroy the national unity and solidarity of the 
respective minorities through class antagonism--which was fostered by 
the CPR--thereby to make them more susceptible to "Rumanization" and 
assimilation.
9 oThe Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve, pp. 3-5; Ionescu, 
Communism in Rumania, pp. 24-25, 44-45.
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particularly in the newly annexed areas of the country. In these areas
the Party enlisted many individuals from the national minorities who
saw their salvation in the right of "self-determination" and the policy
24of mutual national respect under "proletarian internationalism."
These recruits came to play important roles in the early inter-war
years and remained an important force in the Party at least until 1952.
They were in fact the dominant segment of the CPR until the Fifth Party
Congress of 1932. Through front organizations like Madosz and periodi-
25cals like Korunk. they provided the CPR with its "legal" apparatus.
On the "underground" level, Party work took on a more conspira­
torial character than the "propaganda" activities among the minority 
nationalities. In the "underground" the stress was on action rather 
than on "recruitment." The labor field was the major target of this
2 fiaction. The Grivita Railroad Strike of 1933 was its greatest success.
^ F o r  the nature and extent of this minority adhesion to the 
CPR, see: R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 154-155;
Istvdn Nagy, "Forum: Tiz ^ves Az RNK Iroszovetsege," Igaz Szo, vll
(March, 1959), 415-416; Nicolae Kallos, "The Journal 'Korunk* and Its 
Animator, G^bor Gaal," Lupta De Clasa (June, 1964) trans. in Rumanian 
Press Survey, No. 447 (Radio Free Europe, July 15, 1964), pp. 2-11.
o c-’Korunk was a left-wing Marxist oriented Hungarian-language 
periodical which opposed the efforts of minority nationality publica­
tions and organizations, calling for boundary revisions. The latter in­
cluded such publications as Hitel, Zord Id6k. Napkelet Pdsztortuz, and 
such cultural societies and publishers as Erddlyi Helikon, Minerva, and 
Erddlyi Szdpmives Cdh. In contrast to this latter group, the intellec­
tuals who supported Korunk asked for no revisions in frontiers. They 
took the view that social, rather than national solutions, were needed. 
They emphasized the solidarity of Rumanians and Hungarians alike, along 
class rather than national lines.
"Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 45-46; Tomasic, "The 
Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 480.
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However, the Party's range of activities also included sabotage and 
during the Second World War, even guerrilla warfare. In these activi­
ties, it is interesting to note that the ethnic Rumanian "worker" 
elements were more active than the ethnic minority "intellectuals."
The Party Congress of 1932 was in many ways a watershed in the 
history of the CPR. It switched the emphasis from "self-determination"
o nto social problems and the need to exploit economic unrest. This
switch in emphasis laid the foundations for strengthening the ethnic
Rumanian wing of the Party. Yet, growth in the Party did not take
place at this time. The Rumanian population in general, turned with
more enthusiasm to the extreme nationalist anti-Hungarian, anti-Jewish,
28anti-Russian "Iron Guard" movement of Cornelius Zelea Codreanu. In 
the face of this development, all the Party could do was to cooperate 
with other "left" elements to forestall a fascist regime. In this the 
CPR followed the general directive of the Comintern to abandon the
"social fascist" outlook vis-a-vis the Social Democrats and thereby to
join the "Popular Front" tactics of other Communist parties in Europe.^
07'One of the major reasons for this switch was of course the
growing power of fascist movements in Central Europe, which were also
emphasizing the need for territorial revisions and readjustments. In 
order to better cope with this threat from the "right" the CPR now toned 
down its "self-determination" doctrines and stressed that the problems 
of the area demanded economic and social solutions along the Soviet 
pattern.
28Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston: 
Meador Publishing Company, 1949), pp. 95-111; Ionescu, Communism in 
Rumania, pp. 37-38, 49-50.
^ I b i d ., pp. 50-51; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve, p. 5.
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The outbreak of World War II saw the disruption of this tactic
as Germany and the Soviet Union signed a Non-Aggression Pact. This
move caused great confusion within Party ranks and added to the dis-
3 0unity which characterized the organization until April 1944. Dis­
array and complete impotence best characterize the CPR during these
early war years. The most militant and talented Party members were
3 1either in prison or in exile. The remaining members of the Party 
lacked cohesion and their leadership was completely shaken and shattered 
by the fast flow of events and the contrary and mutually exclusive 
demands placed on them.
With the assistance of the Soviet Union, however, the Party was 
able to purge and re-build its shattered organization. The ex- 
Comintern agent, Emil Bodnaras, was instrumental in this Party re­
organization. 32 Holding a secret Party purge in April 1944, he, 
Parvulescu and some other Rumanian Communists prepared the CPR for the 
important role it was to take in the Soviet War effort. Unity and 
cohesion were attained, plans coordinated, and the Party was made ready 
for its part in the overthrow of the Antonescu regime.^
As the Red Army advanced into Rumania the Coup d'etat of
3 0 Ibid., p. 6 ; Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 58-66.
3 1 The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve, p. 6.
•^Ibid., pp. 6 , 18-21; Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 344-345; 
Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 78-81, 351.
3 3 Ibid., pp. 78-86; Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European 
Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1951), pp. 89-90.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
14 2
August 23, 1944 toppled from power the Antonescu dictatorship. This
move— carried out by a "democratic Front" composed of Liberals,
National Feasants, Social Democrats, Communists and other "left"
elements— paved the way for the Rumanian switch. It made inevitable
the Rumanian participation along-side the "Glorious Soviet Armies" in
the "liberation" of Transylvania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.^
As the leading force in the "Democratic Front" the Party moved
to seize the reins of power. Throughout the countryside it agitated
the people against the "democratic Bourgeois" parties and everywhere
35provoked unrest, discontent and disorder. This policy— supported
by the Red Army--enabled the CPR to topple two Sanatescu governments,
the Radescu government, and then to install its own puppet regime under
36Petru Groza on March 5, 1945.
Organization and Membership
The Nature of Party Growth
The most dramatic development having long-range effects on the 
position of the country's ethnic minorities and on the resurgence of 
nationalism, was the rapid growth of the CPR following the seizure of 
power. Figure 4 shows the nature of this Party growth from April 1944
■^Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 83-91.
^%arkham, Rumania under the Soviet Yoke, pp. 191-216, 228-229; 
Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1956), pp. 279-282.
36Ibid.. pp. 278-283.
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1948 937,846 Peoples'Rep.establishedSept. 11 11 Purge of Patrascanu--1948 StalinizationJuly 1950 720,000 11 11 Purge of Pauker-Luka- Stalin dies--1953Georgescu--1952£Agostol"Apr^ (Gheorghiu-Dej) 1954-1955 ) Malenkov Purged
Dec. 1955 595,398 De-Stalinization and
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to 1971.^ The rapid growth of the Party, particularly in the years up 
to 1948 drastically altered its ethnic make-up. This growth relegated 
the ethnic minority Party members— who in the past composed the bulk of 
the CPR--into a secondary position, as Party ranks were swelled by 
ethnic Rumanians who had seen "the handwriting on the wall."^®
This rapid post-war growth of the Party was the first major 
step toward its "nationalization." After 1948, however, the CPR 
stabilized its membership and carried out purges among elements which 
it regarded as "unhealthy." Even these purges, however, caused greatest 
damage not in the ranks of the newly recruited ethnic Rumanians, but in 
the ranks of the veteran ethnic minority C o m m u n i s t s T h u s ,  both the 
growth and the purges of the Party contributed to the strengthening 
of the ethnic Rumanian sectors of the CPR. The most recent increases 
in Party membership have even further accentuated this t r e n d . A t
■^Figure 4 has been compiled on the basis of data obtained from: 
Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Revised Paperback Edition; New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), pp. 85-91; Ionescu, Communism
in Rumania, pp. 149-151, 204-215, 241-244, 318-321; Randolph L. Braham, 
"Rumania: Onto the Separate Path," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-
June, 1964), footnote 5, pp. 16-17; The Rumanian Workers1 Party on the 
Eve, pp. 8-10; "Communist Party Rolls Increase Around World," The Blade 
(Toledo), June 10, 1970, p. 7.
90Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 69-71; Ionescu, Communism in 
Rumania, pp. 204-208.
^This is verified by the fact that in December, 1955, 79.2% 
of the members were ethnic Rumanians in the CPR. By 1968, 88.43% were 
ethnic Rumanians. Compare Ibid., p. 243, with "Report by Nicolae 
Ceausescu on Organizational Measures for the Steady Strengthening of 
the Moral-Political Unity of the Working People," Documents, Articles 
and Information on Romania, No. 27 (Oct. 28, 1968), p. 30.
^®Braham, "Rumania: Onto the Separate Path," footnote 5,
pp. 16-17.
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present, the regime's search for popularity among the masses has 
allowed it to lower its standards for membership. This has enabled 
many to join who are ignorant of, if not hostile to the tenets of "pro­
letarian internationalism" and the traditional policies of "minority 
tolerance" which had prevailed prior to this growth in Party membership.
The CPR Before August 1944
The resurgence of nationalism can be explained partly by the 
decimation of the de-nationalized elements which had composed the bulk 
of the CPR before 1944. Membership in the Party prior to the seizure 
of power was predominantly "internationalist," composed of individuals 
who were for the most part non-Rumanians e t h n i c a l l y H i s t o r i c a l  
reasons determined this adhesion of minorities to the CPR, some of 
which have already been touched on above. We will examine briefly the 
composition of the CPR prior to the seizure of power, as well as after 
its "nationalization."
Before the seizure of power the growth and composition of the
42Party can be divided by the historic Fifth Party Congress of 1932.
Up to this Congress, the national minorities dominated the CPR. Jews 
and Ukrainians from Bessarabia, Bulgarians from Dobrogea and Jews and 
Hungarians from Transylvania outnumbered at this stage the ethnic
■̂*-Kofos, "Balkan Minorities under Communist Regimes," pp.
25-26; Hans Hartl, "Die Nationalit&ten-Politik Des Kreml in Rum&nien," 
Zeitschrift Ftir Geopolitik, XXIV (July-August, 1953), 383.
^ T h e  importance of this Fifth Party Congress on the future 
development of the CPR cannot be over-emphasized. See: Ionescu,
Communism in Rumania, pp. 40-46; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the 
Eve, pp. 3-4.
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Rumanians in the positions of leadership as well as in the number of
/ *3Party members. From 1932 onwards, however, the ethnic Rumanians began 
to play a prominent part in the Party's leadership although they were 
still not the dominant sector of the party membership.
The Party of the inter-war years was made up of roughly two 
groups. One group was composed of national minority intellectuals.
The other group was composed of ethnic Rumanian laborers.^ Of the two 
groups the former seems to have been more important until the Party 
Congress of 1932. They were a heterogeneous lot made up of a variety 
of nationalities drawn from all classes and practically all professions. 
As opposed to this, the ethnic Rumanian sector of the Party was in all 
ways more homogeneous. Not only were they similar in national origin, 
but their class and labor background gave them more social solidarity 
and political cohesion. Their role became more important following 
the Fifth Party Congress, the Grivita Strike of 1933 and the emergence 
of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej as secretary-general of the CPR.^
^ E v e n  the Secretary-Generalship of the Party was held by the 
non-Rumanian Rlek Koblos (alias Badulescu) between 1924-1928. Prior 
to that, the non-Rumanians C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Christian Rakovsky 
had played pre-eminent Party roles. For more on the role of Koblos, 
see: Ionescu, Communism in Rumania« pp. 25-28.
^ Tbid., pp. 20-28; 40-46; Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist 
Leadership," pp. 479-480.
^Another similarity to be noted among the ethnic Rumanian 
"workers" of the Party is their "religious" background— Eastern 
(Rumanian) Orthodox. Ibid., pp. 480-485. Though this factor is not 
decisive in a Communist setting, it should be mentioned because it 
points out that these leaders had similar childhood experiences and 
education.
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The CPR Since the Seizure of Power
Since August 1944 the CPR has undergone a vast change in composi­
tion. This change took place on all levels of the Party hierarchy from 
the Politburo down to the local cell organizations. This change has
brought about a real "nationalization" of the Party along ethnic
Rumanian lines. ° To understand this "nationalization" it will be 
necessary to examine not only all levels of the Party hierarchy, but 
also the fragmentation of the Party leadership following the seizure of 
power. This fragmentation of the leadership followed the general 
pattern of other East European satellites, and reflects the division 
of the Party into "Muscovites," "westerners" and "home" Communists.
The "Muscovites" composed perhaps the most "alien" (i.e., non-
Rumanian) segment of the CPR not only because of their heterogeneous
national background, but also because their first loyalty was always
to the Kremlin center and the International at the expense of Rumanian
47needs or capabilities. This group was represented by such well-known 
individuals as Ana Pauker, Leonte Rautu, Vasile Luka, Dumitru Coliu and 
Emil Bodnaras. They were a "rootless" group who were often at odds 
with one another as well as with the "home" and "western" Communists.
What gave them their uniting label was that they had spent most of
^ I b i d ., pp. 482, 492-494; The Rumanian Workers1 Party on the 
Eve, p. 8 ; Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 204-215, 241-245,
316-321.
^Ibid., pp. 78-79, 118, 350-356; Fischer-Galati, Romania, 
pp. 344-350.
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World War II, as well as some of the inter-war years, in the Soviet 
Union under the tutorship of Stalin. They returned to Rumania on the 
coat-tails of the Red Army to assist and carry to fulfillment the
AOCommunization of the country. °
The "westerners" were the smallest of the three above groups and 
also the least significant. They resembled the "Muscovites" in a number 
of ways, yet they were distrusted by Stalin. Like the "Muscovites" 
they were also recruited predominantly from among the national minori­
ties. Such individuals as Gheorghe Gaston-Marin and Petre Borila 
represent this group.^ Their major— perhaps only--unifying charac­
teristic is that they had spent the war years or part of the 1930's in 
the West, taking part in the Spanish Civil War or in the later resis­
tance movement in France. Like the "Muscovites" they too returned to 
Rumania at the close of hostilities to take part in the Communization 
of the country.
Unlike the above two groups, the "home" Communists in Rumania 
were predominantly (on the leadership level) of Rumanian ethnic stock. 
They had spent the war years as well as most of the inter-war years in 
Rumanian prisons. Although they were relatively a more homogeneous 
lot than the former two groups, they were by no means united in outlook. 
Individuals like Gheorghiu-Dej, Apostol, Patrascanu, Ceausescu, Maurer,
^Ibid., pp. 64-67; Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 78-79,
94-106.
^"Rumanian Planner: Gheorghe Gaston-Marin," New York Times,
June 2, 1964, p. 12; The Rumanian Workers1 Party on the Eve, pp. 21-23.
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Dalea, Moghioros and Draghici made up this group.3® While most of them 
had similar social origins and "religious" backgrounds, their unifying 
characteristic was that they had spent the inhospitable inter-war 
years, as well as World War II, in the c o u n t r y . T h e y  were, in this 
sense, the group which was welded together most through a common past 
of travail and persecution at the hands of the "bourgeois" and "fascist" 
authorities.
From these various elements--"Muscovites," "westerners," and 
"home"— the leadership of the CPR was forged in the immediate post-war 
years. However, the amalgamation of such diverse elements was bound 
not to last. Even during Stalin’s lifetime--who had imposed unity on
COthese elements in the first place— J the instability of the Party's 
composition demanded internal alterations. These alterations were pro­
vided by a number of purges, of which the Patrascanu purge of 1948 and 
the Pauker-Luka-Georgescu purge of 1952, stand out as the most impor­
tant.-^ These early purges were later (1957) augmented by the 
Constantinescu-Chisinevschi purge which followed close on the de- 
Stalinization policies of the bloc, though ideologically not directly 
related to them.3^
3®Ibid., pp. 15-18, 23-31, 34-38; An Analysis of the Elections 
at the Third Rumanian Party Congress (Radio Free Europe, Munich,
Germany, July, 1960), pp. 23-25; "Rumania’s Strongman: Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej," New York Times, January 20, 1964, p. 8.
-^Ionescu, Communism in Rumania. pp. 78-79.
52Ibid., pp. 117-118.
53Ibid., pp. 151-156, 208-215.
54ibid., pp. 284-287.
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The present composition of the CPR reflects the change wrought 
by these past purges. The change has "Rumanized" the Party in the true 
sense of the word on the top levels of power. It has eliminated the 
most "foreign" members from the Party power-structure. Thus, the 
"aliens" Pauker, Luka, Georgescu, Chisinevschi, Foris, Koffler and 
numerous lesser figures received the ax together with a few "natives" 
like Patrascanu and Constantinescu. The net result has been to con­
solidate within the Politburo and the Secretariat the position of the 
ethnic Rumanian Party leaders who had grouped themselves around 
G h e o r g h i u - D e j T h i s  does not mean, however, that all ethnically non- 
Rumanians have been eliminated from the top levels of the Party. It 
merely means that they have been relegated to fringe positions and 
reduced in numbers, while the Gheorghiu-Dej--today, Ceausescu— faction 
of ethnic Rumanians has come to occupy all the centers of significant 
Party power.
The present power "core" of the CPR is thus built around the 
former followers of Gheorghiu-Dej, which included Apostol, Stoica, 
Ceausescu, Draghici, Dalea and M a u r e r . A r o u n d  this ethnic Rumanian 
"core" two less significant groups may be distinguished. One group 
has been described as the Party leaders with military backgrounds and 
close personal ties to the Kremlin. Some have referred to them as the 
"generals" or as the "Kremlin watch-dogs." The group included Bodnaras,
■^Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 482.
560f these leaders two have since died and Draghici has been 
purged by Ceausescu and his followers.
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57Borila, Salajan and Coliu. Following this grouping, the outer fringe 
of the Party power core is composed of such men as Rautu, Gaston-Marin, 
Voitec, Fazekas and Moghioros Those in this last named group, 
though individually influential, are in many ways subject to the cohe­
sive ethnic Rumanian "core" of the Party leadership.
As the above shows, the ethnic Rumanian segment has become the 
axle of the Party wheel which determines the policies of Communism in 
the country. The formerly dominant ethnic minorities, (Ukranians,
Jews, Hungarians, Bulgarians, etc.) have in this way been pushed to 
secondary positions. This pattern has been even more extensively fol­
lowed in the middle levels of the Party structure. The Party officials 
of ethnic minority background have been reduced in such areas as the
CQParty Central Committee and among the Regiune Secretaries. This re­
duction has often paralleled the purges at the top levels of power 
(i.e., Politburo, Secretariat and Party Control Commission), but more 
recently have also been carried out independently of general Party 
purges and related more closely to local "demands" for Rumanization.^®
-^Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 344-345, 349-350; Tomasic, "The 
Rumanian Communist Leadership," pp. 485-487.
~̂ I b i d ., pp. 487-489; "Rumanian Planner: Gheorghe Gaston-
Marin," p. 12; The Rumanian Workers1 Party on the Eve, pp. 31-35, 39-46.
CQIbid., Appendix II, p. 52, Appendix V, pp. 55-61; Tomasic,
"The Rumanian Communist Leadership," pp. 490-493.
G^The "Rumanization" of the top Party and administrative leader­
ship of the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region in 1962 may be viewed as 
such an "independent" purge. As a consequence of this "re-shuffling" 
the predominantly Hungarian area is now "blessed" with a Rumanian, 
Dimitru Puni, as chairman of the regional people's council. See:
George Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," The Reporter, XXXI (November
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The reduction of minority representation in Party affairs has 
also taken place at the base of the Party hierarchy. However, at this 
level it is much harder to ascertain the extent and nature of the re­
ductions. Yet, there are certain indications on the Regiune, commune, 
factory and collective farm level, that there exists a similar trend 
regarding the "Rumanization" of the Party. Aside from some limited 
data, it is possible to conjecture on the basis of the rapid growth of
the Party— immediately after power seizure as well as in the early 
621960's — that the rank and file as well as the leadership is now pre­
dominantly ethnic Rumanian.
As Table III indicates, the over-all composition of the Party 
has become more and more Rumanian. Just in the three years between 
1965 and 1968, the percentage of Hungarian Party members has been 
reduced from 9.5% to 8.67%, while the representation of the Germans 
and other nationalities from 3.5% to 2.9%. This trend is, perhaps, 
not so much due to a reduction in the actual number of Hungarian mem­
bers as to the rapid growth of the Rumanian membership during the 
1960's (See Figure 4).
Hungarian influence in the Party is of a limited nature for yet 
another reason. While in the highest level in the Party there are
19, 1964), 27. A name analysis of the region's intellectual leadership 
reveals a similar "Rumanizingf trend. The article which makes such an 
analysis possible is that by L. Deaky and N. Radulescu on "Fighters of 
the Socialist Struggle," Scanteia (March 6 , 1964) trans. in Rumanian 
Press Survey. No. 426 (Radio Free Europe, March 18, 1964), pp. 2-8.
61Ibid.
^ S e e  Figure 4.
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TABLE I I I
MEMBERSHIP IN THE CPR ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY 
1965-1968 (IN PERCENTAGES)*
Year Rumanian Hungarian German OtherNationalities
1965 87.0 9.5 -- ** 3.5
1967 88.16 8.82 1.29 1.73
1968 88.43 8.67 1.24 1.66
*This Table is based on Nicolae Ceausescu, "Report of the 
Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party on the Activity of 
the Party in the Period Between the Eight Congress and the Ninth 
Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party," Documents, Articles and 
Information on Rumania (July 19, 1965), p. 79; "Report by Nicolae 
Ceausescu on Organizational Measures for the Steady Strengthening of 
the Moral-Political Unity of the Working People," Documents, Articles 
and Information on Romania, No. 27 (Oct. 28, 1968), p. 30; Nicolae 
Ceausescu, "The Leading Role of the Party in the Period of Completing 
Socialist Construction," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, 
No. 6 (May 8 , 1967), p. 22; "Proceedings of the Plenary Meeting of the 
Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party," Documents, Articles 
and Information on Romania, No. 9 (May 15, 1968), p. 2.
**For 1965 the percentage of German Party members is included 
under "other nationalities."
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still some Hungarians, they are denationalized representatives of their 
people. In other words, they are Hungarians in name and language only, 
but not in their values and in their concern for their fellow nationals. 
Four outstanding examples are Alexandru Moghioros, Josif Banc, Janos 
Fazekas, and Mihai Gere. These four individuals have succeeded in 
making it into the highest Party offices, yet none of them count as 
significant policy-makers. Their role seems to serve two purposes: 
first, to convince the Hungarians that they are not completely without 
"representatives," and second, to make outside observers believe that 
Rumanian nationality policy is a sweeping success.
In Rumania today this "window dressing role" can be seen in
that almost every important organ of the Party has on it a Hungarian
representative. However, what the superficial observer fails to note 
is that this representative is invariably one of the four repeaters 
(Moghioros, Banc, Fazekas, or Gere). Thus, while it is true that in 
1965 one Hungarian actually became one of the fifteen members of the 
Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. and one made 
it into the nine man secretariat, the one man was on both occasions 
Alexandru Moghioros. It is also true that ten Hungarians made it into 
the 121 member Central Committee of the R.C.P. and three became alternate
^Along this line, see the text of the speech at Odorhei
(Szdkelyudvarhely) in "Party and State Leaders Visit Brasov, Covasna 
and Harghita Counties," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, 
No. 13 (August 27, 1968), pp. 36-38.
^^Michel Tatu, "A Rom^nositds (Tteme Erddlyben," Eurdpa VII 
(February, 1968), p. 20.
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members of the Executive Committee, but again, these included the four 
denationalized Party leaders mentioned above.^
The Party's "Rumanization" is evident in yet one more develop­
ment, the rehabilitation of Lucretiu Patrascanu. Following the direc­
tives of the Ninth Party Congress an investigation was begun in November 
1965 into the activities of the security forces (Internal Affairs 
Ministry), particularly in reference to the Patrascanu case. While 
the investigation had a very personal and political reason (i.e., the 
purge of Alexandru Draghici), the result was the rehabilitation of 
Patrascanu in April 1968. As we had occasion to note earlier, 
Patrascanu had been one of the few ethnic Rumanians who had been 
purged. In fact, he had been accused of wrong attitudes on the nation­
ality problem. It seems that his stance had been too nationalistic for 
the Party in 1948.^ At any rate, the rehabilitation of this national 
Communist in 1968 indicates that the Party no longer considers his 
type of "nationalism" unreconcilable with the Party's nationality 
policy. Thus, we can see that not only in its organization, but also 
in its ideological stance, the Party has become "Rumanized."
^"Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Rumanian 
Communist Party," Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, No.
13 (August 10, 1965), pp. 3-7.
^6"0n the Rehabilitation of Some Party Activists," Documents, 
Articles and Information on Romania, No. 8 (April 26, 1968), 9-25.
^Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, p. 154; Wolff, The Balkans 
in Our Time, pp. 291-292, 377-378.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
1 5 6
Party Control and "Democratic Centralism"
The factor that has inadvertantly facilitated the "nationaliza­
tion" or "Rumanization" of the CPR has been its organizational structure
68and its adherence to the principle of "democratic centralism." This 
factor has played a part in both government and Party since the over­
lapping and intermeshing of the two hierarchies is ever present. The 
centralization of the Party-State and the Party's monopoly over the 
coercive powers of the state, has enabled the "Rumanization" process 
to proceed unobstructed.
Party organization, through its centralization has enabled the 
majority nationality to assert its pre-eminence. The numbers of the 
Rumanian ethnic element have enabled it to utilize the centripetal 
force of the Party organization to submerge the less numerous ethnic 
minority Communists. The latter, since their numerical eclipse follow­
ing World War II, have been relegated to the fringes of the Party power- 
structure by the ethnic Rumanians. Only the completely de-nationalized 
or Rumanized national minority Communists have been able to remain on 
top in the face of this process.
’Democratic Centralism1 . . . implies a downward flow of 
directives emanating from the apex of the Party or Government, limiting 
the initiative of the subordinate people's councils to matters strictly 
local in nature and extent." Randolph Braham, "The Government,"
Romania, ed. Fischer-Galati, p. 93. The "nationalizing" impact of 
this centralization is perhaps most succinctly described by Robert 
Magidoff in relation to "Russification" in the U.S.S.R. See his 
book, The Kremlin vs. The People (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Company, Inc., 1953), pp. 107-110.
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In Yugoslavia and the Vojvodina
Background and Evolution
Unlike its Rumanian counterpart, the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia (LCY) has always been able to secure some support at the 
fi Qgrass roots level. 3 However, in tracing its origins we are confronted 
by an even more confusing and fragmented organizational background.
The Party's roots go back to the Social Democratic movements of the 
1870's.^® However, those early roots of Yugoslav "Socialism" 
developed in the shadow of the Italian, Austrian-German and Hungarian 
Social Democratic movements as well as the influence of the 19th 
century Russian narodniki.̂ T h u s ,  until December 1918, one cannot 
really speak of a unified South Slav Socialism.
When in the aftermath of World War I the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes was established, it became possible for the
^Since the Sixth Congress of the CPY (Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia) in 1952, the official name of the Party has been changed to 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) . This change was supposed to 
indicate the Party's development parallel to the policy of decentraliza­
tion and self-government in the economy. It was to differentiate it 
from other Communist Parties, demonstrating that it had attained a 
higher stage of development. In the subsequent discussion of the 
Yugoslav Communist Party, this study will refer to it as CPY when the 
party of the pre-Sixth Congress period is considered. It will refer 
to it as the LCY when the period after 1952 is being discussed.
^^Rodoljub Colakovid, nt al. A Jugoszldv Kommunista Szbvetseg 
Rttvid TOrtdnete, trans. Jdzsef Kollin, e£ al. (Novi Sad; Forum 
KOnyvkiadd, 1963), pp. 18-21.
^•*Tbid., pp. 18-24; Bikar Fedora, "Szabd Ervin Szerepe 
Magyarorszdg Magyar ds Nem Magyar Ndpei Munkdsmozgalmaban 1900-t81 
1918-ig," Hid, No. 12 (December, 1964), pp. 1390-1410.
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disparate Socialist movements to attempt unification. However, 
unification was attained only with great difficulty. The regional and 
ethnic basis of existing socialist groups and labor unions made an 
over-all South Slav Socialist organization difficult to attain. Ideo­
logical and personal differences among the leaders of these groups
72conspired to thwart the creation of a "national" organization.
The differences between labor unions and socialist parties 
were further accentuated by the different national affiliation of 
local organizations. In the Vojvodina this was particularly vexing 
because the region's majority population was not South Slav but pre­
dominantly Hungarian and German (see Column I, Table II in Chapter I).
In spite of all these obstacles, the Yugoslav Communists were 
successful in producing a viable "national" political organization by 
the end of the 1930's.
The reason why they succeeded was in large part due to the 
character of the South Slav Socialist movements prior to and during 
World War I. Unlike their Rumanian counterparts, they developed in 
settings which were--for the most part--under "foreign" dominion. The 
rule of the Turks in Macedonia and the rule of Austria-Hungary in 
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Vojvodina forced the 
Socialist movements to become also nationalist movements.^ Since
72Colakovid, et jU.. ,_A Jugoszldv Kommunista Szflvetseg ROvid 
TOrtdnete, pp. 27-47; Charles Zalar, Yugoslav Communism (Printed for 
the Committee on the Judiciary; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1961), pp. 23-36.
^^Ibid., pp. 29-36.
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in Rumania national independence was already a reality when the 
socialist movements began to organize, they did not feel the need to 
be "independence" movements as well. In the lands that were to become 
Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the national independence movement was 
from the beginning closely allied to the socialist movements. The 
ideals of a "Balkan Federation" were always closely related to social 
reform. This was in large part the consequence of a close correlation 
between "foreign" dominance and "social exploitation."^ In other 
words, the struggles for social reform were unimaginable without a 
struggle for South Slavic independence and federation.
The close alliance between "national" and "socialist" aspira­
tions provided a much firmer foundation for organization than was the 
case in Rumania where the Social Democrats were only (or primarily) 
concerned with "social reform." Thus, while in Rumania most Social 
Democrats were not ethnically members of the majority population, in 
Croatia, Slovenia, and the other South Slav areas, the major nation­
ality usually contributed the majority of the members for the local 
socialist organizations.^ Thus, in the South Slavic lands--unlike
Ibid*, P* 34, presents an excellent example of this conver­
gence of "foreign" and "Social" exploitation in Bosnia. He points out
that: "In Bosnia and Hercegovina, the medieval agrarian relations re­
mained unchanged. The Austro-Hungarian administration relied on the 
Moslem feudal lords, begs and agas, against Christian rajas. Moslem 
agas and begs possessed all the land, although the Christian agricul­
tural laborers comprised the majority of the population. The problem 
of solving the agrarian question in Bosnia and Hercegovina was never 
even raised by the Austro-Hungarian regime."
^While no data has been compiled to show this, a name analyse 
of the leaders of the early Socialist movements supports this generaliza­
tion. See Ibid., pp. 23-43; Colakovid', et aj.., A Jugoslav Kommunista
SzSvetsdg RSvid Tbrtdnete, pp. 31-66.
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Rumania--Socialism (later Communism) could not be accused of being an 
"alien" growth. It was rooted in both the national and social aspira­
tions of many South Slavs.
It should be remembered, however, that this national appeal of 
these socialist movements also had a divisive consequence as far as 
the Vojvodina was concerned. In this area, the predominantly non- 
Slavic population did not sympathize with the "national" goals of these 
movements, although a large section of the impoverished Hungarian 
peasantry probably favored the social reform side of their programs. 
Until World War I, however, this question was not really consequential 
for the Vojvodina since its Social Democratic Party as well as its 
general political existence, was integrally tied to the Hungarian 
state.^ Only the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the 
dismemberment of Hungary in the fall of 1918, shifts the fate of the 
area into the sphere of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes.
In the Interwar Period
The Social Democrats of the Vojvodina, as of all Yugoslavia, 
underwent numerous external and internal struggles before they finally 
united into one nationwide party. This was followed by innumerable 
internal conflicts until the Party eliminated from its ranks the 
Socialists to become a Communist Party like its Soviet ideal. Joship 
Broz Tito contended (1940) that this process of Party unification and 
purification required a four-stage development. Accordingly, the first
^ I b i d ., p. 2 2 .
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
161
stage followed immediately after the First World War and lasted until 
the Party's prohibition in 1921. The second stage lasted from the 
prohibition to the Party's Fourth Congress in 1928. This was followed 
by the third stage which lasted to the uomintern's purge of the Party 
in 1937. Finally, the fourth stage began with the purge and lasted 
until the Fifth Conference of the Party in 1940.^
In the present context it is not necessary to dwell on the 
intricacies of these separate stages of development. However, these 
stages of Party growth indicate some of the major shifts in both its 
internal organization and its policies concerning the national minori­
ties. These latter considerations call for more attention.
Following World War I the Social Democratic Parties of the 
South Slavic areas were immediately confronted by the nationality 
question. At their unification meeting in Belgrade (April 1919), the 
old Social Democratic parties united with the new Communist groups to 
form the Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia (Communist). This 
unification was possible only by avoiding the nationality question. The 
program adopted by the new unified party avoided all mention of the 
national question.^ However, thfs refusal to come to grips with the 
major problem of the land only delayed the inevitable rift between 
"left" and "right" factions of the Party.
^Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 51.
70 /Ibid., p. 36-37; Colakovid, et aj.., A Jugoslav Kommunista 
SzBvetsdg ROvid Tdrtdnete, pp. 43-47.
^Ibid., p. 46.
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The Second Congress of the Party held at Vukovar (June 20-25,
1920) faced this same dilemma. However, at this gathering the adoption
of a more explicit program— declaring among other goals the creation of
a Soviet federation of the Balkan and Danubian countries— led to even
more discord between "left" and "right" factions. At the same time,
the adoption--on this occasion— of the name Communist Party of Yugoslavia
also indicated that the Socialists ("Social patriots") were being
80squeezed out of the Party. Yet, the Socialists' formal ouster in
December 1920 did not end factionalism in the Party.
Factional strife continued, even in the face of governmental
persecution. The Prohibition of Party activities and propaganda by the
OBZNANA (Notification) of December 29, 1920, and the divesting of the
mandates of Communist deputies to the Narodna Skupshina (August 2, 1921)
81weakened and furthered the internal dissention within the Party. The 
first, second and third Party Conferences (1922 July, 1923 May and 
December) as well as the III and IV Party Congresses (1926 and 1928) 
continued to reflect conflict between "left" and "right" factions. In 
fact, this internal strife was so detrimental to the Party's cohesion 
and effectiveness, that the Comintern felt compelled to interfere with 
the Yugoslav Party's organization and policies.
r% a
ouIbid., pp. 62-66; Bogdan Smiljevic and Dorde Knezevid, A 
Legujabb Kor Tflrtdnete, trans. Kalman Csehcik (Subotica; Minerva 
Konyvkiadd Vdllalat, 1965), pp. 75-76.
8 1Ibid.. pp. 76-77.
82Wolff, The Balkans, in Our Time, pp. 109-111; Zalar, Yugoslav 
Communism, pp. 40-43.
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As Zalar points out: "The major point of disagreement among 
the factions was the national problem."^ The "right" faction led by 
Sima Markovic contended that the "national question" was basically a 
constitutional problem. The "left" faction, on the other hand, 
rejected this position. It maintained that "self-determination," even 
to the extent of secession, must be part of the Party's revolutionary 
program.®^- At the first and second Party Congress and the first Party 
Conference the "right" faction prevailed. This is evident in the selec­
tion of Party leaders and the omission of the national question from 
the Party programs. However, the intervention of the Comintern in 
1924-25 and 1928, turned the tide in favor of the "left" factions.
Stalin himself dictated the policy to be followed by the CPY. He said 
the following:
If you are drawing up a national programme for the Yugoslavian 
Party (and this is precisely what we are now dealing with), you 
must remember that his programme must be based not only on what 
exists at present, but also on what will inevitably occur by 
virtue of international relations. That is why I think that the 
question of the right of nations to self-determination should be 
regarded as an immediate and burning question. . . .
The postulate of a revolution must be the starting point of 
the national programme.
Further, it is imperative to include in the national programme 
a special point on the right of nations to self-determination, 
including the right to secession. . . .
Finally, the programme should include a special point provid­
ing for these nationalities in Yugoslavia which do not find it 
necessary to secede from that country. . . .  It is there­
fore . . . necessary to . . . have in the programme a point on 
autonomy, with a view to the transformation of the state of 
Yugoslavia into a federation of autonomous national states based 
on the Soviet system.85
^^Ibid., p. 40. ^ I b i d . , p. 41.
®^As quoted by Zalar, Ibid., p. 41. The original passage is 
in Stalin's Marxism and the National and Colonial Question.
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This policy remained the Party's program until August 1935 when 
the Seventh Congress of the Comintern called for the creation of 
Communist led People's Fronts to ward off the rising danger of fascism 
and naziism. At this time, the CPY— like its Rumanian counterpart— made 
a tactical volte-face. It began to stress the need for national unity 
and de-emphasized "self-determination." This changed policy lasted to 
the beginning of World War 11.®^
Tracing the evolution of the nationality policy of the CPY 
reveals a great deal about the composition of the Party as a whole. In 
its early years, the dominance of Markovic and the "right" faction 
indicates the South Slavic dominance in Party leadership. Unlike its 
Rumanian counterpart, the CPY was not a predominantly "ethnic minority" 
organization. As late as the Third Conference of the Party held in 
1923, only the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were recognized as having 
"national individuality."^ It was not until the Fifth Conference of 
October 1940 that the "national identity" of the Macedonian and 
Montenegrin peoples were recognized. It was also only at this latter 
Conference that "the right to freedom and equality" was stated for 
"German, Hungarian, Rumanian and other minorities in (the) Vojvodina."88
Throughout the interwar years the CPY remained a South Slav
®^Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 44-45, 50-51; Colakovid, £t 
aJL =, A Jugoslav Kommunista Szbvetsdg Rdvid Tbrtdnete, pp. 207-296.
Q7'Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 51.
^ I b i d ., Colakovid, et al., A Jugoslav Kommunista Sz6vetsdg 
Rdvid Tflrtdnete, pp. 293-296.
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QQdominated Party. 7 The efforts of the Comintern to mitigate some of 
the adverse effects of this dominance proved effective only in the 
second half of the 1930's when Josip Broz Tito became secretary 
general of the Central Committee of the CPY. Tito's leadership did not 
terminate South Slav dominance. It did, however, bring to an end much 
of the factionalism and it allowed the other nationalities (besides 
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) to participate more actively in Party 
affairs
In the Vojvodina it is just around this time (1934-1937) that 
Communists achieve organizational successes among the Hungarians. The 
Hungarian language journal HID (Bridge), which was founded in 1934, 
is infiltrated by the Communists and taken over by them in 1936.^
This journal provides the intellectual leadership for Hungarian Com­
munists in the Vojvodina. As its title indicates, the journal saw (and
QQ*This is indicated most clearly by the program and internal 
organization of the Party. Both the Slovenes and the Croatians had 
separate Party organizations which affiliated with the nationwide 
Yugoslav organization. None of the other nationalities were given such 
privileges. In all the interwar period, the Party Secretary— with one 
outstanding exception--was always a South Slav. The exception was 
Milan Gorkic who became Party head in 1934 as a result of Comintern 
intervention. Gorkic (original name Josip Cizinski) was Ruthenian in 
background. See Ibid., pp. 203-207, 238-246; Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, 
pp. 43-44. For an exposition of this Slavic dominance also see Milovdn 
Gyilasz, "A Szldv Ndpek Harca a Bdkdert 6s a Demokrdciadrt," Hid. No.
1 (January, 1947), pp. 12-20.
^Colakovid, et si., A Jugoszldv Kommunista Szbvetsdg Rovid 
T5rtdhete. pp. 253-255, 261-269.
^Istvdn Latdk, "Utoszo: A Szervezo 6s Harcra Mozgositd Hid,"
in Hid 1934-1941 ed. Janos KovJcs, £t a l . (Novi Sad: Forum Kbnyvkiadd,
1964), pp. 443-444.
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sees even today) as its major task the construction of "bridges" 
between the Hungarians and the other nationalities of the Vojvodina 
and all Yugoslavia. The editors and staff of this journal were well 
qualified for this task. They were Serbs, Croats, Jews and Hungarians 
who used the Hungarian language to further Party policies.^
As the foregoing shows, the Hungarians had a much more limited 
role in the national Party leadership of Yugoslavia during the inter­
war years than their fellow nationals had in Rumania. However, on the 
local level in the Vojvodina, they did wield some influence in Party 
matters.
The involvement of Yugoslavia in World War II, reduced this 
influence considerably. This was a consequence of two developments: 
the re-annexation of the Vojvodina by Hungary and the imprisonment and 
execution of many Vojvodina Communists (Hungarians, Serbs and Jews) 
by the occupying forces. The re-annexation of the Vojvodina to Hungary 
convinced many Party leaders that many Hungarian Communists were Party 
members only to demonstrate their opposition to the Yugoslav Govern­
ment. Once that government had been replaced, they lost their ardour 
for the Party. Furthermore, many of those who had remained loyal to 
the Party— including Mayer Ottmar, the editor of Hid— were either 
imprisoned or executed. ^  Thus, the CPY's leadership tended to view
^"Szerzdk Betfirendes Jegyzdke," Ibid., pp. 478-481, provides 
a listing of the former staff of the periodical. The names of this 
listing indicate that at least four nationalities were represented on 
its staff.
^Lat^k, "Utoszo': A Szervezd ds Harcra Mozgosito Hid,"
P= 451.
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the Hungarians in the Vojvodina with suspicion.
Organization and Membership
Hungarians continued to be relegated to an insignificant posi­
tion in the Yugoslav Communist (or even Serbian) Party throughout 
World War II and the immediate postwar period. This was due to the 
contradiction they posed to the CPY theory of "national-revolutionary 
war." As first stated in 1928, the theory maintains that:
The problem of national-revolutionary war in Yugoslavia, 
where a number of oppressed nationalities and national 
minorities exist, will play an important role, particularly 
in the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war.
The Party has therefore the duty to aid the liberation move­
ments of the oppressed nationalities and national minorities, 
to lead their fight against imperialism, and to defend without 
any reserve their right of self-determination, even to 
secession. Adopting this policy, the Party has consequently 
the duty to prepare itself and the oppressed masses for the 
organization of the insurrection against the oppressing 
bourgeoisie.^5
As opposed to this theory, the oppressed Hungarian minority— like the 
Bulgarian, German and Albanian minorities--turned for assistance to 
their fellow nationals outside Yugoslavia rather than to the CPY.
Only when that outside help had failed did they try to make amends with 
the CPY.
By seeking outside help for their disadvantaged position, the 
Hungarians found themselves aligned with the Axis forces bent on
^Gyilasz, "A Szldv Ndpek Harca a Bekee'rt e's a Demokrdciaert,"
pp. 12-2 0 .
•^As quoted by Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 43.
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destroying Yugoslavia. Thus, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina actually 
became an obstacle to the unfolding of the CPY's "national-revolu­
tionary war." In other words, the Hungarians remained outside the 
"nation-making process" that has produced modern Yugoslavia and its
Of.ruling Communist Party. u
It was the military and political struggle of World War II that
moulded the CPY and its affiliation with all the nationalities of the
country, including the Vojvodina's Hungarians. Unlike the Rumanian
Communist Party, the CPY did not attain power on the coat-tails of
the Soviet Red Army. The CPY was the major organizer of efforts to
liberate the country from foreign control. It provided the leadership
97for the Partisan struggle against the Axis armies.
The CPY's World War II experience as a national liberation 
movement, put its imprint on the evolution of both its organization 
and membership. The struggle against the Axis was a "national" effort 
on the part of the South Slav p e o p l e s . A s  such, the liberation
^Gyilasz, "A Szlav Nepek Harca a Bekedrt ds a Demokrdcidert," 
pp. 12-20; Paul Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under 
Communism," Slavic Review. XXII (March, 1963), pp. 68-70.
^George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the 
New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), pp. 69-80.
^ T h e  adjective "national" means in this case Yugoslav. Many, 
perhaps most, Croatians would have found themselves more in sympathy 
with the UstaSe than with the Partisans. The Serbs, in turn, probably 
felt themselves closer to the Cetnici than to the Partisans. But the 
fietnici and the UstaSe were never able to transcend their narrow Serb 
and Croatian appeals. Thus, only the CPY led Partisans can claim to be 
the national liberation movement of all the South Slavs. Ibid., pp. 
69-77; George Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 44-46.
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movement was composed mainly of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Monte­
negrins. The Partisans drew their recruits from these peoples. Only
toward the end of the war were they able to "enlist" the support of
QQnon-Slavic groups. 7 Thus, with the exception of one or two outstand- 
ing individuals--e,g., Moshe Pijade— the CPY leadership was drawn 
almost entirely from the South Slavic nationalities. The national 
background of the most important Party leaders of this period reflects 
closely the over-all makeup of the Party. Tito is of Croatian and 
Slovenian background, Rankovid is Serbian, Kardelj is Slovenian and 
Djilas is Montenegrin.
The CPY's leadership of the Partisan struggle also ensured it 
of reliable members and leaders. The war tested the loyalty and re­
vealed the organizational ability of Party members. It. also provided 
the Party with the opportunity to expand membership without risking 
the adhesion of opportunists. As Figure 5 indicates, the CPY's most 
dramatic growth took place in the years between 1937 and 1945, when the 
most risk and the most sacrifice was demanded of Party members.
This is exactly the opposite of the Rumanian Party's growth. As 
Figure 4 indicates, the CPR had its most phenomenal growth between 1944 
and 1947, after the Communist fate of Rumania had already been decided
99shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism," 
pp. 68-69; Kdroly Brindza, "Adatok a Jugoszl^viai Magyars^g Rdszt- 
v^telerdl a N^pfelszabadito Haboruban," Hid, No. 5 (May, 1951), pp. 
323-336.
lOOFigure 5 is based on Neal, Titoism in Action, p. 55; Zalar, 
Yugoslav Communism, pp. 50-51; "Communist Party Rolls Increase Around 
World," The Blade (Toledo), June 10, 1970, p. 7; Hoffman and Neal, 
Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 197.
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(i.e., when under the protective wings of the Red Army it was no longer 
"risky" to be a Communist).
Both the growth of the Party under wartime circumstances and 
its role as the guiding element of Partisan resistance, enabled it to 
become the dominant force in the chaotic setting of Yugoslavia. Unlike 
all the other Communist Parties of East Central Europe— including the 
Rumanian— the Yugoslav Communists came to power without the outside 
assistance of the Red Army.'*'̂ '*' This meant that the CPY was never in a 
dependent status vis-k-vis the Soviet Union. It also meant, that the 
leaders of the Party were not mere puppets of Moscow but leaders who 
ruled in their own right. Thus, the CPY was never really fragmented 
into three identifiable factions (i.e., Muscovites, Westerners and 
"home" Communists) as was the case with most of the other Communist 
parties of East-Central Europe.
This is not to say that there was no diversity in the CPY.
Many of its leaders had been in the Soviet Union for extended periods 
of time. Many others had been in the West--participating actively in
the Spanish Civil War.^^ But very few of them came back to Yugoslavia
with a "Muscovite" or "Western" orientation. Or, at any rate, the 
guerrilla struggle in Yugoslavia re-nationalized them. In this way
1 01XUAThe Red Army assisted only in the liberation of Belgrade and 
the Vojvodina. For the liberation of the major part of Yugoslavia the 
Partisans deserve credit. See Colakovid, et al., A  Jugoslav Kommunista
Szftvetsdg Rdvid Tflrtdnete, pp. 427-430 and Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia
and the New Communism, p. 79.
1 02J-UAZalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 51-52; Colakovid, et al., A 
Jugoszldv Kommunista Szovetsdg Rovid Tbrtdnete. pp. 249-252.
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we can conclude that the CPY was composed predominantly of "home" 
Communists, both on the membership and leadership levels. Furthermore, 
the Party was predominantly South Slav in composition. In the latter 
respect, we can say that all of the major Slavic groups were represented,
1 nowith no one group having a dominant position. With slight qualifica­
tion this characterization of the CPY is still applicable at the present 
time (1970).
Since the end of the Second World War the Hungarians have 
gained some access into the CPY. This access is limited mainly to the 
Party’s organization in the Vojvodina. On the Federation level, they 
have only token representation, i.e., one Hungarian in the Central 
C o m m i t t e e . E v e n  in the Vojvodina they are somewhat underrepresented. 
In the area as a whole the Hungarians make-up about 2570 of the popula­
tion, yet they only composed about 8.4% of the Party membership in 
1 9 5 8 . Supposedly, their percentage of membership has increased since 
1958. As yet, however, none of the statistics indicating this change
have been made available.
•*-^Croatians frequently charge--particularly in emigre circles—  
that the LCY/CPY is Serb dominated. Serbs, on the other hand, say 
that the Croatians and Slovenes dominate the Party. These charges and 
counter-charges hold no water in actual practice. No one nationality 
has a majority of the Party membership. For the South Slavs propor­
tionality in membership prevails. The representative nature of the 
Party is reflected in the data provided by Neal, Titoism in Action 
p. 55.
104The Hungarians also have five representatives in the Central 
Committee of the Serbian party. See Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National
Minorities Under Communism," p. 76, footnote 50.
105Ibid.
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Access to Party membership has been hindered by reciprocal 
suspicion. The Hungarians have shied away from Party membership because 
they have equated the CPY with the national aspirations of only the 
South Slavs, perhaps with reason. The CPY leadership on the other hand, 
has distrusted the Hungarians and considered them not completely 
Yugoslavs, perhaps with reason. At any rate, the Hungarians for the 
most part have not been anxious to join the Party and the dominant 
nationalities "have not been eager to promote Communists from the 
minorities (including the Hungarians) to positions of real responsi­
bility."106
Unlike the Rumanian Communist Party, the CPY has not had to 
undertake numerous purges to gain a national identity. From the 
beginning it has been the national Party of the South Slavs. In fact, 
a good case could be made for the observation that each major purge 
that has swept through the CPY has democratized the Party internally, 
and thereby also increased the role of the Communists of minority back­
ground. Perhaps only the purge of Djilas in 1954 can be considered a 
setback to democratization.10^ This purge, however, was not really 
detrimental to the position of the non-Slavic Party members, since 
Djilas had been one of their major critics in the immediate postwar
• j 108 period.
106Ibid.. p. 76.
107wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 402-403; Neal, Titoism 
in Action, pp. 67-77.
106See Gyilasz, "A Szl^v Ndpek Harca a Bdkddrt ^s a Demokra- 
ciddrt," pp. 12-20; Milovin Gyilasz, "JugoszlAvia Ndpeinek Harca 6s a 
Marxismus-Leninizmus," Hid, No. 12 (December, 1947), pp. 873-883.
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Besides the Djilas purge of 1954, two others have had far 
reaching consequences for the Party and its relationship to the "nation­
alities." One swept the Party in the wake of the Comintern dispute of 
1948, while the other came as late as 1966 with the removal of 
Rankovid. The purge of 1948 removed at the top levels Andriya Hebrang 
(Croatian), Sreten Zujovic-Tsrni (Serb), and Arso Jovanovid (Serb).
All three were Stalinists. Although this purge also eliminated two 
Hungarian Communists in the V o j v o d i n a , i t s  overall impact--from a 
long-range perspective— was to strengthen the "pluralistic" nature of 
the CPY. An indication of this was that Hebrang was accused of main­
taining an "incorrect attitude toward the Serbs in Croatia  ̂ An 
even more important indication was that all the non-Slavic nationali­
ties and their Communist leaders remained loyal to Tito.*^ This 
eliminated some of the suspicion that had carried over from World War 
II experience.
Like the purge of 1948, that of 1966 was not primarily concerned 
with nationality policy. Still, its consequences increased, rather 
than diminished the opportunities of all nationalities to participate 
in the policy-making process of the country. The purge eliminated 
Alexander,Rankovid and Svetislav Stefanovid from the League of
109Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 353-366.
■'•'^Shoup, "Yugoslavia’s National Minorities Under Communism," 
p. 73, footnote 36.
^■■^Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 354.
1-^Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism," 
p. 73, footnote 36.
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C o m m u n i s t s . B o t h  men stood for the "hard line." As responsible 
for internal security, they opposed the processes of decentralization 
and "democratization" which were taking place in the Party, the 
economy and administration in general. Their conservatism, plus their 
Serbian background, made them also less sympathetic toward "self- 
management" in the area of nationality policy. At least, this is one 
of the points on which they were accused of maintaining incorrect 
attitudes.
Rankovic and his followers resisted the changes which were re­
defining the role of the Party and its internal organization.*'*'"' They
saw the Party, very much like Party leaders in other East European 
states, as the director of national affairs, highly disciplined, 
centralized, and directly involved in decision-making for society.
As opposed to this position, the official self-definition of the Party, 
given one year after the Rankovic purge was that:
. . . the League of Communists is not a kind of general repre­
sentative of society which decides on matters on behalf of the 
working people, or rather it is less and less this. On the 
contrary, the League is and must increasingly become the inner 
motive force of self-management by the working people, that is, 
the organizer and initiator of the working class and working 
masses in their efforts to get organized, develop and work as a 
socialist society based on seIf-management, and to mobilize in
113Ernest Buranus, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Revolution," Central 
Europe Journal, XV (April, 1967), 123-126; "Az Xllambiztonsdgi 
Szervek Munkdjanak Eltorzuldsarol Tdrgyal a JKSZ KSzponti Vezetosdge," 
Magyar Sz6 (July 2, 1966), pp. 1,3.
11^Ibid.; Buranus, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Revolution," pp. 125-126.
**~*Ibid., pp. 123-127; Bernard Gwertzman, "Unprecedented 
Reforms: An Upheaval in Yugoslavia," The (Washington) Evening Star,
December 4, 1967, pp. 1,6.
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this struggle for progressive aims and interests the entire social 
labour and creative potential--from material production to science 
and culture.
As the above quote indicates, the League of Communists is still 
the directing force in Yugoslavia. For those who doubt this, the 
Mihailov case is a sobering antidote. Yet, as Kardelj points out, 
the League wants to achieve its leadership through more indirect methods 
than previously. Among others, it allows its front organization, the 
Socialist Alliance of Working People, to take a more active part in 
decisionmaking. This loosened framework, this general decentrali­
zation even in the core of the power structure, gives the nationali­
ties— among them the Hungarians in the Vojvodina--more opportunity to 
participate in the political life of the country. This, as everything 
else in Yugoslavia, is guaranteed only while Tito remains at the helm.
II
While ultimate decision-making power in both Rumania and Yugo­
slavia resides within the Communist Parties, the governmental apparatus 
of both states also perform important policy-making, administrative 
and control functions. This pervasive role of the governments is, of 
course, guided by the Communist parties. None the less, the scope of 
government involvement is so vast, that it has more direct and more
■'■■^Edvard Kardelj, "Some Questions Relating to the Further 
Development of the Assembly and Political System,” Federal Assembly 
Series (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1968), pp. 19-20.
■^Buranus, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Revolution," pp. 126-128.
118Kardelj, "Some Questions Relating to the Further Develop­
ment of the Assembly and Political System," pp. 18-20.
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frequent contact with the population than does the Party. Consequently, 
the nature of access to government at all levels and the actual par­
ticipation in governmental activities by Hungarians, also provides an 
indication of their treatment. This treatment will be evaluated by 
examining the governmental organization and personnel of Yugoslavia and 
Rumania.
In Rumania
As the analysis of Rumania's constitutional set-up indicated, 
the government is unitary and also highly centralized. As the examina­
tion of the membership and organization of the CPR indicated, the non- 
Rumanian elements are much less influential in policy making. These 
considerations might lead us to the conclusion, that in the government 
the non-Rumanian inhabitants have only a very limited role. This con­
clusion is valid as far as actual policy-making is concerned. However, 
such a conclusion does not take into account the symbolic and the 
administrative role of government. In both these latter areas, the 
Hungarians and the other minorities have a highly visible even if not 
a very influential role.
The Grand National Assembly and the National Council of the 
Socialist Unity Front are two "institutions" of the modern Rumanian 
political scene which perform mainly symbolic roles. In both, the 
minorities are proportionally represented. In the Grand National 
Assembly— the supreme legislative body, which (theoretically) has vast 
powers, but in reality is merely a rubber stamp for CPR policies--the
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119Hungarian inhabitants have had their fair share of representatives.
While the Rumanians have not issued exact statistics on the ethnic com­
position of their national legislature, as the Yugoslavs have done, they 
have pointed out on numerous occasions that in the Grand National 
Assembly the minority nationalities are represented in proportion to 
their percentage of the population. Thus, in 1964, out of 465 deputies
61 belonged to the various national minorities.^® In 1969, out of 465
121deputies 67 belonged to the various national minorities. While the
complete name listings for these latter two assemblies have not been
available for examination, the name analysis of the members of the 1957
Grand National Assembly shows that the Hungarians, at that time, had
representation in proportion to their number of the p o p u l a t i o n . A l l
available data seems to indicate that this is also the case today (1970).
In the Socialist Unity Front a similar situation prevails. This
organization is a link between the government and the people according
to a Party theory. In actuality it is the Party's vehicle for acti-
1 o ovating the masses in elections for the Grand National Assembly. J As
H^ p o r  the powers of the Grand National Assembly see Chapter II.
•^®Short Document on Rumania (Bucharest: Agerpres, 1964), p. 15.
121 L. Banyai, "Councils of Working People Belonging to the 
Coinhabiting Nationalities of Romania," Documents, Articles and Informa­
tion on Romania. No. 2 (January 31, 1969), p. 4.
122■L See Andrew J. Caranfil, "Biographical Information of 
Members of the Rumanian Grand National Assembly," Report N o . 26 (New 
York: U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1957).
12*3•‘•■^"Founding of the National Council of the Socialist Unity 
Front," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 22-23 
(December 5, 1968), p. 1.
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a mass organization it has really become a successor to the National 
Democratic Front, which had played an important role in the Communist 
seizure of power following World War II and the People's Democratic 
Front which came into existence after the Communists came to power.
The Socialist Unity Front was brought into existence only very
recently in November 1968.^24 For the Hungarians and the other nation­
alities it has been significant, because it has been one of the few 
nation-wide organizations to which they could affiliate as "national" 
groups. In the fifteen counties of Transylvania where Hungarians 
reside in large numbers, they have been allowed to elect councils of 
Magyar working people. These county councils, in turn, send represen­
tatives to a central "Council of the working people of Magyar nation­
ality of the Socialist Republic of Romania." The latter in turn, 
exists solely to affiliate with the Socialist Unity Front. The same 
holds true for the German, Serbian and other nationality councils 
which have come into existence since October 1968.
The leadership, or the "National Council," of the Socialist 
Unity Front is firmly in the hands of the Rumanian Communist Party.
It is, at the same time, a nationally representative body, including
prominent individuals from the labor field, from women's, youth and 
student unions, cultural and artistic societies, professional associa­
tions and the inclusive councils of working people of the nationalities!2®
124Ibid.
l23Banyai, "Councils of Working People Belonging to the 
Coinhabiting Nationalities of Romania," p. 5.
126Ibid.
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Thus, of the seven Vice-Chairmen of the National Council one is Hun­
garian. Of the remaining twenty-eight members, three are also Hun­
garian.^^ This would indicate that, if anything, the Hungarians are 
over-represented on the National Council. However, it would be naive 
to consider this as a sign of actual decision-making power. Rather, 
the Hungarian representation in the Grand National Assembly as well as 
in the Socialist Unity Front is window-dressing for both "home" and 
"foreign" consumption. It visibly demonstrates the nationality policy 
of the CPR. For example, in the Grand National Assembly, according to 
Nicolae Ceausescu, in February 1968, 86.1% of the deputies were 
Rumanian, 8 .6% were Magyars, 2.1% were Germans and 3.2% were people of
1 OQother nationalities. The deceptive nature of this policy is re­
vealed by the relationship and the functions of both the Grand National 
Assembly and the Socialist Unity Front. The main task of the latter 
was to organize the March 2, 1969 (and all subsequent) elections to the
Grand National Assembly, "under the leadership of the Romanian Communist 
129Party." ihe results of that election--99.75% for the candidates of 
the Socialist Unity Front and 0.23%, against— bear further testimony to 
the merely legitimizing, or symbolic, nature of participation in
127"Founding of the National Council of the Socialist Unity 
Front,"p. 1.
1 p Q°Nicolae Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the 
Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic 
of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 2 
(February 17, 1968), p. 14.
129npoun(jjLng 0f fhe National Council . . .," p. 1.
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either of these two "political" institutions,^®
Of a somewhat more meaningful nature is the role of Hungarians 
in the governmental administration of the country. On the highest 
levels, this entails membership in the'State Council" and the "Council 
of Ministers" of the Socialist Republic of Romania. In the State 
Council in 1969 three members out of 28 were Hungarians. Included 
among these was one of the four Vice-Presidents of the State Council. 
Among the members of the Council of Ministers a less encouraging 
situation prevailed. There were only two Hungarians among the 43 mem­
bers of this body and to make matters worse, they were not ministers to 
specific departments. They were both Vice-Chairmen (two out of eight)
1 Olof the Council of Ministers. While these latter posts are more 
prestigious, they have less impact on actual administration. The 
general result is that the Hungarians are placed into highly visible 
positions, which have little influence on actual administration.
The limited nature of Hungarian influence is conditioned by 
yet two other factors. One is that their representatives on both these 
bodies are individuals who have little sympathy for their fellow 
nationals. They are frequently the same individuals who also hold 
prominent Party posts, such as jAnos Fazekas and Josif Banc.^^ A
• ^ ( ^ ' S i g n i f i c a n c e  0 f  March 2 Ballot," Documents, Articles,
and Information on Romania, No. 4-5 (March 10, 1969), pp. 1-5.
131"After the March 2 Elections," Documents, Articles and 
Information on Romania, No. 6 (March 31, 1969), pp. 4-6.
1 *32Compare Ibid. and "The Council of Ministers of the Socialist 
Republic of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, 
No. 24 (December 25, 1967), pp. 3-4.
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second reason is that the actual role of Hungarians in state administra­
tion is being reduced. This can be ascertained by comparing the na­
tional composition of the State Council and the Council of Ministers 
of 1969 with the composition of the same bodies in 1967. The propor­
tion of Hungarians in the State Council --the more symbolic agency-- 
has remained about the same. In 1967 among its 19 members two were 
Hungarian. In 1969 this changed to three Hungarians out of 28 members. 
In the Council of Ministers--the more administrative agency— on the 
other hand, the number of four Hungarians out of 42 members in 1967,
I 0 9has been reduced to only two Hungarians out of 43 members in 1969.
On lower levels of administration this cut-back in Hungarian 
influence can be examined over a longer period of time. As Chapter II 
indicated, the Rumanian Constitutional system initially granted the 
Hungarians a certain amount of self-administration in those areas of 
the country in which they composed the majority of the population.134 
Thus, in the Eastern-most part of Transylvania the Hungarians were 
given the Magyar-Autonomous Region in 1952. For some years the Hun­
garians— or at least those in the "autonomous" region--enjoyed limited 
self-administration in relation to local needs and problems. However, 
the revolt in Hungary in 1956, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Rumania in 1958, and the general revival of Rumanian nationalism, en­
abled Party leaders to re-consider their grant of self-administration
^^Ibid., pp. 2-4; "After the March 2 Elections," pp. 4-6.
134See part II of Chapter II.
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in the Magyar-Autonomous Region.
In 1960, in the course of an over-all administrative re­
organization of Rumania, the "autonomous region" was drastically alter­
ed. The redistricting of that year— more correctly, gerrymandering-- 
replaced the Magyar Autonomous Region with the Mures-Magyar Autonomous 
R e g i o n . T h e  maps of Figure 6 indicate the extent of the territorial 
changes. What the maps fail to show, however, is that the areas taken 
away from the region were predominantly Magyar in population, while 
the areas received in exchange were inhabited predominantly by 
Rumanians. ^ 6  Table IV provides a breakdown of the changed proportions 
of the region's ethnic make-up. As this shows, and as the revised name 
of the region indicates, the region has been diluted and robbed of its 
former "compact" Magyar character. The region's formerly 78% 
Hungarian population was thus reduced to 65%,. This has naturally
^■*Gyula Miklos, "A RomAn NdpkcJztArsasAgban 1950 6ta 
Vdgrehajtott KttzigazgatAsi-GazdasAgi Ktirzetbeosztasok NAhAny 
Tapasztalata," Fttldrajzi Kdzlemdnyek, IX (LXXV), 4 (1961), 317-320; 
International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian Minority Problem 
in Rumania," Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists,
Mo. 17 (December, 1963), 77; TamAs Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbsdg 
Helyzete Romaniaban," Irodalmi Ujsag (July 15, 1964), p. 1.
^■■^International Commission of Jurists, p. 77} J. F. Brown, 
"The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The World Today, XIX 
(November, 1963), pp. 505-506.
■^^The Rumanization of names has swept all of the country. 
Streets, theaters or public buildings which had a Russian or non- 
Rumanian name, have now been renamed. See George Bailey, "Trouble 
Over Transylvania," The Reporter (November 19, 1964), p. 25;
"LevAl Erddlybbl," Irodalmi UjsAg (August 1, 1964), p. 1.
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TABLE I V














Region 146,830 565,510 266,403 473,154
■ n - -- n/v/v;.SZw-owv ixcgjLuu OOftU iU y «•£ \J i no l aJL KJ\J j / J X 587,628 222,248
Cluj Region 963,748 257,974 883,172 236,858
*This Table has been adopted with minor changes from J. F. 
Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The World Today, XIX 
(November, 1963), 506.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
1 8 6
resulted in reducing the political influence of the Hungarians as 
veil.138
Since 1960, self-administration no longer necessarily means that 
Hungarians rule Hungarians. It is hard to substantiate this while the 
Rumanians do not follow the Yugoslav example of releasing statistics 
on the composition of local governments. Occasionally, it is true, 
the Rumanian government releases some data that sheds light on the 
governmental involvement of the nationalities. However, these are 
figures for the country as a whole and thereby fail to show the corre­
lation between the nationality of the local official elected and the 
national composition of the area for which he is elected. For example, 
it was pointed out by Rumanian authorities in 1968 that: "Among the
over 155,000 deputies (elected) to the local organs of power more
than 11,800 are Magyar, almost 2,800 are German, and over 2,400 are
139people of other nationalities." Yet a name analysis of the pro­
minent local officials of predominantly Hungarian areas, turns up just 
as many or more Rumanians than Hungarians. An example of this was the 
leadership of the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region in 1963. While the
138International Commission of Jurists, p. 77; "Nem Xrt 
Tudni," Ldrmafa, VII (October-December, 1960), p. 25; David Binder, 
"Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," New York Times,
July 14, 1964, p. 4.
13^Nicolae Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the 
Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic 
of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 2 
(February 17, 1968), p. 14.
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region's population was predominantly Magyar, its leadership was at 
least 50% Rumanian.^®
In the present Rumanian administrative set-up, such a distor­
tion of self-government is even more possible and probable. Since 1965 
Rumania has eliminated from its Constitution any reference to autonomy 
and self-government for the Hungarians or any of the other nationali­
ties. In 1968, it followed its theoretical commitment of 1965, with 
an extensive administrative-territorial re-organization of Rumania.
The latter eliminated the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region. It divided 
Rumania into 39 countries, replacing the 17 regions which had been the 
major subdivision of the country previously. This re-organization 
divided the "Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region" into the counties of 
Covasna, Harghita and M u r e s . S e e  Figure 7 for these changes. The 
names of the three counties are all geographically derived, with no 
hint as to their dominant Hungarian composition.
Both the administrative set-up on the local level and the 
national composition of leadership at the highest levels indicate that 
Hungarian involvement is more for show than anything else. However, in 
the everyday lives of Transylvanian Hungarians, the attitudes and 
behavior of the civil servants and the local police officials is direct,
•^^Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27; Deaky and 
Radulescu, "Fighters of the Socialist Struggle," pp. 2-8.
•'•Romania Szocialista Kbztdrsasdg Alkotmdnya (Magyar Nyelvii 
Forditds; Bukarest; Politikai Kdnyvkiadd, 1968), Art. 22, p. 8 .
•^2" N e w  Administrative-Territorial Organization of Romania," 
Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 4 (February 24, 
1968), pp. 3-4; Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the 
Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic 
of Romania," pp. 1-30.
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it is not meant for show. The national background of civil servants
and of the police is, therefore, a more pressing question. However, no
statistics are available to show either that Hungarians are active
participants in these occupations, or that the Rumanian police and
civil servants treat the Hungarians and other nationalities with
tolerance. The only data we have is the impression of travelers and
newspaper men who have had the opportunity to visit Transylvania in the
143course of the past fifteen or twenty years.
The general impression of such observers has been that public 
officials and police are overwhelmingly Rumanian even in predominantly 
Hungarian areas. Perhaps, this impression is a result of an unwill­
ingness on the part of some officials to speak Hungarian when asked 
for assistance. At any rate, in spite of constitutional guarantees to 
the contrary, the exclusive use of Rumanian by civil servants and 
police, indicates an overwhelming Rumanian membership in these occupa­
tional areas. Or, it can also indicate widespread pressure against 
the use of Hungarian by public o f f i c i a l s . I n  either case, the end 
result is the same--a general abuse of nationality rights.
In Yugoslavia
The examination of the governmental order and the part of
■^■^Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 21; Binder, 
"Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," p. 8 ; A Corre­
spondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest . . .  A Conversation Piece," 
Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), 20-21.
^ ^Ibid.; Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27. This 
point is also stressed by many travelers who have tried to use 
Hungarian. A number of these individuals have disclosed this impres­
sion personally to the present student of this problem.
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Hungarians in it, is both easier and harder than was the case with 
Rumania, It is easier, because the Yugoslavs have made available much 
more information concerning this question. It is harder, because the 
nationality problem in Yugoslavia is much more involved generally. 
Furthermore, Yugoslavia has experimented more extensively with new 
administrative forms. This means that less administrative continuity 
has prevailed.
In Yugoslavia, as in Rumania, it is also necessary to distin­
guish the symbolic role and the actual administrative role of the 
national minorities. On the highest level, in the Federal government, 
their role is mainly symbolic, with very limited influence on ad­
ministration. The Federal People's Assembly and the Socialist Alliance 
of Working People of Yugoslavia are the two nation-wide organizations 
that are most suited for this task.*^ As far as the Socialist 
Alliance is concerned, like its Rumanian counterpart the Socialist 
Unity Front, it is an enthusiasm building mass agency. It too, is con­
cerned mainly with elections to the national legislature, in this case, 
the Federal People's Assembly. In this role it tries to be representa­
tive of all sectors of Yugoslav life, including all the nationalities. 
As a consequence, its nationwide ruling council is made up of the 
presidents of the Provincial and Republican councils of the Socialist
145The Socialist Alliance is not a governmental organ. How­
ever, since it roughly corresponds--from a symbolic perspective--to 
the electoral agencies of Western democracies, it can be considered 
together with governmental agencies, rather than with the other mass 
or front organizations of the LCY.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
1 9 0
Alliance. In 1963, PAl Soti a Hungarian, was the President of the 
Provincial Council in the Vojvodina. This automatically made him one 
of the nine members of the national leadership of the Socialist 
Alliance.
Representation in the Federal People's Assembly is also pri­
marily symbolic. As Table V indicates, Hungarians have been repre­
sented by anywhere from 11 to 16 of their fellow countrymen, in a 
legislature that has a total membership of 670. This is not propor­
tional to their numbers in the population. However, proportionality is 
not even attempted. As the above table also shows, the Montenegrins 
have usually had at least twice as many representatives as the 
Hungarians. Yet their actual proportion of the population is the 
same as that of the Hungarians. Still another indication of this dis­
parity in representation, is the number of the Albanian representa­
tives. Although there are almost twice as many Albanians as Monte­
negrins, the latter have always had at least five more representatives 
in the Federal People's Assembly.
This distortion in ethnic representation is in some ways less 
hypocritical than Rumania's exact proportionality. In Yugoslavia, 
the representation in the Federal People's Assembly actually reflects 
at the same time the degree of influence, which each one of the
■*•̂ 1 0 0 0  Facts About Yugoslavia (Beograd; Izdavacki Zavod 
"Jugoslaviaa," 1963), p. 6 6 .
^^For the population statistics of these nationality groups 
see Chapter I, Table II.
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517 238 119 51 32 20 27 15 11 4
1958*** 587 254 130 61 41 33 32 18 12 6 - -




28 101 20 11 6 99
1965 670 251 102 58 45 29 57 16 16 8 88
1967 670 269 109 61 48 34 47 26 13 8 55
*This Table is based on StatistiCki Godisnjak F N R J 1958, Table 1-5, p. 36; StatistiCki Godisnjak 
S  i  I960, Table 1-3, p. 26; StatistiCki Godisnjak S F  R J 1964, Table 101-2, p. 62; StatistiCki 
Godisnjak S F R J 1965, Table 101-4, p. 67; StatistiCki Godisnjak S F R J 1967, Table 101-5, p„ 6 6.
**Includes representatives of the Turks, Bulgarians, Slovaks and Rumanians. For 1965 it also includes 
a representative of the "Moslems."
***Prior to the governmental re-organization of 1963, the SkupStina was composed of two chambers, the 
"Federa1-Republie Council" and the "Council of Producers." In this Table the composition of these 
chambers has been combined to facilitate the comparison of the pre- and post-1963 SkupStina in 
terms of its ethnic make-up. 191
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nationalities exerts on the national level— without regard to their 
percentage of the population. This is even more conclusively mirrored 
in the make-up of the leadership of the Federal Assembly (10 members) 
of which none are H u n g a r i a n . A  similar situation prevails in the 
Federal Executive Council and the Federal Administration. In 1963, 
neither among the 37 members of the Council nor among the 23 Federal 
Administrators (Department heads) could one encounter a Hungarian.
This ethnically unrepresentative national leadership should not 
lead us to the easy conclusion that the Hungarians enjoy less influ­
ence in the Yugoslav than in the Rumanian government. Quite the 
opposite is the case. It seems that the Rumanians feel that they have 
done everything, by putting a few Hungarians into highly visible 
governmental positions. By doing this they feel they have done what 
is required of them by the Leninist, nationality policy. In a sense, 
they have delegated authority to look out for the interests of the 
Hungarians— as of the other nationalities--to individuals who are the 
most unlikely to make a stand for their fellow nationals. The Yugoslavs 
have not chosen this easy way out. They have not placed representa­
tives of the Hungarians in high governmental posts. Thus, they cannot 
delegate their responsibility to anyone. They must consider them­
selves personally responsible for the correct application of the Yugo­
slav version of the Leninist nationality policy. Judging from the 
actual consequences of nationality policies, the Yugoslav system seems
•*•̂ 1 0 0 0  Facts About Yugoslavia, p. 63.
k^ I b i d ., pp. 63-64.
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to have favored the position of the nationalities more.
On the lower governmental levels, the Yugoslav system also 
delegates authority to the representatives of the Hungarians. On the 
Republic level they have had anywhere from 18 to 24 representatives in 
the Serbian Republic Assembly. Table VI provides some data on this sub­
ject. As this Table indicates, the Hungarians have always had a con­
siderable number of representatives in the Provincial Assembly of 
Vojvodina. It should be noted that while they compose about 24% of 
the population in the Vojvodina, the number of their representation has 
declined from 23.1% in 1958 to a little over 20% in 1964. Whether this 
trend has continued is uncertain,since no more recent statistics have 
been released concerning this question. What is certain, however, is 
that the Serbs have preserved their dominance.
On the lowest possible levels of representation a somewhat 
different pattern of representation emerged. Initially, on the commune 
level--in both the district and the commune committees and the dis­
trict and communal workers' councils— Hungarians had a higher percent­
age of representatives than did the Albanians. For example, in 1957 
Hungarians had 233 district committee memberships while the Albanians 
had 241. The Hungarians also had 167 members in the district pro­
ducers' councils against 175 for the Albanians. In commune committee 
memberships the representation was somewhat more in line with
^ ® A s  Table VI indicates, in the Serbian Republican Assembly, 
the Serbs have always overshadowed the other nationalities. In 1965 
they had 328 representatives to 102 for all the other nationalities.
In 1967, they again retained their dominance 328 to 102.
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Serbia 310 252 6 -- 7 2 18 18 7 —
Vojvodina 190 112 12
(1963
2 4 3 
Governmental Re-Organization)
44 13 “ —
1964
Serbia 440 319 9 -- 8 34 35 23 12 ---
Vojvodina 349 156 13 1 7 27 — 70 28 47
1965***
Serbia 440 328 15 1 7 17 38 24 10 —
1967***
Serbia 440 338 15 2 9 5 36 23 12
*This Table is based on StatistiCki Godisnjak F H R  J 1959, Table 1-3, p. 24; StatistiCki Godisnjak 
il £  S  H  1964* Table 101-2, p. 62; StatistiCki Godisnjak S F R J 1965, Table 101-4, p. 67; StatistiCki 
Godisnjak S F R J 1967, Table 101-5, p. 6 6 .
**Includes mainly the representatives of Slovaks and Rumanians.
***No statistics are available for 1965 and 1967 on the ethnic composition of the Vojvodinian 
Skupstina.
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population statistics. In the latter, Albanians had 1,704 memberships 
as against 1,075 Hungarian memberships. In the Commune producers' 
councils it was 1,201 to 719 in favor of the Albanians.^ ^  A compari­
son with the number of Serbs on these local councils also reflects
152favorably on the proportional representation of the Hungarians.
The Governmental re-organization of 1963,led to a more propor­
tional (in respect to the population) representation of nationalities 
on the commune level. There still existed some distortion in favor 
of the South Slavic peoples, but was somewhat more in line with the 
actual populations of various groups. In 1963 on the commune level
Hungarians held 937 seats, Albanians held 1,934 seats, and the Monte-
153negrins held 1,643 seats. In 1965, for these same nationalities,
the numbers were 898, 1,748, and 1,107 respectively.^^ As these
statistics indicate, the Montenegrins have fared better than either 
the Hungarians or Albanians. However, the latter two nationalities 
have gained membership on commune committees, generally in proportion 
to their percentage of the population.
^ ^StatistiCki Godisnjak FNRJ 1959, Tables 1-4 and 1-5, pp. 
25-26; Statistigki Godisnjak FNRJ 1962, Tables 101-4 and 101-5, pp. 
25-26.
152Ibid. Refer to both sources of footnote 151.
-̂ S t a t i s t i C k i  Godisnjak SFRJ 1964, Table 101-2, pp. 63-64.
•̂-̂ StatistiCki Godisnjak SFRJ 1966, Table 101-3, p. 65.
•'■■̂ For the population statistics of these nationality groups 
see Chapter I, Table II.
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The active membership of so many Hungarians in the lower levels
of government does not mean that Hungarians necessarily rule themselves.
As in the case of Rumania, this is not revealed by the statistics. In
the Vojvodina as a whole, as well as on all lower levels of government
(i.e., self-management), the Hungarians are usually in a minority
136(although a strong minority) on committees. But, this is part of 
the Yugoslav nationality policy. It allows the nationalities to be 
represented in government, but never as a corporate unit.
The whole organxzatxon of the Vojvodxna as a special province 
reflects this idea. It is not a "self-governing" area run by Hun­
garians like the Magyar Autonomous Region had been in Rumania.
Rather, the Vojvodina is a multi-national area, that allows for Hun­
garian participation, but not for Hungarian control. This is, in 
part, revealed by the post-war changes in its frontiers. While the new 
Communist Yugoslavia definitely rejected the centralist banovinas 
instituted by King Alexander in 1929, it also failed to re-establish 
the boundaries of the historic Vojvodina. jn its place it drew the
136Milentije Peskovid, "Autonomous Provinces in Yugoslavia," 
Studies. No. 5 (Beograd: Medunarodna Politika, 19b4), p. 31, indicates
that in ten communes (out of the 48 located in the Vojvodina) the 
Hungarians often have a majority position on the local community and 
working organizations.
■*--̂ As part II of Chapter II has pointed out, the Magyar Autono­
mous Region was "self-governing" only in theory. In practice the CPR 
and its predominantly Rumanian leadership exerted full control over it.
^•-^See Chapter II, part II.
■*--̂ See footnote 55 in Chapter II.
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boundaries of the Vojvodina by leaving the Baranya region (which had a 
heavy Hungarian population) outside the province, while it added the 
Srem region (with a heavy Serb and Croat population). Compare Figure 
8 with Figure 3 in the Prologue for these changes.
In this way, the Vojvodina was never really looked on as the 
"home-rule" area of the Hungarians. Rather, it is considered a multi­
national area in which the Hungarians compose the major national minor­
ity. Within this area additional precautions are taken that they will 
not be discriminated against because of their nationality. But, these 
precautions do not constitute exemptions or special treatment. As the 
Yugoslavs constantly point out, the existence of the Vojvodina as an
"autonomous province" is to ensure equality of treatment rather than
lfiOspecial treatment. As far as political influence is concerned, this
ideal is never really attained. Perhaps only on the lowest level, in
the communes, can the Hungarians safe-guard their own interests. On
this level, however, their influence is decisive in only 10 or 11 of
161the 48 communes of the Vojvodina.
In Yugoslavia— as in the case of Rumania--it is evident from 
what has been said in the foregoing, that the Hungarian participation 
in the government on all levels (except in about 11 of the communes) is 
mostly symbolic in nature. The limited nature of their governmental 
influence has some adverse consequences. These are evident in the
•^Opesakovid, "Autonomous Provinces in Yugoslavia," p. 31. 
•^^Ibid., p. 31, footnote 8 .




























national composition of the police force and of the civil servants of 
the Vojvodina. Both the police and the civil servants are overwhelming­
ly Serbs. Even in smaller villages like Teleika (Telecska) and Ruskoe 
Selo (Kis Orosz)— both of which are predominantly Hungarian--the village 
officials are S e r b s . I n  larger towns, like Kikinda and Zombor the 
same pattern prevails. Frequently, the only person who speaks Hun­
garian in governmental offices is the janitor. He frequently performs
163an indispensable role as translator and as "information" center.
The police force is also almost completely Serb. What is worse
is that very few of them know any Hungarian. Here again, the unoffi-
164cial go-betweens--the janitors--are indispensable for communication.
Where there are no go-betweens, a person is lost who does not know
Serbo-Croatian. As far as the police are concerned, the ethnic
imbalance is not completely due to governmental preference for Serbs.
16SIt is, in part, due to Hungarian disdain toward this organization.
■^j^Based on personal observations of the student writing this 
study. In the summer of 1966, he toured the Hungarian inhabited areas 
of the Vojvodina by bicycle for two weeks. On his tour, he visited 
Ruscoe Selo (Kis Orosz') in the Banat. This village was typical of many 
others. Although it was predominantly Hungarian in population, of the 
three "officials" running the village only the least influential— the 
recording secretary--was Hungarian.
^^Based on personal observations of the student in the summer 
of 1966, in the towns of Kikinda and Sombor (Zombor).
164Ibid.
^®^In numerous discussions with Hungarians when the student 
mentioned the l^ack of Hungarian police officials, he was met by 
surprised stares. These conversations usually revealed that Hun­
garians viewed the security service as an undesirable type of occupa­
tion. In fact, in one case in the Banat it was known that a Hungarian 
has actually become a police officer. However, he was feared and 
despised by his fellow nationals more than the Serb officers.
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But a similar excuse could not be made for the ethnic imbalance in
■I ££other governmental offices. OD
The ethnic imbalance in the police force and among civil ser­
vants would not, by itself, lead to discriminatory practices. Dis­
crimination results from the arrogant attitude of the civil servants 
and the police. Even those who know Hungarian, simply refuse to speak 
i t . T h e  nationalism of the Serbs over-rides governmental guarantees. 
But, the national (federal) government is in part responsible for this 
state of affairs. It does not try hard enough to recruit Hungarians 
for government work and it fails to set an example for the use of
minority languages. An example of this are post office forms, which
168appear only in Serbo-Croatian.
It is interesting to note, that most of these practices which 
lead to discrimination come under Serbian Republican rather than federal 
Yugoslav-supervision. In both the Provincial Assembly of the Vojvodina
166T'ne student met innumerable well trained and highly quali­
fied young Hungarians who were unable to find employment in Vojvodina. 
Many could have become excellent civil servants.
167ihe student had a number of experiences in the Vojvodina 
that indicated this. In one instance, he went to the Putnik (Yugoslav 
travel agency) office in Subotica (Szabadka) to purchase a railway 
ticket to Zagreb. He stood in line behind an old Hungarian woman who 
tried to ask for information in Hungarian. She was rebuffed in icy 
tones in Serb: "Ne govorim Magyar!" ("I do not speak Hungarian!")
Then the student pushed his American passport before the forbidding 
official and asked for information and a ticket in Hungarian. The Put­
nik official changed her tone drastically and answered politely in 
Hungarian.
■^®In Kikinda, the student actually helped a local Hungarian 
fill out a postal form which was all in Serbo-Croatian. Spanish- 
Americans do not have this problem in New York State, in spite of the 
fact that New York does not have a highly proclaimed "nationality 
policy."
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and the Republic Assembly of Serbia, the Serbs have an unchallenged 
majority. This is clear even from a cursory examination of Table VII. 
As this table indicates, the Serbs have the same type of sweeping 
dominance over Republican and Provincial matters as the Rumanians have 
over national matters in the Rumanian Grand National Assembly and the 
Rumanian Communist Party. This complete dominance of the Serbs and 
the concomitant ethnic abuses are checked only by the League of Com­
munists and the Federal Government of Yugoslavia. In the latter, the 
Serbs are less powerful due to the combined strength of the other 
South Slav peoples. Table V shows how the Croats, Slovenes. Mace­
donians and other South Slavs can, by combining their voting strength 
in the Federal Assembly check the Serbs in policy making for the
country as a whole. As we have had occasion to see, a similar situa-
169tion prevails in the League of Communists. All this leads us to 
conclude, that the political position of the Hungarian is quite pre­
carious, it depends on the continued process of ethnic checks and 
balances on the all-Yugoslav level.
Ill
Closely tied to the pervasive role of government in both 
Rumania and Yugoslavia, is the control exerted over the economic and 
social existence of the Hungarians. While the Party and governmental
1 f. Qiu;7The constitutional trend toward decentralization is indi­
cated by Pesakovid, "Autonomous Provinces in Yugoslavia," pp. 13-19.
A similar trend in relation to the LCY is presented in Voja Micovid, 
"Development of Inner Party Democracy," Socialist Thought and 
Practice, No. 18 (April-June, 1965), pp. 100-114.
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structures revealed to what extent the Hungarians can actually partic­
ipate in the political life of Rumania and Yugoslavia, their economic 
and social existence reveals to what extent even their "potential" 
power is circumscribed. Therefore, the examination and comparison of 
certain agricultural, industrial, and social policies in these two 
states will add to our understanding of the similarities and differ­
ences between Rumanian and Yugoslavian nationality policies.
Before turning directly to agricultural and industrial prob­
lems it is important to keep three factors in mind. First, that the 
Party-State administers, oversees and develops all agricultural, 
industrial and social programs which are carried out in Rumania and 
Yugoslavia. Second, because planning is centralized all programs 
are inter-related, making progress in one area (e.g. agriculture)
directly dependent on the developments in another area (e.g. indus- 
171try). Third, because of their inter-relationship it is difficult 
to separate, isolate and describe any one area without reference to 
another.
^"Harmonious, Balanced Development of Rumanian Economy," 
Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, No. 11-12 (July 30, 
1964), 8 ; Edvard Kardelj, "A PolgAr Helyzete Politikai As Gazdasdgi 
Rendszerttnkben," in Lukd Andras (ed.) A Tdrsadalmi IgazgatAs 
JugoszlAviAban: Cikkek ds Beszddek Gyiijtemdnye 1950-1960 trans.
Ldszld" Varga (Novi Sad: Forum KOnyvkiadd, 1963), pp. 214-217.
•̂̂ I b i d .; Nicolae Ceausescu, "Report Concerning Measures for 
Perfecting the Management and Planning of the National Economy and 
for Improving the Administrative-Territorial Organization of Romania" 
delivered before the National Conference of the Romanian Communist 
Party, December 1967 (Bucharest: Agerpres, 1967), pp. 5-138.
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In Rumania and Transylvania
The CPR from the very beginning of its ascendancy worked 
assiduously to transform the economic and social relationships within 
the country. This transformation required a far-reaching regulation of 
the existence and activities of the country's population, particularly 
of the Hungarians of Transylvania. It also required the replacement 
of existing social and economic "institutions" with,; agencies and 
organizations that were subservient to the Party. Private property 
and ownership in agriculture and industry were drastically reduced, as 
was the social leadership of the existing churches.
Agriculture and Collectivization
Administrative re-arrangements in Transylvania— as in Rumania 
as a whole— have, from the inception of the People's Republic, been 
designed to bring the rural areas into closer contact with the indus­
trial centers of the c o u n t r y . I n  Transylvania this has meant that 
the strongholds of the nationalities have been integrated more closely 
with the Rumanian areas of dominance. As such, urban-rural integra­
tion was not at that time motivated by a desire to curb the nationali­
ties. Rather, it was one facet of the CPR's policy aimed at the rapid
173industrialization of the country. However, when the administrative 
172Daniel Norman, "'New Course' in Rumanian Agriculture," 
Problems of Communism, IV (July-August, 1955), p. 35; Miklds, "A 
Romdn Nepkdztdrsasdgban 1950 Ota Vdgrehajtott Kbzigazgatdsi- 
Gazdasdgi KOrzetbeosztdsok Nehdny Tapasztalata," pp. 307-325.
173Ibid., p. 309.
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rearrangements are related to the policies carried out in the agricul­
tural and industrial area, it becomes apparent that they have worked 
to the detriment of the nationalities in the long-run. Immediate post­
war agricultural policies also demonstrate this.
Since Rumania was (and still is in 1970) a predominantly agri­
cultural country, the nature of land ownership has always been of 
primary importance. While Rumania— including Transylvania--has had a 
relatively well balanced distribution of land among the peasantry 
since the 1 9 2 0 ' s , t h e  Communists and their sympathizers were still 
able to utilize the slogan of "land reform" as a means of ingratiating 
themselves with some segments of the have-nots. Soon after the Groza 
government came to power a land reform was carried out affecting the 
whole country, but above all the national minorities.^-*
Like the previous inter-war land reforms, ^ 6  those carried out 
by the Groza administration also affected adversely the position of the
■^^George H. Bossy, "Agriculture" in Romania ed. Fischer- 
Galati, pp. 196-197, including Table One; Nicholas Spulber, The 
Economics of Communist Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Mass. : The
Technology Press, 1957), pp. 237-238 and Chart 8 on p. 243.
■^-*Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 348-349; Markham, 
Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke, pp. 374-380, 516-517; Theodor Schieder 
(ed.) The Fate of the Germans in Rumania (A Selection and Translation 
from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa; 
Bonn: Published by the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and
War Victims, 1961), III, 86-87.
176C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors (London:
Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 316-320, provides a balanced 
and objective description of the discriminatory nature of the inter­
war land reforms.
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national minorities. However, the Communist inspired distributions 
struck a particularly strong blow at the German minority.177 goth the 
"Transylvanian Saxons" and the "Banat Swabians" suffered disposses­
sion.^® In this way the strong independent peasant class, which had 
once been the backbone of the German minority, was broken. The fact
that the "land reform" very closely followed national lines was ra-
179tionalized as punishment of "disloyal elements." However, the fact
that the recipients of the confiscated land were almost all Rumanian
demonstrates that the motive was not free of nationalist coloration.
The new landowners were, in the main, local poor Rumanian farm
laborers, or Bessarabian Rumanians transplanted to Transylvania as a
180consequence of the Russian occupation of their homeland.
Two factors indicate the "Rumanization" result of these agrarian 
reforms, regardless of whether they were intentional or unintentional. 
The first is the dispossession and economic destruction of the German 
minority. The nature and extent of this intentional and systematic
I O -I"reform" is indicated by the figures in Table VII. A second indi­
cation of the "Rumanization" result is provided by a comparison of
•'•^Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, p. 237; 
Schieder, The Fate of the Germans in Rumania, pp. 86-87 and Documents 
Nos. 64 and 65, pp. 299-305.
178Ibid., pp. 90-91.
179For example, of these rationalizations see "The Land Reform 
Law of 1945" and "Regulations for the Agrarian Reform" in Ibid., Annex 
10 and 11, pp. 156-164.
180Ibid., p. 90. 181 Ibid., p. 91.
R eproduced  w ith perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
2 0 6
TABLE V I I
THE RUMANIAN LAND REFORM OF 1945-46 AND ITS 
IMPACT ON GERMAN INHABITED AREAS
Extent of Average Size of
Judet* Nature Number of Expropriated Expropriated
of Ethnic Expropriated Land in Holdings in
Composition Owners Hectares*** Hectares
T r a n s y l v a n i a P r o p e r
Sibiu 16,809 42,223 2.6
Tarnava-Mare Areas 15,468 80,070 5.1
Tarnava-Mica Having 9,578 36,229 3.7
Brasov Many 3,108 24,443 7.8
Fagaras German 7,594 38,127 5.0
Alba Inhabi­ 1,711 8,045 4.7
Nassaud tants 4,544 36,469 8.0
Mures 1,914 28,213 14.7
Other Eight Areas with 1,430 48,779 34.1
Judets few Germans
Total 62,157 345,598 5.6
T i s z a P l a i n  (B a n a t a n d S a t u M a r  e)**
Timis Torontal Areas 
with many
54,612 205,607 3.7
Arad Germans 15,654 45,182 2.8
Other Five Areas 3,115 111,971 35.9
Judets with few 
Germans
Total 73,381 362,760 4.9
R u m  a n i ia P r o p e r  
Predominant ly
(I n c 1 u d i n g  D o b r u j a)****
Total area Rumanian 7,681 735,553 95.7
*Judet was the largest administrative unit of Rumania prior to 
the Communist redistricting of 1950, which changed the appellation to 
regiune.
**As footnote 1 m  the Prologue indicates, the designation "Tran­
sylvania" has a wide and a narrow reference. The wider reference 
includes the areas of the Tisza Plain.
***One hectare is 2.47 acres.
****"Rumania Proper" refers to the areas of the "Old Kingdom"(i.e., Moldavia and Wallachia).
*****jhis TABLE has been compiled on the basis of the data provided
by Theodore Schieder and others (eds.),The Expulsion of the German Popu- lation From Hungary and Rumania. a selection! ‘arid 'translation- from Doku- 
mentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bonn; 
Published by the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War 
Victims, 1961), III, 91.
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population statistics in the German areas, prior to and after the 
"land reforms." The phenomenal growth of the Rumanian population and 
the parallel decrease of the German population, shown by Table VIII, 
leaves little doubt as to the policy's net result.
This twofold policy--the economic destruction of the German
minority and the colonization of Rumanians in formerly solid German
areas— has had especially important consequences on the position of the
1 ft 3Transylvanian nationalities in general. The most obvious has been 
the isolation of the Hungarian minority as the only one which was as 
yet dominant in important areas of Transylvania. Although in the agri­
cultural realm the Hungarian minority had already been greatly weakened 
in the inter-war years, in terms of population it is still the majority 
nationality in areas like the Western Rumanian border strip and the 
Szekely counties. But the destruction of the German minority's posi­
tion has accentuated the fact that only the Hungarian minority— the 
largest--remains to be subjugated and broken.
Collectivization of agriculture was the first step which showed
is9Ibid.. p. 93.
183The extent of the havoc wrought by these "reforms" is best 
described by Schieder in relation to the German minority. He states 
on p. 112; "An ethnic German economic life exists no longer in present- 
day Rumania. The close community of the German peasant village, as a 
living and economic organism, had already been destroyed by the 
agrarian reform; subsequent measures of Bolshevisation had also 
destroyed the traditional foundations of the German urban population, 
and at the same time the German character of the towns they inhabited." 
This quote could also be used to describe the position of the other 
ethnic minorities of Transylvania, with the only qualification that 
the Germans were subjugated the earliest.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
2 0 8
TA B LE V I I I
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF SELECTED PARISHES IN THE BANAT BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE LAND REFORM OF 1945-1946
Parish Year Germans Rumanians
Lenauheim 1941 2,421 52
1948 1,717 1,718
Grabatz 1941 2,661 129
(Grabat)
1948 1,527 1,803
Biled 1941 3,008 586
1948 2,791 1,650
Zovrin 1941 3,013 426
1948 2,448 4,024
Hatzfeld 1941 7,245 859
(Jimbolia)
1948 5,489 3,422
*This TABLE is taken from Theodore Schieder and others (eds.), 
The Expulsion of the German Population From Hungary and Rumania, a 
selection and translation from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der 
Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bonn: Published by the Federal
Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1961), III, 93, 
footnote 65.
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indications of infringing on the position of the Hungarian popula- 
184tion. However, this policy got off to a slow start because of the
IOClack of farm machinery. J Only in more recent years has the collec­
tivization drive really "arrived."-*-®^ Thus, until the very recent 
past the Hungarian minority still had some economic base in agriculture. 
In fact, according to reliable sources, collectivization proceeded
slowest in the areas with the highest proportion of Hungarian inhabi- 
187tants. This may be taken as an indication of Hungarian resistance
1 Q A It must be pointed out, that the "land reforms" were merely 
a transition stage in the process of subjugation which preceded total 
collectivization. For a discussion of the land reform as a tactic see 
Bossy, "Agriculture," pp. 201, 207; Spulber, The Economics of Communist 
Eastern Europe, pp. 244-247.
■'■^Norman, "'New Course' in Rumanian Agriculture," pp. 35,
38-39, 42. This lack of farm machinery is also admitted by the 
article "Harmonious, Balanced Development of Rumanian Economy," p. 10. 
The author of this article admits that until 1959, there was only 
"one tractor for an average of 270 hectares /of land/ while in 1963 
for 150 hectares."
■*-®^Until 1957, collectivization was extremely slow. After that 
date the momentum increased and by 1962, collectivization of agricul­
ture was "completed." For a thorough breakdown of this process consult 
the Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 (Rumanian People's Republic: 
Central Statistical Board, 1964), pp. 112-114. It is also of interest 
to compare the collectivization process in Rumania to that of Hungary. 
In both countries completion took place at about the same time, but in 
Rumania the "transformation" was more consistent and gradual while in 
Hungary it was more static and irregular. A good comparison may be had 
from Samuel Baum's The Labor Force of Rumania (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census; International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No.
14. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., 1961), pp. 
18-20 and the same author's The Labor Force of Hungary, pp. 20-22, 
published by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1962 as Series P-90, 
No. 18.
•^Norman, "'New Course1 in Rumanian Agriculture," p. 43; V.L. 
"Nem Art Tudni," Ldrmafa, II (July, 1955), 24-25; F.E.C. "A Szdkelyek 
Ellendllnak," Ldrmafa, III (April-June, 1956), p. 9; Elie Able,
"Rumania Assures Magyars' Rights," New York Times, May 14, 1957, p. 8 .
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against moves which threatened one of its last areas of economic 
strength.
Land collectivization, on the other hand, has provided the 
R.P.R. with a powerful weapon in the drive to "integrate" the Hungarian 
population with the Rumanian. Since collectives are drawn up in dis­
regard of national preferences, the Hungarian peasant is forced to take 
part in collective state enterprises, which are controlled by 
Rumanians or are overwhelmingly Rumanian in composition. Instead of 
"integration" this has resulted in the dispersion of the Hungarian 
peasantry among the Rumanian. What the regime hopes is that such dis­
persion will result in increased intermarriage, assimilation and
IQOeventually complete absorption of the Hungarian minority. °
Collectivization, in this way, resulted not only in the de­
struction of the independent farmer, but also in infringements on the 
Transylvanian peasantry— Rumanians and non-Rumanians--in their right 
to choose their own social life among fellow nationals. Collectiviza­
tion and the consequent "integration" of the peasantry's economic life 
have brought also social "integration." This process, however, is all 
one-sided. Equality is attainable in this social setting if the 
Hungarian is willing to be "Rumanized," if he is willing to desert his
Ibid., reveals that assimilation and inter-marriage is the 
end sought by the regime of the R.P.R. The confirmation of this is 
made by Endre Bodor who was in 1957 deputy chairman of the regional 
council of the Magyar Autonomous Region. This is also indicated by 
Paul Underwood "Rumanians Spur Magyar Culture," New York Times (June 
19, 1959), 5.
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1 8 9national culture and language. At present this does not seem to be 
the case with the Hungarian peasantry. Two probable reasons are their 
strong national consciousness and the natural human reaction against 
coercive tactics.
The one-sided nature of this process of collectivization was 
demonstrated by yet one other policy. This involved the government's 
efforts to keep peasants from moving to the cities to avoid collec­
tivization. As land collectivizing began, many peasants of all na­
tional backgrounds tried to avoid its adverse consequences by moving 
to the cities. The new economic opportunities in the growing indus­
tries threatened to upset collectivization. The CPR moved swiftly to 
put a stop to this unplanned escape from the farm. It had the govern­
ment promulgate a law which forbade rural inhabitants settling in the
190cities without special permission. However, beginning around 1953,
191this legal restriction applied only to the Hungarians. Thus, the 
vast urban growth that has taken place since 1953 has been almost 
solely Rumanian. This has included both Rumanians moving from the 
Regat areas into Transylvanian cities and Transylvanian Rumanians
189io:7A Correspondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest . . .  A Conversa­
tion Piece," p. 20, points out that; "Ambitious youngsters, eager to 
get on in life have to 'Rumanize' their names, and speak and write 
perfect Rumanian. Those who are not willing to do so are told to join 
their 'capitalist1 connections in the West or their 'revisionist' co­
nationals in Hungary or Bulgaria."
190Erddlyi Magyar, "Az Erd^lyi Magyarsdg Tragikus Helyzete,"
A Hdt, II (December 16, 1966), 1.
191Ibid.
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1 92moving to the cities. y A consequence of this policy has been the 
Rumanization of the cities and the erosion of Hungarian economic 
strength.
Industry and the Nationalities
Industrialization has led to similar adverse results for the 
Hungarians. As the discussion of the Country's administrative re­
organization revealed, one of the major concerns of the CPR is to 
integrate urban and rural areas more closely.*92 Stalin's pressure, 
however, had forced the Rumanians to heed "proletarian internation­
alism" at the expense of integration, in the redistricting of 1952. 
Until 1960, local autonomy was therefore constitutionally guaranteed 
for the Hungarians living in the Secuesc (Szdkely) counties. With 
Stalin out of the way, the redistricting of 1960 returned to integra­
tion and "non-political" factors as determining criteria for boundary 
revisions.*9^ The re-organization of 1968 further emphasized that the 
integration of urban and rural areas is a major consideration of CPR
192Ibid.
I no7 For a discussion of the nationalization of industry in 
Rumania consult Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe. 
pp. 76-80, 145-146, and Schieder, The Fate of the Germans in Rumania, 
pp. 109-111. In the latter work also see "The Law Concerning the 
Nationalization of Industry," Annex 12, pp. 165-175, and "The Decree 
for the Expropriation of Real Estate," Annex 14, pp. 178-179.
*9^Miklds,"A Roman Ndpkfiztdrsasdgban 1950 (ita Vdgrehajtott 
Kbzigazgatdsi-Gazdasdgi Korzetbeosztdsok Ndhany Tapasztalata," pp. 
317-319, maintains that social and economic factors were responsible 
for the "realistic" redistricting of 1960. However, the dilution of 
the region's Magyar composition points to political motivation.
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economic and social policies.^ 5  Thus, Hungarian local self-
administration was eliminated to integrate more fully the country's
rural and urban areas in keeping with the actual extent of economic-
1 Q 6social development.
As has been pointed out, the population of urban areas in 
Transylvania had always been predominantly Hungarian and German 
rather than Rumanian. The rapid industrialization and urbanization of 
the country, therefore, directly affected the nationalities. Tran­
sylvania's important wealth of natural resources made it imperative 
that urbanization and the expansion of industry play a particularly 
significant role in the area. While the desire to provide efficiency 
in the utilization of resources (i.e., by taking industry to the 
sources of raw m a t e r i a l s ) - ^ 7  was primary, i t  does not mean that the 
national implications were lost from sight. The nature of the over­
all process of industrialization and urbanization and their respective 
impact on job opportunities and housing make this all the more 
apparent.
l^Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Administra­
tive Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania," 
pp. 1-6 .
196Miklds, "A Romdn Ndpkftztdrsasdgban 1950 dta Vdgrehajtott 
Kfizigazgatdsi-Gazdasdgi KOrzetbeosztdsok Ndhdny Tapasztalata," pp. 307, 
317-319.
Dulea, "Socialist Industrialization and the Urbanization 
of the Population," Probleme Economice (February, 1964) translated ir. 
Rumanian Press Survey, No. 438 (Radio Free Europe, June 3, 1964),
pp. 2-6 .
198Erddlyi Magyar, "Az Erddlyi Magyarsdg Tragikus Helyzete,"
p. 1 .
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Communist Rumanian officials are proud to point out that they 
have reversed the process of the inter-war years when the "bourgeois" 
government neglected the industrialization of many Transylvanian areas 
because of their heavy non-Rumanian p o p u l a t i o n s . T h e y  pride them­
selves in having helped "drag out of backwardness" such non-Rumanian 
areas as the Szekely counties, which had composed the Mures-Magyar 
Autonomous Region, and today include the counties of Mures, Covasna 
and Harghita.^OO These same officials neglect to mention, however, 
that what they mean by "drag out of backwardness" also entails national 
assimilation. The "Rumanization" of such traditionally Hungarian 
cities as Oradea (Nagyv^rad), Cluj (Kolozsvdr), Arad, Satu-Mare 
(Szatmarnemeti) and Tirgu-Mures (Marosvdsarhely) demonstrates that 
assimilation is a purpose of this policy and that it is a definite 
"side-effect" of industrialization.
Table IX indicates the growth and ethnic composition of these 
cities throughout the past hundred years. As the population of these 
cities reveals, the major shifts in favor of the Rumanians has occurred 
in the last fifty years. However, the changes wrought during the last 
twenty years have been even more dramatic. These more recent changes 
have reduced the percentage of the Hungarian population in every 
instance and in some cases have even pushed them into a minority status.
•'•^"Harmonious, Balanced Development of Rumanian Economy," p.
10; Short Document on Rumania, p. 18.
^®®Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 450.




COMPOSITION OF FOUR SELECTED TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES 
(1869-1964)
Census Total Number ox: Percentage of:
year pop. Hung.** Rum. Germ. Hung. Rum. Germ.
Name of: town: Clui (Kolozsvdr)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
1869 26,638
1880 29,923 22,761 3,855 1,423 76.1 12.9 4.8
1890 32,736 27,514 3,226 1,336 84.0 9.9 4.1
1900 49,295 40,845 6,039 1,784 82.9 12.3 3.6
1910 60,808 50,704 7,562 1,676 83.4 12.4 2.8
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE
1920 83,542 41,583 28,274 2,073 49.8 33.8 2.5
1930 100,844 54,776 34,836 2,702 54.2 34.5 2.7
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
1941*** 110,956 97,698 10,029 1,825 88.0 9.0 1.7
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE (CPR)
1956^.^ 154,723 77,839 74,628 1,115 50.3 48.2 0.7
1964 167,011 80,300 80,200 1,200 48.0 48.0 0.7
Name of town: Arad (Arad)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
1869 32,725
1880 35,556 19,896 6,439 5,448 56.0 18.1 15.3
1890 42,052 25,901 7,873 5,626 61.1 18.7 13.4
1900 56,260 38,929 9,556 5,643 69.2 17.0 10.0
1910 63,166 46,085 10,279 4,365 72.9 16.3 6.9
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE
1920 62,490 39,399 12,469 3,012 63.0 20.0 4.8
1930 77,181 41,161 28,537 4,617 53.3 37.0 6.0
1941*** 86,674 26,798 40,677 7,811 30.9 46.9 9.0
UNDER RUMANIAN RULE (CPR)
1956 106,460 37,633 59,050 8,089 35.3 55.5 7.6
1964**** 115,294 38,000 65,000 8,000 33.2 57.0 7.8














town: Oradea Mare (NagyvArad)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
28,698
31,324 26,675 2,009 1,148 85.2 6.4 3.7
1890 38,557 34,239 2,527 1,014 88.8 6.6 2.6
1900 50,177 44,750 3,335 1,404 89.2 6.6 2.8





8,441 598 59.8 12.4 0.9









RUMANIAN RULE (CPR) 
34,501 373 63.5 34.9 0.3




town: Tirgu Mures (MarosvAsArhely) 
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
13,018
13,192 11,028 508 657 83.6 3.8 5.0
1890 14,412 12,785 669 447 89.9 3.1 4.7
1900 19,522 16,705 1,864 686 85.6 9.5 3.5





3,947 446 74.9 12.7 1.4











RUMANIAN RULE (CPR) 
14,315 277 77.0 22.0 0.4
74,004 53,000 18,000 280 71.6 24.3 0.4
*This Table is based on the unpublished "Statistical Studies on 
the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe" compiled by the Mid-European 
Center in New York in 1968.
**Only the Rumanian, Hungarian and German populations are com­
pared for lack of space. However, in Arad and in Oradea Mare (Nagy- 
vArad) the Jewish population was also significant prior to World War II.
***The data for 1941 reflect the territorial and national transfers 
which were a consequence of the Vienna Award. This agreement returned 
the northern third of Transylvania to Hungary.
****Xhe data for 1964 are estimates.
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The last twenty years have been the years of major industrial 
development. These years have, therefore, been responsible for the 
rapid growth of the country's urban centers. Tables IX, X and XI indi­
cate this growth. This industrialization has favored the Rumanians 
rather than the Hungarians, because while the latter have been restrict­
ed to certain regions and occupations, the Rumanians have been imported
from the Regat and rural areas of Transylvania to supply the growing
201industries with a labor force.
The expansion of industrialization demanded a great increase in 
202the labor supply. Since much of this post-war industrialization
has been in predominantly Hungarian and German areas, it would have
been natural to draw on these inhabitants for the needed labor.
Instead, the CPR imported Rumanians from the Regat as well as from the
203surrounding countryside to man the newly established factories.
While the relatively dispersed German minority received an important 
share in this expansion, the share of the Hungarian communities seems 
to have been less. Particularly in more recent years, employment in
^^^Ashbrook, "Ethnic and Political Persecution in Rumania," 
Congressional Record (House of Representatives, August 8 , 1964), 
p. 18073; International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian 
Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 77; Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbs^g 
Helyzete Rom^ni^ban," p. 1.
202u Dulea, "Socialist Industrialization and the Urbanization 
of the Population," pp. 2-6.
203Ibid., p. 5; International Commission of Jurists, "The 
Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania,” p. 77.
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TABLE X
RUMANIA'S POPULATION BY MOTHER TONGUE IN URBAN AND RURAL 
AREAS ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS OF 1956






Total population 17,489,450 5,474,264 12,015,186
Rumanian 15,080,686 4,453,426 10,627,260
Hungarian 1,653,700 699,612 954,088
German 895,374 203,884 191,490
Ukranian, Ruthenian, Hutzan 68,252 7,092 61,160
Gipsy 66,882 13,699 53,183
Russian 45,029 16,509 28,520
Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian 43,057 6,287 36,770
Jiddish 34,337 30,962 3,375
Tartar 20,574 5,624 14,950
Slovakian 18,935 2,928 16,007
Turkish 14,228 8,860 5,368
Bulgarian 13,189 1,527 11,662
Czech 6,196 1,967 4,229
Other languages and non-stated 29,011 21,887 7,124
*This Table is taken from Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 
1964 (Rumanian People's Republic: Central Statistical Board, 1964), 
p. 23.
■^Including population of localities listed as urban.
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TABLE X I *
RUMANIAN AND TRANSYLVANIAN POPULATION GROWTH 
IN RURAL AND URBAN AREAS 
(1930-1966)
Area** Dec.29,1930 Jan.25,1948 Feb.21,1956 Mar.15,1966
Rumania 14,280,729 15,872,624 17,489,450 19,105,056
(Including
Transylvania)
Urban areas 3,051,253 3,713,139 5,474,264 7,305,303
Rural areas 11,229,476 12,159,485 12,015,186 11,799,753
Transylvanian regions:
Banat 1,178,976 1,189,646 1,195,871 1,285,313
Urban areas 244,670 289,412 485,656 587,859
Rural areas 934,306 900,234 710,215 697,454
Brasov (Brass^) 776,092 851,397 981,913 1,106,862
Urban areas 169,566 235,116 463,632 646,858
Rural areas 606,526 616,281 518,281 460,004
Cluj (Kolozs) 990,423 1,060,699 1,153,076 1,207,488
Urban areas 185,912 213,658 323,732 434,980
Rural areas 804,511 847,041 829,344 772,508
Crisana (Krisana) 801,487 807,247 848,272 852,025
Urban areas 109,725 110,467 236,937 310,861
Rural areas 691,762 696,780 611,335 541,164
Hunedoara (Hunyad) 503,111 495,003 572,963 670,298
Urban areas 62,653 76,852 273,146 391,706
Rural areas 440,458 418,151 299,817 278,592
Maramures (Mdramaros) 625,273 641,127 712,567 796,329
Urban areas 112,838 105,200 200,426 297,447
Rural areas 512,435 535,927 512,141 498,882
Mures (Maros)
Magyar Autonomous 659,251 703,401 767,650 818,968
Urban areas 78,054 90,767 181,524 244,191
Rural areas 581,197 612,634 586,126 574,777
*This Table is based on "Communique on the Preliminary Results 
of the Population and Housing Census of March 15, 1966," Documents, 
Articles and Information on Romania, No.18 (Oct. 15, 1966), p. 15.
**The population for 1930 is calculated for the post-World War 
II area of Rumania.
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Transylvanian enterprises is hard to come by for those of Hungarian 
ethnic background.
Members of the Hungarian minority are urged to find work in 
areas outside Transylvania, in the "Old" kingdom (i.e., Moldavia and 
Wallachia).205 This is particularly the case if the individual Hunga­
rian is highly trained or educated, and therefore would occupy a lead­
ing position. For such individuals employment opportunities are closed 
in areas where Hungarian workers still make up an important segment of 
the labor f o r c e . T h e  purpose of this restriction seems to be twofold: 
first to disperse the Hungarian minority as much as possible, and second 
to deprive those Hungarians still concentrated in specific areas of 
their leaders. Even in the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region, this policy 
had been p r a c t i c e d . H o w e v e r ,  dispersion has reached its most
^^Ashbrook, "Ethnic and Political Persecution in Rumania," p. 
18073; "Az Erdelyi Magyarsdg Helyzete," News From Hungary, X (Radio 
Free Europe, July 24, 1964), 2; F.K., "Romdnia Sztintesse Meg az 
Erddlyi Magyarok UldSzdsdt!" Katolikus Magyarok Vasdrnapja, June 21,
1964, pp. 1,5. Some of the tactics used to discourage Hungarians from 
seeking work in Transylvania include— according to some of the above 
sources--pay discrimination and the outright rejection of Hungarian 
applicants to firms which already have 50% Hungarian employees.
^^International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian Minority 
Problem in Rumania," p. 75; "Az Erddlyi Magyarsdg Helyzete," pp. 1-2.
^®^Ashbrook, "Ethnic and Political Persecution in Rumania," p. 
18073; Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," p. 4.
^®^Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27. This is also 
indicated by a name analysis of the Conference of Intellectuals of 
the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region held during the Spring of 1964.
Such a name analysis— carried out with due care— can verify this 
trend toward "Rumanization" of the leading cadres of the autonomous 
region. One article open to such analysis is provided by L. Deaky 
and N. Radulescu, "Fighters of the Socialist Struggle," Scanteia 
(March 3, 1964) translated in Rumanian Press Survey, No. 426 (Radio 
Free Europe, March 18, 1964), pp. 2-8.
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advanced stage in the border strip area in cities like Oradea
2 08(Nagyv^rad) and Satu-Mare (Szatm^rndmeti).
Urbanization, artificially accelerated by industrialization,
has brought with it the vexing problem of housing. Since the building
209industry lagged behind the others, it was evident that housing for 
the increased labor population had to be solved by means other than 
the construction of new buildings. Since the existing facilities were 
far from adequate, even with the total utilization of all living 
space, the CPR undertook a policy of 'deportations."210 were
"useless" (i.e., unproductive) because of old-age, chronic illness, or 
other causes, were to be moved out of the cities to make room for the 
workers which were brought in from other a r e a s ^  As the city popula­
tions have been traditionally Hungarian, German and Jewish, the depor­
tation of anyone was bound to affect the minorities adversely. This 
was particularly so for the Hungarians who composed the largest segment
208International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian Minority 
Problem in Rumania," pp. 75, 77.
^®^George H. Bossy, "Industry," in Romania ed. Fischer-Galati, 
pp. 306-307. This lag in the building industry is also admitted 
inadvertantly by the propaganda pamphlet A Glorious Anniversary: The
Rumanian People *s Republic on the Road of Building Socialism 
(Bucharest, Rumania; Agerpres, 1964), p. 22, where the unknown 
author boasts that: "From State funds alone, nearly 162,000 flats
were built in the first few years of the Six-Year Plan, compared with
125,000 in the 1951-1959 period."
^■*-®Bossy, "Industry," pp. 317-319; Wolff, The Balkans in Our 
Time, p. 462.
211Ibid., pp. 461-462; Schieder, The Fate of the Germans in 
Rumania, pp. 115-116, 119.
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of Transylvania's urban inhabitants.
The replacements for these deportees were inevitably Rumanians. 
In this way the Hungarian population of the cities has been greatly 
reduced in proportion to the Rumanian inhabitants. This trend has 
also been accentuated by tying smaller towns and communes into the 
administrative jurisdiction of certain c i t i e s . T a b l e  IX demon­
strates the tremendous growth of the major Transylvanian cities since 
the end of World War II. These figures plus those of Tables X and XI 
indicate that the rapid increase in the Rumanian urban population has 
reduced, and in some instances destroyed, the Hungarian character of 
most Transylvanian cities.
The foregoing demonstrates that the industrialization of Tran­
sylvania has brought with it "Rumanization" as well. While it may be 
argued that this was merely a side-effect of the process, the methods 
used to attain this result indicate that the CPR planners were aware 
of the impact that these policies would have on the nationalities. It 
is possible that in the early years of industrialization this "side- 
effect" was indeed unintended, but the more recent restrictions on 
employment of Hungarians and their purposeful dispersal throughout the 
country testify that this is no longer the case.^^ The fact that
212 International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian 
Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 74; Baum, The Labor Force of Rumania, 
pp. 15-16.
■^According to Ashbrook, "Ehenic and Political Persecution in 
Rumania," p. 18073, the extent of the dispersal of Hungarians by the 
year 1964, is estimated to have affected 35 to 50 per cent of the 
Transylvanian Hungarians. This means that Hungarians not living in 
their own areas is now possibly as high as 850,000.
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Rumania (in defiance of Comecon) plans to accelerate its industrializa­
tion program, makes the position of the Hungarian minority all the more 
precarious. If industrialization has already caused great damage to 
the Hungarian minority position with the country still devoted mainly 
to agriculture, it is evident that they can expect only more of the
O 1 Jsame as the CPR pushes to reach complete industrialization by 1975.
This all the more so, since Transylvania provides the major possibili­
ties for the further expansion of industry.
Social Organization
The inter-relation between rural and urban growth is stressed 
time after time by Party leaders. They also stress that these 
developments in the economy have immediate effects on social relation­
ships and nationality problems.215 Because they see social and economic 
problems so closely intertwined, they are constantly involved in the 
regulation of social relations. At the present time, the Party carries 
on this regulation directly through government action and also in­
directly through numerous front organizations. Among these the 
Socialist Unity Front plays a part in generating mass support for Party
^■^Dulea, "Socialist Industrialization and the Urbanization 
of the Population," p. 8 ; "Harmonious, Balanced Development of 
Rumanian Economy," p. 8 ; David Binder, "Rumania Adheres to Industry 
Plan;" J. F. Brown, "Rumania Steps out of Line," Survey, No. 49 
(October, 1963), p. 20.
21 SJCeausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Administra­
tive Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania," pp. 1-30.
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policies. However, the labor unions, youth and student associations
and women's organizations, are more specialized and therefore also more
216effective in guiding social behavior.
At the same time, the Party has tried to eliminate all com­
peting groups and associations in society which have made claims on the 
guidance of human behavior. The churches of the various religious 
denominations have been the major victims of the Party's drive to 
establish its control-monopoly over society. The elimination of the 
churches deserves more in-depth analysis, since their fate was--and is 
today, in a less sweeping way--tied to the existence of the national 
groups in Transylvania.
The position of the churches and religions of Transylvania is 
unique in two ways. First, they are subject to suppression, both as 
institutions and as advocates of doctrines by a regime that is deter­
mined to control both the realms of organization and thought. Second, 
the religions of Transylvania and their respective churches composed 
the last possible organizational area where national "particularism" 
and "isolationism" (the first stages of "bourgeois nationalism") were 
able to find sanctuary. Consequently, the Communist Rumanian regime 
endeavored to destroy the churches— while other institutions like the
Gregorian, "A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt - A Ndp Vezetdje 
A Szocializmus tfpitdsdben" in A Romdn Kommunista Pdrt Politikdj^nak 
IddszerG Probldmdi (Bukarest: Politikai KOnyvkiadd, 1967), pp. 27-
58; P. Velica, "A Pdrt ds a Tflmeg - ds Tdrsadalmi Szervezetek" in Az 
RKP Szervezeti Szabdlyzata (Bukarest: Politikai KOnyvkiadd, 1967),
pp. 168-190.
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schools, it desired "only" to c o n t r o l . F o r  the purposes of this
study, the position of the churches as the last bulwark of "national
particularism" is of primary importance.
In Transylvania, national divisions closely parallel religious
d i v i s i o n s . W h i l e  the Hungarian and German inhabitants are, almost
to a man, either Roman Catholic or Protestant, the Rumanians are,
almost to a man, either Rumanian Orthodox or Uniate (Greek) Catho- 
219lie. This division reflects the Western historical orientation of
the Germans and Hungarians, and the Eastern and Balkan (Byzantine)
220historical orientation of the Rumanians. As a result, the two
^ ^ I t  would be more correct to state that the CPR wished to 
destroy the respective churches and then to gain control of the remain­
ing vestiges. Raoul Bossy, "Religious Persecutions in Captive Rumania," 
Journal of Central European Affairs, XV (July, 1955), 162, makes this 
clear when he states that "The first concern of the Communist govern­
ment was to secure the compliance of the entire Orthodox clergy, from 
the highest prelate to the most humble village curate. It was hoped 
that the prestige of the Church might thus be used on behalf of the 
government's aims without resorting, if possible, to spectacular legis­
lative measures that could not fail to dismay public opinion." Emil 
Ciurea, "Religious Life," in Captive Rumania ed. Alexandre Cretzianu 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 167 and Persecution
of Religion in Rumania (Washington, D.C.: Rumanian National Committee,
1949), p. 30, present a similar viewpoint.
^®Bossy, "Religious Persecutions in Captive Rumania," p. 161; 
M i M o s  Veto, "Kremlin and Vatican," Survey, No. 48 (July, 1963), p. 164.
^^ I b i d .; Gordon H. Skilling, "Two Orthodox Satellites,” Inter­
national Journal, XVII (Autumn, 1962), 387; Wolff, The Balkans in Our 
Time, pp. 559-561; Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 132-134, 136-137.
^ % o l f f ,  The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 72-73, 560, indicates that 
the Uniate (Greek) Catholic Church came into existence at the end of 
the seventeenth century as a result of "pressure from the Hungarian and 
Austrian Catholic churches" which caused Transylvanian Rumanians to 
abandon the Orthodox faith and to recognize the Pope's supremacy. As 
they point out, however, the Transylvanian Uniate Church finally 
enabled the Rumanians to foster a more Western orientation. In fact, 
it was these Transylvanian Rumanians who led Rumanian orientation toward 
France, rather than the Balkans or Russia. With their "re-incorporation" 
into the Orthodox fold, the Rumanians have even lost this link with the 
West.
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million Rumanian Orthodox and the 1,600,000 Uniate (Greek) Catholics
of Transylvania see their national existence as dependent on the fate
of Rumanians south and east of the Carpathians in the Regat. The
1,050,000 Roman Catholics and 1,150,000 Protestants, on the other
hand, find their destiny to be more closely tied to the West, par-
221ticularly to Hungary. (See Table XII.)
The influence of the respective churches in molding these ori­
entations was determined by the role of the churches as preservers 
and defenders of national cultures. All the churches, without excep­
tion, provided the inhabitants of Transylvania not only with spiritual
solace, but also with social, cultural and educational opportunities,
222as well as charitable and welfare institutions. They played an 
important part in the daily lives of the people and provided the guid-
oo oance which the Communist state monopolizes at the present. J Thus,
^•^The religious statistics are based on a comparison and 
evaluation of data taken from: Veto, "Kremlin and Vatican," p. 164;
Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 559-561; Fischer-Galati, Romania, 
pp. 132-137; and Ciurea, "Religious Life," p. 166. The numbers 
arrived at above are only rough estimates. Because Communist census 
takers ignore religious affiliation, it is impossible to obtain more 
exact figures.
222 Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 136-137, presents some of this. 
However, his conclusion differs from that presented in this study
insofar that he considered the role of the churches to be "essentially
spiritual and certainly apolitical." While this may have held true 
for the religious life of "historic" Rumania (i.e., the Regat), this 
was not the case in Transylvania. This is demonstrated by C. A. 
Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 299-306.
2 2 *3JEven in the realm of "folk" art, the influence of the
churches is quite perceptible. A good example of this is the combina­
tion of "folk" motifs and more formal art in the decoration of some 
churches in Wallachia and Moldavia. See for example, Monuments of 
Religious Art in Rumania (Bucharest, Rumania: "Carpati" National
Travel Office, /n.d./).
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
2 2 7
TABLE X I I





Orthodox 1,932 13,108 13,000 13,700^
Greek Catholic 1,385 1,427 1,400 1,400
(Uniate) 
Roman Catholic 947 1,234 1,275 1,000
Calvinist 696 711 700 575
Lutheran 274 399 400 250
Unitarian 68 69 70 70
Baptist 38 61 50 50
Armeno-Gregorian -- -- 50 25
Seventh Day Adventist -- -- 15 15
Christians of the Old Rite -- -- 50 25
Moslem 0 185 180 30
Jewish 193 757 750 175
Other 13 106 __ e __ e
Total 5,548 18,057 17,940f 16,315f
aFor data concerning the religious composition of Rumania and 
Transylvania in 1930, this Table is based on Recensamintul Populatiei 
Rominiei Din 29 Decembrie 1930, pp. 70-73. For the 1938 and 1955 data, 
this Table is based on the estimates provided in Stephen Fischer-Galati,
"Religion" in Romania, pp. 132, 135-37.
^Including the areas of Crisana, Maramures and the Banat.
c1930 and 1938 statistics pertain to the expanded area of inter­
war Rumania. 1955 statistics pertain to the present-day area of the 
country.
^The estimates of the number of Orthodox and Greek Catholic 
believers have been provided in spite of the "official" Communist spon­
sored merger of the two religions in 1949. In that year, the number of 
adherents of the "united" Rumanian Orthodox Church was estimated at 
13,900,000.
eUnfortunately, the estimates for 1938 and 1955, do not include 
the number of non-believers, individuals without religion, and assorted 
"others." However, it is probably safe to say that around 500,000 
people would have fallen under the "other" listing in 1955— mainly 
Communist Party members.
^These totals are merely the sum of the listed religious 
adherents. They are not an accurate reflection of the country's total 
population either for 1938 or 1955.
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the churches were not merely religious institutions, but they also 
provided social, national and even political identification for the 
inhabitants of Transylvania.
The importance of the national-cultural position of the 
churches became evident in the inter-war years, when the Roman Catholic, 
Calvinist and Unitarian Churches strove to further Hungarian learning 
and culture in Transylvania in spite of the Rumanian government’s re­
strictions .224 Recollecting this inter-war role of the Churches, the 
Communists were quick to attack them following Groza's successful 
seizure of power. The churches were not to be tolerated as refuges 
for "national particularism" and "isolationism." Furthermore, they 
would not be allowed to share with the CPR the right to educate the 
inhabitants of Transylvania. The Party could not bear or afford the 
competition of the churches in the struggle for the minds of men; 
thus, they had to be destroyed.
Determined to seize complete control of all phases of life, the 
Party set out to deprive the churches of their role in education, 
charity, welfare and social intercourse.225 ^his was done through a 
dual process which utilized "legal" as well as extra-legal methods.
224Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors. pp. 299-306.
29 s-\Fischer-Galati, Romania, p. 138, maintains that only after 
the establishment of the R.P.R. in December 1947, did the regime begin 
the "systematic" subjugation of the churches. He also maintains (p.
146) that religious persecution had "generally been unnecessary," 
except for recalcitrant Uniates and Catholics. However, other sources 
point to the persecution of all religions. See Persecution of Religion 
in Rumania, p. 35.
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All religions suffered from these Communist tactics, regardless of the 
nationality of their adherents.226 However, there were tactical dif­
ferences in the treatment of the respective religions which, in the 
long-run, worked to the detriment of the churches of the national 
minorities, while they enhanced the position of the Rumanian Orthodox 
Church relative to the others.
Although religious persecution was supposedly not directed 
against the national minorities, its results definitely affected them 
adversely. The Party attacked all religions and its persecution 
spared none, yet it still caused the greatest damage to the position of 
the Transylvanian minority churches. In the long-run, this means that 
the "proletarian internationalist" government of Groza and Gheorghiu- 
Dej achieved, perhaps inadvertantly, a greater stroke for the cause of 
"Rumanization" than all the efforts of the bourgeois nationalist 
administrations of the inter-war years. They destroyed a bulwark of 
ethnic minority strength, which in the past provided the cultural and 
educational possibilities and the social opportunities needed for 
nat iona 1 surviva 1.^27
^^ I b i d .; Ciurea, "Religious Life," p. 166; Wolff, The Balkans 
in Our Time, p. 550.
^^^Regardless of what the motive was that brought about the 
above delineated religious persecutions, it has not brought better 
understanding in its wake between Rumanians and Hungarians. Hugh 
Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1951), p. 342, points out that: "Even if Hungarian
peasants are no longer to be persecuted for being Hungarians, they are 
liable to be persecuted for being kulaks, or for being Catholics, or 
for being 'reactionary.' Will the average man distinguish the motives 
for which he is maltreated, or prefer one form to another?"
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Rumanian society, has in this way achieved centralized direc­
tion over human behavior. The Party lays down the standards and its 
front organizations have the task of inculcating and enforcing them.
The organizations perform this task with just as much ritualism and 
rigidity as some of the churches were guilty of in the past. However, 
they are organizations with a Rumanian national character. None of 
them can be accused of providing one or the other national minorities 
with preferred treatment. Certainly all of them stress that the 
Rumanian Socialist Republic is the home and guardian of all the peoples 
who reside within its borders. These front organizations, on the other 
hand, are all predominantly Rumanian in membership and leadership.
Thus, unlike the churches which they have replaced, they do not look 
after the preservation of the cultural heritage of the Hungarians or 
other nationalities. They serve only the CPR, and more recently, this 
also means that they serve Rumanian nationalist interests as well.
In Yugoslavia and the Vojvodina 
The league of Communists of Yugoslavia, like its Rumanian 
counterpart, also desired to transform drastically the existing social 
and economic relations. Its control of this transformation had far- 
reaching consequences for the Hungarians living in the Vojvodina.
Agriculture and Collectivization
Long before the Communist seizure of power, it was a central 
tenet of the Party's nationality policy, that the uneven rate of 
economic development throughout the country was the major cause for
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OOQnational antagonisms. ° Two means of eradicating these antagonisms 
were the more equitable distribution of land and collectivization.
These policies are contradictory, yet the CPY resorted to both. First 
it initiated a vast program of land reform, which it later negated-- 
at least temporarily— with an ambitious program of collectivization.
Land reform and collectivization were not undertaken merely to 
augment the CPY's nationality policy. Collectivization was an end in 
itself, necessary for transforming Yugoslavia into a Communist state. 
Land reform, on the other hand, was a means of consolidating the polit­
ical position of the CPY. It enabled the Party to punish its enemies, 
reward its friends and gain support from the landless peasantry.229 
In other words, the agricultural policies of the LCY/CPY were from the 
beginning molded by ideological and pragmatic considerations, besides 
concern for an effective nationality policy.
However, the Party’s agricultural policies faced immense 
obstacles. The country had suffered extensively from World War II. 
According to Zalar, 40.2% of the plows, 66.5% of the tractors, and 
69.7% of the threshing machines had been destroyed in the course of 
the war. Furthermore, livestock had decreased by 55 to 60%.^® Added 
to this was the fact that the vast majority of the population depended
^®Koca Joncid, "The Relations between Nationalities in Yugo­
slavia," Studies, No. 24 (Beograd: Medunarodna Stampa - Interpress,
1967), pp. 12-28.
229Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 137-139.
230Ibid., p. 142; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 323.
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on. agriculture for a livelihood. To make things even more difficult,
this livelihood was based— for the most part--on land holdings that
were too small to permit the application of modern agricultural
methods. According to Zalar "the average holding was slightly more
231than five hectares or about 12.5 acres."
At first, the Party turned to land reform as the solution. But
from the beginning it considered land reform mainly as a tactical move.
In this respect the redistribution of land in the immediate post-war
years, parallels closely the Rumanian land reforms undertaken about
this time. In Yugoslavia, as in Rumania, the major loser in the
232"reforms" was the German mxncrxty. Wtixle thxs redxstrxbutxon had
nationwide implications, its impact was most sweeping in the Vojvodina.
There, the richest farmlands were to be had and they were in the
possession of non-Slavic nationalities.
On August 23, 1945 the Provisional People's Assembly enacted
233the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization. As the title of this 
piece of legislation indicates, more was intended than the expropria­
tion of estates exceeding a certain s i z e . ^ 4  The "reform" had as its
O 0*1JJ-Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 138.
^■^Colakovid, et aJL., A JugoszlAy Kommunista Szbvetsdg Rttvid 
Tdrtdnete, pp. 456-458; Theodor Schieder (ed.) Das Schicksal der 
Deutschen in Jugoslawien in Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen 
aus Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bundes-Ministerium fQr Vertriebene, Flfichtlinge 
und Kriegsgesch&digte; Bonn: Oscar Leiner Druck K.G., 1961), Band V.
233Ibid.; Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 138.
234... .Ibxd.
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aim also the outright confiscation of the lands of "enemies of the 
people," "collaborators" and expelled Germans (Volksdeutsche). Since 
most of Yugoslavia's German population was concentrated in the Vojvodina, 
it became the major setting for both land confiscation and land distri­
bution. The Vojvodina's German population— which had composed about 
one-third of the area's total population— was forced to give up all its 
land holdings. These covered some of the most fertile parts of the 
country. Out of a total reform "land pool” of 1,611,867 hectares, more 
than half--876,692 hectares--had been confiscated from the Germans and 
"other enemies of the people."235
The lands confiscated from the Germans, together with the ex-
235
propriations of large estates, were then either distributed among
landless peasants or turned into vast state farms. Of the total,
791,755 hectares were distributed among 330,250 families, while
820,029 hectares were kept by the state to build up its socialist
sector in agriculture through the creation of collective farms and 
2 ¥7state farms. Both of these consequences had long-range adverse 
effects on the position of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina. The ill 
effects stemmed from the pro-Slavic distribution of the confiscated 
lands. Since priority was given to those who had taken part in the
23*5JIbid.: Schieder, Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien,
Band V.
JDAs Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 138, points out, only
11,000 estates were larger than 50 hectares.
237Ibid.. p. 139.
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partisan struggle against the Germans, few Hungarians obtained any 
land. Most of the German lands were taken over by landless South Slavs, 
who were brought in from great distances to replace the expelled 
Germans. Just from the poverty-stricken areas of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
and Montenegro, sixty thousand families were resettled in the Voj- 
vodina.^®
This vast shift in population meant not only that the Vojvo- 
dina's national composition became almost three-fourths South Slav, but 
also that in the newly created state farms and collective farms the 
South Slavs were given a dominant position. This became evident par­
ticularly when the process of collectxvxzatxon get underway xn earnest.
Unlike the East-Central European satellites of the U.S.S.R., 
Yugoslavia began this process almost immediately with the termination 
of hostilities. In record time, the Yugoslavs hoped to achieve the 
same degree of collectivization (relatively speaking) as the Soviet 
Union had achieved over a period of two or three decades. However, at 
the very outset they encountered a great deal of resistance. The land- 
hungry peasantry was not easily convinced that collective and state
238This policy of colonization closely parallels the less 
ambitious inter-war policies of settling dobrovoljci along the northern 
frontiers of the Vojvodina. See Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, 
pp. 401-403, 426-428 and compare with Colakovic, et: al., A Jugszldv 
Kommunista SzBvetsdg Rffvid Tflrt&iete, pp. 456-457; Wolff, The Balkans 
in Our Time, p. 164. One very telling example of the extensiveness of 
this colonization can be found in the little village of Ruskoe Selo 
(Kis Orosz) in the Banat. Prior to World War II, it had one street 
called "ndmet utca" (German Street) because Germans lived on it. After 
the war it was renamed "bosznydk utca" (Bosnian Street) for the new 
occupants who have replaced the Germans. The village--excepting the 
above named street--is overwhelmingly Hungarian.
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farms were in the best interest of all c o n c e r n e d . M u c h  coercion
and a great deal of economic pressure had to be used to reach 39% collec-
240tivization of all the land surface by 1950-1951, and 22% of the
arable land by 1952.24^
The drive to collectivization hit the Vojvodina hardest, with
Macedonia a close second. Together, these two areas by 1958 had 58% of
their arable land collectivized, which was almost three times the
highest rate of collectivization reached by the nation as a whole one 
242year later. This by itself does not mean that collectivization was 
used to subjugate some of the lesser nationalities of Yugoslavia, but 
it does indicate that the Hungarians among others in the Vojvodina-- 
through design or coincidence— again suffered the most from governmental 
policies.
Fortunately, in the instance of these policies the government 
itself realized that it had undertaken a self-defeating policy. In 
subsequent years it eased the pressure to collectivize, and this enabled 
many peasants to leave the collectives into which they had been forced. 
This re-evaluation of agricultural policies, came only after the 
droughts of 1950 and 1952, and the alarming drop in livestock, showed 
the weaknesses of collective agriculture. Party leaders, have ever
22^Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 139-140.
240Ibid .. p. 141.
2 4-*-Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 435.
242 Ibid., p. 430, footnote 21.
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since blamed these early errors on over-centralized decision making 
243and bureaucratism. The solution, more recently, has been left to
Republican level planning. While this has by no means terminated the
Yugoslav desire to socialize agricultural relations, it has reduced
244the socialist sector as well as the efforts made to expand it.
At the present writing (1970) agriculture in Yugoslavia is
based on a wide variety of land ownership. State farms, numerous types
of collectives and private farms all indicate that a more pragmatic
approach prevails. It is true that the Party encourages the expansion
of the socialist sector, but it no longer resorts to outright coercive
245tactics and forced deliveries. Preference for the socialist sector 
is evident mainly in taxing policies.
For the Hungarians of the Vojvodina, as for all the other 
peoples of Yugoslavia, this means a more tolerable relationship with 
the government and also higher living standards. Hungarian farmers who 
have been able to remain independent are allowed to own 17 hectares of 
land. If more hands are available in the family it is possible to own
O A £twice as much. ° While more people in the Vojvodina are in the
^^joncid, "The Relations Between Nationalities in Yugoslavia," 
pp. 22-23.
^Sfolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 429-439; Pdter LSrinc,
"A Vajdasdgi Nagybirtok ds a Hare a Fblddrt," Hid, No. 4 (April, 1955), 
698-703; IvAnka Ivkovid, "A Vajdasdgi Falukban Vdgbemend Tdrsadalmi ds 
Gazdasdgi Vdltozdsok Ndhdny Jellegzetessdge," Hid, No. 4 (April, 1963), 
474-487.
^^Dennison I. Rusinow, "A Note on Yugoslavia," American 
Universities Field Staff Reports Service, Southeast Europe Series, XI 
(June, 1964), 21-22.
^^Data based on a personal conversation with a Hungarian 
peasant in the Banat during the summer of 1966.
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socialist sector than in any other part of the country, membership in 
those collectives has affected Serbs and other nationalities just as 
negatively, or just as positively, as the Hungarians. Only in the 
drawing of the collective farm boundaries across nationality lines, 
have the results been unfavorable for the Hungarians. This practice 
has been responsible for some erosion of their ethnic solidarity. But, 
this is still negligible. Most of the assimilation takes place in the 
urban areas rather than on the farm.^^
In summary, we can conclude that agricultural policies have 
not been detrimental to the Hungarians in recent years. Aside from the 
inevitable integrative force of collective agricultural enterprises, 
no policy in this area threatens them with assimilation. The immediate 
post-World War II policies did most of the damage, especially the 
"land-reform." In a real sense, these policies led to a recolonization 
of the Vojvodina which placed South Slavs onto the rich lands vacated 
by the Germans.
Industry and the Nationalities
Since the Vojvodina is predominantly an agricultural area of
Yugoslavia, very little can be said about the impact of its industrial- 
248ization. On the other hand, the industrialization which is taking
^^Information based on personal observations and numerous con­
versations with Hungarians in Novi Sad, Subotica, Sombor, Senta, 
Srbobran, and Kikinda.
^®Jack C. Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multi-National State (San 
Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966), p. 109.
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place throughout Yugoslavia has important cjnsequences for the nation­
ality policy of the LCY. As Koca Joncid, a deputy to the Yugoslav 
Federal Chamber of Nationalities, pointed out:
In view both of overcoming certain adverse heritages and 
providing optimum prospects for the development of the Yugoslav 
community, it is to be remembered that economic relations form 
the essence of inter-national relations. The basic instrument 
of Yugoslavia's economic development is income distribution 
according to working results— a distribution practised in the 
basic production units— which enables the producers to take an 
active part not only in production but also in distribution. 
Parallelly, a process of economic, voluntary, conscious integra­
tion evolves as a form of concentration of product ion.
Joncid is saying among other things, that the right type of economic
and productive relations will lead to the right nationality policies.
Effective integration of the economy will produce internationality
solidarity.
Industrialization, unlike agriculture, has been more easily 
dominated, directed and controlled by the state. Thus, it has been 
used even more effectively by the state to guide both social and na­
tionality relations. The LCY has on numerous occasions stressed that 
economic development of backward areas of the country must take place 
if nationality conflicts are to be reduced. To this end, the Yugoslav 
government has made special efforts to industrialize and modernize the 
undeveloped republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Monte­
negro, as well as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia.
^“̂ Joncid, "The Relations Between Nationalities in Yugoslavia,"
p. 36.
^®Ibid_., p. 30, footnote 5.
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To achieve such industrialization, it has had to depend on the assis­
tance and contributions of the already developed parts of the country, 
including the Vojvodina. However, this policy of "taking from the 
rich to help the poor," has not been popular with the developed areas 
of the country. Some contend that it has created moire discord than 
solidarity
The leaders of modern Yugoslavia believe that this policy wili
ultimately solve the country's nationality problems. Thus, to obtain
machinery for their new industrial enterprizes in Montenegro and
Macedonia, they have had to trade on the international market the raw
materials and foodstuffs coming from the Vojvodina, Croatia or
Slovenia. At least in the Vojvodina this has had some adverse effects.
252It has kept the area predominantly agricultural. This, in turn,
with the extensive mechanization of agriculture in the latter part of
the 1950's and the 1960's, has led to unemployment--or excess labor—
in the Vojvodina. Only by moving to other parts of Yugoslavia can
these unemployed find jobs. Lately, the solution has been to go to
2S3the West to seek employment, mainly in German factories. Both these
^-**Most of the present economic policies--by allowing for de­
centralized decision-making--seem to be based partly on this assump­
tion. See Rusinow, "A Note on Yugoslavia," pp. 19-25 and Zaninovich, 
The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia, pp. 114-135.
9 S9Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multinational State, p. 109,
^-^Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia, p.
159, maintains that 250,000 Yugoslavs now hold temporary jobs in 
Western European countries.
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alternatives are less than ideal from the perspective of the retention 
of Hungarian ethnicity. Employment in Yugoslavia outside the boun­
daries of the Vojvodina puts excessive pressure on the individual to 
Slavicize. Employment in Western Europe reduces the size, and thereby 
the influence of the Hungarian population of the Vojvodina.
The limited economic opportunities in the Hungarian areas are 
indicated in part, by the difficulty the state has in finding employ­
ment for those who end their schooling after the eighth grade. In the 
town of Senta (Zenta) in 1965, out of a graduating class of 400, one 
hundred students did not continue their studies. These 100 students 
also failed to find employment in Senta.2^  In the following year it 
was expected that 500 students would be graduating, and about half of
them would not continue their studies and would be unable to find 
255jobs in the town. A similar situation prevails in Subotica 
(Szabadka) where students leaving school also find themselves among 
the unemployed.^56 Circumstances of this kind would indicate that 
industrialization in Slavic parts of Yugoslavia has been possible at 
the expense of economic stagnation in some others, among them the
257Hungarian towns of the Vojvodina.
2-^Zolt^n Hatala, "A Zentai Fiataloknak Nines Hoi Mesters^get 
Tanulniuk," Dolgoz6k No. 28, July 8 , 1966, p. 4.
255ibid.
256Tibor Kolozsi, "Az Ipari Tanuldk Sorsa," 1_ Nap No. 30,
July 22, 1966, p. 11.
2-^This is particularly true for the largest Hungarian city, 
Subotica (Szabadka). During the interwar years it was the third 
largest city of Yugoslavia after Belgrade and Zagreb. In the post-war 
period its population declined. Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multinational 
State, pp. 107-109.
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The lack of major industrial expansion in the Vojvodina has 
meant that very little urban growth has taken place. With the excep­
tion of Novi Sad (Ujvid^K), the seat of the Provincial government, no 
other municipality has a population of 100,000 or over. In part, this 
can be explained by the unique nature of Yugoslav industrialization.
As Dragoljub Milivojevirf points out, in Yugoslavia "industrialization, 
which has been developing intensively since the war, did not have a
substantive influence on urbanization. The new factories were often
258located far from the city sections." Often, they were located in 
such out of the way places as Montenegro, which has no urban center to 
speak of.2'9
Social Organization
That urbanization has not taken place in the Vojvodina--with 
the limited exception of Novi Sad— is indicated by Table XIH, which 
reviews the evolution of the population in some of the larger munici­
palities of the Vojvodina. These population figures also reveal 
something else. They show that while urbanization has not taken place, 
Serbianization has. It is true that Serbianization has been most 
dramatic in Novi Sad, the largest city, but it is also apparent that 
the cities which have not been touched with urbanization have also
258"The Yugoslav Commune," Studies, No. 8 (Beograd:
Medunarodna Politika, 1965), p. 36.
2 SQIn the past decade this process has been reversed by the
process of economic decentralization. See Zaninovich, The Development
of Socialist Yugoslavia, pp. 114-135; Rusinow, "A Note on Yugoslavia,"
pp. 19-25; Buranus, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Revolution," pp. 123=125.
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undergone changes in their national composition in favor of the South 
260Slavs. For example, the Serb population of Zrenjanin (Nagy- 
becskerek) has risen from 45% to 54.2%. A similar trend can be found 
in most of the other municipalities of the Vojvodina, not excluding 
small villages . ^ 1
The change in the ethnic composition of these towns is due 
mostly to colonization, although intermarriage and assimilation has 
also taken its toll. A close look at the statistics provided by Table 
XIII will show that the rise of South Slav percentages, particularly 
that of the Serbs, is closely related to the drastic post-war decline 
of the German population. This is even the case in Novi Sad. In the 
latter instance, however, a substantial shift in population has taken 
place since 1948. As Table XIII shows, the percentage of Hungarians 
has dropped from 27.9 to 20.8, while the Serbs have increased from 
59.5 to 66.6 percent of the population. In the latter instance 
urbanization and assimilation can be used to explain the shift.
While assimilation of one nationality by another is officially
260ihis Serbianization is also born out in a negative way by 
religious data concerning some of these cities. It is known, for 
example, that Novi Sad's Catholic population dropped from 50,280 in 
1941 to 43,436 in 1961, that Apatin's Catholics diminished from 
34,689 in 1941 to 19,892 in 1961. See Schematismus Cleri Apostolicae 
Baciensis Administraturae (Subotica; Procudebat Typographia Panonia, 
1961), p. 37.
^ ^ S e e  footnote 238 above.
262Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multinational State, p. 107-109,
121.
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TABLE X I I I  *













town: Novi Sad (Uividdk)
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
19,119
21,325 5,517 8,790 5,159 26.9 42.8 25.1
1890 24,717 7,804 9,608 5,996 31.6 38.9 24.3
1900 29,296 10,321 9,889 562 6,483 35.2 35.6 22.1





16,071 6,486 33.4 41.0 6.5




YUGOSLAV RULE (LCY) 
36,520 8,407 1,390 27.9 59.5 1.9
1953 83,180 22,375 42,205 8,637 1,200 26.8 66.5 1.5




town; Zrenianin (Nagybecskerek) 
UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE
19,666
19,529 3,639 7,868 6,356 18.9 40.3 32.4
1890 21,934 5,116 8,020 7,874 23.3 36.4 36.0
1900 26,407 9,288 8,091 707 8,055 35.1 32.1 30.5





10,712 7,888 27.3 39.0 28.6




YUGOSLAV RULE (LCY) 
19,179 711 792 40.3 51.5 2.1
1953 44,199 16,683 22,619 859 800 37.7 54.2 1.8
1965 59,000****

















21,200 17,877 1,876 447 84.4 8.8 2.1
1890 25,725 23,013 2,228 362 89.5 8.7 1.4
1900 28,588 25,731 2,379 7 245 81.6 8.1 .9
1910 29,666 27,221 2,020 5 177 91.6 7.4 .6
1921 30,694
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE 
26,529 2,857 310 87.0 9.3 1.0
1931 31,969 25,924 4,181 454 412 81.1 14.5 1.3
1948 25,277
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE 
20,898 3,536 169
(LCY)
32 82.5 14.6 .1









19,845 2,960 11,023 4,531 15.0 60.7 22.9
1890 22,768 3,519 12,870 5,719 15.5 56.4 25.2
1900 24,843 9,288 8,091 70 8,055 37.3 32.6 32.5
1910 26,795 5,968 14,148 13 5,855 22.3 54.5 21.9
1921 25,774
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE 
4,122 15,060 5,774 16.0 58.6 22.5
1931 28,400 5,333 15,530 483 3,803 18.7 56.5 20.4
1948 28,667
UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE 
6,922 20,276 264
(LCY)
408 24.1 70.6 1.4
1953 29,570 7,122 20,796 245 400 24.1 70.3 1.3
1965 33,000****
*This Table is based on the unpublished "Statistical Studies on 
the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe" compiled by the Mid-European 
Center in New York in 1968.
**Only the Serb, Croat, Hungarian and German populations are com­
pared for lack of space. However, in Novi Sad and Senta the Jewish popu­
lation was also significant prior to World War II. The Croats and Serbs 
are listed separately in the columns designating their numerical share of 
the population. Under the column for percentages the two peoples have 
been listed under the "South-Slav" designation.
***The 1966 statistics for Novi Sad are based on Gydrgy G3m6ri, 
Irodalmi Ujsdg of November 1, 1966.
****The 1965 statistics for the total populations of the respective cities are based on Statistical Pocket-Book or Yugoslavia 1966 (Beograd: 
Federal Institute for Statistics,' 1 9 6 6 ) ,  p .  T T 3 .
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considered undesirable^ 6 3  actual practice an undetermined number 
of Hungarians become Serbs every year. The reverse process is not as 
likely to occur at present, although it has taken place in years past. 
Social pressure, rather than governmental pressure, is responsible for 
this. Mixed marriages inevitably lead to a Serbian rather than a 
Hungarian upbringing, since the setting is dominated— at least in the 
Vojvodina--by Serb society. If a child of such a mixed marriage does 
not want to designate himself either as a Serb or a Hungarian, he will 
call himself a Yugoslav.2^4 The latter designation, however, still 
diminishes the number of Hungarians while it increases the number of 
South Slavs. Population figures for all of Yugoslavia indicate that 
there are about 317,125 inhabitants that view themselves in this way. 
Although most are Serbs and Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least
20,000 are inhabitants of Serbia proper. The latter, or many in the 
latter group, are probably individuals who have had parents of two dif­
ferent nationalities.265
Assimilation in this biological sense is not yet--as the above 
statistics indicate--the major threat to the Hungarians. Much more 
pernicious is the social pressure to use Serbo-Croatian instead of 
Hungarian in public discourse. Even in cities with a large Hungarian 
population like Subotica (Szabadka), more likely than not, a stranger
2^2Joncid, "The Relations Between Nationalities in Yugoslavia,"
pp. 54-57.
264Ibid., p. 56. 265Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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will be spoken to in Serbo-Croatian rather than Hungarian .̂ 6  This 
social pressure to use the language of the South Slavs, erodes Hun­
garian cultural development. Hungarian ethnicity, in other words, 
becomes a liability, particularly if one would like to make it to the 
top in Yugoslav society.
Hungarian culture also faced this threat in the inter-war period. 
At this time, the Catholic churches provided the Hungarians with a final 
defense of their cultural traditions. In Yugoslavia, such an extra- 
governmental defense of "national particularism" is no longer possible. 
Like its Rumanian counterpart, the Yugoslav CP eliminated at the outset 
the social and behavioral influence of the churches in the country.
This process of elimination was in no respect less sweeping or final 
than the Rumanian subjugation. However, due to Yugoslavia's greater 
"visibility" before the West, particularly the U.S., the subjugation 
was relatively less brutal.^ 7
As Table XIV indicates, in 1953 Yugoslavia had 5,383,000 Roman 
Catholics. Of these 565,000 reside in the Vojvodina. In the Vojvo­
dina, as was the case in Translyvania, religious affiliation has been 
closely related to nationality. All Roman Catholics are either Hun­
garian, German or Croatian. Since in the Vojvodina there are few Croa- 
tians, most of the Catholic population is now accounted for by the 
Hungarians.2®8 However, the center of their Church organization is
^6*>See footnote 167 above.
^^Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 559.
^^Schematismus Cleri Apostolicae Baciensis Administraturae, 
pp. 13-24.
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TABLE X I V
RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE 






Orthodox 5,593 6,786 7,011 780
Roman Catholic 4,709 5,218)
) 5,383 565
Greek Catholic 40 45)
(Uniate)
Old Catholic -- 7 -- --
Lutheran ) 175) __ d
) 229 ) 148
Calvinist ) 56) __ d
Other Christian -- -- 71 --
Moslem 1,345 1,561 2,083 5
Jewish 65 68 -- --
Other Religions 2 ) 156 139d
) 1
Without Religion )
or unknown 1) 2,083 225
Total 11,985 13,917 16,937 1,714
aFor 1921 and 1931 statistics this Table is based on Jugoslavia; 
History, Peoples and Administration, pp. 155, 219, and Stephen Clissold 
(ed,), A Short History of Yugoslavia, p. 165. For 1953 statistics it 
is based on Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, Tables 3-2 and 
3-3, pp. 33, 35, and Eterovich and Spalatin (eds.), Croatia; Land, 
People, Culture, p. 17.
^1921 and 1931 data pertain to the inter-war territory of 
Yugoslavia, while the 1953 statistics pertain to the enlarged area of 
present-day Yugoslavia.
cData pertains to the post-World War II territory of the 
Vojvodina. It includes the Srem but excludes the Baranya.
^Lutherans diminished greatly as a consequence of the elimina­
tion (i.e., deportation, evacuation, etc.) of the formerly important 
German minority. Most of the remaining Protestants are enumerated 
under "other religions" in this Table. Most of the Calvinists are 
Hungarian.
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located outside the Vojvodina.2*>9 Already in the interwar years the 
Yugoslav government tried to limit the Church’s national role, by 
making Hungarian Catholics subject to a non-Hungarian Church hier­
archy. This policy was continued by the Communist Government follow-
270ing the Second World War.
The Tito government actually followed the interwar policies 
of Yugoslavia also in at least two other respects. It continued to 
restrict the educational role of the Churches and it continued to sub­
sidize them. The first policy ensured the Party’s monopoly of decision 
over the content and objectives of education. The second policy kept
the churches in a dependent status. Their right to existence became a
271question of constant review by the CPY. This eliminated the 
churches as possible competitors in the area of social control and 
ensured that they would not hinder the Party in carrying out its 
nationality policy.
The CPY was able to do this not only because it wielded the 
power of the state, but also because the churches had greatly dis­
credited themselves during World War II. This was particularly true 
of some of the Croatian clergy that had supported the Ustasha 
imposed conversions of Orthodox Serbs, but also was the case in the
269Ibid., pp. 8-9.
2 7 0 Ibid.; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 424;
Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 156.
2^ I b i d .. pp. 551-553, 557-559; Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, 
pp. 243-249.
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instance of some Hungarian clergymen who had greeted the invading 
Hungarian army as a force of national liberation. In the immediate 
post-war years many of these Croatian and Hungarian clergymen were 
thrown into prisons or even executed.272 jn subsequent years, a con­
tinued propaganda campaign against the Roman Catholic Church in 
particular, diminished its influence among the young.27^
This heavy-handed policy has been eased with the years. Im­
prisonments have become less frequent and some clergymen formerly 
imprisoned were released. By 1960 the Yugoslav government showed a 
definite desire to restore relations with the Vatican.27^ By the
o7csummer of 1966 this was done. However, in the area of social 
policy, the Party has continued to bar church involvement. The 
churches have been--as in the case of Rumania— left only a purely 
religious role. That is, they have been allowed to retain certain 
buildings to administer to the "spiritual" needs of those who explic­
itly want it. To this end, the churches— including those of the 
Hungarians--have been allowed seminaries to educate the personnel of
272Ibid.
O 7 O Churchgoing is one of the few concrete indications of this 
process of alienation between the youth and the Churches. In 1966 
this student attended at least a dozen Catholic church services.
These services were attended mainly by women, old men and young chil­
dren with their grandmothers. Very few people between 12 and 40 
attended these services.
27^Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 247.
275"RendezSdik Hazdnk ds a Vatikin Viszonya," Magyar Sz6,
June 25, 1966, p. 1.
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the cult. They have also allowed the Churches to publish religious 
material. In 1966, for example, the Catholic seminary in Subotica had 
about 90 Hungarian students.^76 The Catholics also publish the Hun­
garian language monthly periodical, H i t d l e t In return for these 
concessions, the Church plays a passive political role. At times, 
certain "peace priests" actually support government policies. The 
periodical Hitdlet sometimes contains writings from some of these 
"peace priests."278 material testifies, the Catholic Church
in the Vojvodina is not capable of defending the national heritage of 
the Hungarians. It has reduced itself to providing Christianized 
Hungarian language arguments for "peace," "international understand­
ing" and obedience of state authorities .^79
The Church has become tolerated because it is no longer a 
threat to the Party's control of society. Its guiding role in setting 
standards for the community has now been replaced by the Party and its 
numerous mass organizations. None of the latter can be accused of 
being overly concerned with the national cultures of the country's
^^Based on personal conversations with certain staff members 
of the seminary.
^^This publication is edited in Novi Sad and printed in 
Subotica. Its editor in 1966 was Huzsvdr Ldszld.
278 /"Afrika Nemcsak A Gyarmati Rendszer Rabl&ncat Torte Kette,
Hanem . . . Termdkeny Tdlcdra Talalt az Evangdlium Is," Hitdiet, IV
(February, 1966), p. 3; "Erre Van Pdnz!?" Hitdlet, IV (April, 1966),
p. 3; "Olvasdink Bardtaink - Irjak, Kdrdezik," Hitdlet, IV (June,
1966), p. 28.
^^Ibid.
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minorities. They are all the creatures of the LCY and their sole 
purpose for existence is to implement the policies of the Party on 
a day-to-day basis.^80 Their composition in membership and leadership 
is predominantly South Slav, although each of them have at least a 
token representation of the national minorities.
The brief look at the Socialist Alliance earlier in this 
chapter, revealed that the Hungarians have their share in the leader­
ship of the Party's most general purpose mass organization. Such 
proportional representation— as was the case in Rumania also--seems 
to occur less frequently in the more specialized mass organizations.
In the CTUY (Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia), the youth 
organizations (SKOJ, Union of Pioneers, Ciciban, etc.) the Union of 
Women’s Societies of Yugoslavia, the Veteran's Union of Yugoslavia 
and other mass organizations, the leadership is overwhelmingly South
O Q1Slav. The eclipse of the churches by these mass organizations has
left the Hungarians without a mass organization that would concern
itself with their national survival. For the latter, they have to
2©odepend directly on the LCY. However, in Yugoslavia, these mass
^®^Jovanovic, "The Social and Political System in Yugoslavia," 
pp. 20-23; Kardelj, "Some questions Relating to the Further Development 
of the Assembly and Political System," pp. 15-21.
OQ1OAWhile no statistical data is available concerning the na­
tionality background of the membership and leaders of these mass 
organizations, a name analysis of the top leadership invariably shows 
South Slav dominance. As an example, see P.R. "A Munka Eredmdnye Legyen 
a Mdrce," Dolgoz6k . July 22, 1966, p. 1.
2 QO° For the nature of LCY control of the mass organizations, see 
Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 230-238.
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organizations— unlike their Rumanian counterparts— are not dominated 
by any one of the nationalities. Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins 
and Macedonians all have an important voice in their policy making.
This results in a general tolerance for minority views, even if those 
views are not proportionately represented in the organization.
IV
From what has been said in the foregoing, we can conclude that 
the actual and potential power position of Hungarians in Transylvania 
and the Vojvodina have certain similarities and differences. In terms 
of their relations with the Communist Parties concerned, their situa­
tion is drastically different. In Yugoslavia, the CPY (LCY) has 
always been a South Slav national movement in which the Hungarians 
have never felt completely at home. As a consequence they have not 
joined the Party in large numbers and are at present not proportionally 
represented in it. However, this Party has expanded rather than 
restricted their opportunities to enter its power structure. Until 
the present writing (1970) this has led to some influence, particu­
larly on the Provincial level of the Party. The exact opposite situa­
tion has prevailed in Rumania. In its origins, the CPR was to a large 
extent a cosmopolitan Party representing all the nationalities of the 
country. It was able to be this, because it was never really a 
"national" movement like its Yugoslavian counterpart. However, once 
the Party seized power it began to nationalize itself through a series 
of purges and a rapid expansion of Party membership. By the late 
1950’s the CPR became an ethnic Rumanian Party inspite of the fact that
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all nationalities are still "proportionally represented" in it. As 
such, it is becoming less responsive to nationality needs and to their 
representatives.
In the governmental set-up, yet another difference in nation­
ality relations is revealed. The Yugoslavs seem to care much less for 
window-dressing than the Rumanians. In their major governmental and 
quasi-governmental bodies they are not concerned with giving propor­
tional representation to the nationalities. On the top levels, Hun­
garians hold very few important posts aside from their share in the 
Chamber of Nationalities of the Federal Assembly. This does not mean 
that the Hungarians do not have a share in government. It only means 
that their share reflects more closely the extent of their importance 
in policy-making.
In Rumania, the Hungarians have a proportional role visibly, 
but only a very limited role in actuality. On all the major govern­
mental organs Hungarians are given positions which are merely symbolic 
in nature. This policy is also evident on the lower governmental 
levels. While Yugoslavia has constantly expanded self-government on 
this lower level, the Rumanians have stressed centralization. The 
elimination of the Hungarian Autonomous region is testimony to this.
Two additional differences emerge. First, that the Yugoslavs 
have provided decentralization and limited self-rule according to 
regional and economic criteria rather than according to nationality. 
This has denied the Hungarians autonomy as a group, but it has enabled 
them as individuals to further their "group" culture. In Rumania the
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Hungarians gained group autonomy for a time, but this never allowed 
for real self-government. It remained, until its eclipse, a symbolic 
right without substance. Second, the Rumanians have always delegated 
their responsibilities for the treatment of the Hungarians to the de­
nationalized "representatives" of the Hungarians. The Yugoslav 
government, on the other hand, because it did not delegate this respon­
sibility, was more involved and concerned over the correct application 
of its nationality policy.
Finally, in the economic and social area, there are perhaps 
more similarities than differences. Both the Rumanians and the 
Yugoslavs have eliminated the churches as possible competitors for 
control over society. Under both systems, the Hungarians have thereby 
lost one of the best means of defending their cultural heritage. 
Together with this loss, the Hungarians have also been disadvantaged 
by the post-war land reforms in both countries. Land collectivization 
and the nationalization of enterprises affected them adversely also, 
but not more so than those of the majority nationalities. In this 
area the only difference between the two countries has been in the 
application of the policies, and the extent of success achieved. The 
more flexible and pragmatic approach of the Yugoslavs— at least since 
1952— has provided a more bearable setting for all peoples (regard­
less of nationality) than has Rumanian dogmatism.
On the other hand, industrialization and urbanization have a 
less erosive effect on the durability of the Hungarians in the 
Vojvodina than on those in Transylvania. The reason for this has been
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twofold. First, very little industrialization has taken place in the 
Vojvodina. The major shifts in the ethnic composition of the area have 
been due l̂ o outright colonization. Second, in Transylvania extensive 
industrial and urban development has taken place. Furthermore, these 
developments have been used to strengthen the Rumanian population of 
Transylvania. The application of the law concerning rural mobility 
into urban areas, as well as the law encouraging a higher birth rate, 
indicate that purposeful Rumanization is taking place.
These similarities and differences indicate that the Hungarians 
in the Vojvodina have much more potential as well as actual powers than 
do those of Transylvania. This also means that they are usually better 
treated as a national group. The irony of this is that in Transylvania 
there are three times as many Hungarians as in all Yugoslavia.
This great disparity in the power positions of the two minor­
ities is due to the nature of the political balance of power within 
the respective countries and the role of the Hungarians in these respec 
tive balances. In Yugoslavia the Hungarians have taken a limited 
share in Party and governmental activities. While they have not yet 
gained proportionality (in comparison to the Montenegrins, for example), 
their political position has improved appreciably in the last ten 
years. Parallel to this improvement there has also been an improvement 
of their economic position and their social opportunities. At the 
same time, no one nationality has been able to dominate the political 
setting, thereby putting numerically lesser nationalities at a dis­
advantage .
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In Rumania, on the other hand, the exact opposite has happened. 
The Party purges of the 1950's hurt primarily the representatives of 
the ethnic minorities, particularly the Jews and the Hungarians.
Similar purges also swept through all levels of government. While 
there are still many Hungarians in the Party and government for 
propaganda purposes, they lack influence or have lost their national 
consciousness. Furthermore, one nationality, the majority nationality, 
now dominates all major positions of power. This unchecked dominance 
has led to disadvantages for the Hungarians, as for other minorities, 
in both their economic and social existence.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL POSITION 
OF THE HUNGARIANS
The political existence of the Hungarians in Rumania and Yugo­
slavia has demonstrated that the internal political balance among the 
nationalities has increased the likelihood of a more humane or 
tolerant treatment for them. We shall now try to ascertain if this 
is also the case in relation to their educational and cultural 
opportunities.
In the past, non-governmental institutions like the churches, 
played an important role in providing such opportunities. As the pre­
ceding chapter stressed, in both Transylvania and the Vojvodina the 
treatment of the churches was not officially considered to be a part 
of nationality policy. However, since religious affiliation in both 
areas was closely related to particular ethnic groups, the treatment 
of church groups has had a direct bearing on the treatment of the na­
tionalities. In both Transylvania and the Vojvodina Communist policies 
toward the churches reduced the churches as effective defenders of the 
nationalities. While the policies differed in their methods and 
severity, their results were alike in that the churches lost their 
former roles in the social and educational life of the peoples of both 
countries. They underwent a period of repression and persecution 
which left them active only in the spiritual field. Briefly, the
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churches were eliminated as competing centers of influence to the 
party-state.-*-
I
This drastic reduction of the influence and activities of the
churches had a direct consequence on educational policies in both
Rumania and Yugoslavia. In both, education became the monopoly of the
state. Unlike the state policies dealing with religion, education was
from the beginning considered a testing ground for nationality policies.
It was contended that the state would guarantee the nationalities the
preservation and development of their cultural and linguistic pecu- 
2liarities.
In Transylvania
For the purposes of this study the Rumanian educational system 
will be examined only as it relates to the nationalities of Transylvania. 
The educational opportunities ("socialist in content and national in 
form") of the Hungarian inhabitants will provide a basis for evaluating 
the practical application of "proletarian internationalism."
-*-See Chapter III above for a more extensive treatment of this
problem.
^"Constitution of the Rumanian People's Republic 1952" in 
Constitutions of Nations, ed. Amos J, Peaslee (Second edition; Hague, 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), III, Art. 17, paragraph J,
p. 242; "Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" 
Collection of Yugoslav Laws, ed. Borislav T. Blagojevid (Beograd: 
Institut of Comparative Law, 1963), Arts. 41, 42 and 43, p. 25.
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Nationality Schools Past and Present
A superficial examination of school statistics leads to the 
impression that the R.P.R. has followed the tenets of "proleterian 
internationalism." The comparison of educational establishments for the 
national minorities under the inter-war "bourgeois nationalist" regime 
with the establishments provided by the R.P.R. presents a hopeful 
picture. While the inter-war regime allowed the Hungarian minority 819 
confessional educational establishments and 217 state schools plus 232
3sections, the R.P.R. provides this same minority with 1,632 state 
school units,^ an increase of 364 school units. Table XV presents a
OC. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors (London; Oxford 
University Press, 1937), p. 308 presents the statistics cited above. 
Joseph S. Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems (Stanford 
University, California: Stanford University Press, 1932), pp.209-210,
presents the number of state maintained minority schools as 1,525M  
This number is not broken down by Roucek, and therefore it is impossible 
to evaluate the number of the Hungarian Schools supported by Rumania. 
Nonetheless, Macartney (p. 311) sheds more light on the real state of 
Rumanian supported minority schools. He relates that; "An inquiry 
conducted in 1934-35 by the Magyar minority leaders resulted in the 
conclusions that instead of 271 State schools and 218 sections with 
Magyar language of instruction (as shown by the Ministry of Education 
for 1933), there were, in reality, only 55 such schools and 57 sections. 
The remainder did not function, had been closed, or were staffed 
entirely by Rumanian teachers."
^Brahara, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic,(U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 77, presents the above total 
for the 1955-56 school year. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time,
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 461, footnote
7, presents the Hungarian total at 1,597 for 1954. Fischer-Galati, 
"Education," in Romania ed. Fischer-Galati (New York; Frederick A. 
Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 160, maintains that; "The number of educa­
tional institutions for national minorities increased from approxi­
mately 100 in 1938 to approximately 3,200 in 1954 . . . "  Though 
Fischer-Galati1s numbers are exaggerated, it is apparent from a com­
parison of Macartney's and Braham s statistics that the minorities 
gained in educational facilities because of the CPR's early adherence 
to "proletarian internationalism."
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TABLE X V
THE EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE THREE MAJOR NATIONALITY 
GROUPS IN TRANSYLVANIA 1914-1957







R U M A N I A N
Primary Schools 1,145 4,100
Secondary Schools 11 199Special Schools 2
Training Colleges 3 --- **
Universities 0 1
H U N G A R I A N
Primary Schools 1,265 993 232 1,396 196
Secondary Schools 92 30 0 62 81Special Schools 84 20 48
Training Colleges 8 7 0 0 5
Universities 0 0 0 11*** 5
G E R M A N
Primary Schools 254 399 75 259 89
Secondary Schools 16 32 0 11 17Special Schools 16 1 11
Training Colleges 3 5 0 0 1
Universities 0 0 0 0 0
*This Table has been compiled on the basis of data in Joseph S. 
Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1932), p. 209; C. A. Macartney, Hungary and 
Her Successors (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 264,
306-315; Anuarul Statistic al R.P.R. 1958 (Bucharest: Directia
Centrale de Statistica, 1958), Tables 138 and 139, pp. 236-241. How­
ever, it should be kept in mind that school units can be compared fairly 
only when conditions are alike. This is not the case with the times 
and the school systems which are presented here. Thus these figures are 
more valuable for reference than for comparison.
**Data concerning the Rumanian educational institutions in Tran­
sylvania have not been available, since Rumanian school statistics are 
presented only in relation to the country as a whole.
***The 11 refers only to "Faculties" (ie., Departments), not to 
independent minority universities.
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general breakdown and comparison of educational establishments for the 
major minorities in the years 1914, 1932 and 1957. This would seem to 
indicate a decided improvement in the educational position of the 
minorities.
What the statistics in the above table do not show is that
this favored position of the minorities was merely a passing phase.^
As early as 1956-1957, there were significant reductions in this
£favorable minority educational situation. They took their toll par­
ticularly in the Hungarian sector, but the trend in this direction 
affected the other nationality groups as well. In fact, Braham points 
out that decreases of this nature had been going on ever since 1952- 
1953.^ However, these earlier reductions were not systematic and 
planned like those which occur after 1956. By 1958 the position of 
the Hungarian minority grew even more depressing, particularly on the 
higher levels of education.
It seems that the R.P.R. followed a truly "proletarian
-’"Transitional phase" may, perhaps, better describe this past 
favored treatment of minorities. It may bring to mind a similar 
"transitional phase" in the existence of the Soviet Union's national 
minorities, just before the re-assertion of Great Russian nationalism 
in the 1930's.
^"The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," Bulletin of the 
International Commission of Jurists, No. 17 (December, 1963), p. 76, 
indicates--together with some other studies--that 1958 was the 
critical year in Rumanian nationality policies. However, Table XVI 
presents statistics which indicate that a shift in policy was already 
in existence in the 1955-56 school year.
^Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 74.
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internationalist" educational policy from 1948 to about the autumn of
g
1956. With the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956, 
this policy of "enlightenment" underwent a drastic change which became 
apparent by 1958. Several aspects of government-educational policy 
indicate this change. The reduction in the number of nationality 
schools, the complete amalgamation of high level minority educational 
facilities with the Rumanian, the decrease of minority language instruc­
tion and the concomitant increase of Rumanian language instruction in 
minority s c h o o l s , a l l  point to this unmistakable trend which looks 
more and more like the "Rumanization" policies of the inter-war years.
Recent Educational Policies
Using the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the parallel dis­
turbances in Transylvania as the pretext, the Rumanian Ministry of 
Education has initiated and is now pursuing educational policies 
designed to reduce and eventually to eradicate all forms of national
O"The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76.
^Skilling, "Two Orthodox Satellites," International 
Journa1. XVII (Autumn, 1962), 388, seems unable to see this change.
While he is aware of the moves against the Hungarian institutions 
in Transylvania, he does not draw the logical conclusions warranted 
by the evidence. This is probably due to his unfamiliarity with 
the general Transylvanian situation, which he reveals in the dis­
cussion of the "merger" of the Babes and Bolyai Universities.
^Ibid.; Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's 
Republic, pp. 78-79.
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1 1"particularism" and "isolationism." These policies are to achieve
their goal by stressing the "socialist content" rather than the "na-
12tional form" in education. While the "national form" was hedged in 
and carefully limited, the new designs to de-emphasize the "national 
form" entails such steps as restrictions on presentation as well as 
content of curricula. In content, more emphasis is to fall on Rumanian 
subjects and less stress on those which are of more particular rele­
vance to national minorities. In presentation as well, Rumanian 
instructors teaching in the Rumanian language are given precedence in 
educating the minorities.
The most outstanding feature of minority education in Transyl­
vania has been the appearance of "parallelization." Though "para- 
llelization" has always played a part, it has become particularly 
important in the last few years.^ "Parallelization" means the 
setting-up of Rumanian language classes parallel with the existing
11Ibid.; George Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," The 
Reporter (November 19, 1964), p. 26; Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Rumania" 
in East Central Europe and the World ed. Stephen D. Kertesz (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), pp. 158-166.
Actually, even one year prior to the revolution there were some hints 
of a turn toward more nationalistic policies. Along this line see 
LcJszld Bdnyai, "Tizdves a Bolyai Tudomdnyegyetem," in A Kolozsvdri 
Bolyai TudomAnyegyetem (1945-1955) (Cluj: Allami Tanugyi ds
Pedagdgiai Kdnyvkiadd, 1956), pp. 5-13.
1 9 Ibid.; La'szlcf Bdhyai, "Forum: Irodalomtanitds ds Hazafias
NeveIds," Igaz Szrf, VII (Feb., 1959), 236-242.
1 ̂x "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76;
Skilling, "Two Orthodox Satellites," p. 388; Tamds Schreiber, "A 
Magyar Kisebbsdg Helyzete Romdniaban," Irodalmi Ujsdg (July 15, 1961).
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minority language classes. This is done even in areas where there are 
no Rumanian students to attend them. The primary purpose is to induce 
minority students to leave their own schools and classes to attend the 
schools and classes of the majority nationality. This policy reduces, 
in the long-run, the existence of the nationality schools. What 
happens is that one minority school after another is closed because 
there are supposedly not enough pupils to attend them.^ The real 
reason, however, is that the parallel schools and sections exist to 
absorb the students of the minority schools, after they have been 
pressured into deserting the latter.
As the national minority school loses students to the parallel 
Rumanian institution, the government closes the former and replaces it 
by a nationality section, which is then attached to the formerly 
"parallel" Rumanian institution. In this way the "parallel" Rumanian 
school becomes the sole school for the community.
■^In contradiction to the above contention it is possible to 
show that the total number of minority students in 4-year schools 
increased to 131,773 in 1956-57 from 127,634 in 1955-56. Yet in this 
same space of time the number of minority schools decreased from 
1,416 to 1,343 in these same 4-year schools. This pattern is also 
apparent on the higher levels of education. See Braham, Education 
in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 75, Table 13. While the 
decreases of the years prior to the above seem more natural, the 
decrease in later years certainly does not. Now the decrease of 
minority schools is followed by the decrease of minority students 
rather than the other way around.
■^These pressures are of various kinds, some direct and some 
indirect. See in this regard "The Hungarian Minority Problem in 
Rumania," p. 76; Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbseg Helyzete Rom^ni^ban."
F. K . , "Romania Szuntesse Meg az Erde'lyi Magyarok tildozds^t," Katolikus 
Magyarok Vasirnapja, 71 (June 21, 1964), 1.
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This policy has steadily reduced the number of "independent" 
educational institutions of the nationalities--increasing the nation­
ality sections attached to the Rumanian institutions.^ Table XVI 
indf^ates this trend until 1958.^  "Parallelization" is then followed 
by the progressive curtailment and reduction of the nationality sec­
tion, until it becomes indistinguishable from the rest of the new 
parent school either in curriculum or in staff.
Parallelization has affected all levels of education, not 
excepting universities and higher institutions. In fact, it is on the 
level of higher education that this policy most clearly reveals the 
attempt to "Rumanize" and to assimilate.̂  While proletarian
•̂ I b i d .; Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbsdg Helyzete Romaniaban"; 
"Level ErddlybcSl," Irodalmi Uisag (Aug. 1, 1964).
1 7'Unfortunately there are no statistics available which would 
shed light on the position of the nationality schools since 1958.
The R.P.R. has omitted any reference to nationality educational 
facilities since that date. Apparently the data was too incriminating 
to be published. Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, 
p. 74, footnote 70, also makes note of this "omission."
-*-®"Levdl Erddlybdl," Irodalmi Uisdg; Schreiber, "A Magyar 
Kisebbsdg Helyzete Romdnidban"; F. K., "Romania SzCintesse Meg Az 
Erdelyi Magyarok Uldozdsdtl"
IQ^Higher education demonstrates this trend best because (1) 
it has been totally "Rumanized," (2) it has affected the leading 
strata (i.e., intelligentsia) of the Transylvanian Hungarians, and 
(3) it has been least possible to camouflage or hide from world 
scrutiny the absorption of these important institutions. In this 
regard see Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," pp. 26-27; David 
Binder, "Rumania’s Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," New 
York Times (July 14, 1964), p. 4; J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question 
of Transylvania," The World Today, XIX (Nov., 1963), 503-504.























TABLE X V I
NATIONALITY SCHOOLS AND SECTIONS IN RUMANIA 1948-1958




















Education, Grades 1- 
Schools
10(11)
2,115 2,201 2,273 2,233 2,202 2,209 2,203 2,153 2,020 2,023
Sections 110 108 123 133 148 135 146 202 404 388
No. of Students 220,337 236,650 241,627 244,649 235,563 231,259 217,150 208,658 214,785 219,612
Teacher Training** ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Technical
Schools 31 24 18 18 21 19 12 7 8 8
No. of Students 5,503 7,492 10,061 12,198 11,448 11,917 7,650 1,186 1,212 1,409
Vocational
Schools 0 0 41 36 25 15 11 •20 13 13
Sections 0 0 48 46 50 42 41 40 59 54
No. of Students 0 0 8,543 8,566 8,151 6,974 5,425 6,061 7,029 5,624
Higher Education
Faculties 17 17 20 15 16 17 16 13 11 12
Sections 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4
No. of Students 2,835 2,887 3,512 3,304 3,253 4,138 3,515 3,437 3,692 4,082
*This Table has been compiled on the basis of Table 13 in Randolph L. Braham, Education in the 
Rumanian People's Republic (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 75, and Table 138 in Anuarul statistic al R.P.R. 1958 (Bucharest: 
Directia Centrala de Statistica, 1958), pp. 236-237.
**For the minority teacher-training program in Rumania see TableX/I in this chapter.
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20internationalism lasted, u the Hungarian minority had its own indepen­
dent Bolyai University at Cluj (Kolozsvar), its Medical and Pharmaceu­
tical Institute in Tirgu-Mures (MarosvAsArhely), and a Hungarian
section in the Petru Groza Agricultural Institute and at the Gh. Dima
21Conservatory also at Cluj. All four have been "parallelized." The 
B61yai University was the first to meet this fate, when in 1959, it 
was merged with the "parallel" Rumanian Babes U n i v e r s i t y T h i s  was 
followed by the reduction (i.e., absorption) of the Hungarian section 
of both the Petru Groza Agricultural Institute and the Hungarian 
Medical-Pharmaceutical Institute at Tirgu Mures in 1962.^3 since that 
date all higher education for Hungarians is restricted to Rumanian
Of)Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1951), p. 341, notes that this early policy was 
by no means whole-heartedly and enthusiastically supported. He 
maintains that: "This liberal nationality policy was not carried
through without strong opposition, not only from the Rumanian nation­
alist followers of Maniu but also from a part of the Rumanian Party 
itself, led by the former Minister of Justice Lucretiu Patrascanu.
The removal of Patrascanu from his office and his disgrace within 
the party were certainly to some extent due to his 'incorrect1 atti­
tude on the national question."
21"Cluj Regiune" according to Faclia, Feb. 6 , 1958, in 
"Comprehensive Regiune Summaries," Weekly Summary of the Rumanian 
Provincial Press 4-9 Feb. 1958 (JPRS/Washington, D.C. - April 22, 
1958), p. 3.
22Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania"; Braham, 
Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, pp. 78-79; Bailey, 
"Trouble Over Transylvania," pp. 26-27. It was in connection with 
this "parallelization" that three Hungarian professors committed 
suicide. One of them, Szabddi LAszlcf, was a famous Communist poet 
and intellectual of the Hungarian minority. See in this regard "The 
Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76.
^ I b i d .; Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27; F. K. 
"Romania Szuntesse Meg Az Erddlyi Magyarok UldbzesdtJ"
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institutions, and to the few remaining Hungarian sections, which still 
maintain a precarious existence within such Rumanian facilities
The Romanizing effects of parallelization on the highest levels 
can be seen in the academic publishing activity of the Babes-Bolyai 
University. While Nikolai Ceausescu and lesser party leaders have 
denied that Rumanization exists,^ a brief analysis of the official 
academic journals of the Babes-Bdlyai University indicates just the 
opposite.
Before the Babes and the Edlyai Universities were merged, in 
1958 their learned journals were published in Rumanian and Hungarian 
respectively.26 After the merger, the academic publications still 
appeared in both languages, but now the Rumanian and Hungarian studies
Besides this formal pattern of "integration" there is also 
an informal trend along similar lines which is stressed and fostered 
by the Rumanian regime. The most recent example of this policy has 
been the sharing of rooms in student hostels and dormitories by 
Rumanians and Hungarians. The pretext for this is that the Hungarian 
students will more easily learn Rumanian if they share rooms with 
Rumanian students. See "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," 
This policy received its inception soon after the Hungarian Revolution 
of 1956. A. Rosea, "The Party Organizations and the Patriotic 
Education of the Youth," Lupta de Clasa (Nov., 1957), pp. 87-96 in 
Selected Translations from East European Political Journals and 
Papers (JPRS/Washington, D.C. - Feb. 28, 1958), p. 126.
2-*Nicolae Ceausescu, "A Romdniai Tdrsadalom Szerkezetdben 
Vdgberaend Mdlyrehatd Tdrsadalmi-Politikai Vdltozdsok," (Speech 
delivered on Oct. 24, 1968; Bukarest; Politikai Kdnyvkiadd, 1968), 
pp. 28-41, and "Speech by Jdnos Fazekas at Odorhei Meeting," Docu­
ments , Articles and Information on Romania, No. 21 (Aug. 27, 1968), 
pp. 36-38, provide the best two examples of such denials.
26Compare Buletinul; Universitatilor V. "Babes" Si "Bolyai," 
Vol. I, Nr. 1-2, (1957), and V. Bdbes e's Bdlyai Egyetemek 
KBzlemdnyei, I. ev., 1-2 sz., (1956).
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appeared together rather than in separate journals. In most cases each
of these studies was followed by a brief summary of its contents in
27the other language. However, with the passage of time (less than 
seven years) the Hungarian language studies were almost completely 
eliminated.^®
As a perusal of these studies indicates, Hungarian scholars now
OQpublish their studies mainly in Rumanian. This tendency is not a
"natural process." It is a consequence of both faculty and editorial 
30pressure. u
Perhaps an even more telling indicator is the "format" of these
27Ibid.; Buletinul: Universitatilor V. "Babes" Si "Bolyai" .
Vol. I, Nr. 1-2, (1957).
O QIn 1956-57 it was still possible to find scholarly works in 
Hungarian. In V. Bdbes ds Bdlyai Egyetemek Khzlemdnyei, I ev.,
1-2 sz., (1956), there are fourteen Hungarian language studies and 
five Rumanian language studies followed by the Hungarian summaries of 
seven Rumanian studies. By 1960 it is evident that Hungarian language 
studies decline in numbers. In Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai 
Series 1, Fasciculus 2, Anul 5 (1960), there are 26 items, articles 
and studies of which only one appears in Hungarian, while 21 of the 
contributors are Hungarian. By 1965 the situation is even worse. 
Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai (Series Philosophia et 
Oeconomica, Anul X, 1965), contains seventeen items, articles and 
studies of which none appear in Hungarian in spite of the fact that 
five of the contributors are Hungarian.
^Ibid.
®^Ihat such faculty and editorial pressure exists is hard to 
substantiate. This contention is based on the observations of two 
scholars, a Pole and an American, who spent extended periods of time 
doing research at the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj (Kolozsvar) 
during 1967 and 1968 respectively. Both maintained, in personal con­
versations with this student, that the pressure was evident in the 
language used by the Hungarian faculty members. They never speak to 
one another in Hungarian, if even one Rumanian faculty member is 
present.
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academic journals. In the years immediately after the merger, the 
journals were truly bi-lingual in appearance as well as content. The 
"table of contents" in each journal listed the articles according to 
the language in which they were written. The Hungarian article list-
onings were even followed by Rumanian translations. Titles, such as
"contents," appeared in both languages. At first even the name of the
place (Cluj-Kolozsvar) of publication, was provided in both languages.
But, this was not to last. By 1959, the place of publication was
32listed only in Rumanian. In some journals even the bilingual 
designation for "contents" (Sumar-Tartalom) was replaced with the 
Rumanian "Sumar."^ while this may seem trivial, it indicates that 
the "national form" is being eliminated in the University life of the 
Transylvanian Hungarians.
A substantive analysis of these articles also indicates that 
the "socialist content" of higher learning, is falling more and more 
within a national Rumanian, rather than an international Communist 
mold. This, of course, is discernable only in studies which fall 
within the Social Sciences. A comparison of the pre-merger academic
^ V .  Bdbes ds Bdlyai Egyetemek KBzlemdnyei, I ev., 1-2 sz.,
(1956).
3 2 Compare Ibid., and Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, 
Series 1, Fasciculus 1, Anul 4 (1959).
33Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series 1, Fasciculus
1, Anul 5 (1960); Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series 3, 
Fasciculus 1, Anul 4 (1959); Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, 
Series Psychologia Paedagogia, Anul 9 (1964).
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journal, appearing in Hungarian, with its post-1958 successors, reveals 
that the earlier studies were often concerned with local Transylvanian 
problems and Hungarian cultural matters.^ The later studies, on the 
other hand, have been concerned more with the problems, culture and
OChistory of Rumania as a whole. J
This examination of the academic publication of the Babes- 
Bolyai University has shown one facet of Rumanization in higher educa­
tion. Another, even more menacing feature of Rumanian educational 
policy has been the steady decrease in the training of minority na­
tionality teachers. While reliable data on this trend are available 
only to about 1957, some later sources indicate that this process 
has since been accelerated; so that today the minority teachers' 
program is negligible or non-existent Table XVII indicates the
A Kolozsvdri Bo'lyai Tudomdnyosegyetem (1945-1955) (Cluj , 
Transylvania: Allami Tanttgyi ds Pedagdgiai K 6nyvkiadd, 1956), con­
tains some of these studies. Also representative are: Emil Petrovici,
"A Roman Sris, 0ri§, Or^ia, Ora§a, Ora^ani, Ora^eni Magyar Varjas," 
pp. 223-226, Attila T. Szabd, "A Gyermekld ds Rokonsdga," pp. 235-251, 
and M 6zes Gdlffy and Gyula Mdrton, "A Bdlyai-Egyetem Magyar Nyelvdszeti 
Tanszdkdnek Nyelvjdrdskutatd Tevdkenysdge A Magyar Autonom Tartomdnyban," 
pp. 253-279, in V. Bdbes ds Bdlyaj Egyetemek Kflzlemdnyei, I ev., 1-2 
sz., (1956),
■^Some examples are: A. Bodor, "Adaldkok a Helyi Elem 
Fennmaraddsdnak Kdrddsdhez a Romaikori Ddcidban: A Liber ds a Libera 
Kultusz," Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series 4, Fasciculus 1
(1960), pp. 25-58; Zoltdn Farkas, "Allam, Nemzet ds Szuverdnitas a 
Szocializmusban," Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series
Philosophia, Anul XI (1966), pp. 19-27.
•^Pdl Nagy, "Huszonnyolc Uj Tanitd," Igaz Szd, VIII (Aug.,
1960), 243, mentions that 28 students graduated from the Jdzsa Bdla 
Pedagogic Institute in 1960. Nagy seems to imply that there are many 
throughout the country who would like to attend the institute. But 
the results seem meager indeed. Five of the graduates were from Stalin 
(Brassd) Regiune, three from Baia-Mare (Nagybdnya), two from Oradea
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TABLE X V I I
NATIONALITY TEACHER TRAINING PROGRAM IN RUMANIA FROM 1948 TO 1958 
















1948-49 Schools 15 3,327 ---- **
Sections 1
1949-50 Schools 22 4,275
Sections 3
1950-51 Schools 23 5,617
Sections 6
1951-52 Schools 24 6,217
Sections 10
1952-53 Schools 26 5,728
Sections 8
1953-54 Schools 25 5,671
Sections 8
1954-55 Schools 17 2,638
Sections 13
1955-56 Schools 10 1,197 4 672
Sections 14 10
1956-57 Schools 0 503 0 246
Sections 12 5
1957-58*** Schools 1 387 1 248
Sections 11 5
*This Table has been compiled on the basis of Tables 13 and 14 
in Randolph L. Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic 
(U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 75-76, and Tables 138 and 
139 in Anuarul statistic al R.P.R. 1958 (Bucharest: Directia centrala
de statistica, 1958), pp. 236-241.
**No data is available for the share of the respective minorities 
prior to and including the academic year 1954-55.
***The last year that any data has been released by the R.P.R. 
regarding the state of minority education is 1958.
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drastic nature of this policy until 1958. It shows, among other things, 
that while in the 1948-1949 school year 3,327 students were in the 
teacher-training program (for the nationalities) and 2,835 were in 
institutions of higher education, by the 1956-1957 school year the 
respective realms had 503 and 3,692 students each.^ In a country 
where everything follows a state plan this systematic elimination of 
a minority teaching program cannot be explained by reference to "lack 
of interest," particularly not among nationality groups which have 
been determined to preserve their national identity.
More recent sources indicate that the reason for this drastic 
curtailment in nationality education opportunities is due to the 
regime's policy toward the graduates of higher institutions. The 
regime fosters a policy of dispersing the minority intelligentsia 
throughout Rumania, particularly the Regat, in order to leave the
(Nagyvdrad), two from Timisoara (Temesvdr), one from Gluj (Kolozsvdr), 
and the rest from the Magyar Autonomous Regiune. Since 1960 no other 
reliable evidence is available that would shed light on the nation­
ality teachers-training program. Also see "White Paper" on the 
Liquidation of the Hungarian Minority's Educational Facilities in 
Roumania (New York: Association of Hungarian Students in North
America, 1966), Table II, p. 12. The only evidence that can be found 
is negative. For example, the fact that propaganda brochures no 
longer boast of the "great opportunities" for minority national 
cultural facilities. The Short Document on Rumania (Bucharest: 
Agerpres, 1964), pp. 5-6, conspicuously avoids reference to Hungarian 
educational facilities in cities like Cluj, which in earler brochures 
were always mentioned. More recent sources also avoid mention of 
Hungarian educational opportunities. See "Start of School-Year in 
Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 17 
(Sept. 15, 1970), pp. 23-24.
07'Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 75,
Table 13.
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respective minorities without leaders of their own.^® Since special­
ized qualifications for the instruction of minority nationalities is 
incompatable with such dispersal, the program has been eliminated as 
useless. All those who enter the teaching program must now be ready
to teach anywhere in Rumania and cannot "specialize" in minority na-
39tionality instruction. In this way not only is the back of minority 
education broken, but the respective minorities are deprived of intel­
lectual leadership.
In content the minority educational program is, of course, 
"socialist." This means that the minorities have had the same material 
presented to them as the rest of the population, with the exception 
only that they were able to have it presented in their own language.^®
F. K., "Romania Sztlntesse Meg Az Erddlyi Magyarok ftldbzdsAt." 
Nagy, "Huszonnyolc Uj Tanitd," also indicates this trend when he 
inadvertantly reveals that almost all the graduates of the J6zsa 
Bdla Pedagogic Institute would like to return to their respective 
regions to teach. The implication is that this may not be possible.
A Correspondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest . . .  A Conversation 
Piece," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), 20, also throws 
weight behind this observation when he states that: "Ambitious
youngsters, . . . have to . . . speak and write perfect Rumanian."
This policy is also evident in the recruitment of skilled workers.
See the advertizement "A BalanbAnyai Szakiskola SzakmunkAsokat KApez 
Ki," Elflre. June 20, 1970, p. 2.
39As far as could be ascertained no specific restriction 
exists. The Ministry of Education merely leaves out the minority 
teachers-training program and nothing is again said about it.
^Endre IstvAnfy, "Assimildlddds ErdAlyben," LArmafa, III 
(Oct.-Dec., 1956), 11; A Correspondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest 
. . .  A Conversation Piece," and Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," 
p. 27, indicate, however, that even the use of the minority languages 
in public is now greatly curtailed.
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The difference between the education of the Rumanian and the non- 
Rumanian sector of society was thus reduced to language. Otherwise 
both majority and minority are equally subject to Communist indoc­
trination.
In spite of the "socialist content" of education for all sectors 
of society, the differences granted in presentation by "proletarian 
internationalism" enabled the minorities to foster their respective 
cultures. As Braham points out, the "national form" of presentation 
entailed giving the minorities at least the opportunity of furthering 
the national language and the study of the national l i t e r a t u r e H o w ­
ever, soon after 1956 the authorities began to clamp down even in this 
area. The R.P.R. set out to "Rumanize" even the "national form" of 
the educational system. First, as the foregoing demonstrated, the 
regime began to limit the educational facilities for minorities by 
eliminating their schools (where possible) and replacing them with 
sections which were later also to be absorbed. Then it encroached on 
the remaining institutions by limiting the hours devoted to the study 
of the nationality language and literature.^ This was followed by 
a policy of discouraging students from attending nationality schools.
41Braham, Education in the Rumanian People *s Republic, p. 74, 
Table 12, presents the number of hours devoted to the study of the 
respective mother tongues. A Correspondent, "Nationalism in 
Bucharest . . .  A Conversation Piece," points out that "the minority 
languages . . . have again been abolished as media of teaching in the 
former 'minority' schools; they have now been granted the position of 
'first foreign language' taught."
Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbs^g Helyzete RonUmi^ban."
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According to reliable sources, the restriction has gone so far as to 
limit "nationality" education in the Hungarian communities to the eldest 
son in each f a m i l y . ^
There is no doubt that the R.P.R. has reduced, through these 
methods, the opportunities of the nationalities to foster their respec­
tive cultures. In this way the R.P.R. has reverted to a policy similar 
to the inter-war Rumanization policies of the bourgeois nationalists. 
Yet, it has done this under the pretext of eliminating national partic­
ularism and isolationism, two handmaidens of "nationalist reaction." 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and others have deemed this to be a real 
struggle for the furtherance of proletarian internationalism and 
socialist patriotism.^ But through it all, the pattern of nationalism 
begins to emerge as the emphasis is placed increasingly on "socialist 
patriotism," rather than on "proletarian internationalism."^ The 
educational policies of the R.P.R. have in fact not only Rumanized the
^ I b i d .; "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76.
4V  A. Varga, "The Fundamental Laws and Characteristics of the 
Great October Socialist Revolution," Probleme Economice, (Oct., 1957), 
pp. 8-10, in Selected Translations from East European Political Journals 
and Newspapers (JPRS/Washington, D.C. - March 7, 1958), pp. 138-139, 
states that "proletarian internationalism is inseparable from the 
socialist patriotism; they are interlaced, representing the unity be­
tween the national and international interests of the workers." This 
definition is very revealing, for it shows that the "inseparable unity" 
of the workers is in danger only if their national and international 
interests conflict.
^Bdnyai, "Forum: Irodalomtanit^s 4s Hazafias Nevel^s," pp.
236-242; Rosea, "The Party Organization and the Patriotic Education of 
the Youth," pp. 115-126; Varga, "The Fundamental Laws and Characteris­
tics of the Great October Socialist Revolution," pp. 138-139.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
2 7 7
"national form" of minority education, but they have, to some extent, 
even put their Rumanian imprint on the "socialist content."
The net result of these Rumanian educational policies has been 
to make the minorities more aware of their obligations under "prole­
tarian internationalism," while the Rumanian majority has been able to 
revel in old-fashioned nationalism under the guise of "socialist 
patriotism." This has been translated into general educational poli­
cies. Some indications of this are discernable in the statements of 
leading Party members, educational officials, and youth and student 
leaders.^
In the Vojvodina 
In this area of education, Yugoslavia's treatment of her Hun­
garians is quite unlike Rumania's prevailing policies. Generally, 
there has been an expansion rather than a reduction of educational 
opportunities. Due in large part to this difference, the Yugoslavs
46Rosca, "The Party Organization and the Patriotic Education 
of the Youth," p. 115; Tudor R. Popescu, "The Educational Function 
of the Family under Socialism," Revista de Pedagogie (Jan., 1963),
Trans, in Rumanian Press Survey No. 342 (Radio Free Europe, May 2,
1963), pp. 10-11; N. Ceausescu, "The Fourth Conference of the Union 
of the Rumanian Students' Association," Scanteia Tineretului (Feb. 2, 
1963) Trans, in Rumanian Press Survey N o . 329 (Radio Free Europe,
Feb. 28, 1963), p. 3; P^l Nagy, "Irodalom ds Iskola: A Prdza
FejlSddse," Igaz Szo. XI (Apr., 1963), 589-590; and "Gheorghe Gheorghiu- 
Dej Elvtdrs Beszdde Az Irok Orsz^gos fSrtekezletdnek Zaroiile'sen," Igaz 
_Szcf, X (Feb., 1962), 156.
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have released much more data concerning their nationality educational 
47programs.
Nationality Schools Past and Present
From the Yugoslav educational data we can discern that its 
policies were not always more permissive than those of Rumania. In the 
immediate post-World War II period, the Hungarians actually fared 
better in Rumania than in Yugoslavia. As the Statistical Yearbook of 
the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia for 1954 shows the number 
of Hungarian schools increased to only 212 in the 1950-51 academic
A Oyear from the woefully inadequate 186 of 1938-39. It was only with 
the 1951-52 school year that serious efforts were made to expand the 
educational opportunities of the H u n g a r i a n s A s  we have seen, in 
the case of Rumania the opposite trend prevailed. It was the late 
1940's and early 1950's that enabled the Hungarians to have their own 
schools, while more recently— particularly since 1956--the Rumanians 
have tried to limit Hungarian educational opportunities.
It is true, however, that in the case of both these countries
^Yugoslavia has been less reluctant to release such data 
because it has nore to be proud of. With the exception of only the 
German minority--which has only limited educational opportunities-- 
Yugoslavia has released data on the educational opportunities of all 
ethnic groups. See Jugoslavia 1945-1964: Statistidki Pregled
(Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1965), Table 19-3, pp. 295-296.
48Statistidki Godisjak FNRJ 1954 (Beograd; Savezni Zavod Za 
Statistiku i Evidenciju, 1954), Table 257, p. 331.
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minority educational opportunities increased after the second World 
War. In the Vojvodina the contrast between pre- and post-war condi­
tions was even greater than in Transylvania. The reason for this was 
that in Yugoslavia the Church was already eliminated from education in 
the interwar years. In Rumania this elimination took place only after 
World War II. At any rate, for the Magyars of the Vojvodina this 
interwar elimination meant the loss of education in their own language. 
The state schools controlled by the Serb dominated Ministry of Educa­
tion in Belgrade, had very little sympathy for national minorities. 
They allowed the Hungarians instruction in their own language only in 
the first four elementary grades. In all education above that level, 
instruction was given exclusively in S e r b i a n . B u t  even the number 
of elementary schools allowed the Magyars was well below that which 
their numbers would have warranted. In 1934 they possessed only 157 
school units. This is meager indeed, when compared with the 693 
school units which they had prior to World War 1.^^ By the 1938-39 
academic year the number of their school units increased to 186, which 
was still completely inadequate. Furthermore, the content of educa­
tion in these schools was often little above the level of indoctrina­
tion in "Yugoslav nationalism," taught by a staff that was at least
-*®Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 156; Macartney, Hungary 
and Her Successors, pp. 420-421.
■̂*-It should be pointed out, on the other hand, that many of 
these 693 school units teaching in Hungarian prior to World War I, 
were merely instruments of "Magyarization." Thus, the comparison is 
not altogether fair.
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Recent Educational Policies
Yugoslavia's current policies are a healthy corrective for
these previous shortcomings. As Table XVIII reveals, the number of
ethnic minority school units has remained relatively stable since the
early 1950's. However, the number of classes, students and teachers
has constantly increased. In the case of the Hungarians of the
Vojvodina, a similar trend is revealed by Table XIX. As the latter
indicates, however, the Hungarian growth has been somewhat less
dramatic. This can be explained, in part, by the limited growth of
53the Hungarian population of the country.
It is somewhat harder to explain the steady decline of the
number of Hungarian students in primary schools. As Table XIX demon­
strates, beginning with the 1956-57 academic year, the number of Hun­
garian grade-school children has fallen from 49,844 to 45,311 by the 
1965-66 academic year.^ This has taken place in the face of expanded 
educational opportunities.-’-’ A simple explanation is again demographic.
-^Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 420-421.
5^See along this line "A Ddlvideki MagyarsAg Demogr^fidja,"
News from Hungary - Magyarorsz^gi Hirek (Compiled by Free Europe, Inc.) 
XVI (Aug. 28, 1970), 4.
-’̂ 'See Table XIX. It is not possible to trace this trend past 
1966 since the latest available source on this question was published 
only in 1967. See StatistiCki Godisnjak SFRJ 1967 (Beograd: Savezni
Zavod Za Statistiku, 1967), Table 126-4, p. 286.
-’-’Note particularly the increase in the number of Hungarian
teachers in primary, vocational and secondary schools. See Table XIX.























TABLE X V I I I
ETHNIC MINORITY LOWER EDUCATION IN YUGOSLAVIA 1938-1966*
School Primary Schools Vocational & Other Schools
Secondary Schools
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No.
Year Schools Classes Students Teach- Schools Classes Students Teach- Schools Classes Students Teach-
1938/39** 554 1,444 80,432 1,445 8 46 1,624 252 2 8 222 21
1949/50*** 1,398 ----- 172,708 2,555 12 ----- 1,586 80 160 — 25,469 8981951/52 1,555 3,991 167,349 3,241 289 1,008 31,964 1,395 9 47 1,255 107
1952/53 1,543 4,349 166,625 3,571 297 1,239 37,923 1,888 9 41 984 110
1953/54 1,562 4,509 163,313 3,805 312 1,456 42,851 2,117 8 43 1,089 88
1954/55 1,550 4,589 161,864 3,928 313 1,538 45,855 2,361 9 51 1,245 117
1955/56.*..1,499 
1956/57****!,463
4,507 157,421 3,893 322 1,645 49,662 2,442 11 53 1,413 1605,939 201,675 5,988 11 61 1,647 180 22 114 2,909 284
1,449 6,019 201,781 6,143 10 61 1,605 138 23 114 2,865 2631958/59 1,432 6,173 201,741 6,435 8 58 1,659 134 23 118 2,984 231
1959/60 1,440 6,412 209,961 6,405 12 73 1,988 173 23 128 3,284 280
1960/61 1,443 6,787 218,965 6,615 15 75 2,374 196 26 137 3,413 309
1961/62 1,391 7,005 225,833 7,082 64 304 8,397 692 24 135 3,476 257
1962/63 1,431 7,342 238,423 7,379 86 376 10,495 735 29 164 4,522 329
1963/64 1,419 7,582 244,453 7,842 89 414 11,724 895 31 184 4,902 315
1964/65 1,428 7,830 248,853 8,717 90 457 12,780 1,050 33 192 5,615 403
1965/66 1,422 8,054 253,588 9,340 107 488 13,792 1,074 37 228 6,152 527
*This Table is based on Jugoslavija 1945-1964: Statistigki Pregled. Table 19-3, pp. 295-96; 
Statistigki Godisnjak F N R  J 1957, Ifable 24-5,'p. 378; Statistigki Godisnjak S F R J 1963, Table 125-2, 
p. 299; Statistigki GoUisnja'k S |  R J 1967, Table 126-4, p. 286.
**For the 1938-39 school year the above sources provide conflicting data. The data in this Table 
for 1938-39 is based on Statistigki Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Table 24-8, p. 378, because this is the only 
source which provides data on all the minorities, Including the Germans.
***The data for the 1949-50 school year are based solely on Statistigki Pregled.
****The classification of types of schools between 1951-56 differs slightly from the classifications 
of other years. This accounts for the important changes in the statistics of the "Vocational & Other 
Schools" category in the 1956-57 school year. Another reason for variations in data is the inclusion of 
the German minority's educational data in the 1951-56 sources. The latter are left out of all subsequent 







































Primary & Other Secondary 
Schools Schools Schools
1938- Schools 183 1 2 288 4 1 42** -- 1
1939 ■ Classes 452 3 12 748 20 5 139 -- 10
Students 27,915 82 337 38,458 610 140 7,480 -- 516
Teachers 374 2 50 711 145 19 181 -- 46
1949- Schools 235 2 54 1 -- 32 1 11
1950 Classes -- -- -- 1 -- -- -- --
Students 36,533 580 10,423 27 -- -- 5,647 149 1,643
Teachers 588 32 333 1 -- -- 89 -- 90
1953- • Schools 274 73 2 11*** -- -- 37 13 1
1954 Classes 989 448 12 13 -- -- 133 60 3
Students 35,512 15,043 321 305 -- -- 4,756 2,102 60
Teachers 897 690 29 14 -- -- 132 118 17
1956- Schools 263 2 5 -- -- -- 37 1 1
1957 Classes 1,512 18 37 -- -- -- 231 2 4
Students 49,844 451 1,050 -- -- -- 8,353 35 109
Teachers 1,810 41 73 -- -- -- 246 13 29
1959- Schools 273 2 6 -- -- -- 32 1 1
1960 Classes 1,546 18 42 -- -- -- 254 2 5
Students 48,382 457 1,234 -- -- -- 8,677 57 153
Teachers 1,767 55 110 -- -- -- 289 13 14
1962- Schools 256 28 6 -- -- -- 32 2 1
1963 Classes 1,573 141 40 -- -- -- 253 4 8
Students 48,228 3,665 1,076 -- -- -- 8,717 94 200
Teachers 1,797 257 67 -- -- -- 289 22 17
1965- Schools 235 40 8 -- -- -- 30 1 1
1966 Classes 1,551 163 44 -- -- -- 251 1 9
Students 45,311 4,694 1,198 -- -- -- 8,043 23 250



























Year Primary & Other Secondary Primary & Other Secondary
Schools Schools Schools Schools Schools Schools
1938- ' # Schools 33 __ 1' ' ' — - - — -
1939 # Classes 82 -- 4 - - “ ■*# Students 4,742 -- 161 - -# Teachers 103 -- 11 " “ *“ ••
1949- # Schools 28 i 7 773 3 39
1950 # Classes -- — - - **
# Students 3,055 100 801 99,565 244 5,446
# Teachers 76 3 36 1,157 13 166
1953- # Schools 3l 14 1 881 152 1 o
1954 S Classes 118 47 3 2,411 593 18v Students 3,570 1,385 93,305 16,386 522# Teachers 110 70 4 1,920 759 24
1956-
1957










# Teachers 212 24 17 2,867 I 491959- # Schools 33 1 1 873
1,0^997
7















4,599 154,909 4 211 941 5,375
2176,53342458299
2,4 It 139 16 128
# Students 4,605 142 131 176,723 8,624 3,835
# Teachers 233 18 9 5.858 568 239
*This Table is based on Jugoslavija 1945-1964: StatistiCki Pregled, Table 19-3, pp. 295-296; Statistiki 
Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Table 24-8, p. 378; StatistiCki Godisnjak S F R J 1963, Tabl~. 125-2, p. 299; 
StatistiCkT Godisnjak S F R J 1967, Table 126-4, p. 286.
**Data for the 1938-39”school year includes Czech as well as Slovak educational institutions. Post-World 
War II data separates the two. In the present Table only the Slovak statistics are indicated for the years 
between 1949 and 1966.
***Educational data concerning the German minority in Yugoslavia is available only for the period between 
1938-56. See StatistiCki Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Table 24-8, p. 378; StatistiCki Godisnjak F N R J 
1954, Table 257, p. 331.
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It relates to the aging of the East-European populations, particularly 
that of the Hungarians. Accordingly, school age children compose a
c / r
smaller percentage of the Hungarian population than previously.
This explanation is far from satisfactory. It fails to account 
for the growing numbers of Hungarian students in the Vojvodina who 
attend the Serbo-Croatian schools. Unlike their counterparts in Tran­
sylvania, they are not under overt pressure to attend the schools of 
the majority nationalities. This is brought out by the lively debate
which has grown up concerning the future of Hungarian educational
57opportunities in Yugoslavia. Most of the analysis coming from the 
Vojvodina, indicate that it is "parental opportunism" that is mainly 
responsible for the defection of Hungarian students.-^ Educators, 
newspapermen and community leaders all point out that the burden of 
guilt rests with the parents of the p u p i l s . T h e y  send their children 
to the schools taught in Serbo-Croatian in order to provide them with 
a better understanding of the country's major language. These parents 
feel that only education in a non-minority school will provide their
-^"A Ddlviddki Magyarsdg DemogrAfiAja," News from Hungary, p.
4; "A Kelet-Eurdpai TArsadalmak ElSregeddse," News from Hungary-Magyar- 
orszAgi Hirek (Compiled by Free Europe, Inc.) XVI (Aug. 7, 1970), 3.
-*^MihAly Agoston, "Hova Irassam?" Magyar Szd, July 3, 1966, 
p. 14; Gdza Vukovics, "Buzld Iskolaudvar Meg a Tflbbi," Magyar Szo',
June 24, 1966, p. 9.
-̂ I bid.; Agoston, "Hova Irassam?", p. 14; ZoltAn Varga,
"Petdfi Hitet . . . Itt-Ott, III (Sept., 1970), 23.
~*̂ Ibid.; Agoston, "Hova Irassam?", p. 14; Vukovics, "BuzlcS 
Iskolaudvar Meg a Ttfbbi," p. 9; Gdza Vukovics, jAnos Vlah and Jdzsef 
PolyvAs, "A Nyelv Nem AkadAly," Magyar Szd*, June 2, 1966, p. 3.
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children with an adequate command of Serbo-Croatian for continued
studies on the university level or equal opportunities in social-
ft fleconomic advancement.
To combat this drain on the Hungarian language schools, educa­
tors and community leaders have proposed "dual language" schools on 
the primary and high school levels. These schools have instruction in 
both Hungarian and Serbo-Croatian. Their advantage is that both the 
minority and the majority languages are used and learned simultaneously. 
This educational approach results--under ideal circumstances— in minor­
ity students learning the language of the majority without losing their 
own. At the same time, it educates the majority nationality students
in the language of the minority people with whom they live side by
. . 61side.
So far no data has been made available which would indicate 
that the "dual-language" schools have put an end to the erosion of 
Hungarian education in the Vojvodina. ^  However, their existence and 
constant expansion demonstrates that Yugoslavia is much more generous 
in its nationality policies than Rumania. The difference between the 
policies of the two countries is summarized in the contrast between
^ I b i d .; Varga, "Petdfi Hitdt . . . ," p. 23.
ft 1Two interesting discussions of such "bilingual education" are: 
Ldszld Varga's "KdtnyelvG Oktatds Vajdasdgban," Hid, XXV (Feb., 1961), 
pp. 157-165, and jdnos Kossa's "Nyeivmuveies a Kdtnyelvtiseg 
Kfirfilmdnyei K6zdtt," Hid, XXX (Nov.-Dec., 1966), pp. 1296-1301.
62The effectiveness of bilingual education has been evaluated 
in a number of articles. Of these the thoroughest analysis is provided 
by Varga, "Kdtnyelvu Oktatds Vajdas^gban," pp. 157-165.
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the Rumanian policy of "parallelization" and the Yugoslav policy of 
"dual-language" instruction. As we have had occasion to see, "paral- 
lelization" eliminates Hungarian language instruction. Its purpose is 
linguistic assimilation. The "dual-language" system on the other hand, 
has as its goal the preservation of the minority languages of Yugo­
slavia.^
The content of the curriculum, as in Transylvania, is "so­
cialist." However, a perusal of social science textbooks--particularly 
history textbooks— indicates that a great deal of attention is given 
to the history of the individual national groups that make up Yugo­
slavia. For example, in the Hungarian language world history text for
high-school students, a great deal of attention is devoted to the
fifa.development of Communism in both Yugoslavia and Hungary. No similar 
attention is paid to Hungarian Party developments in Rumania. In the 
latter case, the role of Hungarians is examined only as it relates to 
Rumanian Party and national history.^ The difference between the two 
educational systems is that in the Yugoslav case a trans-ethnic 
"national" consciousness is inculcated, while in Rumania it is a more
^ T h e  contrast between these policies is effectively presented 
by Ste.en Bdla V^rdy, History of the Hungarian Nation, Part 2 (Astor 
Park, Florida: Danubian Press, Inc., 1969), pp. 338-360.
/: a
Bogdan Smiljevid and Horde Knezevid, A Legujabb Kor 
T6rtdnete, trans. Kdlmdn Csehdk (Subotica: Minerva KSnyvkiadd, 1965),
pp. 14-18, 32-41, 96-101, 123-129, 212?215, 260-263.
^ F o r  example: Constantin Daicoviciu, et al., Rumania
(Bucharest: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959).
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narrow ethnic Rumanian national conciousness. This difference will be 
examined more closely in relation to the over-all cultural policies of 
the two states.
The contrast between Rumanian and Yugoslav policies is also 
evident in the teacher-training programs of the two countries. Unlike 
Rumania, Yugoslavia has constantly expanded its teacher-training 
program for the Hungarians. Table XIX shows that from the academic 
year 1949-50 to the academic year 1965-66, the number of Hungarian 
teachers has grown from 588 to 2,079 in primary schools and 32 to 434 
in vocational and specialized schools. Very recently, the Yugoslavs 
have expanded this program even further by establishing a teacher- 
training center in Subotica (Szabadka) which will be concerned mainly 
with the education of "dual-language" instructors.8^
Only in the area of University instruction do the Hungarians 
of the Vojvodina seem to lag behind their fellow nationals of Tran­
sylvania. They possess only one "faculty" (i.e., department) in the 
Hungarian language. This is the Hungarian Literature and Language 
Faculty at the University of Novi Sad (Ujvid^k).88 However, it should
66On the other hand, Table XIX also indicates that the number 
of secondary school teachers has declined from 333 in 1949-50, to 
141 in 1965-66. This discrepancy is difficult to explain. It is 
probably due to two factors: the parental opportunism mentioned
earlier and the states relocation of many high-school teachers in the 
expanding vocational institutions.
^^Varga, "Pettffi Hitet . . .," p. 23.
68Ibid.
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be noted that this department came into existence only ten years ago, 
and that there is talk of adding more Hungarian language departments 
at the University of Novi Sad.^^ As opposed to this, Rumania possesses 
more instruction in Hungarian at the Babes-Bolyai University. But, 
this instruction is being reduced rather than expanded. Thus, a statis­
tical comparison of Hungarian instruction in the two countries is bound 
to be misleading unless the long-range developments are also considered.
In the area of academic publications a similar situation 
prevails. Seemingly, the Hungarian scholars are better off in Rumania, 
where some of them may get a Hungarian language article or study pub­
lished in the Babes-Bolyai Studia. ^  In Yugoslavia no such dual­
language publication exists for Hungarian scholars. They publish 
everything in the journals and language of the majority nationalities 
or they send their studies to scholarly publications in Hungary. The 
latter alternative is less available to Hungarian scholars in Tran­
sylvania. Thus, it would not be fair to say that in this area oppor­
tunities for Hungarians are less in Yugoslavia than in Rumania.
Rather, the inequalities of treatment are a product of different 
academic developments. Transylvania was always an intellectual center 
and it had many Hungarian scholarly publications before being incor­
porated into Rumania. The Vojvodina, on the other hand, was never a
^ I b i d .; "Hirek," News from Hungary - Magyarorsz^gi Hirek 
(Compiled by Radio Free Europe), XVI (July 17, 1970), p. 6 .
^®See footnote 28 above concerning the extent of these oppor­
tunities .
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major intellectual center, due to the geographic proximity of the Hun­
garian universities of Pecs and Szeged. When the Vojvodina came under 
Yugoslav rule, it had no Hungarian higher educational institutions.
Only in the latter half of the 1960's have such institutions begun to 
make their appearance
Many Hungarians attend the universities of Belgrade and Zagreb.
More recently, they are an important part of the student body at the
72University of Novi Sad (Ujviddk). As the Hungarian instruction 
expands at the latter, even more Hungarians will continue their studies 
there rather than at the more distant educational centers of Zagreb 
and Belgrade. Unlike their Rumanian counterparts, this will enable 
Hungarian intellectuals in Yugoslavia to take a more active role as 
leaders of their people. It will bring them closer to their people 
geographically, socially and in their professional concerns of re-
70search and education.
The above analysis indicates that the educational policies of 
Rumania and Yugoslavia contained certain disadvantages for their
71"Hungarol<4giai Intdzet Ujviddken," A Hdt, May 12, 1967, p. 1; 
Varga, "PetSfi Hitdt . . . p. 23.
nrj'According to "Hirek," News from Hungary, p. 6 , during the 
1969-70 academic year only 1,376 Hungarians were enrolled at the 
University of Novi Sad (Ujviddk). This made up 11.8 per cent of the 
University's total enrollment in an area where the Hungarian share 
of the population is 24.2 per cent. It is contended by Hungarian 
student leaders, that "dual-language" (bilingual) instruction in the 
University would eliminate this imbalance.
^ I b i d .; "Hungaroldgiai Intdzet Ujviddken," A Hdt, p. 1.
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Hungarian inhabitants at one time or another. In Yugoslavia the 
educational deprivation was most acute in the immediate post World 
War II years. In Rumania, on the other hand, it became detrimental 
only after the internal and external checks were removed from the rule 
of the Rumanian ethnic majority in the years between 1956-58. By and 
large, the analysis reveals an increase in the educational opportuni­
ties for Hungarians in the Vojvodina and a drastic reduction of the 
educational opportunities of their fellow nationals in Transylvania.
II
A similar picture emerges from the comparison of Rumanian and 
Yugoslav policies in the area of mass communication. While in both 
states the news media--and all other means of disseminating informa- 
tion--came under close governmental supervision and control, their 
policies differed in the impact they had on minority— particularly 
Hungarian--cultural developments.
In Transylvania
The Party considered the news media instruments of education, 
second only to the schools in effectiveness. From the beginning, the 
CPR made extensive use of these media to gain the support of the non- 
Rumanian nationalities.^ It appealed to them in their respective 
languages through the daily press, radio broadcasts and assorted other
74Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 570-581; Romulus Boila, 
"Press and Radio," in Captive Rumania ed. Alexandre Cretzianu (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 264-267.
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printed and electronic media. Ever since, the media continue to per­
form such a propaganda or control role among the Hungarians and other 
nationalities. At the same time, the media also serve as channels of 
cultural expression and development. The dual nature of the media—  
i.e., as control instruments of the state and servants of nationality 
culture--will be examined in two parts. The role of the printed media 
(newspapers, periodicals, etc.) will be examined first and then 
compared to the role of such electronic media as radio and television.
Newspapers, Periodicals and Magazines
As in the case of the schools, "proletarian internationalism"
was a real working factor in the realm of the written word prior to
1956. National groups could have and, in fact, were encouraged to
have their own periodicals and newspapers in order to better disseminate
75the directives of the Party. The volume of these publications com­
pared favorably with the inter-war period, even if their number and 
quality did not.^ (Table XX presents a comparison of minority
^Hajdu GyOzd, "Forum: A Pdrtos Szellem Erttsitdsddrt Irodal-
munkban," Igaz Szd, XV (June, 1956), 871-74, presents this "educational" 
role and at the same time provides a good example for the evaluation of 
this function of the printed news media, even if his concern is 
primarily with literature.
^ T h e  status of minority periodicals for the inter-war years 
presented by Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems, p. 209, 
and Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 315. The post-war status 
of these periodicals is presented in Boila, "Press and Radio," pp. 
268-269. Some more recent trends are treated in; Bailey, "Trouble 
over Transylvania," p. 29; Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed by 
Nationalist Drive," pp. 1, 5; "Levdl Erddlyb81," Irodalmi Uis^g, p. 1.
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TABLE X X
RUMANIAN AND NATIONAL MINORITY PUBLICATIONS IN 
THE INTER-WAR AND POST-WAR PERIODS















*This Table has been compiled on the basis of data in Joseph S. 
Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1932), pp. 208-209; Rumanian Statistical 
Pocket Book 1964 (Rumanian People's Republic; Central Statistical 
Board, 1964), Tables 138 and 139, pp. 266-268; Catalogue 1963;
Rumanian Periodical Publications (Centrului National de Schimb; 
Bucharest, Rumania: Biblioteca Centrala de Stat a R.P.R., 1963). For 
somewhat different inter-war figures, see C. A. Macartney, Hungary and 
Her Successors (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 315.
**Rmnanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964, op. cit.
***Catalogue 1963, op. cit.
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publications in inter-war and post-war Rumania). When the CPR aban­
doned "proletarian internationalism" it still continued to utilize the 
mass media in its relations with the Hungarians. Thus, to the present 
there are numerous Hungarian language publications and broadcasts in 
the country. These, however, serve the minority cultures less and less 
and the Communist control apparatus more and more.
One outstanding feature of the minority publications world, 
until very recently, has been its relative stability. According to the 
Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 the total number of minority 
publications rose from 29 in 1950, to 38 in 1963.^ This figure is 
misleading, however, insofar as it does not designate the gain in 
relation to specific minorities. Such round numbers only indicate that 
publications for all nationality groups increased, it does not show 
that certain nationalities lost some publications while others gained 
some. To find out to what degree any such gains or losses affected the 
nationalities of Transylvania, it is necessary to examine those Rumanian 
catalogues which list the number and nature of the publications origi-
70nating in the country.
^ Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 (Rumanian People's 
Republic: Central Statistical Board, 1964), pp. 266-268, Tables 138 and 
139. It is interesting to note how I. Nistor inflated the number of 
these periodicals to a total of 48 when he wrote a propaganda article 
for Izvestia (Dec. 27, 1953). For this article consult under "Rumania" 
the "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," The Current Digest 
of the Soviet Press, IV (Feb. 7, 1953), 18.
^®The catalogues which are most useful included: Newspapers and 
Periodicals from Rumania (Bucharest, Rumania; Cartimex, 1962); Cata­
logue 1963: Rumanian Periodical Publications (Centrului National de 
Schimb; Bucharest, Rumania; Biblioteca Centrala de Stata R.P.R., 1963); 
and Catalog 1962 (Academia Republicii Populare Romine; Bucharest, 
Rumania: Institutul de Studii Romino-Sovietic, 1962).
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According to the most recent catalogue which could be obtained, 
there are 28 Hungarian, 13 German and 2 Serbian minority publications 
listed. The discrepancy between this number and that presented in the 
Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 above, is explainable only by 
the latter's attempt to distinguish between "foreign" and "domestic" 
publications. The Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 presents a 
smaller number of minority entries, probably because it divides the Ger­
man publications into two categories: one for domestic and one for
foreign consumption. With this discrepancy explained, it is possible 
to evaluate the catalogue entries in more detail. Of the 355 entries, 
258 are Rumanian, 28 Hungarian, 13 German, 2 Serbian, 12 English, 10 
Russian, 19 French, 1 Chinese, 7 Spanish and 2 Latin.^ of the 258 
Rumanian entries, 70 contain German extracts and summaries, 76 contain 
English extracts and summaries, 197 contain Russian extracts and sum­
maries, 189 contain French extracts and summaries, and 2 contain
onItalian extracts and summaries.
It is then apparent that the minorities are relatively well 
provided with publications in their own language, with the exception
O 1of Yiddish. 1 However, this evaluation must be qualified by the fact
79Catalogue 1963: Rumanian Periodical Publications.
onSome of these publications contain summaries and extracts 
in more than one language, of which the Russian and French appear most 
frequently. None of them have summaries in Hungarian!
81Boila, "Press and Radio," p. 269, points out, however, that
the Jews were not worse off than any of the other groups in this
category. Though they only had two Yiddish publications, they also
had two in Rumanian and one in Hungarian; The Germans had four; the
Yugoslavs two; the Ukrainians two; the Armenians two; the Greeks one;
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that in the last two years significant reductions have taken place in 
some areas, affecting particularly circulation (number of copies)
OOrather than the number of the publications.0 -̂ However, in the realm 
of publications it may be premature to state that a systematic policy 
is being undertaken to reduce minority papers and periodicals. At 
present, such a policy would be a disadvantage to the CPR because these 
publications provide it with the best means for disseminating its 
propaganda among the nationalities. At the same time the Party seems 
magnanimous toward the minorities by allowing "their" journals to 
exist
The reduction of "proletarian internationalism" in the pub­
lication world has, therefore, taken a different path. This differ­
ent approach is successful because the written word is more pliable 
and controllable than the school system. Censorship enables the 
government to have more control over each and every periodical, than
and the Hungarians thirty. If these figures are added together they 
present a total of 46 publications. This is again at variance with 
the 32 which are allotted in the Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 
for the year 1955 (the year given by Boila for his statistics). For 
this discrepancy, however, the investigator is unable to provide an 
explanation.
^"Lev^l Erd^lybol," Irodalmi Ujsdg, p. 1.
OOIt would be a disadvantage to the CPR at present because a 
large segment of the minority populations still only understand their 
own languages, or very little Rumanian. However, this situation is 
being altered by the great emphasis which has been put on the study of 
Rumanian among the national minorities. In a few years it may be 
possible for the Rumanians to take away all minority publications. By 
then only the old people will be unacquainted with Rumanian, but they 
are the ones for whom the Party cares least anyway.
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Q Ais the case with individual t e a c h e r s . T h u s ,  it is unlikely that the 
Party will destroy one of its most effective means of control over the 
nationalities by using the same elimination methods as against the 
schools. Rather than eliminating the minority periodicals, the CPR 
utilizes them as avenues of propaganda in the offensive against "par-
QCticularism" and "bourgeois nationalism."
CPR publications have had a long tradition as champions of 
"proletarian internationalism" and as uncompromising fighters against 
manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism." Even before the seizure of 
power, such journals as Korunk were early Communist centers of 
Rumanian-Hungarian co-operation.®® However, as was demonstrated in 
relation to Party-nationality relations, those early years of co­
operation were possible only because of the truly "internationalist" 
composition of the CPR. Today, when the CPR has lost this "inter­
nationalist" character, it is no longer possible to expect that Elftre,
®^These periodicals and publications are easily controlled by 
the CPR, because they are few in number (38 in 1964), they are all 
printed in government publishing houses, and the contributing writers 
are not only Party members but also front-line fighters for the cause 
of Rumanian "socialist patriotism." See in this regard, H. F., "A 
Mai Erddly II," Nemzetfir, June 1, 1960.
®®Banyai, "Forum: Irodalom Tanitds ds Hazafias Nevelds," pp.
236-242; GyiJrgy Kovefcs, "GySzelmek Utjdn," Igaz Szd , IX (May, 1961), 
645; and "A Szocialista Realizmus," Igaz Szd. X (May, 1962), 755-766, 
present the usual arguments of these "front-line fighters for 
socialist patriotism."
®®IstvAn Nagy, "Forum: Tiz fives Az RNK IroszOvetsdge," Igaz
Sz6 , VII (March, 1959), 415-417; N. Kallos, "The Journal 'Korunk' and 
Its Animator, Gdbor Gaal," Lupta de Clasa (June, 1964), trans. in 
Rumanian Press Survey N o . 447 (Radio Free Europe, July 15, 1964), 2-5.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
2 9 7
Korunk, Igaz Sz6 and other Party journals keep reflecting that spirit. 
The spirit of "proletarian internationalism" has been slowly replaced 
by the spirit of "sodalfct: patriotism."®^
Transylvanian nationality publications can be divided mainly 
into two groups: technical-professional and economic-political-social-
OOcultural publications.00 The second group of the two is, by far, the 
more important in the life of the minorities, not only as regards the 
number of the reading audience, but also as regards their effective­
ness as channels of propaganda. This is not the case with the first 
group, which contains periodicals likely to suffer elimination (i.e., 
absorption) in the near future. The prospects for elimination are 
indicated by the fact that all important such journals appear only in 
Rumanian.®^ Anyone who wishes to enter these coveted professional- 
technical circles must, therefore, be well acquainted with the Rumanian
®^See footnote 44 above.
OOThe above division can be justified because the primary func­
tion of the technical-professional periodicals is not indoctrination 
(though they sometimes contain such articles), as it is for the 
economic-political-social-cultural publications. Furthermore, the 
above division facilitates a clearer analysis.
®^This is based on the examination of Catalog 1962, which deals 
with technical, scientific, medical and other professional publica­
tions. The catalogue is published by the Institute of Rumanian-Soviet 
studies of the Academy of the R.P.R. The striking feature of this 
catalogue is that not one of the works listed therein appears in Hun­
garian. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 573 maintains, on the other 
hand, that "the less elaborate works were printed in Magyar and German, 
as well as Rumanian." Catalogua 1963: Rumanian Periodical Publica­
tions , lists five such publications in the Hungarian language (Orvosi 
Szemle, p. 53; Mdhdszet, p. 75; Matematikai ds Fizikai Lapok, p. 41; 
Tanflgyi Ujsdg, p. 29; and KSnyvtarosok Tijdkoztatdja, p. 12) and also 
studies of the Babes-Bolyai University which still appear in Hun­
garian and Rumanian in 1963.
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language.
The economic-political-cultural-social journals, on the other
hand, have become the most convenient channels of CPR efforts to
9 0instill &xiaL3st patriotism" into the national minorities. u While 
formerly these journals were important avenues for the expression of 
class solidarity and tHe common struggle of all nationalities for the 
socialist fatherland, now these same journals have become Rumanizing 
instruments of the majority nationality. This can be easily ascer­
tained by an examination of the development of any of these periodicals 
since the Communist seizure of power. While earlier articles stressed 
the equality theme, the more recent ones stress the need for closer 
identification with the majority n a t i o n a l i t y A r t i c l e s  before 1958 
gjlorified the R.P.R. for enabling the minority nationalities to 
develop their own national cultures on the basis of proletarian inter­
nationalism and brotherhood. Since then, the stress has been on 
becoming better acquainted with the culture and language of the major­
ity nationality.^ The constant emphasis on learning the Rumanian 
language and reading Rumanian literature has become more insistent in
^ S e e  footnote 83 above.
91Bdnyai, "Forum: Irodalom Tanitds e's Hazafias Nevel4s," p.
242; A. F., "A Mai Erd^ly II," Nemzetfir, June 1, 1960.
92Hajdu GydSzd, "Menet Kttzben," Igaz Szd, VI (May, 1958),
655-656.
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these periodicals with each passing year.^
At present the periodicals and publications printed in the
languages of the national minorities serve only one purpose--the subju-
94gation of the nationalities to the CPR* Their subjugation, unlike 
that of the Rumanian masses, is in this way twofold— ideological and 
national.^ Thus, it seems meaningless to quote statistics regarding 
the number of publications allowed the national minorities, since each 
of those publications serves the CPR and its Rumanizing goals.^
93The first Congress of the Rumanian Writers1 Association in 
1956 was already deeply concerned with furthering the learning of the 
Rumanian language and with the position of the minority nationalities. 
See "Vigyazo: dsszehivtdk a Romdn Ndpkdztdrsasdg Iroinak ElsS
Kongresszusdt," Igaz Szd, IV (April, 1956), 601. Stressing the need 
for more translations and language studies is also emphasized by: 
Veronica Porumbacu, "KOzBs Uton," Igaz Szd, IV (June, 1956), 876-877; 
Elemdr Jancso, "Szemle: Dunanak, Oltnak Egy a Hangja," Igaz Szd, VI
(Jan., 1958), 139-140; "Forum; A Korszertlsdg ds Pdrtossdg Jegydben," 
Igaz Szd, VIII (June, 1960), 854, Az 'Igaz Szo1 SzerkesztBsege, "A 
szocialista ifpitds Szolgdlataban," Igaz Szd, X (Dec., 1962), 892;
Ldszlo Baldzs, "Mddszeresseg a Nyelvtanuldsban," Igaz Szd. XI (Jan., 
1963), 113; Bdla Kelemen, "Nyelvtanulds-Olvasds," Igaz Szd. XI (April, 
1963), 587.
9 47 This is best indicated by the uniformity of all such publica­
tions. Boila, "Press and Radio," pp. 268, 270, points out this feature 
of the Rumanian news media. He states: "Every editorial of every
paper might have been written by the same person, for all the differ­
ences to be observed. Even the makeup of newspapers is similar . . . 
aside from insignificant details, all newspapers nowadays are but 
specialized editions of Scanteia."
-̂*F. K., "Romdnia Szuntesse Meg az Erddlyi Magyarok Ulddzdsdt," 
Katolikus Magyarok Vasdrnapja, June 21, 1964, pp. 1, 5.
^Some light is shed on this by Ldszlo Sdndor, "Ukrajnai 
tizenet" in "0lvas6k Foruma," Igaz Szd, VI (May, 1958), 794-795, when 
he complains that the periodical (Igaz Szd) is very deficient in the 
works of Hungarian writers from anywhere but Rumania.
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The Air Waves: Radio and Television
Much of what applies to the printed news media also applies to 
the electronic media. However, in this realm there are no data avail­
able which would make it possible to compare the inter-war period and 
the present.^ While this makes it almost impossible to provide an 
adequate treatment of the electronic news media, it does not mean that 
some of their general characteristics cannot be presented to indicate 
the nature of their contribution to minority opportunities. One such 
characteristic is that broadcasting resembles publishing as an easily 
controlled and manipulated means of news dissemination.^®
Available sources also indicate that radio transmission is a 
growing and important channel of news dissemination for the CPR. The 
rapid expansion of radio broadcasting indicates this. While in 1938 
Rumania only had two broadcasting stations, by 1963 their number had 
grown to twenty-two.^9 However, to assess the share of the national
^George H. Bossy, "Transportation and Communications" in 
Rumania, ed. Fischer-Galati, pp. 331, 342, presents some figures which 
enable a general comparison of pre-war and post-war broadcasting 
facilities and capabilities. However, these shed little light on the 
share (if any) which the national minorities may have had in this 
area. A further complication in any such comparison is the role of 
television, which was non-existent in pre-war Rumania.
^®Boila, "Press and Radio," pp. 272-273, presents this malleable 
feature of the written and electronic news media. However, in one 
respect the latter faced an obstacle which the written media did not 
have to confront, namely broadcasts from abroad. Jammings did not 
always successfully eliminate the outside intruders (e.g., Radio Free 
Europe, Voice of America, etc.). But for the Rumanians this also 
entails competition in the broadcasting field with the Communist Hun­
garian stations.
^Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964, pp. 262-263, Table 134.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
minorities in this growth is d i f f i c u l t . T h e  nearest estimate 
possible has to be based on regional divisions, which of course cross 
linguistic and national lines. A comparison based on regions cannot 
provide conclusive evidence because of the very limited data available. 
While it is true that the predominantly Hungarian Mures-Nagyar 
Autonomous Region had a low rate of radio subscriptions, so did the 
predominantly Rumanian regions of Iasi, Suceava and Dobrogea. While 
it is also true that Rumanian areas (Ploesti and Bucharest city and 
region) had the highest subscription rates, Brasov, a region with a 
heavy Hungarian population, was not far b e h i n d . R a t h e r  than re­
vealing national discrimination, all the available data indicate that 
subscriptions run higher in the industrially more developed regions 
than in the more backward ones.
Since the texts of radio and television broadcasts are also 
unavailable, it is impossible to assess the content of the programs 
maintained for the nationalities of Transylvania. j But, since the 
electronic news media are as well controlled and censored as the 
written ones, it is probably safe to assume that, rather than decrease 
nationality programs the CPR just shifts the emphasis of the propaganda
■'•^About all that can be stated with certainty is that broad­
casts in the language of the national minorities exist and have in 
fact been expanded. See along this line "Erddlyi Hirek," Larnafa, V 
(April-June, 1958), 33; Constantin Daicoviciu and others, Rumania 
(Bucharest: Foreign Language Pub. House, 1959), p. 516.
^Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964, p. 264, Table 135.
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toward more 'feocfalifit patriotism" as was the case with the nationality 
publications.
The only concrete source that is available for an evaluation 
of the Hungarian share of broadcasts in Rumania is the listing of 
radio and television programs in the daily papers. A perusal of this 
listing for the past two years (1969-1970) indicates that separate 
generalizations must be made in discussing the two media.
Television seems to have been an overwhelmingly ethnic Rumanian 
media until November 1969. Until then, there were no distinct Hun-
*1 A Ogarian language programs. u This does not mean that Hungarian sub­
jects, personalities or films were barred from television, it means 
only that there were no regular Hungarian language programs. Programs
dealing with a Hungarian subject were most frequently presented in 
103Rumanian. Only in the course of the present broadcasting season 
has the Rumanian Television network allowed for a "Hungarian Hour."
In actuality, this involves a one-hour Sunday afternoon program 
(beginning at 12:30 or 1:15 p.m.) and a half-hour program on Thursdays 
(beginning usually at 5:30 p.m.). The German minority also has a one- 
hour program on Saturdays.
102This is indicated by a comparison of the "television and 
radio guide" sections appearing in the Saturday issues of the Hungarian 
daily printed in Bucharest. Particularly: "Mtlsorkalauz," Elfire, Nov.
15, 1969, p. 4, and "Mtisorkalauz," Elfire, Nov. 22, 1969, p. 4. Prior 
to Nov. 22, 1969, no mention is made of Hungarian programs.
•*-^Ibid., and all "radio and television guide" sections in the 
Saturday issues of Elfire prior to Nov. 22, 1969.
■*-®̂ See all "radio and television guide sections in the Saturday 
issues of Elfire from Nov. 22, 1969 to the present.
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The opening of television to such regularized minority pro-
grams--even on such a limited scale— is a complete reversal of the
Rumanian allocations of television time. The drastic nature of this 
change for the Hungarians--is evident from the content of the televi­
sion programs preceding the Fall of 1969. The discriminatory nature 
of broadcasting is to be found more in what had been omitted than in 
what was included. Aside from the inclusion of political programs 
and programs taken over from Western Television— like "Bonanza"—  
the Rumanian programs were for the most part educational in nature.
For example, the television carried regular language instructional 
programs. It had regular weekly language programs devoted to 
Rumanian, Russian, German, French, Spanish and English. However, it 
did not have any Hungarian language instruction programs.
The motives for the change in Rumanian attitudes seems to stem
from their more exposed political posture vis-h-vis the Soviet Union.
The Rumanian leaders are much more uncertain of their position since 
the Czecho-slovakian events of August 1968. As a consequence, they 
have become more concerned with mending their political fences at 
home. Thus, they have granted a number of opportunities for cultural 
development to the national minorities, such as the "Hungarian Hour" 
on television.
In the area of Radio broadcasting, the Hungarians have had a
^O^Ibid.; for more specific examples see "Mfisorkalauz," El6re, 
Apr. 5, 1969, p. 4; "Mfisorkalauz," Elflre, Mar. 29, 1969, p. 4; 
"Mfisorkalauz," Eldre, Aug. 19, 1969, p. 4.
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more proportional share of broadcasting than in the case of television. 
This has been particularly true since the addition of the broadcasting 
center at Tirgu-Mures (Marosvdsarhely) in March 1957. This center 
had for a long time the second most powerful transmitter after the one 
at B u c h a r e s t . A t  Tirgu-Mures and at Cluj (Kolozsvdr) the Hungarians 
have always had daily programs. The number of hours transmitted in 
Hungarian has always varied, but it has been substantial. At both 
these broadcasting centers the Hungarians can listen to about one- 
third of the programs in their own language.
This does not mean that everything is well in this area. In 
terms of program content, the Hungarians are more frequently objects 
of propaganda than not. In this their fate does not differ greatly 
from that of the other inhabitants of Rumania. It does, however, 
limit the role of the media as instruments of cultural preservation.
On the all-national level, this is apparent also in the limited use of 
Hungarian in the programs of the broadcasting center at Bucharest.
Only one half-hour of news is provided on weekdays and twenty minutes
1 f)Qon Sundays. The broadcasts transmitted for abroad from Bucharest 
also show a bias against the Hungarians. Thirteen languages are used
106"Erddlyi Hirek," Ldrmafa, V (Apr.-June, 1958), p. 33.
107T, . ,Ibxd.
10®See any "Miisorkalauz," in the Saturday issues of E16re from 
March 1957 to the present.
■*-^See: "A Bukaresti Rddi<i Magyar Nyelvti Adasa," Elffre, Nov. 
22, 1969, p. 4, and Eldjre, June 13, 1970, p. 4.
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to transmit to areas outside of Rumania, but Hungarian is not one of 
them.110
In The Vojvodina 
As in the case of Rumania, so in Yugoslavia, from the end of 
the Second World War to the present, the mass media have played a
significant role both as instruments of Party control and as vehicles
for the preservation of nationality cultures. To evaluate the media 
in terms of this dual role the study will--as in the case of Tran-
sylvania--separate the analysis into two parts. The printed media will
be considered first and radio and television second.
Newspapers, Periodicals and Magazines
In Yugoslavia, the right to publish newspapers and periodicals
in the language of the minority nationalities has been considered an
111indication of the correct application of nationality policies.
While no data has been obtained to indicate nationality publishing 
activity prior to 1953, we do know that the post-war period saw a vast 
expansion of nationality publications. In the inter-war period the 
Hungarians suffered a great lack in this respect. Their two major 
publications Kal£ngya and Hid were continuously ready to fold.11^ Thus,
110See: "The Daily Schedule of Broadcasts for Abroad," in
Documents, A cles and Information on Rumania, for June 20, 1965,p.
21, for Dec, i<J, 1966, p. 21, and for June 15, 1970, p. 26.
111Ldszld Reh^k, "A Vajdasdgi Nemzetisdgek Helyzete Jugo- 
szl^via Uj Alkotmdnyos Rendjdben," Hid. XXVII (May, 1963), 573.
112»szemle, Szemelv^nyek: Kaldngya" in Hid 1934-1941 eds.
J^nos Kov^cs, et al., (Novi Sad, Yugoslavia: Forum Kdnyvkiadd, 1964),
pp. 272-273.
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the period after the Second World War has been in this respect a 
great improvement over the past. By 1953 the Hungarians had seven
1 1 Operiodicals and ten newspapers that appeared regularly.
This expansion in nationality publishing is a source of pride 
to the Yugoslav authorities. Consequently they have been assiduously 
collecting and publishing all data related to minority newspapers and 
periodicals. Tables XXI and XXII summarize the results of their 
efforts. As Table XXI shows, the number of Hungarian newspapers has 
remained relatively stable in the 1950's and 1960's. It has varied 
between eight and twelve in number, but in the number of issues pub­
lished there has been a steady increase from 7,615,000 in 1953 to 
15,687,000 in 1 9 6 4 . Since 1964 a slight decline has taken place, 
so that in 1966 there were 13,912,000 issues published.
In periodical publication a slightly different picture emerges. 
The number of periodicals has increased, while the number of issues 
has slightly decreased. Thus, Hungarian periodicals have increased
from seven in 1953 to eleven in 1966. At the same time the number of
116their issues has decreased from 670,000 in 1955 to 508,000 in 1966.
In general, the periodicals have had a somewhat more erratic develop­
ment than the newspapers. However, as both Table XXI and Table XXII 
indicate, among all the non-Yugoslav nationalities, the Hungarians
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TABLE XXI
NATIONAL MINORITY NEWSPAPERS IN YUGOSLAVIA*
Nationality 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Bulgarian # of 1 2 2 1
Newspapers
# of issues
in Thousands 73 64 30 4
Czech # of
and Newspapers 5 2 2 1 1 4 4
Slovak # of issues
in Thousands 769 394 434 368 93 498 506
Italian # of
Newspapers 4 2 1 1 2 3 6
# of issues
in Thousands 1,026 794 645 687 700 791 847
Hungarian # of
Newspapers 10 9 8 9 9 12 11
# of issues
in Thousands?, 615 10,370 7,638 8,691 11,054 10,526 13,284
Rumanian # of
Newspapers 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
# of issues
in Thousands 378 141 136 130 14 213 849
Ruthenian # of
Newspapers 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
# of issues
in Thousands 70 73 74 88 89 97 21
Albanian # of
Newspapers 4 5 6 4 4 6 6
# of issues
in Thousands 528 580 550 662 297 628 1,997
Turkish # of
Newspapers 2 1 1 1 3 3
# of issues
in Thousands 50 34 0 116 61 94
German** # of
Newspapers 3 3 3 2
# of issues
in Thousands 32 71 93 5
*This Table is based on data provided in the Yugoslavian statis­
tical yearbooks which have been published since 1954. Consult StatistiCki 
Godisnjak FNRJ (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1954-1962), and
StatistiCki Godisnjak SFRJ (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku,
1963-1967).
**Data for the German language newspapers is available only for 
1955, 1956, 1957 and 1958.
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TABLE XXI (Continued)
Nationality 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Bulgarian # of 
Newspapers
# of issues
1 2 1 3 2 2 2
in Thousands 37 36 37 164 179 153 152
Czech # of
and Newspapers 4 6 4 5 6 7 4
Slovak # of issues




5 5 5 5 7 6 5
in Thousands 969 952 851 893 1,003 1,025 1,030
Hungarian # of 
Newspapers
# of issues
11 12 11 12 9 9 9




2 2 2 2 2 3 2




2 2 2 1 2 1 2




6 7 9 10 9 8 7
in Thousands 1,703 2,070 2,531 2,280 3,101 2,936 3,883
Turkish # of
Newspapers 3 3 4 3 3 4 4
# of issues
in Thousands 144 190 101 226 218 894 1,929
German # of 
Newspapers
# of issues 
in Thousands
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TABLE XXII
NATIONAL MINORITY PERIODICALS IN YUGOSLAVIA*
Nationality 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Bulgarian # of 
Periodicals







Periodicals 4 4 4 4 4 1 2
Slovak # of issues 
in Thousands 55 72 72 60 82 4 19
Italian # of 
Periodicals 2 4 4 2 2 1 1
# of issues 
in Thousands 45 81 73 29 65 27 30
Hungarian # of 
Periodicals 7 9 10 9 10 6 6
# of issues in Thousands 422 466 670 653 585 340 296
Rumanian # of 
Periodicals 3 3 2 2 2 1 1
# of issues 
in Thousands 47 21 20 5 3 4 5
Ruthenian # of 
Periodicals 2 2 1 1 1
# of issues 
in Thousands 17 15 15 17 4
Albanian # of 
Periodicals 5 6 6 6 7 4 4
# of issues 
in Thousands 286 377 261 247 278 109 166
Turkish # of 
Periodicals 








German** # of 
Periodicals 4 5 4 4
# of issues 
in Thousands 50 47 11 45
*This Table is based on data provided in the Yugoslavian statis­
tical yearbooks which have been published since 1954. Consult StatistiEki 
Godisnjak FNRJ (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1954-1962), and
Statistjgki Godisnjak SFRJ (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1963-
1967).
**Data for the German language periodicals is available only for 
1955, 1956, 1957 and 1958.
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TABLE XXII (Continued)
Nationality 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Bulgarian # of 
Periodicals 
# of issues 
in Thousands
Czech # of
and Periodicals 2 2 2 2 2 2 4
Slovak # of issues
in Thousands 20 7 17 18 18 18 235
Italian # of
Periodicals 1 3 2 1 3 3 4
# of issues
in Thousands 40 51 71 45 52 69 67
Hungarian # of 
Periodicals 
# of issues
7 8 8 7 9 11 11
in Thousands 321 327 214 148 409 677 508
Rumanian # of
Periodicals 1 1 2 (1) (2 ) (4) (2 )
# of issues




(1) (2 ) (4) (2 )
in Thousands __(4) (4) (8) (8)
Albanian # of
Periodicals 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
# of issues
in Thousands 157 166 24 256 314 426 441
Turkish # of 
Periodicals 
# of issues 
in Thousands
German # of 
Periodicals 
# of issues 
in Thousands
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have the most publications and the most issues. This is due not so 
much to their numbers as to the high rate of literacy among them.
The number of publications and the number of their issues, by 
itself, does not reveal whether the minority is under pressure from 
the majority. The fate of the Hungarians in Rumania attests to this. 
So, the examination of the contents of these publications is necessary. 
After all, these Hungarian language newspapers and periodicals could be 
used merely to facilitate the Party's control of the Hungarians, with­
out any regard for Hungarian cultural survival.
A content analysis of Hid (the most influential periodical in 
the Vojvodina) and Magyar Szd (the largest Hungarian language daily 
newspaper of Yugoslavia) indicates that while the lip-service paid to 
"proletarian internationalism" is not much more pervasive than in 
Rumanian publications, the Hungarians have greater opportunity to use 
the media to further their own cultural development. One of the most 
outstanding indications of this is the constant concern for the ex­
pansion of cultural opportunities.'*''*'^ Articles also abound in the dis­
cussion of Hungarian cultural development on a wider scale, throughout
1  I Qall the Hungarian inhabited areas of East-Central Europe.
■'■■'■̂ Akos Benkfi, "A Jugoszl^viai Magyar Proza 'Uj HullAma,"' 
Forres. IV (July-Aug., 1970), 44-54.
■‘•^Some examples are; S^ndor Bogd^nfi, "Rdgi KOvek, Uj 
Emberek KolozsvArott," Magyar Szd, July 1, 1966, p. 6 ; B. I. "Egy 
Biblic5gr<£fia Tanulsdgai," Hid, XXX (Apr., 1966), 526-527; B. I. "A 
'Hid-Szerep' IrodalomtBrtdn^sze," Hid, XXX (Mar., 1966), 382-384;
Julia Baranyai, "Jegyzetek Az Orm^ns^fgi ^s Dr^vaszSgi T&jnyelvrbl,"
Hid, XXV (July-Aug., 1961), 673-676; Ervin Sinko, "Magyar Folyoiratok- 
ban Lapozgatva," Hid, XXVIII (Apr., 1964), 363-392.
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Furthermore, the writings of Hungarians from other countries frequently
119appear on the pages of periodicals like Hid. It is true that the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia uses those publications to control 
the Hungarians, but the publications are in turn made to serve 
cultural needs also.
The above is not valid for Yugoslav publications in general.
As in the case of Rumania, only the social, economic, political and 
cultural printed media appear in the languages of the minority na­
tionalities. The technical and professional journals appear almost 
exclusively in Serbo-Croatian or Slovenian.^® Thus, as in the case of 
Rumania if anyone wishes to become accepted in professional circles, he 
(or she) must be proficient in the language(s) of the majority nation­
alities. In Yugoslavia the problem is mitigated somewhat by access to 
such professional journals published in Hungary. In Rumania, the 
latter are for the most part— difficult to come by. Another mitigating
factor is that in Yugoslavia books are published in Hungarian relating
121to technical and professional fields. In Rumania, this is not the
•̂•̂ I b i d .; Tibor D^ry, "Ambrus," Hid. XXIX (May, 1965), 636-659; 
Imre Bori, "Luk^cs GytJrgy as a Magyar Irodalom," Hid, XXIX (Apr.,
1965), 441-463.
120This was the case in the summer of 1966. At that time, a 
personal effort to find such technical-professional journals failed to 
locate any in the Hungarian book and periodical stores of Novi Sad 
and Subotica.
•‘‘Forum Kttnyvjegyzlk 1965-1966 (Novi Sad: Forum KSnyvkiadd,
1966), pp. 27-29.
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The cultural-social-political publications in Yugoslavia do not 
propagate an ethnic nationalism under the guise of "socialist patrio­
tism." They cannot do this, since no ethnic group can monopolize the 
designation of being Yugoslav. To be Yugoslav, one has to transcend 
narrow ethnic categories. Thus, the articles and editorials which 
refer to "socialist patriotism," always do so in reference to trans­
ethnic goals. In Yugoslavia, "socialist patriotism" is truly unimagin­
able without "proletarian internationalism." The connection between 
the two is usually illustrated by the common Partisan struggles of all 
the people of Yugoslavia against the German occupiers. This 
tendency to equate "patriotism" with the trans-ethnic Partisan tradi­
tions of World War II ensures that none of the nationalities remain 
outside the Yugoslav political "mainstream." As was shown, a quite 
different situation prevails in Rumania.
The Airwaves: Radio and Television
In Yugoslavia too, much of what applies to the printed news
^^S^muel Domonkos, A Romdn Irodalom Magyar Biblidgrdfidja 
1831-1960 (1961-1965) (Bukarest: Irodalmi KOnyvkiadd, 1966), pp.
30-33 indicates that translation has been overwhelmingly concerned 
with literary works.
^^Danilo Kefiid, "Figyeltf: A JKP Vajdasdgban a Felkelds
Elfikdszitdsdnek ds Meginditdsdnak Napjaiban," Hid, XXV (Sept., 1961), 
784-792; Pdter Lflrinc, "Vajdasdgi Nemzetkdzi Harcosok," Hid, XXI 
(Oct., 1957), 784-793; Mihdly Olajos, "Egybeolvadds - Nem Beolvadas," 
Hid,XVII (Dec., 1953), 837-840; Zsivan Miliszavac, "A Partizdnsajt6 
Vajdasdgban,” Hid. XVI (Nov., 1952), 659-661; Kdroly Brindza,
"Adatok a Jugszldviai Magyarsdg Rdsztvdteldrfll a Nepszabaditd 
Hdboruban," Hid, XV (May, 1951), 323-336.
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media also applies to the electronic media. Government regulation is
unchallenged. Both radio and television are first and foremost the
channels of communication of the Party. As such, these media have been
modernized and vastly expanded. In 1939 there were only 155,000 radio
124licenses in the country. By 1962 there were 2,040,000. For tele­
vision, growth and expansion began only in the second half of the 
1950's. The first television program was broadcast from Zagreb on May 
15, 1956. Presently, three television studios operate in Yugoslavia, 
in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.
It would be unfair to compare the post-war share of minority 
broadcasts to the pre-war situation. For one reason, the electronic 
news media have only become mass media in the post-war period. For 
another reason, in the pre-war period there were no ethnic minority 
broadcasting opportunities. In this respect, both Rumania and Yugo­
slavia improved conditions greatly after the war came to an end.
Radio broadcasting has been influenced much more than tele­
vision by post-war efforts to increase programs in the language of 
the national minorities. While no exact data has been made available 
on this question, a perusal of the weekly listings of radio programs 
indicates that at least in the Vojvodina, Hungarians have the oppor­
tunity to listen to broadcasts in their own language. Of Yugoslavia's
10/1000 Facts About Yugoslavia (Beograd: Izdavacki Zavod
"Jugoslavija," 1963), p. 104.
125Ibid.
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ten major broadcasting centers, two have Hungarian language programs 
on a regular basis. These are located in Novi Sad (Ujviddk) and 
Osijek (Eszdk). The station at Novi Sad broadcasts 15 minutes of news 
daily in Hungarian. The station at Osijek provides one hpur and fif­
teen minutes of news daily in Hungarian. Aside from these regular 
programs, both stations dedicate at least one or two hours per week to 
Hungarian popular and/or folk music.
Yugoslav television does not offer the Hungarians a special 
program in their own language. In this respect Rumanian broadcasting 
is one step ahead. However, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina are geo­
graphically close enough to Budapest to pick up the programs of the 
major Hungarian television network. In fact, all the Hungarian 
language newspapers of Yugoslavia carry a complete listing of all 
television programs beamed from Budapest. This is a service that 
the Hungarian language papers in Rumania fail to provide. In this 
respect, Yugoslav policies are more favorable to the Hungarians.
This discrepancy in the Rumanian and Yugoslav policies can be 
explained, in part, by different views toward the relation of the 
Hungarian government to Hungarians living in areas outside its present
19AFor complete program listings see the special "radio and 
television guide" sections of the Saturday issues of Magyar Sz6 .
The more specific sources for the data presented above include:
"Radioujsag," Magyar Szd, July 16, 1966, between pp. 6-7; "Rddidujsag," 
Magyar Szd, July 9, 1966, between pp. 4-5; "7 Nap Rddid-Televizid 
Musora," T_ Nap, July 22, 1966; "Novi Sad-i Musor," Dolgozok, July 8 , 
1966, p. 13.
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borders. The Rumanians try to limit contacts between Hungary and the 
Hungarians of Transylvania. As a consequence, Rumanian broad­
casting is in constant competition with Budapest. -^9 r^g recent 
addition of two weekly television programs in Hungarian may be indica­
tive of this. The policy of silently ignoring Hungarian broadcasts 
coming from Budapest, makes this even clearer. Thus, the expansion of 
Hungarian language broadcasting in Rumania seems to be more a response 
to growing competition with Hungary than a policy of strengthening 
nationality opportunities.
The Yugoslav experience lends further support to the above 
observation. In recent years, relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia 
have been better than at any time either before or after World War II. 
However, the prevalence of cordial relations between the two states 
has not been followed by an expansion of Hungarian-language broad­
casting in the Vojvodina. Instead, more co-operation has prevailed in 
the mutual publication of broadcasting p r o g r a m s . T h i s  is in con­
trast to policies of the past, particularly the time of the Tito-Stalin 
split, when relations were poorest between Hungary and Yugoslavia. At 
that time there were actually more Hungarian language broadcasts in the
l^SBaiiey^ "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28.
129Ibid.
^^For example: "Jugoszlav Televizirf-Magyar Televizio'," T_ Nap,
July 22, 1966, between pp. 18-19.
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Vojvodina to counter the broadcasts of Rakosi's H u n g a r y . T h i s  
points out again that broadcasting time by itself is not an adequate 
indicator of nationality policies. Much more revealing is the content 
of the programs.
As the above description and comparison of Rumanian and Yugo­
slavian policies indicates, the Hungarian population in both is closely 
circumscribed in its access to the mass media. However, while in both 
countries there is close supervision of Hungarian use of the mass media, 
in Yugoslavia more leeway is allowed for publications and programs of 
a non-political nature. In Rumania, on the other hand, Hungarian 
language publications and broadcasts are primarily and overwhelmingly 
political in content. Thus, in Yugoslavia the mass media is a means 
of transmitting material and information which can at times contribute 
to the development and preservation of national cultures. In Rumania 
this is less frequently the case. Here, the news media are more 
prominent as instruments of Rumanization, or in the very least of de­
nationalization .
Ill
To this point, we have only considered specific institutions 
and instruments for the transmission of ideas, values and culture.
While we have also considered the content of the transmitted ideas and 
values, this was done from a rather narrow perspective (i.e., in
101■LJ This was pointed out to this student in a personal conversa­
tion, by a secretary for one of the Hungarian-language periodicals in 
the Vojvodina during the summer of 1966.
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relation to specific means of transmission, such as schools, radio
programs or newspapers). Now we wi]l turn to an examination of the
question of "content" from a more general perspective by considering 
those elements of Rumanian and Yugoslavian historical self-interpre­
tation, literature and art, which reflect on the place of the minority 
nationalities in the respective societies.
In Rumania
Historical Self-Interpretations
Rumanian historical self-interpretations reveal a great deal 
about the treatment of the Hungarians of Transylvania. The national 
mythologies of the post-World War II period have placed them into an
interesting relationship with the Rumanian majority. These mythologies
see the Hungarians as one of the "co-inhabiting" nationalities that 
has had a share in the formation of modern Rumanian history. At the 
same time, the Hungarians are presented as sharing only in the 
"Socialist" traditions of the past. They are considered outsiders as 
far as the "national" history of Rumania is concerned.
This ambivalent relation of the Hungarians to the Rumanians is 
a consequence of two streams of recent historical interpretations. One 
emphasizes socialist traditions and "proletarian internationalism" 
while the other stresses national development and "socialist patrio­
tism." The first stream of interpretation dominated Rumanian histori­
cal writings from 1945 until about 1956-58, while the more "national" 
orientation has become prominent since that time.
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The interpretation and presentation of history has always had
political significance for the inhabitants of Transylvania. Chapter I
touched on the utilization of historical arguments by Hungarians and
132Rumanians in presenting their respective claims to Transylvania.
With the advent of "proletarian internationalism" these arguments were 
dismissed by the Communist governments of Rumania and Hungary as mere 
devices of the past bourgeois regimes to divide the working classes
T O Oalong national lines in order to exploit them more easily. The 
Communist regimes turned historical study away from these divisive 
claims to "studies" which demonstrated the common destiny of all 
workers, regardless of nationality.
■^■^Michae 1 J . Rura, Reinterpretation of History as a Method of 
Furthering Communism in Rumania (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univer­
sity Press, 1961), pp. 1-2, also demonstrates the predominant nation­
alist strain in pre-World War II Rumanian historiography.
■^•^^Banyai, "Forum: Irodalomtanitds ds Hazafias Neve'lds," p.
239, states: "The teaching of history was a special tool of the
former Hungarian and Rumanian capitalist-landowner regimes for the 
furtherance and extension of chauvinistic and nationalistic prejudices. 
The teaching of literature had a similar role. As opposed to this, 
socialist history and literature teaching strengthens the brotherly 
unity of our nation's workers in the spirit of proletarian interna­
tionalism."
^■•^While these divisive claims were not debated (prior to the 
summer of 1964) this does not mean they had ever been completely 
abandoned. For example, Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 92f., restates many 
of the claims (e.g., origins, colonization, etc.) which had been first 
presented by pre-Communist historians. However, the emphasis in these 
works is rather on unifying factors. In fact, some events are completely 
ignored and insignificant occurrences stressed in order to drive home 
the idea of class unity regardless of nationality. Some examples of this 
can be found in the treatment of historical events by Tibor Oldh,
"Moldva ds HavasalfiJld Egyestildsdnek Centendriuma," Igaz Szd, VII (Jan., 
1959), 7; Endre Kdkassy, "Anyag ds Adat: Moldva ds Havasalfdld
Egyesuldse a Korabeli Kirlapok Tiikrdban," Igaz Szd, VII (Jan., 1959), 
116-117, 120; Gyorgy Adorjian and Victoria Marinescu, "A Nemzetkozi
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Rumanian historical interpretations were permeated in the 
early post-war years with tfye general spirit of "proletarian interna­
tionalism," fostered by both the CPR and the Soviet U n i o n . T h i s  
historiography was dominated by the precepts of Communist ideology and 
the influence of Soviet historiography. Two main threads of thought 
thus became ingrained in the Rumanian post-war interpretations of 
history. The first stressed the importance of class struggle and class 
solidarity throughout Rumania's past. The second emphasized the 
importance of Russian and Slavic influence on the cultural and political
1 O7development of Rumania. '
The interest of the nationalities was relatively well served by
Munkasszolidaritds Nagyszeru Megnyilv^nuldsa," Korunk, XXIII (Feb., 
1964), 236-241; P^l Binder, "Avram Lancu Levelezds " Korunk, XXIII 
(March, 1964), 425-427.
135The tactical purpose of this favorable "proletarian inter­
nationalist" setting has already been examined in Chapters I and II. 
Wolff, "Rumania," in The Fate of East Central Europe ed. Stephen D. 
Kertesz (Notre Dame, Indiana; University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), 
p. 261, maintains that one of the motives for this early policy was 
the Russian desire to reduce Rumanian nationalism. Whatever the 
motive, Rura, Reinterpretation of History, pp. 8-9, 17, presents the 
strong influence of Soviet historians on early postwar Rumanian 
attempts in this field.
■LJOStephen Fischer-Galati, "Review Article: Fifteen Years of
Rumanian Historiography, 1947-1962," Journal of Central European 
Affairs, XXIII (Oct., 1963), 361f., and Rura, Reinterpretation of 
History, pp. 18-22, both stress the overriding importance of the 
ideological element of Communist Rumanian historiography.
137Ibid., also shows the great importance of the emphasis in 
Communist Rumanian historiography on the debt of the country to Slavic 
and particularly Russian influence and culture. Wolff, The Balkans in 
Our Time, pp. 459, 575.
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this historiography as it reduced the nationalism and the extremist
assertions of the majority nationality, which in the past had
138presented the minorities as mere interlopers. Now, instead of 
presenting them as second-rate citizens and interlopers, the history 
of the R.P.R. was revised to show them as equals on the basis of class 
struggle and solidarity. Past events, like the "Revolutions" of Ddzsa 
Gyorgy and that of 1848, were reinterpreted to show that, regardless 
of nationality, the oppressed segments of society all had a common 
destiny which was class-bound. ̂ 9
More recent trends in Rumanian historiography seem to point in 
a different direction, which has become apparent particularly in the 
past ten years. The new direction is evident in Rumanian histories 
discussing Transylvania and its nationalities, and Rumania's relations 
with the Soviet Union. References to Russian or Slavic influence on
•1 OQJORoucek, Contemporary Rumania and Her Problems, p. 5; Charles 
Upson Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania 1s Case /n.p.: n.n., 1941/, p. 11.
IS^Three examples of this are: Binder "Avram Lancu
Levelezdse"; Jdzsef Faragd, "Anyag ds Adat: Bern Ap6t Vdro Romdn ifnek
1851-bUl," Igaz Sz6 , IX (Oct., 1961), 613-616; and GyOrgy BGzfidy,
"K6z5s Harcok Nyomdban,” Igaz Sz<5, IX (Dec., 1961), 861-863.
l^Oit is, of course, difficult to compare the earlier works with 
the more recent ones. A number of obstacles stand in the way of such a 
comparison. First, the language barrier; second, the fact that earlier 
sources are relatively scarce; and third, the similarity of methodolog­
ical procedure (e.g., collective scholarship) in the studies often blurs 
their dissimilarities. Due to these difficulties the analysis of 
historiography has been mainly carried out through the examination of 
secondary sources. Two revealing sources have been book reviews and the 
news concerning historical conferences. In both areas since 1964 there 
has been a strong turn toward Rumanian nationalism. See C. Daicoviciu, 
"Debates of Historians," Contemporanul (May 29, 1964) trans. in
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Rumania are now toned down. Where previously the U.S.S.R. had received 
lavish praise from Rumanian historians, it now receives little
■j / 1
credit. Rumanian "nationalism," in spite of ideological hindrance 
has reasserted itself, and is belittling the role of the Russians and
I/Othe Slavs while enhancing the role of the Rumanians.
Rumanian writings concerning the ethnic minorities of Tran­
sylvania reveal a similar "nationalist" tendency. This latter trend 
affects the nationalities directly. As in inter-war Rumania, so in 
the R.P.R. the question of origins and continuity is again becoming a
Rumanian Press Survey No. 446 (Radio Free Europe: July 8 , 1964), pp.
2-6; G. Unc, "Book Review; E. I. Rubinshteyn; The Downfall of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy," and T. Lungu, "Book Review; History of 
Rumania, Vol. 4, "Analele Institutului de Istorie a Partidului de pe 
Lange CC al PMR, Vol. 10 (1964), trans. in Rumanian Press Survey No.
451 (Radio Free Europe; Sept. 26, 1964), pp. 2-8.
^•*-While in 1959, Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 143, praised the 
role of the "glorious Soviet Armies" in the liberation of Rumania, by 
the summer of 1964— on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Rumania's 
"liberation"--the role of the Red Army was merely mentioned. See for 
example, "The Great Anniversary" and "It Happened in August 1944," 
Rumania Today, 116 (1964), pp. 1-5; David Binder, "Bucharest Plays Down 
Arrival of Mikoyan for Liberation Fate," New York Times (Aug. 21, 1964), 
P. 2; David Binder, "Rumania Enjoys Being Red Mecca," New York Times 
(Aug. 24, 1964); Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 27.
I/OIbid., pp. 25, 27. However, the relatively recent histori­
cal writings do not show this process too clearly. The emphasis on 
Slavic influence is still important in Short Document on Rumania, p. 8, 
and this seems also the case according to Keith Hitchins, "Book Review; 
Istoria Rominiei, Vol. 1," Balkan Studies. IV (1963), 183. Yet, these 
latter sources are already dated to a certain degree, since the new 
"nationalist" trend in historiography vis-h-vis the Slavs begins only 
in the spring of 1964.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
3 2 3
dominant area of historical r e s e a r c h . B u t ,  more alarming than this 
is the "re-re-interpretation" of the role of nationalities in such 
events as the Revolution of 1848. New historical treatments present 
what has been termed "double-subjugation."^^ Rumanian historians in 
their writings have abandoned a solely class-determined explanation 
and have combined it with a national one. In this way, Rumanian 
historians can claim that the role of the nationality groups (par­
ticularly the role of Germans and Hungarians) in the past, was to sub­
jugate the Rumanians and the Slavs under their rule regardless of 
c l a s s . T h i s  inversion of former interpretations puts the nationali­
ties back into the position of former "oppressors," who are now ruled
^Hitchins, "Book Review: Istoria Rominiei, Vol. I," pp.
182-183; Short Documents on Rumania, p. 7; Daicoviciu, Rumania, pp. 
92ff.; Fischer-Galati, "Review Article: . . .," pp. 162-163.
144rjihis concept of "double-subjugation" is a recent (spring of 
1964) interpretation of Rumanian-Hungarian relations of the past.
Short Document on Rumania, pp. 8-11, and Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 129, 
still stress the class subjugation of Rumanians and Hungarians alike. 
The new "double-subjugation" thesis is presented in Daicoviciu,
"Debates of Historians"; Unc, "Book Review: . . Lungu, "Book
Review: . . ."; Bailey, p. 27; Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed
by Nationalist Drive." Also indicative of this trend is the erection 
of a bust in the honor of Stephan Ludvig Roth in Medias (Megyes) in 
the spring of 1964. Roth had been a "Saxon" leader who, together with 
the Rumanians, opposed the Hungarian insurrection of 1848. He was shot 
in 1849, by the Hungarians as a traitor and the enemy of Hungarian 
freedom and independence. The celebration of Roth clearly shows the 
nationalist reassertion of the Rumanians vis-h-vis the Hungarians.
The above event was noted in the May 16 issue of Elflre according to 
"Hirek: Udvarolnak a Szdszoknak," Transylvdnia, VI (June, 1964), 12.
1 ASBailey, "Trouble over Transylvania"; Daicoviciu, "Debates 
of Historians," p. 3.
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by the formerly "oppressed."
The historical self-interpretations of the past ten or fifteen 
years de-emphasize Hungarian-Rumanian relations in all but the 
"socialist" traditions of the c o u n t r y . I n  the writings concerning 
both the Rumanian acquisition of Transylvania and the development of 
the Rumanian people, the Hungarians are either left out or they are 
given a negative role. Thus, the old national myths of the inter-war 
years have been revived to prove Rumanian prior occupation of Tran­
sylvania. This is done by concentrating studies on the Dacian kingdom 
of the third century A.D.^^ It is also done by stressing only the 
Rumanian traditions of Transylvania.'*'^ This Rumanian nationalist
•^One of the foremost indications of this is the "rehabilita­
tion" of the anti-Hungarian Rumanian historian, Nicolae Iorga. His 
works provide the foundation for most of the arguments for continuity 
of "Romanian" history from Decebal (2nd century A.D.) to the present. 
See: "25th Anniversary of Assassination of Scientist Nicolae Iorga, "
Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, no. 22 (Dec. 1, 1965), 
pp. 12-13.
147ihe recent celebration of the 50th anniversary (Dec, 1, 1968) 
of Transylvania's incorporation into Rumania, provided the opportunity 
for the writing of some of these historical self-interpretations. See: 
"Jubilee of Transylvania's Union with Romania," Documents, Articles and 
Information on Romania, Nos. 22-23 (Dec. 5, 1968), pp. 6-9; "New Books: 
Review of C.C. Giurescu's 'Transylvania in the History of the Romanian 
People,'" Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 12 (June 
30, 1968), pp. 14-15; Constantin Daicoviciu, "The Achievement of the 
Unitary State--an Age-Old Aspiration of the Romanian People," Documents, 
Articles and Information on Romania, No. 21 (Nov. 15, 1968), pp. 8-9.
•*~̂ I b i d .; "New Books: Review of C.C. Giurescu's 'Transylvania
in the History of the Romanian People,'" pp. 14-15.
■*^Along this line see particularly Daicoviciu, "The Achieve­
ment of the Unitary State . . .," pp. 8-9. He summarizes two-thousand 
years in the history of Transylvania without once mentioning Hungarians. 
This is quite an achievement since from 895 to 1918 the area's history 
was primarily Hungarian in content.
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interpretation of history has two consequences. It cuts off the Hun­
garians from the history of Rumania and it exaggerates the importance 
of the Rumanians in the history of Transylvania and the Balkans. This 
type of historical interpretation fans nationalistic claims and also 
relegates the Hungarians into the position of "late-comers" or 
"foreigners
Literature, Publishing and Libraries
While these "nationalist" tendencies are relatively easy to 
trace in historical self-interpretations, they are more difficult to 
trace in l i t e r a t u r e . I t  is, nevertheless, possible to discern the 
pattern of Rumanian nationalism here also. The perusal of the Rumanian, 
Hungarian language literary periodicals Igaz Sz6, Korunk and Utunk have 
proved fruitful. In fact, the pattern that emerges is not unlike that 
produced by the analysis of Rumanian historical writings.
As in the case of Rumanian historical studies, the literary 
creations up until the autumn of 1956, also reflected the spirit
1 cnIn spite of this, the underlying similarities of Party 
control vis-h-vis literature and historiography enable any investiga­
tion to confront literature, like historiography, as part of the 
repertoire available to the Party-State control-system. The differ­
ences of Party control are mainly due to tactical demands. The role 
of the respective fields is, however, the same. See Wolff, The Balkans 
in Our Time, pp. 576-577; "Literature and the Arts," Romania, ed. 
Fischer-Galati, pp. 172-173, 174.
1 SINicholas Timiras, "Communist Literature in Romania,"
Journal of Central European Affairs, XIV (Jan., 1955), 372-373.
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of "proletarian internationalism."^^ By 1958, there are indications 
that some literary works began to experiment with the treatment of more 
"national" Rumanian topics. Yet, these were few and rather the excep­
tion than the rule. What indicated to a greater extent the "turn" toward 
more national interests was the revival of many of Rumania's past 
literary greats.*-^ Writers like I. L. Caragiale, Vasile Alecsandri, 
Mihail Eminescu, Alexandru Davila and some others were again presented 
on stage and their works were republished. Classical Rumanian litera­
ture was revived and again made available to the Rumanian public.
for the minority nationalities the revival of Rumanian national 
literature meant a further encroachment on the development of their 
respective "national forms" in literature. Instead of being allowed
1 52J Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 178, notes that: "The national
minorities also have a flourishing literature. This is something 
typical of the new conditions and of the equality enjoyed by the 
national minorities and guaranteed by the people's democratic regime.
So among many others we have the poetry of Imre Horvdth and LdszlA 
Szabddy and the prose writings of Istvdn Nagy, IstvAn Asztalos . .
It is ironic that the poet Szabddy, mentioned by Daicoviciu, committed 
suicide in protest to infringements on Hungarian cultural institutions 
(i.e., Bdlyai University) in the same year when Daicoviciu's book went 
to the press.
ICOJ-,JSee, The Theatre in the Rumanian People's Republic (Bucharest, 
Rumania: Meridians at "Scinteia House," 1961), pp. 22-24, and
Caragiale Sur Les Scenes Roumaines et Etrangeres (Bucharest, Rumania; 
Commission Nationale de la Republique Popolaire Roumaine Pour L'Unesco, 
1962).
•^^Tt is in the field of literature that perhaps the earliest 
return to national forms took place. "Literature and the Arts,"
Romania,, pp. 175-176, already presents this trend as in full swing 
prior to 1956.
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to revive their own great literary c l a s s i c s , t h e  Hungarian, German
and other nationalities were encouraged to adopt the Rumanian classics 
156as their own. The articles in Igaz Szd reflect this policy of 
literary Rumanization. In the issues of this periodical appearing 
after 1956, articles translated from Rumanian appear in ever increas­
ing numbers. These contributions present a good cross-section of 
classical and contemporary Rumanian writers.
Besides the increasing number of Rumanian contemporary and 
classical works, the Hungarian minority is permitted to read the works 
of its "own" contemporary writers and selected writings of
■^-*In fact, limitations have even been placed on their reading 
of contemporary Communist Hungarian literature, from areas outside 
Rumania (e.g., Hungary, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Carpatho-Ukraine) as is 
indicated by "Olvasdk Foruma," Igaz Szd, pp. 794-795; Tibor Ddnes,
"Az Erddlyi Magyar Kultura 1970-ben," Irodalmi Ujsdg (July-Aug., 1970), 
p. 7.
^^Fischer-Galati, "Rumania," pp. 164-165, in his discussion of 
the regime's efforts to stem the tide of "unhealthy"activities and 
"national isolation" does not specifically refer to the adoption of 
Rumanian classics for the minorities. However, to reduce "nationalism" 
and "isolationism," it is apparent from other sources (see below) that 
the regime has fostered the reading of Rumanian classical and con­
temporary literature among the Hungarian minority.
^-*^More inidicative is the great number of articles devoted to 
the propagation of reading Rumanian works. See GydzS Hajdu, "Pdrtos 
Egysdgben-Testvdri Osszeforrotsdgban," Igaz Szd, VII (Oct., 1959), 
515-516; Veronica Porumbacu, "Aranyhid," Igaz Szd, VII (Oct., 1959), 
641; Scridon Gavril, "Rebreanu Jon'ja Magyarul," Igaz Szd, IX (June, 
1961), 861; jdzsef Izsak, "Koltdszet ds Korszeruseg," Igaz Szo/, IX 
(Oct., 1961), 593-594; Endre Kdkdssy, "Nagy Mii-Nagy Forditd Feladat," 
Igaz Szd, X (May, 1962), 723. Also indicative is the great number of 
translations from Rumanian into Hungarian. Andor Rethi, "Adalekok a 
Romdnbol Magyarra Forditott Irodalmi Miivek KSnyvdszetdhez (Aug. 23, 
1944-Aug. 2 3 j 1959),"Igaz Szd, VII (Oct., 1959), 719-731, presents a 
list of 133 Rumanian writers whose works have been translated into 
Hungarian in the indicated fifteen year period (1944-1959). Also see 
Domonkos, A Romdn Irodalom Magyar Biblidgrdfiaja.
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"left-democratic" writers of the past like Ady Endre and Jdzsef 
158Attila. These latter works are all in the spirit of "proletarian 
internationalism," unlike the enumerated Rumanian works which call for 
"socialist patriotism" and pride in the achievements of the R.P.R.
Thus, the Hungarians are robbed of their own national consciousness, 
while at the same time they are extolled to become better Rumanians.
In this way the minorities find that their right to use the mother 
tongue does not include the right to read the literature that goes with 
the mother tongue. Instead, they have to be satisfied with transla­
tions of Rumanian authors and the stilted, artificial products of the 
minority authors who write in the Hungarian, German or Yiddish language 
but who think in the Rumanian.
158g£nya£^ "Forum: Irodalom Tanitds ds Hazafias Nevelds," pp.
238-241, presents the rigid qualifications that must be met by the 
writers of the past before their works are ideologically accepted as 
reading material for the Hungarian minority. Some examples of the type 
of reading material having origins outside Rumania include: the
official Hungarian Communist Party stand regarding "reactionary" 
writers, "Forum: A 'Ndpi1 Irokrdl," A MSZMP KOzponti Bizottsdga
Mellett Mtikfidfl Kulturdlis Elmdleti MunkakozSsseg Alldsfoglalisa" (con­
densed, appeared originally in Tdrsadalmi Szemle No. 6 , 1958) Igaz Szd, 
VI (Oct., 1958), 452-479; the castigation of evidences of "revisionism" 
in the writings of George Lukdcs by jdzsef Szigeti, "MGvdszi Alkotds es 
Pdrtossdjg Lukdcs GySrgy Esztdtikajaban," (taken from Tdrsadalmi Szemle 
No. 9, 1958) Igaz Szd, VI (Sept., 1959), 283-297; the preachments of 
past writers like Jdzsef Attila and Ady Endre against nationalism or 
for collaboration with the Rumanians. Even in this case, usually some­
one writes about what these individuals said rather than presenting the 
original works of the authors concerned. Along this line see Endre 
Bustya, "Szemle: Ady Endre, Vallomds a Patriotizmusrol," Igaz Szd,
VI (June, 1958), 924; Veronica Porumbacu, "A Szocializmus Kortdrsa," 
Igaz Szd, XI (Jan., 1963), 102, 104.
■*-^See along this line Zsolt Galfalvi, "A Kommunizmus Tdvlatai 
es az Irodalom," Igaz Szd, VI (April, 1959), 481-482; L. Deaky and N. 
Radulescu, "Fighters of the Socialist Struggle," Scanteia (March 6, 
1964) trans. in Rumanian Press Survey No. 426 (Radio Free Europe:
March 18, 1964), 7.
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The pressure on Hungarian literary publications is indicated 
by yet another consideration. This is their isolation from worldwide 
Hungarian literary developments. Little or no contact seems to take 
place with Hungarian writers in Yugoslavia, the U.S.S.R., Czecho­
slovakia and Hungary. At any rate, references are rarely made to Hun-
i fingarian literary productions outside Rumania. Only ideological works 
from "foreign" authors are given certain consideration. In a real 
sense this means that the Transylvanian Hungarians are closed off from 
the major literary trends of their people. This stiffles their own 
literary development to a considerable degree.
This policy in literature carries over to the government's 
attitude toward book publishing and libraries. Besides censoring the 
writings which are in conflict with Communist ideology, recent censor­
ship also has been extended to those works which conflict with the 
Rumanian nationalism expressed in "socialist patriotism." The result 
has been a two front campaign designed to undermine the cultural 
"national form" of the Transylvanian minorities. The first is the
"positive" tactic of publishing more and more Rumanian works in the
162language of the national minorities. The second consists of
160Not to mention Hungarian writers in the West, who are com­
pletely inaccessible to them. For the latter see: Bdla Pomogdts,
"Magyar KSltbk Nyugaton," Forras, IV (July-Aug., 1970), 55-59; Ddnes, 
"Az Erddlyi Magyar Kultura 1970-ben," p. 7.
Ibid.; Domonkos Varga, "A Megmaradds Irodalma," Valdsdg,
XIII (Aug., 1970), 84-86; Mihaly Czine, "A Romdniai Magyar Irodalom 
FejlSddse 1945 Utin," in A Kassai Batsdnyi-Kor Efvkdnyve 1965-1968 
(Bratislava: Maddch Kdnyvkiado, 1969), pp. 317-332.
•*-^See: Domonkos, A Romdn Irodalom Magyar Biblidgraphidja.
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disbanding many old libraries, which are overwhelmingly minority
libraries, and scattering their contents throughout the country.
Since these libraries contain works mainly from pre-Communist days,
many works are consigned to trashheaps as unfit for the furtherance of
164Rumanian "socialist patriotism."
This does not mean, however, that book publishing in the Hun­
garian language is being reduced. As with everything else, opportuni­
ties in this area are closely tied to domestic and international 
political developments. As Table XXIII indicates, publishing activity 
in the language of the ethnic minorities has been reduced to some 
extent since the Hungarians revolted in 1956. From 917 titles in 
1957 the number of ethnic minority books has been reduced to 519 
titles in 1964. This reduction does not show the Hungarian share of 
titles. However, in the same period that the number of minority
titles were being reduced the number of books published in the country
1
rose from 2,469 in 1959 to 3,268 in 1963. This indicates, that
163i'xhe Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76. It is 
also interesting and ironic to note in this connection the impounding 
of the old Hungarian Library at Aiud (Nagyenyed). Just a few years 
ago (1959) Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 507, could still boast of Rumania's 
benevolent treatment of the Hungarian minority by referring to the 
famous many centuries old (six centuries to be exact) College and 
Library of Aiud; which showed to the world "the common struggle waged 
by Rumanians and Magyars against the tyrants."
•*-6̂ 0f course this purge of "unfit" books affected Rumanian 
works as well as those of the minorities, as Rura, pp. viii-ix points 
out. However, the later impoundings and confiscations have affected 
mainly the Hungarian libraries.
165gee Table XXIII and Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964, 
Table 137, p. 265.
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TABLE X X I I I
BOOKS AND BOOKLETS PUBLISHED IN THE LANGUAGES OF THE 









1949 770 4,322 5.6 5,868
1950 935 3,855 4.1 7,234
1951 888 3,673 4.1 4,216
1952 879 5,001 5.7 5,926
1953 806 5,920 7.3 4,730
1954 741 5,832 7.9 3,272
1955** 724 4,736 6.5 3,007
Hungarian
Share 432 3,139 7.3 2,569
German
Share 159 884 5.6 313
1956** 745 5,617 7.5 3,487
Hungarian
Share 437 3,740 8.6 2,902German
Share 180 1,174 6.5 461
1957 917 6,319 6.9 3,907
1958 656 6,830 10.4 2,648
1959 592 5,291 8.9 2,108
1960 569 5,517 9.7 2,612
1961 584 3,895 10.1 3,142
1962 587 5,665 9.7 3,635
1963 574 5,357 9.3 3,545
1964 519 4,951 9.5 3,153
*This Table is based on Anuarul Statistic A1 R.P.R. 1965 
(Bucuresti: Directia Gentrala De Statistica, 1965), Table 256,' p. 532; 
Anuarul Statistic A1 R.P.R. 1957 (Directiunea Centrala DeStatistica; 
Bucuresti: Editura Stiintifica, 1957), Table 138, p. 222.
**Aside from 1955-1956, Rumanian statistics are not available indicating the share of the respective minorities.
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minority publishing— of which the Hungarian language books are the 
most numerous— has stagnated while Rumanian publishing has been ex­
panded .
It is, perhaps, due to this stagnation— as well as interna­
tional developments (the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968)--that 
efforts have been expanded recently to encourage nationality publica­
tions. A new publishing house was established in the early part of 
1970 which is to deal strictly with nationality titles. The "Kriterion" 
publishing house (this is its official name) has already published a 
number of Hungarian works. It remains to be seen whether or not 
such a separate publishing house will actually raise the number of 
works published in minority languages. It also remains to be seen 
whether or not this new set-up eliminates the great gaps in the content 
of nationality titles. This is particularly relevant for Hungarian 
titles, which have rarely included technical and professional works, or 
works which would make the Transylvanians more conscious of their 
linguistic affiliations and their national history
The Fine Arts
In the area of music, drama and the plastic arts a great deal 
more leeway is allowed individual representatives of the national 
minorities. The Rumanian government encourages cultural development by 
providing certain opportunities (e.g., folklore festivals, exhibitions,
l^Varga, "a  Megmarad^s Irodalma," p. 84.
■*-̂^Ibid., pp. 84-86.
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musical contests, etc.) and facilities (e.g., opera houses, theatres, 
museums, etc.). At the same time, this development must not conflict 
with the Communist order in Rumania. The latter consideration is 
the major limitation on the creative urge among both Hungarians and 
Rumanians.
In Transylvania there are some indications that besides Party 
restrictions, there may also be certain Rumanian "national" restric­
tions on Hungarian artists. While the government fosters development 
in the fine arts and attempts to involve all segments of the population 
in cultural activities, it seems to do this on the basis of a double­
standard. It encourages the "revival" of all Rumanian national art 
forms, while it allows the Hungarians only the "folk" forms of their 
national culture.
This Rumanian cultural policy is discernable from even a super­
ficial examination of Rumanian tourist pamphlets designed for Western
168"Literature and the Arts," Romania, pp. 180-181; Burillianu, 
"Cultural Life in Captive Rumania," pp. 129, 134, 149, 155-157. Two 
areas, which play an important role for cultural development in general 
but are less concerned with the position of the minorities per se, are 
the Rumanian-Soviet Institute (recently curtailed in activity) and the 
motion-picture industry of the R.P.R. Buirillianu discusses this on 
pp. 158 and 162. Also see Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 578-580.
■^Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 189, presents some of the "oppor­
tunities." jdzsef Faragd, "Anyag is Adat: Hdromszdki Magyar Miorita,"
Igaz Szd, VII (Oct., 1959), 689-695, indicates that "folk" culture can 
also demonstrate not only the interdependence; of Hungarian and Rumanian 
people's culture, but that the Hungarians "owe" a great deal to the 
Rumanians in this area.
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consumption.*-^® Such propaganda brochures present with great skill 
the art treasures of Rumania, regardless of their origin— whether they 
were products of medieval, bourgeois, or proletarian culture. But there 
is little or no mention of the great art treasures of Transylvania of 
past ages which point to the Hungarian and German cultural life of the
171area. ' In fact, this policy of erasing nationality cultural accom­
plishments has taken particularly objectionable forms recently. These 
include the demolition of the ruins of non-Rumanian castles, which
provide historical links for the Transylvanians with their Hungarian
172past. One of the recent examples of this policy has been the 
regime's attempt to demolish the Church of St. L^szlc^ in Orodea 
(Nagyvirad), which is a church of great interest for medievalists 
both in art and architecture.*-^-*
Nationalist cultural policies, however, are blurred by the 
great strides made by the regime in spreading cultural facilities to
1 70' See in this regard issues of Rumania for Tourists, Rumania 
Today, or such specific brochures as Monuments of Religious Art in 
Rumania, and Livres Anciens en Roumanie (Bucharest: Commission
Nationale de la R. P. Romaine Pour L'Unesco, 1962).
171' Daicoviciu, Rumania, pp. 507, 511, cometimes violates the 
above generalization by acknowledging the contribution of Hungarians 
or Germans in one or two special cases. But then he proceeds to 
belittle the role of these same nationalities in other cases (pp. 197- 
198, 523).
172International Commission of Jurists, "The Hungarian Minor­
ity Problem in Rumania," p. 76.
*-^-*Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28; "Levdl 
ErdelybOl," Irodalmi Ujsag.
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174all areas of the country. The national minorities have been given 
a proportional share in these institutions. Thus, of the 37 state 
supported theatres 6 belong to the Hungarians, 2 to the Germans and 2 
to the J e w s . 175 A similar policy is followed in relation to opera 
houses, orchestra halls, museums, houses of culture and folk-culture 
study centers. But even while the facilities are distributed propor­
tionally to all nationalities, it must be remembered that the produc­
tions, exhibitions, etc., which appear in these centers of culture, 
are controlled and censored by a government which is becoming more 
nationalistic and more intolerant toward non-Rumanian art forms.
The extent of this intolerance is reflected in the themes of 
recent cultural productions. In the movie-making industry the 
Rumanians have stressed nationalist themes, which place the Hungarians
particularly in a disadvantageous light. Two examples are "Dacians" 
176and "The Column." Both these films portray the ancestors of
*1 *7 / This should be qualified, however, by the fact that recently 
a similar process like that of "parallelization" in the educational 
system has been evident in the theatrical world. See Bailey, "Trouble 
over Transylvania," p. 27.
•*~̂ T h e  Theatre in the Rumanian People1 s Republic (Bucharest: 
Meridians - "Scinteia House," 1961), pp. 7-8, 12-13. However, these 
figures should be taken with a grain cf salt. It is probably more correct 
to assume that about half of these minority theatres are "sections" of 
Rumanian establishments rather than "independent" ones. Some further 
statistics regarding theaters in the R.P.R. may be found in Rumanian 
Statistical Pocket Book 1964. pp. 260-263, Table 133. Also See Wolff,
The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 456-457, and Daicoviciu, Rumania, pp. 189, 
288, 684-685, 759-762, 818-819.
176a  brief description of these films is provided in: "A New 
Romanian Film: The Column," Documents, Articles and Information on
Romania, Nos. 22-23 (Dec. 5, 1968), p. 19.
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present-day Rumanians as defenders of Western Civilization against the 
incursions of barbarian horsemen from the East (Huns, Avars, Bulgars, 
Hungarians?). The film-industry supports in this way a national 
mythology that is exclusivist. Films stressing the solidarity of all 
peoples in Transylvania seem no longer to be in vogue. The only such 
film that, has been produced recently, dealt with the Dozsa Gyorgy 
peasant uprising. However, this was mainly a Budapest production.^ 7
In theatre, a similar one-sided situation prevails. While the 
Rumanian language theatres frequently present plays writted by 
Rumanians covering Rumanian themes, the Hungarian language theatres 
rarely have the chance to present the plays of Hungarian authors or 
plays which have Hungarian themes. A perusal of theatre productions 
during the years 1965-1970, indicates that the dramas of Rumanian and 
non-Hungarian writers completely dominate the Hungarian language stage
1 7 0of Transylvania. Furthermore, when theatre groups from Hungary 
tour Rumania, they can perform only in Bucharest and other cities 
which fall far from Hungarian inhabited Transylvania.^ 9
In the world of music and the plastic arts less restrictions 
prevail. From available information concerning music, painting and 
sculpture, it is possible to conclude that Hungarians are given more
177Exerpts of the text of this film are reproduced under 
"LAncosok" in Elflre, June 22, 1969, p. 4.
178A slightly more favorable situation prevails in relation 
to musical productions. See along this line Ferenc lA s z IA's , "Profil 
As /£rnyAk," in Elflre, May 4, 1969, p. 4.
179M ichel Tatu, "A RomAnositAs Uteme ErdAlyben," Uj Europa,
VII (Feb., 1968), 22.
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extensive opportunities than either in the world of motion-pictures or 
theatre. In fact, many of the foremost artists of Rumania are of Hun­
garian e x t r a c t i o n . T h u s ,  it is possible to conclude that less 
national persecution takes place in Rumania's policies toward indi­
viduals who excel in music, painting or sculpture.
In Yugoslavia
Historical Self-Interpretations
Like its Rumanian counterpart, Yugoslavia's historical self­
interpretation reveals a great deal about the country's policies 
toward its minorities, particularly the Hungarians. The nature of 
Yugoslavia's self-interpretation has undergone a number of significant 
changes. These can be considered in three phases: the post-war period,
the era of Soviet-Yugoslav discord and the period following the East- 
Central European upheavals of 1956.
The experience of World War II provided Yugoslavia with its 
major source of self-definition. This experience produced the 
"Partizan myth" discussed earlier.^®'*' It also provided the definition 
of the proper historical roles and relationships of the Yugoslav peoples 
and the national minorities in the expansion of Communism.
■^®Ldszl6 , "Profil 6s Xrny^k," p. 4. A perusal of the cultural 
section of the Sunday editions of Eldfce, presents a good cross-section 
of the richness and variety of the contributions of Hungarian artists. 
Also see "A Maros-Magyar Autondm Tarom^nyi Kdpzffmflvdszeti Tcirlat 
Anyagdbol," Igaz Sz<5. XII (Nov., 1964), 732-735; Iv£n Kovrfts, 
"Miivdszvil^g: Tdli Tdrlat MarosvAsdrhelyen," Igaz Sz6 , XIII (Mar.,1965),
432-437.
^■^^See Chapters I and II.
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In the immediate post-war period the historical works tended
to stress the themes of war guilt, progressive versus reactionary
nations, and the major role of the South Slavic nationalities in the
182liberation of Yugoslavia. These themes usually appeared together.
They not only provided an interpretation of the war, but also a ra­
tionalization for the post-war treatment of the German, Albanian,
183Italian and Hungarian minorities.
World War II is presented in these writings as the great world 
conflict in which the progressive forces led by the Soviet Union, 
destroy the forces of reaction led by Nazi Germany. Closely tied to 
this world conflict is the Yugoslav struggle for national indepen­
dence and social transformation. The partizan conflict against the 
foreign occupation is portrayed as the South Slav peoples' struggle 
leading to the country's liberation and communization. In this 
struggle, the role of the ethnic minorities was originally considered 
either minimal or negative. The Germans of the Vojvodina were pre­
sented as the outright collaborators of the Nazis. The other non-Slav 
nationalities— including the Hungarians— were less sweepingly condemned.
In the case of the Hungarians the condemnation was directed mainly at 
their "ruling classes."184
182MiioVan Djilas, "A Szldv Ndpek Harca a Bdkeert es a Demo- 
kr^ci^ert," Hid, XI (Jan., 1947), 12-20, and from the same author, 
"Jugoszldvia Ndpeinek Harca ds a Marxizmus-Leninizmus," Hid, XI (Dec., 
1947), 873-83.
•I QO Paul Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities under Communism," 
Slavic Review, XXII (Mar., 1963), 66-73, has the best short summary 
of this treatment.
•^^Ibid.. pp. 70-73; Djilas, "A Szldv Ndpek Harca a Bekeert es 
a Demokraciddrt," pp. 12-20.
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After the "enemies of Yugoslav independence and social trans­
formation" were liquidated, a re-evaluation of their role took place
in historical writings. This re-evaluation corresponds roughly to the
185political ideological dispute with the U.S.S.R. In the years 
1948-49, as outside political pressure mounts and as the threat of 
Soviet intervention grows, the emphasis in Yugoslavia falls on solidar­
ity among all the peoples. This stress on a common destiny and unity 
in the face of adversity, puts the Hungarians and the other non-Slavic 
nationalities back into Yugoslav history. The historical writings 
which emerge at this time, "prove" that the Hungarians and other na­
tionalities fought "shoulder to shoulder" with the South Slavs against 
the foreign invader during World War 11.^®®
From the Tito-Stalin rift to the present (1970), this line of 
argument dominates. In reference to the Hungarians, it exaggerates 
their partizan role by stressing the PetSfi Brigade and the interwar 
Communist movements of the Vojvodina. The Petdfi Brigade, in particular,
has been embellished greatly to give the impression of popular support
187for the "national liberation war." This has meant that the purpose
^•^^Kdroly Gyetvai, "Vajdasdg Onkormdnyzati Alapokminya," Hid,
XII (Oct.-Nov., 1948), 475-480; "A Vajdasdgi Magyar Kulturmunkdsok 
tjjrtekezletdnek H a t d r o z a t a i Hid, XII (Dec., 1948), 560-562; Pdter 
Lbrine,"P^rtszeruseg es Hazafisdg," Hid, XIV (July, 1950), 486-497.
■*-88j6zsef Merton, "Fdsi Ferenc Elvtirs, A Magyar Partizan,"
Hid, XII (Jan.-Feb., 1948), 25-28; Brindza, "Adatok a Jugszlaviai 
Magyarsdg Rdsztvdteldrdl a Ne'pfelszabadito Hdboruban," pp. 323-336; 
Lftrinc, "Vajdasdgi Nemzetkozi Harcosok," pp. 784-793; KeSid, "Figyelo:
A JKP Vajdasdgban a Felkelds Elfikdszitdsdnek ds Meginditasanak 
Napjaiban," pp. 784-792.
187Lajos tfltetd, "Petflfi Hitet Hoztuk Magunkkal," Itt-Ott, III 
(July-Aug., 1970), 16-19.
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of the struggle became much more than South-Slav liberation. It has 
become the event which has ended national and social exploitation of
I O Oall peoples. ° This latter interpretation means that all nationali­
ties— except the Germans--find that they are no longer considered "out­
siders" in Yugoslav history books.
In general, the Yugoslav self-interpretations— historical self­
definitions --have been broadened and made more tolerant over the years. 
This has meant that the "national destiny" of Yugoslavia has been much 
freer of ethnic exclusivism than is the case in Rumania. In the 
latter instance, both the war experience and the revival of "Daco- 
Roman" myths, has emphasized the ethnic Rumanian destiny of the country. 
On this score the Hungarians of Transylvania have much less opportunity 
to identify with Rumanian national self-interpretations, than their 
fellow nationals have in the Vojvodina to identify with Yugoslavia's.
Literature, Publishing and Libraries
Yugoslavia's historical self-interpretation and its consequences 
are also reflected in the literary and publishing activities of the 
Hungarians in the Vojvodina. The major trends and opportunities of a 
literary nature are indicated by the periodicals published in Hungarian. 
The periodical Hid and the experimental publication Uĵ  Symposion,
188Tibor Minda, "A Nemzeti Kisebbsdgek Helyzete Vajdasdgban," 
Hid, XXVII (Jan., 1963), 102-107; Edvard Kardelj, "A Nemzeti Kdrdds- 
r81," Hid, XVIII (Jan., 1954), 31-40; Olajos, "Egybeolvadas— Nem 
Beolvad^s," pp. 837-840.
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provide two of the most important sources in this area.'*"®9 The develop­
ment of these two publications--as of Magyar Szo— mirrors the evolution 
of the cultural life of Hungarians in the Vojvodina.
As the perusal of Hid reveals, until about 1949-50, there was 
very little in the way of Hungarian literature in Yugoslavia. The 
articles in Hid and many other publications appeared in Hungarian, but 
were concerned primarily with CPY propaganda rather than Hungarian 
culture. As a Hungarian writer of this period admits, much that went 
by the name of literature was for the most part "directed" writing
serving socialism as the new political order. It was a period when
191"revolutionary slogans" composed much of the content of Hid. Only
in 1950 is there a shift away from such strictly politically oriented 
19?writings. v
The Hungarian writers of this transition period found it diffi­
cult to adjust to the new Yugoslavia. Many continued to write from a 
particularist, regionalist perspective. Although they were all 
champions of the "new order," their literary contributions manifested 
a certain isolation from literary developments throughout the rest of 
Yugoslavia. To remedy this situation, the government fostered a policy 
of translation of Hungarian literary works into Serbo-Croatian. This 
policy immediately broadened the perspectives of the Hungarian writers.
•^Benkfl, "a  jugoszlaviai Magyar Proza 'Uj Hull^ma,1" pp. 44-48; 
Janos Herceg, "A Mai Jugszlaviai Magyar Irodalom Vazlatos Attenkint^se," 
in A Kassai Bats^nyi-Kflr gvkflnyve 1965-1968. pp. 293-307.
190 191Ibid. Ibid. . pp. 294-295.
192Ibid.. p. 295.
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Their audience had been expanded to include others besides their own 
people. Thus, they could no longer remain just regional and just 
ethnic writers of the Vojvodina. At any rate, the new generation of 
writers, seems to have become more cosmopolitan in orientation and at 
the same time also less ideological.^ 3
While Hungarian writers have abandoned their narrowed perspec­
tive, they have not been hindered in the publication of Hungarian 
language works. Unlike their Rumanian counterparts, they have not been 
deluged by t aslations of the works of the majority nationality. 
Although many Serbo-Croatian works have been translated into Hungarian 
it seems that reciprocity prevails in this area. Many Hungarian works
are translated into Serbo-Croatian, although not quite as many as
194Serbo-Croatian works into Hungarian. This contrasts favorably with
the situation in Rumania, where the predominant trend is all one-sided 
in favor of Rumanian works, which are translated into Hungarian.
A content analysis of the literary productions also favors the 
Yugoslav setting as against the Rumanian. Hungarian writers--both 
classical and modern— are generally more favorably received by the 
publishers. In large part this is due to the "Forum" publisher of 
Novi Sad, which concentrates on the publication of Hungarian
» 3Ibld.
^Jugoslavia 1945-1964; Statistidki Pregled, Tables 20-14 
and 20-15, p. 332; "Az Ujviddki Forumrol," Eldre, Apr. 20, 1969, 
pp. 3-4; Forum Kttnyvjegyz^k 1965-1966, pp. 5-32.
•'•^Domonkos, A Romin Irodalom Magyar Bibliografiaja.
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19 6works. In Rumania, such an "independent" Hungarian publisher is 
inconceivable. Only very recently, have the nationalities obtained the 
"Kriterion" publisher. However, the latter is a publisher for all 
non-Rumanian works. None of the nationalities have exclusively their 
own publisher.
Also indicative of Yugoslavia's more tolerant view toward its 
nationalities is the content of nationality publications. The Hun­
garian publication Hid, contains much more material that is cultural 
than its Rumanian counterparts Igaz Sz<$ and Korunk. While these 
Rumanian periodicals concentrate much of their attention on translations 
of Rumanian works and propaganda articles, Hid is primarily concerned 
with literary and cultural problems. This is not to say that Hid is 
free of translated materials or propaganda, it is merely to say that 
it is less dominated by them. Furthermore, the political propaganda 
which appears--particularly recently--in Hid, reflects a more tolerant 
atmosphere than that which appears in Korunk or Igaz Szo. Unlike the 
Rumanian stress on "socialist patriotism" and "Daco-Roman" antecedents, 
the writings in Hid have continued to reflect "proletarian internation­
alist" ideals, particularly in discussions of World War II and the 
struggle against Nazi occupation.^ 7
Book publishing reflects this atmosphere also. Over the years 
the publishing opportunities of the Hungarians have been constantly
^ ^Forum KOnyvjegyz^k 1965-1966, pp. 5-32; "Az Ujvid^ki 
Forumrol," pp. 3-4.
■^^See footnote 186 above.
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expanded. This is particularly true since 1964. As Table XXIV reveals, 
from 1953 to 1963 a yearly average of 51 Hungarian books were published 
in Yugoslavia. In 1964 and 1965 respectively, more than twice that 
number were published. By 1966 the number of such books had increased 
to 152.^® Parallel to this development there has also been an in­
crease in the overall volume of the number of books published.
This expansion of Hungarian publishing activity in Yugoslavia
contrasts favorably with the dwindling publishing activities of the
199minorities in Rumania. However, the Yugoslav policies are more
responsive to minority needs in yet another way. Unlike Rumanian poli­
cies, they do not try to isolate their Hungarian minority from the 
literary and cultural publications of Hungarians in Hungary or other 
"socialist" lands. This is shown both by international debates which 
take place on the pages of Hid among Hungarians and also by the content 
of books published for them in Yugoslavia. In the case of Rumania, the 
Hungarians suffer a great lack by being deprived of such international 
contacts.^®®
■^^Between 1951 and 1954 the situation was even more favorable 
for the Hungarians. In 1951 they had 120 titles, in 1952, 83 titles, 
and in 1953, 65 titles. It seems that in response to international 
political pressure, (Tito-Stalin Conflict) the Hungarians were given 
more opportunities to publish. As this pressure diminished with the 
death of Stalin, the number of Hungarian titles also declined. For 
this data see Statistidki Godisnjak FNRJ 1954 (Beograd; Savezni Zavod 
za Statistiku i Evidenciju, 1954), Table 278, p. 349.
■^^Compare the data of Tables XXIII and XXIV. The favorable 
position of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia does not mean that they do not 
have some problems in this area. See jAnos HorvAth, "HiAnyoznak a 
Magyar Kttnyvek" Magyar Szd, May 16, 1970, as quoted in Nemzetor, 
July-Aug., 1970, p. 12.
^^DAnes, h^z ErdAlyi Kultura 1970-ben," p. 7.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
345
TABLE XXIV*
BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS PUBLISHED IN THE LANGUAGES OF THREE 
SELECTED NATIONAL MINORITIES IN YUGOSLAVIA
Year German**
No.of No. of 
titles copies
Hungarian 
No. of No. of 
titles copies
Albanian 
No. of No. of 
titles copies
1953 33 174,000 65 325,000 56 169,000
1954 53 489,000 62 260,000 89 356,000
1955 53 898,000 41 182,000 69 388,000
1956 31 201,000 58 213,000 65 414,000
1957 60 1,058,000 65 396,000 58 185,000
1958 85 248,000 49 279,000 67 311,000
1959 78 355,000 46 174,000 64 312,000
1960 49 401,000 35 175,000 44 160,000
1961 48 309,000 66 294,000 86 382,000
1962 64 495,000 76 314,000 80 459,000
1963 68 447,000 42 149,000 134 1,113,000
1964 84 234,000 121 583,000 180 951,000
1965 85 271,000 125 758,000 150 618,000
1966 64 254,000 152 983,000 132 638,000
*This Table is based on StatistiCki Godisnjak SFRJ 1967 
(Beograd: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1967), Table 127-19, p. 301;
StatistiCki Godisnjak SFRJ 1964 (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za
Statistiku, 1964), Table 126-15, p. 328; Jugoslavia 1945-1964: 
StatistiEki Pregled (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1965),
Table 20-14, p. 332; StatistiEki Godisnjak FNRJ 1959 (Beograd:
Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1959), Table 2-310, p. 267.
**Most of the books published in German are intended for 
East and West Germany rather than the few Germans left in Yugoslavia.
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The Fine Arts
Music, drama and the plastic arts among the Hungarians of the 
Vojvodina seem to receive ample state support. This support involves 
controls. However, the cultural policies of Yugoslavia allow the 
Hungarians more leeway to develop their "national forms" than Rumania1s 
policies. This difference between the two countries is due primarily 
to Yugoslavia’s internal "liberalization" following the Tito-Stalin 
split and also the country's heterogeneous ethnic make-up.
Since no single nationality has a dominant majority position 
in Yugoslavia, it is impossible to find agreement as to what composes 
the "national" culture of the land. It is generally contended that the 
South Slavic cultures together, provide the country with its major 
sources of cultural identification.^®^ However, the diversity of these 
cultures makes the exclusivist claims or privileged treatment of any 
one of them highly unlikely. Thus, the cultural diversity of the non- 
Slavic nationalities is tolerated and preserved by the cultural divers­
ity of the majority nationalities.
The rift which developed between Yugoslavia and the "socialist 
camp" in the late 1940's also increased nationality cultural oppor­
tunities in the long-run. In terms of immediate consequences the
201For some different interpretations of this question see: 
Milovan Djilas, "Nemzeti Miszticizmus--A Mi Idealismusunk Jellegzetes 
VonAsa," Hid, XVI (July-Aug., 1952), 427-435; Dusan Popovics, 
"Kulturegyeshleteink FogyatdkossAgairol ds Uj TAvlatairol," Hid,
XX (Aug.-Sept., 1956), 565-573; Dobrica Cosic, "A Korszerutlen 
Nacionalizmusrol," Hid, XXVI (Jan., 1962), 21-31; Dusan Prijevec, 
"Szlovdnsdg, Jugoszldvsdg ds Szocializmus," Hid, XXVI (Mar., 1962), 
289-303.
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9 09Tito-Stalin split actually worsened nationality relations. w But the 
general liberalization which followed on the domestic scene, eventually 
contributed to increased national opportunities in the area of music and 
art. The conflict with Stalin led to the isolation of Yugoslavia in the 
cultural as well as the political and economic area. Consequently, the 
Yugoslavs turned to the West to break out of their isolation. In the 
cultural area this involved, among other things, an extensive film 
exchange program. This and other exchanges with the West, worked to
make Yugoslav cultural policies more flexible than that of the other
2 0 3East-Central European states.
This flexibility meant— after Rdkosi was eclipsed temporarily 
by Nagy--that Hungarians in the Vojvodina were able to gain access to
films produced in Hungary. However, the number of films rarely exceeded
204three per year prior to 1964. This number compares unfavorably 
with the number of films allowed in from other countries, such as 
Czechoslovakia, Italy, France and the U.S.S.R., none of which have sub­
stantial fellow-nationals living in Yugoslavia. It also seems one­
sided, when one considers that Hungary imported 21 and 10 Yugoslav
2®2Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 368-371, 375-377, 423- 
427; Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism," p. 73; 
John C. Campbell, Tito's Separate Road (New York; Harper & Row, 1967),  
pp. 21 ,  113.
2 0 3 For the dramatic shift in the film exchange program of 
Yugoslavia see particularly Statistidki Godisnjak FNRJ 1959 (Beograd: 
Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1959 ), Tables 2-307 and 2 -3 0 8 ,  p. 266, 
and Jugoslavia 1945-1964: StatistiCki Pregled. Tables 20-5  and 20-6 ,
p. 328.
204Ibid.
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films in 1963 and 1964 respectively. Hungary has a very small Serbian 
population which does not even come near in size to the half-million 
Hungarians in the Vojvodina. However, this lack of imported Hungarian 
films in the Vojvodina is still better than the film policies of 
Rumania. In the rare instance when a Hungarian film finds its way to 
Transylvania, it ends up with a deliberately unsynchronized sound­
track.20^
The films available to the Hungarians in the Vojvodina are 
primarily non-Hungarian. However, the content of these films is not 
anti-Hungarian. Western films are all of the light variety, with 
emphasis on entertainment. Yugoslav films, on the other hand, are 
set to perpetuate attitudes which tone down ethnic animosities. Thus, 
World War II and the Partizan struggles provide one of the major 
sources for the themes of Yugoslav films.200 The latter stresses 
common struggle against foreign oppression. It propagates solidarity 
among the nationalities and minorities of the country by emphasizing 
proletarian internationalism. As opposed to this, Rumanian film 
policies have begun to emphasize the strictly "national" heroic- 
historical themes. Thus, they have produced "The Column," "Dacians" 
and "Decebal"— films which delegate all the country's- national minori­
ties into the "foreign" category.
200Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28.
2 06Out of 20 films produced in Yugoslavia during 1965-1966, 
eleven are in some way related to the Partizan struggles of World War 
II. See Jdnos Brenner, "Megmentik Polit," 7 Nap, July 22, 1966, p. 12.
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In the area of theatre, the Hungarians in the Vojvodina have 
less opportunities than those of Transylvania. As was shown the Hun­
garians in Transylvania possess six theatres. In the Vojvodina, they 
have access to theatres in Novi Sad and Subotica. But, both of these 
theatres are predominantly S e r b i a n . T h e  only consolation to this 
great lack is that Yugoslav Hungarians can cross the border and attend 
the open-air theatre in Szeged. The latter is just across the Hun­
garian- Yugoslav frontier and is frequented by many Vojvodinians during 
the summer.^®® Another consolation is that Hungarian actors and 
theatre groups from Hungary have more opportunities to perform in
1 - 2 0 9Yugoslavia.
Theatre life in the Vojvodina is a rare luxury for Hungarians.
However, it is only fair to point out that opportunities in this area
are more extensive than at any previous time in Yugoslavia's history.
In the interwar years, only the most primitive types of theatre pro-
210ductions seem to have been tolerated or encouraged. In the imme­
diate post-war period, the Stalinist atmosphere also stiffled creativity. 
Only in the second half of the 1950’s and the 1960's has it been
207'iElkdszult a szabadkai N^pszinhaz Oszi Miisorterve," Magyar 
Szd, July 29, 1966, p. 12; "Ot Szinhdzi Est Mdrlege," Magyar Sz6 , June 
24, 1966, p. 9; Istvkn Ldnyi, "A Vajdas^gi Szinjatszas Ndhdny 
Probldm^ja'rol," Hid, XXII (July-Aug., 1958), 617-620.
208j^roly Erd^lyi, "Utlev^lel a Szegedi Szabadt^ri jAtekokra?" 
Magyar Szd, July 16, 1966, pp. 1, 3.
209por example: Sz. M . , "Nevess Veltink--Ha Tudsz," Polgoz6k .
July 8 , 1966, p. 9.
^•^Istvin Lateik, "A Vojvodinai Magyar Szinjatszas Kerdds^hez," 
in Hid 1934-1941, pp. 298-303.
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possible to discern certain improvements in theatre production. How­
ever, only a very limited number have been performed in the Hungarian, 211 language.
In the musical life of the Hungarians a similar situation seems
to prevail. Aside from folk and popular music, very few Hungarian
212renditions are available of serious or classical music. This lack 
is unfortunate from a broader cultural perspective, but it does not 
involve national discrimination. Numerous radio programs devote time 
to Hungarian music of the folk and popular variety. Furthermore, broad­
casts from Budapest fill the classical gaps which exist. These broad­
casts are followed religiously by many Hungarians in the Vojvodina.
In the plastic arts the Hungarians seem to enjoy just as many 
opportunities as the other peoples of Yugoslavia. They hold frequent
O I Oexhibitions which seem to be well attended. Both painters and 
sculptors gain extensive recognition of their works. Many of the major 
towns of the Vojvodina have artist's associations. Their works have 
been taken on international tours, mainly in "socialist countries." A
^■Kjdzsef Sulhof, "A VajdasAgi SzinhAzak Unnepi SzemlAje,"
Hid, XXI (July, 1957), 544-546; IstvAn LatAk, "A VajdasAgi Magyar 
SzinjAtszAs Nagy Halottja," Hid, XXIV (May, 1960), 375-378. Also see 
footnote 207 above.
^•^KAroly Krombholz, "A VajdasAgi Magyar ZeneszerzSk KArde'sArol," 
Hid, XVII (Feb., 1953), 133-135.
213Imre Devits, "A VajdasAgi Miivesztelepek," Hid, XXI (Dec., 
1957), 1065-1070; "Julius 7-An: TArlat Palicson," Magyar Szo, June
24, 1966, p. 9.
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favorite route of these exhibits is Hungary, where they are usually 
w e l l - r e c e i v e d ^
The architectural development and the upkeep of historical sites 
has been less discriminatory than in Rumania. Reminders of the area's 
Hungarian past are not being systematically eliminated or "re-possessed." 
This may be due, in part, to the less obvious nature of the Hungarian 
monuments in the Vojvodina, but also to the generally more tolerant 
attitude of the Yugoslavs toward symbols of cultural diversity. Thus, 
old Hungarian churches and castles, instead of being demolished receive 
some state assistance for their u p k e e p . T h e  latter is motivated 
less by nationality policies than by considerations affecting tourism. 
Still, the net result is a type of co-existence for the historical 
reminders and symbols of the inhabitants of the Vojvodina.
Yugoslav policies toward the museums and libraries also mirror 
tolerance. Unlike the case of Rumania, there does not seem to be a 
policy aimed at dispersing minority nationality books or historical 
artifacts. While the number of libraries and museums has constantly 
expanded, so has the share of the Hungarians increased in both areas. 
Village libraries and houses of folk culture have been some of the 
major gainers of this expansion.^16
21^[argit V. Kiss, "Zrenjanini Mtiv^szek Kiillitasa Bdke'scsab^n," 
Bdkdsi |let, V, No. 1 (1970), pp. 107-110.
Ol C good example of this is Petrovaradin (Pdterv^trad) across 
the Danube from Novi Sad. Ivo Frol (ed.) Petrovaradin (Novi Sad:
Izdavac Matica SRPSKA, 1963), presents a good description of this 
historical landmark and the efforts made by the government to preserve 
it.
^ ^ Jugoslavija 1945-1964; Statistigki Pregled, Table 20-10,
p. 330.
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I V
The general cultural setting of the Hungarians in Transylvania 
is much more restrictive than that of their fellow nationals in the 
Vojvodina. As the preceding discussion of education, the mass media 
and cultural life demonstrated, Rumania is also more restrictive from 
an institutional perspective. However, this generalization is valid 
only from the late 1950's to the present. The Yugoslav policy of 
relative tolerance is also historically circumscribed. It is a conse­
quence of the post-war challenge to create internal unity in order to 
ward off external threats to national security.
This difference in the cultural and educational policies of 
the two states reflects the erosion of the ethnic balance of power in 
Rumania and the relative stabilization of the ethnic balance of power 
in Yugoslavia. In Rumania the shift toward more repressive policies 
is evident following the Party purge of some of the major representa­
tives of the Hungarians and the other minorities. This shift in the 
balance of power within the Party took place between 1952 and 1957. 
Parallel to these shifts, the educational policies reflected some re­
strictions on the Hungarians already in the 1955-56 school year. These 
became much more pronounced by 1958 and all-pervasive in the late 
1960's, when the ethnic Rumanian dominance of Party leadership is no 
longer challenged. As the analysis shows, cultural policies also 
followed this pattern.
In Yugoslavia a somewhat different trend has prevailed. Until 
about the middle of the 1950's Hungarian opportunities were closely 
limited. Since then educational and cultural policies try to satisfy
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the needs of the Hungarians as well as most of the other nationalities. 
In the past few years even more effort has been exerted to remove any 
disadvantages that may have prevailed in this area. This effort 
parallels the solidification of the balance of power between ethnic 
groups in the leadership of the Yugoslav League of Communists. Since 
the majority nationality cannot dominate the Party leadership, it is 
also unable to carry out repressive policies as it had done in the 
interwar years. While the possibility does exist that the Yugoslav 
nationalities together may turn to oppress non-Slavic nationalities, 
this has not happened lately due to the unofficial alliances between 
certain Slavic and certain non-Slavic nationalities.
The close relationship between internal political changes and 
ethnic policies has been demonstrated. However, the shifts in the 
internal balance of power do not give a complete picture. Many 
changes in ethnic policies are understandable only if we examine the 
international relations of the states which are most concerned with 
the future of Transylvania and the Vojvodina. This concern and the 
relations of these states provides the focus for the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS 
OF NATIONALITY POLICIES
The fate of the Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina is 
closely intertwined with the peace of East-Central Europe. Ethnic 
animosities in this area have been the cause of a number of major con­
flicts. Since the Hungarians compose the largest minority population 
in the area, their treatment affects the international relations of 
most states in Eastern Europe, but particularly that of the U.S.S.R., 
Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary.^
This chapter will examine how the treatment of the Hungarians 
influences relations between these states. At the same time, it will 
consider how relations among these states affect nationality policies 
in Transylvania and the Vojvodina. By examining the problem from both 
directions, it may be possible to avoid the fruitless debate as to 
what came first. Furthermore, the examination of the problem's inter­
national ramifications will demonstrate to what extent international 
power relations influence the intra-national balance of power among the 
ethnic groups of Rumania and Yugoslavia.
•*-Czechoslovakia also deserves to be on this list since it has 
more than 517,000 Hungarian inhabitants. It has been omitted from the 
above listing only because the present study is concerned solely with 
Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina.
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I
In both Transylvania and the Vojvodina the Soviet Union has, 
at times, influenced the treatment of the Hungarians. In Transylvania 
this influence has frequently been directly responsible for certain 
policies or policy shifts. In the Vojvodina such influence has been 
more indirect, but at times also decisive. This influence has been 
exerted politically and ideologically.
The political influence of the Soviet Union is a consequence 
of its expanded role in East-Central European affairs since World War 
II. Its ideological influence is even older, going back to the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. These two sources (political and ideo­
logical) of its policy-making encounter in Rumania, Yugoslavia and 
Hungary the national aspirations, political interests and ideological 
commitments of small states trying to maintain their independence and 
security. To rephrase Philip E. Mosely, is it ideological or political 
considerations that guide the relations among these "Socialist" s t a t e s ’ ^
The answer to this question has already been provided in the 
discussion of the domestic policies of Rumania and Yugoslavia with 
respect to their Hungarian inhabitants. Now we will examine what the 
relations among these states, the U.S.S.R. and Hungary reveal about 
the fate of national minorities under Communist rule. This will help 
determine the role of ideology and power in the international relations
O"Introduction: Power and Ideology in the Communist States,"
in The Communist States at the Crossroads, ed. Adam Bromke (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 3-4.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
3 5 6
of these states. First, we will concentrate on the Soviet Union's 
attempt to keep these nation-states within its hegemonial orbit.
Second, we will examine how the conflicting interests of Rumania, Yugo­
slavia and Hungary— as reflected by their nationality policies--thwarts, 
or limits the Soviet efforts to solidify the "socialist camp."^
The Impact of Soviet Hegemony and Ideological Solidarity 
One of the outstanding developments of the post-World War II 
era has been the dominant role played by the Soviet Union in the affairs 
(internal and external) of East-Central European states. The incorpora­
tion of these countries into the Soviet bloc, with the exception of 
Yugoslavia, has made the U.S.S.R. not only "guide" but also "arbiter" 
of affairs generally.^ Thus, the problem of Transylvania and its 
large Hungarian population also became subject to Soviet supervision. 
Only Yugoslavia has been able to maintain its political independence. 
However, ideological "solidarity" has even affected it and its policies 
in the Vojvodina.
In Rumania
In the immediate post-war years Stalin's grip on East-Central
-’Yugoslavia's leaders dislike the idea of "Socialist camp." 
It indicates cold war alignments. In public statements and in their 
policies as well, they have indicated their independence from this 
"camp."
^Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Revised paperback 
edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), p. 51, notes
the three main reasons for this state of affairs as: (1) "over­
whelming Soviet strength" (the Red Army of occupation); (2) "weak­
ness of the non-Communist forces in East Europe"; and (3) "the rapid 
demobilization and disengagement of the West."
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Europe enabled him to determine the fate of the Hungarian and other 
nationalities of Transylvania. As earlier chapters have already indi­
cated, he utilized the discord in the area to further his own end--the 
rapid Comraunization of Rumania.-* Stalin used Transylvania as a means 
to control the newly acquired Rumanian and Hungarian satellites.^ To 
say, however, that this was just an extension of the policy of divide 
et impera would be to over-simplify. Undoubtedly, use of this dis­
puted area for such purposes was not neglected by Stalin.^ Yet, 
stability and conformity were more important to him at this stage, and 
it does not seem likely that he would have encouraged dissension between
-*The utilization of Rumanian-Hungarian discord by Stalin to 
facilitate the Communist seizure of power in the former country has 
already been treated in foregoing chapters. However, besides the 
sources mentioned previously regarding this tactic, an interesting 
sidelight is provided for it by Hungdricus, "Romania Uj Politikija ds 
Erddly Kdrddse," Nemzetffr, IX (Sept., 1964), 1. In this article it 
is related that the September 1945 election in Hungary giving the 
Communists only 17% of the vote, and the election of May 1946 in 
Rumania giving the Communist dominated National Democratic Front 70.5% 
of the vote, convinced Stalin that Rumania should receive all of 
Transylvania. Petru Groza did in fact quote the election results as 
"proof" that Rumania was more dependable. His argument seems to have 
carried weight since the Peace Treaty of 1947 confirmed the annexation 
of Transylvania to Rumania.
The fact that Stalin did not even attempt a compromise— he 
annexed Transylvania in toto to Rumania— adds credence to this conten­
tion.
^Along this line see Nicholas Halasz, In The Shadow of Russia 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1959), pp. 185-186. Yet, Stalin
was also searching for a viable and stable order in East-Central 
Europe--under Soviet control. He at one time even toyed with the idea 
of incorporating the satellites directly into the U.S.S.R. This he 
wanted to achieve by first amalgamating Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and 
Albania, then by federating Rumania and Hungary, and also Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. See Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin trans. 
Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962),p.
177.
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two satellites which he already controlled. The fact that he pro­
tected the Hungarian minority against Rumanian terror and oppression 
shows, however, that he saw tactical utility for the Soviet Union in 
keeping a strong minority (dependent on Soviet protection) within
Rumania.** His support for establishment of the Magyar Autonomous
oRegion is yet further indication of this.
Stalin's death in 1953 ended the position of the Autonomous 
Region as a possible counter-weight to Rumanian ambitions.*-® The 
old dictator's successors turned to utilize more formal means of con­
trol. While this does not necessarily mean that minorities were 
relieved of this role, it does mean that their importance diminished 
considerably in the eyes of Soviet policy makers. In fact, the Hun­
garian Revolt of 1956, and the parallel disturbances among the Hun­
garian population of Transylvania ended Soviet expectations of 
minority support for the U.S.S.R. in Rumania.*-*-
QHalasz, In the Shadow of Russia, p. 82; Robert Lee Wolff, 
"Rumania," The Fate of East Central Europe ed. Stephen D. Kertesz 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), pp. 256-
257, 261.
^Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambirdge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 453.
10But it was not the death of Stalin, as much as the with­
drawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, that eliminated com­
pletely the "counter-weight" idea of the Hungarian minority. For the 
importance of this troop removal on Rumania's re-assertion of more 
independence see John Michael Montias, "Communist Rule in Eastern 
Europe," Foreign Affairs. 43 (January, 1965), 332.
*-*Kciroly Illyds, "A Kreml Keserti Csaldddsa Az Erd^lyi Magyarok- 
ban," Ldrmafa, III (October-December, 1956), 21; J. F. Brown, "The 
Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The World Today, XIX (November, 
1963), 502.
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The Khrushchev policies of the latter 1950's and early 1960's
reflect this Soviet "apathy" toward the Transylvanian nationalities.
Just prior to, during, and after the disturbances of 1956, Khrushchev
was already in the process of providing the "bloc" with a more formal
1organizational structure. This structure was built on the founda­
tion of Soviet sponsored cooperation among East European satellites in 
matters of defense and economy. The Warsaw Pact and COMECON (CEMA) 
were to provide the central core for this system of coordinated 
planning and control.^ The position of Rumania's Hungarian minority 
was greatly affected by these changes, positively as well as nega­
tively.
The "negative" impact has already been noted above as the 
decrease of the political importance of ethnic groups. The "positive" 
result was that closer relations were fostered between individual 
satellites. This meant that relations between Rumania and Hungary 
would also involve more cooperation. In the economic sphere this was 
to entail more trade agreements, and the continuation of such projects 
as Romagchim, which had been brought into existence under the watchful 
eye of Stalin.^ This latter "joint company" enabled Hungary as well
■^Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, Appendix I, pp. 445-451; J. F. 
Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," Survey, No. 49 (Oct., 1963), 19; 
Andrzej Korbonski, "Comecon," International Conciliation, No. 549 
(Sept., 1964), 4-7.
1 ̂ Ibid.; Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc. Also see Nicholas 
Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The Technology Press, 1957), pp. 425-432, for the early development of 
Comecon.
■^George H. Bossy, "Mining," Romania ed. Stephen Fischer- 
Galati (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 244.
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as Rumania to use the natural gas deposits of Transylvania for their
respective industrial undertakings.^
In spite of such formalization of relations, the relations
16between Rumania and Hungary deteriorated rather than improved. Soviet 
overlordship ensured that their differences would not be paraded pub­
licly before the world, but disagreements were nonetheless real.
Soviet hegemony acted as a break on these differences. More recently , 
particularly since 1963, the Soviet system of satellite control has 
loosened just enough to allow outsiders to verify the existence of these 
differences."*"^ The root of contention between the two satellites has 
remained the question of Transylvania and minority rights.
In the summer of 1963, rumors were wide-spread that Transylvania
18or a part of it would be returned to Hungary. It was contended that 
the Soviet Union was using this as a threat toward Rumania in order to 
force the latter to submit to Comecon policies and coordination. Since
15Ibid.
•*"̂ This deterioration of Rumanian-Hungarian contacts must not be 
blamed on the formalization of relations. Rather, the deterioration 
was a consequence of the greater "independence" of the respective 
satellites; an "independence which developed parallel to, but not in 
direct conjunction with the formalization of relations.
■^See for example in the New York Times: "Rumanians Print
Views of Peking," June 23, 1963, pp. 1, 12; David Binder, "Rumanian 
Leader's Visit to Tito Held New Sign of Independence," November 24, 
1963, p. 15; Paul Underwood, "Yugoslavia Signs Rumanian Accord," Dec.
1, 1963, p. 14; David Binder, "Rumania Adheres to Industry Plan," Jan. 
19, 1964, p. 18; and more recently Binder's, "Rumania's Minorities 
Pressed by Nationalist Drive," July 14, 1964, p. 4.
18Seymour Freidin, "East Europe Wants Land Soviet Took," New 
York Herald Tribune. Sept., 14, 1964, p. 6.
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nothing came of this, it can be assumed that the rumor was either false
19or just the "news" of a Russian bluff never carried out. At any 
rate, the Soviet Union avoided such a step--the re-partitioning of 
Transylvania--for fear of further unrest and instability in the 
satellite empire.
The re-partitioning of Transylvania is undesirable from a 
Soviet perspective primarily for two reasons. These reasons are in 
some ways related, since both afreet the position of Soviet authority 
in the area. The first is that the redrawing of boundaries would re­
open the whole question of borders, ceded territories, and annexations. 
Since the Soviet Union had gained the most territory in the last war, 
the re-opening of this question would undoubtedly affect it adversely.^® 
This is also underlined by the fact that Transylvania in Rumanian hands 
provides the Soviet Union with less military headaches. The present 
set-up impairs the strength of Hungary and at the same time leaves the 
strategically important area of Transylvania in the possession of a 
satellite which is more open to direct Soviet military pressure.
Another factor, perhaps not as important as the above two, is
■^The Rumanian elation following the replacement of Khrushchev 
would indicate that such a bluff may have been made. Rumanians viewed 
him as a personal enemy of their country. The CPSU criticism of 
Khrushchev after the take-over by Brezhnev and Kosygin lend additional 
weight to this view. See particularly points 5 and 6 enumerated by 
Henry Tanner in "29 'Errors' Laid to Khrushchev," New York Times, Oct. 
30, 1964, pp. 1, 13. Also see David Binder, "Rumania Retains Indepen­
dent Line," New York Times, Nov. 16, 1964, pp. 1, 5. It still remains 
to be seen, however, whether the policies of Brezhnev and Kosygin can 
really take a more "conciliatory" stance toward Rumanian nationalism 
than had Khrushchev's.
^Freidin, "East Europe Wants Land Soviet Took," pp. 1, 6 .
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that Rumania proved to be a "loyal" satellite while Hungary had re- 
21volted. This loyalty was not only demonstrated by allowing the Soviet 
Union to use Transylvania as the base of operations against the Hun­
garian freedom fighters, but also by Rumania's subsequent role in help-
O Oing to eradicate all vestiges of the opposition. ^ Thus, Rumania 
emerged from the traumatic events of October-November 1956, as an ex­
ponent of "stability" and "loyalty," while the Hungarians--in Hungary 
and in Transylvania--were labeled as "reactionaries" and enemies of
O Othe U.S.S.R. Since the Kremlin center wanted to preserve the post­
war East-Central European gains and the Communist status quo at all 
costs, it naturally backed the "stability" of the Rumanians rather than 
the "turbulance" of the Hungarians.
Only the events of August 1968, seem to have made Soviet policy 
makers re-evaluate Rumania's "dependability." In the Soviet military 
campaign to stamp out national Communism in Czechoslovakia, the 
Rumanians were excluded. Rumania was the only Warsaw Pact nation 
which did not send (or was not asked to send?) troops to help crush 
the DubCek regime. Instead, Rumania itself faced the prospect of a
^George Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," The Reporter,
XXXI (Nov. 19, 1964), 26, demonstrates how the Rumanians have played- 
up this "loyalty" theme to enhance their own position in the bloc.
^ I t  should be noted that Imre Nagy, p£l Maldter and other 
Hungarian leaders of the Revolt of 1956, were sent to Rumania after 
their capture, both for their trial and execution. See, Ibid.; Elie 
Abel, "Nagy is Abducted by Soviet Police: Sent to Rumania," New 
York Times, Nov. 24, 1956, pp. 1-2.
O O•‘•-’Along this line see Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Rumania,"
East Central Europe and the World ed. Stephen D. Kertesz (Notre Dame, 
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), p. 165.
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Soviet invasion due to its maverick international posture.^ This 
again raised the possibility of territorial revisions in Transylvania. 
However, the Soviet policy-makers considered their show of force in 
Czechoslovakia as indication enough of their determination to inter­
vene when any member of the Socialist "camp" became too vociferous in 
proclaiming its independence. Rumania, therefore, has taken some 
steps backward from its exposed international stance.
The bond of ideology is less evident but no less important than 
the bond provided by Soviet hegemony. While the two are closely 
related, it is still possible to discern the distinct impact of 
ideology on Transylvania's inhabitants--Rumanians and Hungarians 
alike. This "common" factor of ideology involves more than "just" the 
fate of Transylvania; it directly affects the destiny of Communist 
Rumania and Hungary, as well as the Soviet Bloc as a whole. J
^Stephen S. Anderson, "Yugoslavia; The Diplomacy of Balance," 
Current History, vol. 56 (April, 1969), p. 216.
^^This powerful bond of ideology can be discerned from KAd^r's 
report to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party on Nov. 
30, 1959. At this time the Rumanian Communists were already openly 
carrying out policies which undercut the position of the Hungarians in 
Transylvania. Yet, in the face of this, Kdd^r still could say that the 
interests of all socialist countries were identical. He still main­
tained that: "The solid and everlasting foundation of the unity of the
socialist camp lies in the common socio-political system, the common 
road of building socialism, a common ideology and joint efforts to 
safeguard peace. Our cooperation within the camp is regulated not only 
by full equality . . . but . . .  by the principles of mutual assis­
tance. . . . Loyal service to the vital interests of our people 
requires that one of the main tasks of our foreign policy continue to 
strengthen the power and unity of the socialist camp and to repel 
decisively all attempts against it . . .  to strive to establish good 
relations with all neighboring countries. . . .  In addition to the
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In the case of minority nationalities, the concept of "class 
solidarity" has been most important. It was this concept that was to 
end the ethnic strife that had existed between Rumanians and Hungarians 
in the past, It was easily "achieved" in the monolithic structure of 
the Soviet Bloc under Stalin.^ With the older dictator’s death, how­
ever, enforcement of "proletarian internationalism" or class solidarity 
became more complicated. The formalization of bloc relations—  
mentioned above— added to these complications; but so did the fact that 
first Tito, then Mao and Hoxha, and then Gheorghiu-Dej and now Ceausescu 
have come to play roles as interpreters as well as followers of Com­
munist ideology.
The loosening grip of one authoritative ideological center and 
the subsequent "polycentrism" of the bloc has greatly affected the 
place of Transylvania in the relations of Rumania and Hungary. Yet,
Soviet Union . . . the fraternal Czechoslovak Republic and the Rumanian 
People's Republic are direct neighbors of ours . . . our steadily 
flourishing friendship with these two people's states is firmly based 
upon the most intimate understanding and proletarian internationalism." 
See jinos KcidcTr, Socialist Construction in Hungary: Selected Speeches
and Articles, 1957-1961 (Budapest; Corvina Press, 1962), pp. 207-208.
^ A t  this point it should be noted that some students of the 
bloc reject that, even under Stalin, "monolithic" was a correct adjec­
tive for the "Socialist camp." Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, maintains 
that the bloc has in reality oscillated between diversity and uniformity. 
He stresses that diversity reigned supreme until 1947. However, Paul 
Kecskemeti, "Diversity and Uniformity in Communist Bloc Politics,"
World Politics, XIII (Jan., 1961), 317, points out that this early 
post-war "diversity" described by Brzezinski was imposed rather than 
spontaneous. Still, it is good to ponder Montias' contention that the 
differences between "monolithic" Stalinism and the following "thaw" 
is overdrawn. See Montias, "Communist Rule in Eastern Europe," pp. 
333-337, and Morton A. Kaplan, "Old Realities and New Myths," World 
Politics, XVII (Jan., 1965), 335-343.
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the uniting force of ideology still remains. This is due to the 
common ideological heritage of most Central and East European Communist 
parties and the fact that leading positions of interpretation are
occupied in both Rumania and Hungary by men of relatively similar back-
27grounds. Furthermore, since Communism must also view the possibili­
ties of spreading and exporting the ideology to new areas, it is 
necessary to stress the "traditional" class solidarity of peoples and 
their right to "national self-determination" from Western colonial
OOpowers. 0
While recent developments have strongly shaken the effective­
ness of ideology as a uniting force, it must be remembered that ideology 
has been effective when the "interests" of Rumania and Hungary, the 
hegemonial power, and the bloc in general coincided with its demands.
The "ideological" struggles against nationalism bear this out. First, 
the struggle against Titoist deviations and the Yugoslav heresy of 
"National Communism." Second, the constant ideological struggle 
against Western and non-Communist international influences, whether 
these be in the form of "black Vatican reaction," "capitalist 
imperialism," or "rootless Zionist cosmopolitanism." Third and last—  
but not least--the concerted drive to fight nationalism among the
^ B y  "similarity" of backgrounds not social-class composition, 
but developmental pattern is meant. Both in Rumania and Hungary the 
"centrists" are now predominantly at the helm. In both countries the 
"left" and "right" elements have been kept from exercising influence 
within or without the Party.
OO See N. A. Mukhitdinov, "Nationalities Policy and Imperialism," 
(originally appeared Jan. 31, 1959 in Pravda, pp. 7-8, and Izvestia, 
pp. 4-5) translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XI 
(March 25, 1959), 25?29.
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Hungarians of Transylvania as well as Budapest and the surrounding 
lowlands
The struggle against Titoism united Rumania and Hungary in the 
Stalinist campaign against "National Communism." This campaign, how­
ever, was also inspired by Stalin's political desire to subjugate 
Yugoslavia completely to his own absolute authority. Stalin utilized 
ideology mainly as a tool to rally his satellites against the deviator. 
Thus, Rumania and Hungary joined hands in the castigation of "Titoist
OAtraitors" and "National Communists." u These tactics were applied 
with equal effectiveness and even more brutality against those who had 
connections and ties with the non-Communist world. Both the Bucharest 
and Budapest regimes unleashed attacks against the Roman Catholic
O  -1Church and its "international conspiratorial network." A similar 
campaign was also carried out against "the machinations of rootless
OOcosmopolitans" who divided their loyalties between Rumania and Israel.
O Q7In relation to Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, this ideo­
logical unity completely disintegrated in August, 1968.
onJUFor a description of this persecution see Wolff, "Rumania," 
The Fate of East Central Europe. p. 262, and The Balkans in Our Time,
p. 459. Also see "Minorities in Eastern Europe-II," East Europe, VII
(April, 1959), 9-11, and Evangelos Kofos, "Balkan Minorities Under
Communist Regimes," Balkan Studies. II (1961), 39.
33-Wolff, "Romania," pp. 269-271.
OOJ In the anti-Zionist campaign, Rumania for a long time took a
more aggressive part than did Hungary. The reason for this may be
attributed in large part to Rumania’s possession of the largest Jewish 
minority among the satellites. See F. F., "Jews in the People's Demo­
cracies," The World Today, XIV (March, 1958), 119-121; Jacob K. Javits,
"The Presecution of Jews in Rumania by the Soviet Puppet Communist
Regime," Congressiona1-Record-Appendix (House of Representatives, June
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Ideological solidarity was even more evident when Communist 
Hungarians and their Rumanian counterparts moved to crush the 
"bourgeois nationalist" manifestations among Hungarians at the time of 
the 1956 Revolt. The cooperation between the two governments was 
close and brutally similar.33 This cooperation was couched in ideo­
logical terminology, but evidently was based on political expediency. 
Nonetheless, the major ideological argument called for the destruction 
of "reactionary" and "bourgeois nationalist" elements which were 
attempting "to turn back the clock" to the national hatreds and ani­
mosities of the past.34
Ideological unity between the two regions was so close at this 
time that Party solidarity— but not class solidarity— bridged national 
divisions. The Communist leadership of both satellites followed con­
certed and systematic strategies which were to eradicate the "national­
ist germ" for good.33 Party leaders from Rumania visited YL&d&r twice 
during the three months after the Soviet Union crushed the Revolt in 
November 1956.33 At this time agreement between the Party leaders of
22, 1954), pp. A-4565 - A-4566; R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism 
in Eastern Europe (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1961), p. 167; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 459-461. More 
recently Rumania has tended to be somewhat more moderate. See Ldszl6 
Hory, "A Romdn-Magyar Viszony es Erddly Magyarsdga," in Larmafa 
Erd^lyi Evkanyv ed. Andres Kedves (Lienz, Austria: Erddlyi Miihely,
1968), p. 78.
OO This "cooperation" is reflected best in "Joint Communique on 
Rumanian-Hungarian Talks," Pravda, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 3, as condensed 
and translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VIII (Dec.
26, 1956), 19.
34Ibid. 35Ibid.
36Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," pp. 502-503.
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the two satellites seems to have been c o m p l e t e . H o w e v e r ,  the very 
weak position of the Kaddr regime was, in part, responsible for this 
unity of purpose.®®
Ironic as it may seem, this unity of the two satellites in 
fighting "nationalist reaction" also sowed the first seeds of dissen­
sion which were to develop between them later. The seeds of this 
dissension were to be found in the over-enthusiasm of the Rumanian 
Communist Party in eradicating the "nationalist isolation" and "back­
wardness" of the Transylvanian Hungarians. This enthusiasm has not 
slackened in pace since 1956; in fact it has become more systematic in 
its expressions vis-h-vis the Hungarian m i n o r i t y . jn Hungary the 
anti-nationalist campaign had been completed more or less by 1961. In 
fact, its most brutal manifestations were already history by the close 
of 1958, when the Rumanians were still executing "secessionist" or 
"separatist" conspirators.^®
The Romanians have rationalized their repressive tactics by
Joint Communique on Rumanian-Hungarian Talks," p. 19.
®®Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," p. 503.
®^Senator Pell, "Negotiations with Rumania," Congressional 
Record (Senate, May 11, 1964), p. 10532, states: "What lends particu­
lar irony to the Rumanian situation is the fact that in Hungary, where 
the 1956 revolutions all began, there has been a general amnesty so 
that vast numbers of persons who participated in the uprising in that 
nation are now free. We in the West can only ask why Rumania has not 
seen fit to do the same." For this contrast also see "Magyarellenes 
Hajszdra Izgat a Romdn Sajtd, Megszigoritottdk a Hatdrdtl^p^st Nehogy 
Kulfoldre Szivdrogjanak Az Irt6 Rendelkezdsek Rdszletei," Katolikus 
Magyarok Vasdrnapja, June 14, 1964, p. 1.
^®Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 26; "Eight in 
Rumania Reported Executed," New York Times. Spet. 6 , 1958, p. 8 .
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stressing that "national sovereignty" and "socialist patriotism"
demand the complete subjugation of elements which conspire against
41the interests of the R.P.R. The fact that Rumania asserted its 
independent nationhood in the Soviet bloc has made it possible for her 
to interpret ideology regarding the Transylvanian minorities from this 
purely national perspective.
The Hungarian Communists, on the other hand, have been handi­
capped in opposing these innovations in Communist i d e o l o g y . ^  They 
were, and still are, more dependent on the Soviet Union than the 
Rumanians. Interference with Rumanian nationalities policy would be 
construed as a violation of "national sovereignty," thereby leaving 
the Hungarian regime open to the charge of "bourgeois nationalism." 
Consequently, the present stance of the two satellites toward each 
other is one of muffled discord, generated by the plight of the 
Transylvanian H u n g a r i a n s R e c e n t  Rumanian-Hungarian talks have shed 
some light on the extent of this dissension.^ This discord, however,
^*Fischer-Galati, "Rumania," pp. 164-165.
^Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," pp. 23-30.
^Overt manifestations of this discord can be found in the 
recent restrictions against Hungarians who wish to visit relatives in 
Transylvania. Often they are subjected to intensive searches at the 
border crossing points in order to determine that they have no 
Hungarian books and periodicals in their possession. See "Hirek," 
Transsylvdnia, VI (July, 1964), 11.
■̂‘̂'David Binder, "Rumania Presses Pursuit of Independent 
Economy," New York Times, July 6 , 1964, pp. 1, 10, indicates that the 
high level Rumanian-Hungarian talks of early July, "did not appear too 
successful." Also see: Hory, "A Romdn-Magyar Viszony ds Erddly
Magyarsdga," pp. 73-78.
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is cloaked and hidden from world view by the surface homage paid in 
both Bucharest and Budapest to "proletarian internationalism."
In Yugoslavia
Soviet political and ideological guidance of Yugoslavia came 
to an early end in 1948-49. Yet, while Yugoslavia is no longer con­
sidered part of the Soviet "bloc," it cannot avoid being influenced—  
at least indirectly— by Soviet political moves and ideological inter­
pretations. However, unlike any of the other East-Central European 
states, Yugoslavia is not in a dependent status vis-k-vis the Soviet 
Union.
In the political relations of the two states, from the begin­
ning, Yugoslavia's "self-liberation" and "self-communization" enabled 
Tito and his followers to make their own policies. They were able to 
do this because they had a popular power base; the Partizan movement. 
This did not mean that they opposed Soviet policies in the area.
They were, in many respects the most circumspect supporters of the 
Soviet Union.^ But the fact that they did not owe their liberation 
or their power to the Soviet Union, made them automatically more prone 
to stand on their own. The Communists in the rest of East-Central 
Europe, on the other hand, were the mere creatures of Soviet policy. 
This difference ultimately undermined the Soviet Union's efforts to 
extend its hegemony to the Adriatic.
^Milorad M. Drachkovitch, "Yugoslavia," in The Communist 
States at the Crossroads, p. 179.
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The Soviet Union's policies vis-h-vis Yugoslavia did not reveal 
frustration prior to 1948. After all, soviet forces did help liberate 
parts of Serbia, Belgrade and the Vojvodina.^ This wartime coopera­
tion carried over into the immediate post-war period. Soviet foreign 
policy supported Yugoslavian claims not only against the territorial
claims of Bulgarians and Hungarians, but also in the West, concerning
47Carinthia and Trieste. This support faltered only when Stalin became 
convinced that he could not control the Yugoslav leadership, like he 
controlled all the other Communist parties in the area.
Once this was realized, Stalin attempted to impose hegemony 
on the Yugoslavs from outside. This attempt led to the familiar Com­
munist Information Bureau dispute, which ended by expelling the 
leaders of the Communist Yugoslav Party from the "socialist camp."
This expulsion was followed by a concerted effort to have the Yugoslav 
leadership replaced.^®
Stalin tried to isolate and quarantine the Yugoslavs and their
^Punisa Perovid, "Twenty-five Years of the Yugoslav Revolu­
tion," Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 22 (Apr.-June, 1966) 
pp. 18-19.
^ T h e  Yugoslavs claimed later that this Soviet support was 
less than half-hearted. See: John C. Cambell, Tito's Separate Road
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 11; George W. Hoffman and Fred
Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, 1962), p. 100.
A Q^ F o r  two thorough discussions of the Yugoslav-Soviet con­
flict see: Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism,
Chapters 8-10, pp. 113-151; and Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our 
Time, Chapter 11, pp. 352-390.
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pernicious doctrine of "Titoism" which threatened Soviet hegemony.^
The Soviet Union proceeded to foment national animosities between 
Yugoslavia and her neighbors as well as between the peoples of Yugo­
slavia. Stalin was well aware of Yugoslavia’s Achilles1 heel. Thus, 
his puppets in Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary began to make 
old territorial claims on Yugoslavia. They also tried to arouse 
national antagonisms between the peoples of Yugoslavia by claiming 
that the Rumanian, Bulgarian, Albanian and Hungarian minorities were 
being oppressed.'*®
Stalin's campaign failed! The national minorities did not 
take the bait and the peoples of Yugoslavia supported their leaders' 
defiance of the new external threat.'*'*' However, this did not end 
Soviet efforts to gain political control over Yugoslavia. Although 
Stalin's death in March 1953 put an end to crude and overt efforts 
like the above, the new leaders of the Soviet Union tried a number of 
times to regain Yugoslavia for the socialist camp. After Stalin's 
death they immediately set to mend their relations with Tito. They 
reduced their propaganda barrages and called on their satellites to 
stop creating frontier incidents. This was followed by diplomatic
^ T h e  best brief discussion of "Titoism" as a doctrine is in; 
Fred Warner Neal, Titoism in Action (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univer­
sity of California Press, 1958), Chapter 2, pp. 15-33.
-*®Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 143- 
147; Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, Pp. 21, 113; Paul Shoup, "Yugo­
slavia's National Minorities Under Communism," Slavic Review, XXII 
(March, 1963), p. 73.
51Ibid.
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exchanges at the highest level, with Khrushchev making his "trip to
52Canossa" to Belgrade in 1955.
This trip re-established Soviet-Yugoslav relations for a brief 
period, but not Soviet hegemony. In fact, the Belgrade Declaration 
which resulted from this meeting of reconciliation, confirmed that Tito 
had bpen in the right and Stalin in the wrong. Furthermore, it also 
enshrined a number of principles which indicated Soviet acceptance of 
Titoism. These included "respect for the sovereignty, independence, 
integrity and . . . equality among states in their mutual relations 
and in their relations with other states," and "mutual respect for, and 
non-interference in, internal affairs for any reason whatsoever, 
whether of an economic, political or ideological nature, because 
questions of internal organization, or differences in social systems 
and of different forms of Socialist development, are solely the con­
cern of individual countries . " ^
The Soviet effort to regain influence in Yug slavia was short­
lived. Events in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 disrupted 
the Soviet-Yugoslav detente. Tito's speech at Pula on November 11,
1956, angered the Soviet leaders because of its criticism of Soviet 
intervention in H u n g a r y . 54 cjiarge Qf "revisionist" again became
■^Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, pp. 31-35.
CO Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury (eds.), The Soviet-Yugo­
slav Controversy 1948-58: A Documentary Record (New York: Prospect
Books, 1959), pp. 55-60, as quoted in Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, 
p. 33.
54jhe thoroughest discussion of Yugoslav-Hungarian, and 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations for this period can be found in Ferenc A. 
Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1961), particularly pp. 343-352, 472-473.
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popular in Pravda as an adjective for Yugoslavia, Relations between 
the two states reverted to open antagonism, although somewhat less 
vociferous in nature than during Stalin's lifetime.
Events in the "socialist camp" forced Soviet policy makers to 
heal this second rift. The growing dispute with China, particularly 
by 1960, and Albanian defection in 1962, made Tito appear ideologi­
cally less dangerous and Yugoslavia geo-politically more attractive. 
Thus, Tito received an invitation to Moscow, which he honored in 
December 1962. On this occasion Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union again 
became reconciled. This was supported by Yugoslavia's more active 
relations (economic, cultural, etc.) with members of the Soviet bloc.
By 1965, Yugoslavia began to participate in certain of the commissions 
of CEMA.55
Soviet efforts to pull Yugoslavia even closer to the bloc 
failed to materialize as conflict in the Middle East and disputes 
within the bloc revealed the aggressive nature of Soviet foreign 
policy. The Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967 gave the Soviet fleet the 
opportunity to move into the Mediterranean en masse. This eliminated 
the previous naval weakness of the Soviet Union in this area. Further­
more, it thereby gained the military potential to exert pressure on 
Yugoslavia from the West.-^
-^Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, pp. 59-60; Peter Mayer, 
Cohesion and Conflict in International Communism (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1968), p. 150.
56yugoslav policies concerning the Middle-East crisis of 1967 
and after reveal certain inner contradictions. While Yugoslavia has 
consistently supported the Arab states against Israel, it has also 
feared the expansion of Soviet influence in the area. For this
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Just one year later, in August 1968, the Soviet Union and its 
Warsaw Pact allies over-ran Czechoslovakia and forced the abdication 
of the reform-minded DubCek regime. This intervention in the internal 
affairs of another socialist state— one that was a full-fledged mem­
ber of the bloc— made Yugoslav leaders more uncertain and more cautious 
about their relations with the Soviet U n i o n . T h e y  have condemned 
the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and have become less enthusi­
astic about expanding their relations with the Soviet Union.-*8 Instead, 
they have concentrated on strengthening their relations with Rumania 
and some other smaller states in the socialist camp.
Yugoslavia's post-war relations with tl̂ie Soviet Union indicate 
a series of Soviet foreign policy blunders. Stalin's coercive tactics, 
and subsequent diplomatic efforts, have failed to bring Yugoslavia 
back into the socialist camp. This has led the Brezhnev-Kosygin team 
to try a totally new approach. It has bypassed the necessity of making 
Yugoslavia part of the "camp" by moving past it— with its naval 
forces--into the Mediterranean. This solution has made Yugoslavia less 
important from a political perspective, but it has still not neutral­
ized its ideological impact on socialists the world over.
All these attempts to re-incorporate Yugoslavia into the
dilemma, compare Bernard Gwertzman, "Unprecedented Reforms; An 
Upheaval in Yugoslavia," The (Washington) Evening Star, Dec. 4, 1967, 
p. 6 , and Jack Anderson, "Tito Opposed to Soviet Power Gains," The 
(Toledo) Blade, Nov. 16, 1970.
-^Anderson, "Yugoslavia; The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 216,
58Ibid., p. 217.
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Socialist camp reveals very little about the national minorities and 
their treatment. Unlike Transylvania, the Vojvodina has not been 
used by the U.S.S.R. as a lever to influence the Yugoslav govern­
ment's behavior. Only Stalin had attempted to use national animosi­
ties to force Yugoslavia to its knees. His failure has probably kept 
Stalin's successors from resorting to this tactic. This does not 
mean, however, that in the future such a Soviet tactic would fail.
It is quite conceivable, that the strained relations between Croats 
and Serbians and other nationalities, could be used to disrupt Yugo­
slavia once Tito is no longer on the s c e n e . W i t h o u t  Tito's 
presence the tactics of 1948-1952 might succeed in destroying Yugo­
slavia.
It would seem, however, that the U.S.S.R. would prefer to 
gain Yugoslavia's support on the basis of ideological affinity. This 
has not been possible since 1948, and is less likely to be the case 
in the future as well. The reason is that Yugoslavia's independence 
from the bloc has enabled it to become an interpreter of ideology in 
its own right.
Until the Cominform dispute Yugoslavia conformed to Soviet 
leadership in this area. However, once the Soviet shackles had been 
removed, the Yugoslavs set out to let their unique national problems
"^Gwertzman, "Unprecedented Reforms: An Upheaval in Yugo­
slavia," pp, 1, 6 ; Vincent Buist, "Yugoslavia Continues as 
Maverick, But Internal Cultural Feuds Remain," The (Toledo) Blade, 
Dec. 13, 1970, p. 3.
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guide their ideological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s S o  it was in the area of 
nationality policy also. While the Yugoslavs took over "Leninist" 
principles on this question, it has been the unique experiences of 
their own country that has molded their national policy. Experience, 
plus Yugoslav reaction to Stalinist abuses, were the guides. In 
looking at the Soviet example they saw a great deal that was acceptable 
in theory, but contradicted by Soviet practice.^ The Yugoslavs re­
acted against this hypocrisy. They also responded to the needs of the 
multi-national make-up of their country. Thus, they put into practice 
a nationality policy which rejected Soviet over-centralization and has 
instead expanded self-government opportunities for all the peoples of 
Yugoslavia.
As in the case of the nationality problem, so in the question 
of "worker's councils," economic decentralization, relations among 
socialist states, and numerous other areas, the Yugoslavs have come 
up with their own ideological justifications and interpretations.^
This has made them competitors of the Soviet Union and China. As a 
consequence, each dispute between Yugoslavia and the major Communist 
states has at the same time also carried ideological undertones. It 
is due to this ideological role of Yugoslavia, that it has been 
attacked most frequently.
6%eal, Titoism in Action, pp. 29-30.
fi 1Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism," 
pp. 69-72, points out that in the immediate post-war period even 
some of these contradictions were copied.
^Neal, Titoism in Action, pp. 18-33.
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While the variety in ideological interpretations has under­
mined socialist solidarity, this does not mean that "socialist 
solidarity" is dead. It is sacrificed only when national interests 
come into conflict (e.g., Czechoslovakia 1968, Rumania 1964, etc.).
In instances where no national conflict prevails it still enables the 
socialist states to take a united stand (e.g., Vietnam). A good 
example in Yugoslavia was Tito’s reaction to the writings of Mihajlo 
Mihajlov. Tito was incensed not only because Mihajlov criticized 
his domestic policies, but also because the writings offended Moscow 
and thereby strained Tito's relations with the Party of the first 
Socialist state.^
This last point, however, also tells us that in the inter­
national relations of the socialist states, the respective definitions 
of "national interest" will tell more about the treatment of the Hun­
garians in Yugoslavia and Rumania than the examination of Soviet 
efforts to guide these states politically and ideologically.
II
For a time both Soviet hegemony and Communist ideology per­
formed a conflict reducing role in Eastern Europe. They contributed 
to the stifling of national animosities. However, both had been imposed 
on the area. Consequently, their effectiveness was tied to the Soviet 
monopoly of both ideological and political leadership. As this leader­
ship was challenged, the former nationality conflicts again cropped up.
63Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, pp. 146-147.
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The re-emerging nationalisms of Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary 
have become the most important consideration in the nationality poli­
cies of these states. In each case, the national interests of the 
country has a direct bearing on the treatment of the Hungarians in 
the two areas under study. We will examine how these national inter­
ests are defined and how they affect international relations. Con­
versely, attention will be paid to the impact of these international 
relations on domestic policies.
The Impact of Nationalism and Separate Roads to Socialism
The political interests, as well as the disagreements between 
Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary, are an inheritance from the inter-war 
years. The friction was suppressed in the Stalinist era by the 
demands of the hegemonial power for stability and ideological unity. 
However, this imposed stability could last only so long as the 
leadership of the bloc remained unquestionably the Soviet Union in 
all matters. In Yugoslavia this was no longer the case after 1948.
In Rumania this was the case during Stalin's lifetime and even under 
his successors until the events of 1956.^ But by the end of that
C AImre Nagy, "Nationalism and Proletarian Internationalism" 
in Imre Nagy on Communism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
1957), pp. 238-239, presents an opposed view. He stresses that rela­
tions between socialist countries were far from being ideal. Some 
verification can be found for Nagy's contention in a Hungarian- 
Rumanian convention announced in early 1950. According to this con­
vention, Magyars could opt for Hungarian citizenship and move to 
Hungary. This reflects in a way, an early subtle attempt to reduce 
the Hungarian minority numerically. However, it seems that very few 
people took advantage of this "opportunity."
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year, the monolithic character of the bloc was irreparably destroyed 
as Gomulka led Poland toward more "independence" within the Socialist 
camp. In the succeeding years other satellites also contributed to 
the loosening of the bloc, though in differing ways. Yugoslavia's 
national communism was being copied by others. Hungary and Rumania 
were also affected by this "thawing" process. As a result, their 
former national claims again became prominant in their relations.
Rumania
The re-assertion of political interests between Rumania and 
Hungary took place in spite of an elaborate network of treaties and 
agreements which were to safe-guard the unity and stability of the 
bloc. J Economic, military, cultural, "friendship," and other 
treaties and agreements obligated both satellites to look at the well­
being of the bloc as a whole rather than their respective "narrow and 
selfish" national needs. ^  But this re-assertion was possible only
^ F o r  this "network" see Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, pp. 106- 
111, 395-400. However, in some instances the formal framework of 
agreements actually undergirded Rumania's ability to subjugate its 
Hungarian minority. Legal conventions and agreements particularly 
would fall into this category. According to Paragraphs 115, 204, or 
120 of the new Hungarian penal code, Hungarians may be punished and 
even extradited to other satellites for speaking, acting, or inciting 
against the "social or economic order of another country." Thus, 
"criticism of the rights (or of their absence) of the Hungarian minor­
ity in Rumania or Czechoslovakia, for instance, could make its author 
liable to be tried under the Hungarian conspiracy Act, if so requested 
by either of these two countries." See G. R. Urban, "Hungary: The
Balance Sheet," Survey, No. 40 (Jan., A>62), 8 6 .
°°For a list of treaties ant ;reements that are to insure 
Rumania's participation in bloc affairs see "Appendix-Principal 
Treaties 1945-1956" in Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 362-367.
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because the Soviet Union sustained set-backs as the leading authority 
on questions of ideology and policy, thereby leaving the satellites 
more room for maneuvering within the bloc. Thus, they could raise 
questions (e.g., the position of Transylvania and the national minori­
ties) which had never been really settled or s o l v e d . T h e  Sino-Soviet 
split of the early 1960's accentuated this tendency. It was in part 
responsible for Rumania's ability to stress its own sovereignty and 
"unquestionable" right to Transylvania.®®
Developments in the economic field provide, perhaps, the 
clearest example of the re-assertion of Rumanian nationalism and the 
concomitant revival of Hungarian minority problems. Only one example 
of these relations will be examined here; That is the sharing of 
Transylvania's natural gas by Rumania and Hungary through the joint 
company Romagchim.
Romagchim was set-up in the early 1950's. It was to enable 
Hungary to utilize some of Transylvania's natural wealth in coopera­
tion with Rumania. This was just one of the many joint projects 
between satellite countries. The case of Romagchim is significant
®^Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," p. 19.
DORumania has even gone so far in its national "claims" as to
present her bill for Bessarabia to the Soviet Union according to
Freidin, "East Europe Wants Land Soviet Took." Yet in the question 
of other boundaries (particularly the Rumanian-Hungarian border) the 
Rumanians have rejected any considerations for revision. See:
"Hirek: A Hatdrok Bdkes Revizidja," Transsylvdnja. VI (July, 1964),
12.
f i  9 Bossy, "Mining," p. 244; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time,
p. 516.
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for this study because it was an experiment in the exploitation of 
the natural wealth of an area which was claimed by both satellites.
In many ways Romagchim was the perfect example of economic integra­
tion within the bloc— which was being emphasized more and more by 
COMECON (CEMA).7® However, it also contained the roots of potential 
discontent insofar as this agreement enabled Hungary to obtain raw 
materials from Transylvania, while providing Rumania in return mainly 
with finished goods.^
Rumania's rebellion against Comecon planning and the develop­
ment of "economic nationalism" also complicated the existence of
Romagchim. Since Rumania was no ^onger subject to the Soviet joint 
7 2companies,7 the same charges, which had previously been leveled 
against them, were now leveled against Hungary. Discontent with 
Comecon and past Soviet economic exploitation was thus transferred to 
Rumanian-Hungarian common utilization of Transylvania's natural 
wealth. As some available sources indicate, Romagchim is to be dis­
banded so that Rumania can better utilize her "own" industrial
^^Korbonski, "Comecon," pp. 40-44.
Ionescu, "The Economic Field," Captive Rumania ed. 
Alexandre Cretzianu (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956),
p. 8 8, Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 523.
7 2 For discussion of "joint companies" and their negative 
legacy see: Korbonski, "Comecon," pp. 40-41; Spulber, The Economics
of Communist Eastern Europe, pp. 190-193; Ionescu, "The Economic 
Field," pp. 50-55; Pavel B. Steanu, "The Nationalization of Rumanian 
Industry," Journal of Central European Affairs. XI (Jan.-Apr., 1951), 
49-51.
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potential and raw materials.73
The economic disharmony of Communist Rumania and Hungary is 
also evident in the positions taken by the two satellites over the 
question of Comecon planning and bloc integration and specializa-
mm f
tion. As opposed to Rumania's independent stance, the Communist
Hungarians have supported the economic integration of the bloc,^-*
and have frequently commented on the evil effects of "economic nation- 
76alism. The reason is quite clear: Hungary without Transylvania is
very poor in natural resources and therefore more dependent on sharing 
and cooperation. Rumania with Transylvania, on the other hand, is 
more able to preach a policy of economic sovereignty. The fate of 
Romagchim makes this all the more apparent.
The United States and the Western "camp" are the outside sources 
of support for independence among the satellites. Trade is the major
^ T h e  investigator has no direct statement to the effect that 
Romagchim is or will be disbanded. The above conclusion is based on 
the correlation of reports that imply that this was the next "logical" 
step. See; Montias, "Background and Origins of the Rumanian Dispute 
with Comecon," pp. 126-127; "Levdl Erddlybdl," Irodalmi Ujsdg, Aug. 1, 
1964, p. 1; "Rumania and Comecon," Background Report (Radio Free 
Europe, May 6 , 1964), pp. 1-3; "Rumanian Edition of 'World Marxist 
Review* Omits Article on Joint Planning," Rumania (Radio Free Europe, 
Sept. 3, 1964), p. 6 .
^Korbonski, "Comecon," p. 52; John Michael Montias, "Back­
ground and Origins of the Rumanian Dispute with Comecon," Soviet 
Studies, XVI (October, 1964), 150-151. "Az Integrdcid Feld: A KGST
RendkivUli Moszkvai Uldsszaka Utdn," Magyar Hirek, XXII (May 17,
1969), p. 3.
^ I b i d .; Korbonski, "Comecon," pp. 49-55.
76"Rumanian Edition of 'World Marxist Review' Omits Article on 
Joint Planning," pp. 3-4. _
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incentive that is offered to Rumania and the other satellites to
encourage them to drift away from the Soviet s p h e r e . B o t h  Rumania
and Hungary have taken the bait. It remains to be seen to what extent
the West can really reel them away from the Soviet "camp" before the 
78line snaps.
The Rumanian attempt to gain more Western trade has affected 
the fate of Transylvanian Hungarians in two contradictory ways. First, 
it has moved Rumania toward a more independent and nationalist course, 
thereby putting the minorities in a less favorable position. Second, 
it has forced the Rumanian government to provide the West with some 
evidence of good faith toward its citizens irrespective of nationality. 
At present the first result of the road to "independence" is more 
prominent. However, since the summer of 1968 the second consideration 
is also evident.^9
Another area that has felt the impact of revived Rumanian 
nationalism (i.e., "socialist patriotism") has been the realm of 
Rumanian-Hungarian cultural relations. The two satellites have had
o ncultural agreements going back to the early post-war years. u Both
^Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," p. 27. The Western 
assumption is, of course, that such trade agreements also lead to other 
agreements. A reflection of this is the recent U .S .-Rumanian cultural 
exchange agreement. See "U.S. and Rumania Sign Cultural Exchange 
Agreement for 1965-66," The Department of State Bulletin, LII (Jan.
18, 1965), 87-90.
^Victor Zorza, "Mr. Johnson Provokes Moscow's Anger," Manches­
ter Guardian Weekly, Jan. 14, 1965, p. 7, indicates that the U.S.S.R. 
policy makers see this as a hopeless venture on the part of the West.
79»Helyzetkep 1970 Vdgdn," Ldrmafa, XII (Dec.,1970), p. 1.
^^Michel Tatu, "A Romdnositds titeme Erddlyben," Uĵ  Eurdpa, VII 
(Feb., 1968), pp. 21-22.
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countries were to send a certain number of exhibitions, folk-dance
groups, theater productions, films, etc. to the other country. Since
81Hungary has no numerically significant Rumanian minority, it is 
apparent that the value of this cultural exchange was appreciated most
opby the Hungarian minority of Transylvania.oc- Not only did this provide 
the Transylvanian Hungarians with a connection with their fellow ethnic 
nationals, but it enabled them--at least in the folk realm--to 
reinforce their cultural identity, an identity which was definitely 
Hungarian in "form" even if socialist in "content."
As Rumanian socialist patriotism gained prominence, a campaign 
was initiated against the "particularism" of the Hungarian minority. 
However, this was not immediately evident after 1956. The shortcomings 
of the Rumanian-Hungarian cultural exchange program, became apparent 
only after 1962. The Western press picked up indications of it first
®-*-In 1956, Rumanians composed only 0.1 per cent of the popula­
tion according to Facts About Hungary; The Fight for Freedom (ed.)
The Hungarian Committee (New York: Waldon Press, 1966) p. 349. As
P. T., "A Mi Nemzetis^geink," Magyar Hirek, XXI (Dec. 10, 1968), p. 3, 
points out, the Keid^r regime is exerting its utmost to make its 
minorities the best treated in East-Central Europe. It is hoped by 
the regime that the power of example may rub off on the Rumanian 
policy makers as well. The KAd^r regime has carried out numerous such 
manifestations of "proletarian internationalism." One such futile 
effort has been the erection of a monument honoring "the heroic 
Rumanian soldiers who . . . participated in the liberation of Hungary." 
See the news of this event in the Jan. 3, 1958, issue of Esti Hirlap 
translated in "Review of the Hungarian Central Press, March 11, 1958," 
p. 8 , in Selected Translations from East European Political Journals 
and Newspapers (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Joint Publications Research
Service, 1958).
®^Tatu, "A RomAnosit^s tfteme Erd^lyben," p. 22.
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in Soviet-Rumanian relations.®® Nonetheless, the change was not 
limited to the discontinuation of Soviet Cultural penetrations®^"-- 
correctly diagnosed by the Rumanians as attempted "Russification."
The Rumanians extended their campaign of "de-Russification" or 
"Rumanization," as has been seen, to include the Hungarians of Transyl­
vania .
Cultural relations between Rumania and Hungary deteriorated.
The cultural agreements signed in the past were not abrogated; they 
were, in fact, carried out to the letter. The spirit of these agree­
ments, however, was now sabotaged in the way they were carried out.®-* 
George Bailey describes this in reference to the Rumanian-Hungarian 
film exchange program. He maintains that films sent by the Hungarian 
government to Rumania--particularly Transylvania— were provided with 
Rumanian sound-tracks and Hungarian sub-titles. When this was pro­
tested by the Hungarian regime, the Rumanians left the Hungarian
8Asound-track but desynchronized it with the film. As Bailey indicates, 
these tactics are not limited merely to the film exchange program, but 
encompass the whole gamut of recent Rumanian-Hungarian cultural relations.
O OBrown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," pp. 32-33. Also see, 
"Rumanian-French Cultural Agreement," News from Rumania, VII (Jan. 14, 
1965), 10, and "The Visit of the Rumanian Government Delegation to 
France," Rumania Today, 117 (Sept., 1964), 4, as indications of this 
change in Rumanian outlook toward the Soviet Union.
°^"For a description of this past cultural penetration see 
Wolff, "Rumania," pp. 272-273 and The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 459-579.
®-*Tatu, "A Romanositds Uteme Erddlyben," pp. 21-22.
86"Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28.
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As in the cultural and economic realm, the impact of Rumanian 
nationalism has also affected the military role of Transylvania in 
the bloc relations of Rumania and Hungary. However, since in the 
military relations of the bloc Soviet hegemony is the "all-knowing" 
planning, and controlling factor, it is of little consequence what one 
satellite would prefer as opposed to the wishes of another.®^ Further­
more, the strategic position of Transylvania places it into the center 
of Soviet military planning. Yet, because of Transylvania's position 
between Rumania proper and Hungary, the area is a definite asset to 
the possessor state from a military or strategic point of view.®®
Under Soviet control, the relative military advantage does not 
constitute a danger to Communist Hungary at present. The only really 
significant danger is aimed at the position of the Transylvanian Hun­
garians. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania, they are
®^For all practical purposes the armies of the respective 
satellites are merely units of the Soviet army. This is ensured by 
the numerous controls exercised from the Moscow center over training, 
strategy, indoctrination, etc. See Serge H. Aronovici, "National 
Security," Romania ed. Fischer-Galati, pp. 124-130; Vali, Rift and 
Revolt in Hungary, pp. 78-80. While in the military area there is 
little opportunity for independence, Rumania has gotten by with minimum 
participation in the past few years. It did not participate in the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, it has successfully declined use of its 
territory (as of 1970) to Warsaw Pact maneuvers, and it participated 
in the vast East-German Warsaw Pact maneuvers with only a token force 
of 300 men. See: "Helyzetk^p 1970 Veg£n," Ldrmafa, p. 1; Kurt L. 
London, "The U.S.S.R., East Europe and the Socialist Commonwealth," 
Current History, Vol. 56 (April, 1969), pp. 198-199.
OQThis, of course, presupposes conventional military tactics. 
Otherwise nuclear and missile warfare has made obsolete both Rumania 
and Hungary as military factors. For a treatment of this problem see 
John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (Paperback 
edition; New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).
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left defenseless vis-A-vis any depradations the Rumanian army might 
engage in. Such a contingency should not be ruled out as unlikely in 
view of past atrocity campaigns against the Hungarians (e.g., the 
terror of the Maniu Guardists after World War XI and the Iron Guardists
OQbefore that) and the ever mounting resurgent nationalism of the 
Rumanians. While the restraints of the Warsaw and "Friendship and non- 
Aggression" Pacts are, at present, all important, some recent Rumanian 
statements indicate that these too might be only relatively "all- 
important ."90
The opportunities provided by Sino-Soviet rift, have enabled 
the Rumanians to map out a foreign policy which is very similar to 
that of Yugoslavia. It is based on "the principles of sovereignty, 
national independence and noninterference in internal affairs . " ^  
Rumania's actual ability to follow such an independent course is, how­
ever, more circumscribed. Rumania is a member of the Warsaw Pact, 
even if a reluctant one. It has also been compelled to sign a new
89Ursula Lenoy, "Transylvania," East Europe and Soviet Russia, 
VIII (Aug. 21, 1952), 12. "A Vasg^rda Rdmuralma Romdn MegviIrfgitdsban," 
L^rmafa, XII (Dec., 1970), pp. 5-6.
^^David binder, "Rumania Stresses Independent Role in Red 
Fight," New York Times, Nov. 20, 1964, p. 2.
Q 17 On the occasion of the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian 
"friendship" treaty, Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer toasted Premier 
Alexei Kosygin by reminding him that; "The treaty we will sign seals 
the principles underlying these relations, namely fraternal assistance, 
mutual advantage, observance of national sovereignty and independence, 
equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs." See "Romania 
Signs Russian Pact; Bucharest Insists on Sovereignty," The (Toledo) 
Blade, July 7, 1970, p. 2.
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Soviet-Rumanian friendship treaty on July 8, 1970, which has committed 
the Rumanians to support the Soviet Union in the event it is attacked 
by any other power.^ This last point commits the Rumanians to support 
the Soviet Union even against a Chinese attack.
For the Rumanians this involves a step away from their previous 
"neutral" position between the U.S.S.R. and China. However, the events 
of the past two years have forced Rumania to be less vocal in 
asserting its independence from the Soviet Union. The prospects of a 
Czechoslovak type intervention have moderated the Rumanians. So, they 
have signed the friendship treaty and they have publicly emphasized 
their good relations with the U.S.S.R.^ At the same time, they have 
tried to continue their own policies by strengthening their contacts 
with other Balkan states as well as some non-Communist states, includ­
ing the United States.^
In the course of the 1960's the Rumanians have been particu­
larly active in the United Nations. They have used their position in
^"Sovereignty, Mutual Aid Stressed in Delayed Soviet-Romanian 
Treaty," The (Toledo) Blade, July 8, 1970, p. 2; "Aldirtdk a Romdn™
Szovjet Bardtsdgi Szerztfddst," Elffre, July 9, 1970, pp. 2-3; "An
Important Event in the Development of Romanian-Soviet Cooperation, 
Alliance and Friendship," Documents, Articles and Information on
Romania, No. 13 (July 15, 1970), pp. 1-2.
^ I b i d .; "Aldirtdk a Romdn-Szovjet Bardtsdgi Szerzflddst,"
Eldre, pp. 2-3. At the same time they have also stressed their con­
tinued good relations with Communist China. "Debate Among Communists 
Urged by Romania President," The (Toledo) Blade, July 10, 1970, p. 3,
^"Nicolae Ceausescu Eln&k Franciaorszdgi Ldtogatdsa," Elflre, 
June 20, 1970, p. 1; "Richard Nixonnak, Az Amerikai Egyesfilt Allamok 
Elnokdnek Latogatdsa Romanidban," Elffre, Aug. 3, 1969, p. 1.
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this international body to further the ideals of "non-interference" 
in the affairs of s t a t e s . T h e y  have stated their opposition to 
military blocs and other manifestations of cold war conflict. At the 
same time they have supported efforts which would provide for European 
security. ^  All these efforts point to a Rumanian desire to loosen 
the ties binding them to the Soviet bloc and thereby enable them more 
flexibility in both internal and external policies.
Until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the most important
part of Rumania's policy was to solidify its relations with Yugoslavia.
Their joint construction of the hydroelectric dam on the Danube is the
most outstanding example of this policy. While the events of 1968
have not hindered the further strengthening of these relations, they
have kept Rumania from expanding such ambitious bilateral contacts
with other socialist states. Until 1968, it seemed as if Rumania were
trying to re-create the Little Entente of the inter-war years— but in
a socialist context. Besides extensive and ever-expanding contacts
with Belgrade, the Rumanians also tried to draw DubCek's Czechoslovakia
97closer to themselves. At the same time Ceausescu cold-shouldered the
^ S e e  for example their attempt to provide the United Nations
with a "workable" definition of aggression. Gheorghe Badescu,
"Concern for Defining Aggression: Romania's Contribution," Documents,
Articles and Information on Romania. Nos. 15-16 (Aug. 15, 1970), p. 22.
^"Speech by President Nicolae Ceausescu in the Moroccan 
House of Representatives," Documents, Articles and Information on 
Romania, No. 40 (Dec. 14, 1970), pp. 9-12.
^Ldszl 6 Hory, '"Vfirfls Kis-Entente'— Romania Vdgy^lma,"
Ldrmafa, XIII, No. 2 (1966), pp. 11-12; Anderson, "Yugoslavia; The 
Diplomacy of Balance," pp. 214-217.
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Hungarians and the Bulgarians.
This attempted re-creation of the inter-war political alignment 
in East-Central Europe, had a very ominous implication for the Hun­
garians. It would have united the policies of those three states which 
had the largest Hungarian minorities (Rumania 1,603,000, Czechoslovakia 
517,000, Yugoslavia 503,000). Dubcek's reluctance and Soviet inter­
vention, kept this plan from unfolding. Thus, since 1968, Rumania has 
been more intent on strengthening its relations in the Balkans.
Besides Yugoslavia, it has expanded its relations with Bulgaria,
n oTurkey and even Albania.70
These Rumanian international policies indicate a great deal of 
flexibility. At the same time they indicate certain continuities.
The most obvious has been the continued poor relations with Hungary. 
Although numerous contacts have taken place between the two states,
these have not altered the cool atmosphere between the two states.99
Rumania's international posture toward Hungary reflects its 
less than ideal treatment of the Transylvanian Hungarians. Yet, since 
1968, the Rumanian nationalist pressure has been eased a little. This 
can be accounted for by the Rumanian realization that better relations 
with the Hungarians may actually be a wiser policy in the long-run.
9®In Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, see for 
instance: "Prospects of Romanian-Yugoslav Friendship," Dec. 1, 1970,
p. 1; "A Historical Page of the Growing Romanian-Bulgarian Friend­
ship," Dec. 1, 1970, p. 3; "The Visit of President Nicolae Ceausescu
to Turkey," April 15, 1969, pp. 1-2.
^Hory, "A Rom^n-Magyar Viszony £s Erddly Magyars^ga," pp. 73-85.
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It may enable Rumania to become stronger internally and also more 
respected internationally. It remains to be seen, whether such a more 
tolerant policy can continue to prevail after overt Soviet pressure is 
again relaxed.
In conclusion, we can say that Rumania's more independent posi­
tion within the bloc has had a dual consequence. It has been disrup­
tive on the international level. Within the Socialist camp it has 
contributed to disharmony, particularly in relation to the U.S.S.R. 
and Hungary. The fate of ROMAGCHIM, Hungarian-Rumanian cultural 
exchange programs, and the break-down of COMECON integration testifies 
to this. On the other hand, intra-nationally it has led to more 
cohesion by unleashing a new wave of Rumanian nationalism. This has 
provided the Rumanian Communist Party with a stronger base of popular 
support. Yet, this support has been gained at the expense of 
alienating the Hungarian population of Transylvania. The latter, in 
turn, has kept Rumania and Hungary from drawing closer to each other, 
thpreby also perpetuating East-Central European "Balkanization."
Yugoslavia
Tito's Yugoslavia initiated the process known as polycentrism 
in the Socialist camp. The Cominform dispute in 1948 enabled the 
Yugoslavs to go their own way, to follow their specifically Yugoslav 
road to Socialism. This independence— unlike Rumania's more recent 
efforts to assert national goals apart from the interests of the Soviet 
bloc— has not led to more strife among the nationalities of the 
Vojvodina. Exactly the reverse has been the case. The Hungarian and
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other non-South Slav minorities were under most pressure while Yugo­
slavia was still in the Socialist camp. With each passing year since 
the break with Stalin, Yugoslavia has improved its relations with these 
minorities and also the neighboring countries of which these minorities 
are representatives. There are some exceptions to this rule. The 
Albanian minority has been under more pressure than the others.
This is in large part due to the poor relations that have existed be­
tween Yugoslavia and Albania throughout the post-World War II period.
The Hungarians of the Vojvodina, on the other hand, have been 
treated much better in the late 1960's than at anytime in Yugoslavia's 
turbulent past. As we have seen in the examination of the country's 
domestic policies, this improvement is a consequence of the political 
system's internal need for stability and peace. On the other hand, 
it is also due to Yugoslavia's improved relations with Hungary.
During Stalin's lifetime, Rdkosi's Hungary was one of the most vocif­
erous opponents of Yugoslavia. This is indicated, among other things,
by Tito's desire to have R^kosi replaced as head of the Hungarian
i mWorkers' Party in 1955. Soviet intervention achieved just that. 
Rdkosi's successor, ErnO GerS, tried to improve relations with Tito. 
However, his overtures were unsuccessful because his Stalinist back­
ground and the Hungarian Revolt of October 1956, intervened.
During the early days of the Hungarian revolt, Tito sympathized
^•®9At the end of 1968, they were promised certain reforms-- 
including greater autonomy and expanded economic opportunities. 
Anderson, "Yugoslavia: The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 213.
•*-®^Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, pp. 220-222.
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with Imre Nagy and the goals of the freedom fighters. However, as
the revolt became m e anti-Communist in nature, Tito called for its 
1 02suppression. His role simultaneously as supporter of Nagy, critic
of the revolt and then critic of Soviet intervention left a deep rift
in Yugoslav-Hungarian relations. Jdnos Kdd^r's government was able to
1 f ) 3bridge this rift only in the early 1960's. Since about 1962, the 
relations between these two states have steadily improved. Delega­
tions of the two countries exchanged visits and these were followed 
by economic and cultural agreements. Only the invasion of Czecho­
slovakia marred these relations briefly in 1968. Since then, the two
states are again on friendly terms.
Yugoslavia has followed a consistent policy toward the other 
socialist states of East-Central Europe. As Stephen S. Anderson 
points out:
Although emphatically not a member of the Soviet bloc, 
Yugoslavia has nonetheless maintained a lively interest in its 
affairs, not only seeking normalization of relations with all 
Communist nations, but also trying to promote trends within 
the bloc which make it less likely and less able to threaten
her. Again and again, this has placed Yugoslavia on the side
of Communist leaders attempting to liberalize domestic policies 
and loosen their bonds to the Soviet Union.
This has made Tito expand Yugoslavia's relations with Rumania,
•*~̂ Ibid. , pp. 229-235; Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, pp. 40-41.
1 0 3UJVali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary,presents the best discus­
sion of Yugoslav-Hungarian discord following the events of 1956, He 
indicates that one of the major reasons for conflict was the Kadar 
government's inability to keep its pledge to Tito that Imre Nagy 
would not be executed.
104"Yugoslavia: The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 212.
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Hungary and Poland, while he has been more hesitant with Bulgaria 
and the post-Dubdek Czechoslovakia.-^
Yugoslavia's relations with the bloc countries are an important 
part of its over-all foreign policy to maintain domestic tranquility 
and international independence. In its broader international policies 
Yugoslavia has tried to retain its non-aligned position between East 
and West. In part, it has achieved this by taking a leading role in 
the organization and policy-making of the "Third World" countries.
To appeal to these states, Yugoslavia has been doubly sensitive about 
its internal policies, whether they involve economics or relations 
among the different nationalities of its population.
A related over-all goal of Yugoslav foreign policy is to safe­
guard its non-alignment by avoiding becoming too dependent on any one 
state or group of states. The lessons c£ 1948 are a bitter reminder of 
the dangers involved in such dependence. Thus, Yugoslavia has tried 
"to put its eggs in more than one basket" both politically and economi­
cally. Tito's trips around the world, Yugoslavia's stands at the 
United Nations, and her economic policies as well, point this out. For 
example, its trade policies--unlike other socialist states--are not 
dependent primarily on other socialist states. Instead, about 60 per
•*-®̂ 0f all these countries, however, the relations with Rumania 
have been the most extensive. See: Ibid., p. 217; "Joint Communique
on the Iron Gates Meeting Between Nicolae Ceausescu and Josip Broz 
Tito," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 18 (Sept.
30, 1969), pp. 1-2; "Interview Granted by Nicolae Ceausescu to the 
Journal !Komunist' of Yugoslavia," Documents, Articles and Information 
on Romania, No. 16 (Nov. 21, 1969), pp. 10-12; "Tito Aid in Romania," 
The (Toledo) Blade, Dec. 26, 1970, p. 3.
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cent of its trade is with the Western democracies, 10 per cent with 
the underdeveloped world, and only 30 per cent with the socialist 
camp.’*"̂ ’
Its trade with both Hungary and Rumania has been growing.
But Poland, East Germany and the U.S.S.R. are Yugoslavia's most
important trade partners in the bloc. However, of these states only
the U.S.S.R. can compete with the volume of trade carried on with West
108Germany, Italy and the United States. u Because of this diverse 
source of its trade, Yugoslavia has been intent on receiving at least 
observer status at the meetings of trade associations and economic 
organizations like CEMA and the E.E.C. Yet, it has hesitated joining 
any of these groupings, for fear of losing its non-aligned p o s i t i o n . -^9
Yugoslavia's trade with Hungary is about equal in volume to 
that carried on with Rumania. ® Its most important export to 
Hungary is timber, while it imports foodstuffs and certain finished 
goods. This trade furthers good relations between the two states. Its
■^Anderson, "Yugoslavia: The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 212;
Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, p. 165; Statistical Pocket-Book of 
Yugoslavia 1966 (Beograd: Federal Institute for Statistics, 1966),
pp. 73-74.
•̂•̂ I b i d . In the case of Hungary, Yugoslavia's trade has been 
increased, but it has declined in terras of its proportional share of 
Hungary's total trade. See Vardy, History of the Hungarian Nation, 
Table XIV, p. 409.
•^^Statistical Pocket-Book of Yugoslavia 1966, pp. 73-74.
•'•^Anderson, "Yugoslavia; The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 214.
•̂•̂ Statistical Pocket-Book of Yugoslavia 1966, pp. 72-73.
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expansion would sustain Yugoslavia's continued tolerant nationality 
policy, but its existence is not the primary reason for such tolerance.
In the cultural relations between the two states, the needs 
of Hungarians in the Vojvodina are rarely neglected. A  number of agree­
ments have been negotiated between the two states which cover cultural
exchange programs of all types. Yugoslav films are sent to Hungary,
111while Hungarian films are taken into Yugoslavia, Artist groups, 
theater groups and various other cultural organizations and associa­
tions carry on extensive tours in the respective countries. The Hun­
garian groups tour mostly in the Vojvodina, while the Yugoslav groups
112tour mainly Budapest. L These exchanges are also supplemented by 
agreements which concern cooperation in book publishing and subscrip-
1 I Otion opportunities across national boundaries. J
The only area where very little cooperation has taken place is 
military affairs. Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact keeps the 
Yugoslavs from attempting extensive military relations or security
-kjugoslaviia 1945-1964; Statistidki Pregled (Beograd;
Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1965), Tables 20-5 and 20-6, p. 328;
Facts About Hungary; The Fight for Freedom, Table on "Feature Films 
Shown," p. 359.
1-^The extensiveness of these exchanges is also indicated by 
cultural, economic, etc. programs carried on by individual cities 
across the borders. For example see "Szoros Kapcsolat Zombor ds Baja 
KttzOtt: Hazatdrt a Zomboriak KttldOttsdee Magyarorszdgrol," Magyar Szo',
July 28, 1966, p. 2.
■^•^Compare in this relation, Tatu, "A Romdnositds Crteme 
Erddlyben," p. 22, with Tibor Korom, "A Jugoszldviai Magyar Nyelv- 
mtivelO Egyesulet Munkdjdrol, TerveirOl ds Probldmdirol" in A  Kassai 
Batsdnyi-Kflr ifvkflnyve 1965-1968 (Bratislava; Maddch Konyvkiado,
1969)., pp. 277-278.
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discussions with Hungary on a bilateral basis. Although some discus­
sions have taken place between the two states concerning military 
matters, these have been of a very limited n a t u r e . W h e r e  the two 
states have had opportunity to cooperate, has been in relation to 
recent efforts to strengthen European security. Both states, plus
Rumania and some Western states have been pushing for discussions with
115the aim of establishing a secure Europe free of military blocs.
Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact has at times made the 
existence of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina more difficult. This was 
the case in August 1968, when Warsaw Pact armies crushed Czechoslovak 
independence. In this latter instance, Warsaw Pact military units 
also exerted pressure on Yugoslavia and Rumania. Soviet, Bulgarian 
and Hungarian troops were drawn up along the borders of both these 
states. In Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito's government reacted with exten­
sive, well publicized, military preparations of its own. Among these 
preparations, its deployment of troops deserves closer attention.
As in the old Austro-Hungarian empire, so in Yugoslavia, troops 
of a particular nationality are usually not quartered or trained in 
regions populated by their fellow nationals. In practice this means 
that Hungarians from the Vojvodina spend their military duty in far-off
114See reports in News From Hungary-Magyarorszagi Hirek XVI 
(Radio Free Europe) for late 1970 and early 1971.
■^"Interview Granted by Nicolae Ceausescu to the Journal 
'Komunist' of Yugoslavia," pp. 5-6; Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, 
pp. 156-157; "A Katonai T8mbSk Feloszlatdsdval Csdkkenne a Fesz- 
iiltsdg--Jelentette Ki Ceausescu," Magyar Szd, July 17, 1966, p. 6 .
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Macedonia or Bosnia-Hertzegovina. Macedonians or Albanians, on the
other hand, serve the military in Slovenia, Croatia or the Vojvodina.
In 1968, however, the Yugoslav strategists altered this usual practice
in response to the Warsaw Pact pressure. They moved their Hungarian
troops back to the Vojvodina to face their fellow nationals across
the border. If hostilities were to commence, it would mean--at least
initially— Hungarians fighting Hungarians and Bulgarians fighting 
117Bulgarians.
In conclusion, we can say that Yugoslavia's "secession" from 
the bloc has had both constructive and disruptive consequences. 
Internally, it has led to more cohesion and harmony. The peoples of 
Yugoslavia became more united in the face of outside Soviet pressure 
which attempted to make them conform. The memory of German occupation 
in World War II and the more recent Soviet threat of 1968, reinforced 
this inner unity. On the other hand, Yugoslavia's defection has also 
had disruptive consequences for the Socialist camp. It has, through 
its stress on independent roads to socialism, contributed to the con­
tinued fragmentation of East-Central Europe. From the perspective of 
limiting Soviet hegemony this is a positive development, but as the
12.6Anderson, "Yugoslavia: The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 217,
maintains that; "All military leaves were cancelled and a partial 
mobilization began . . . /this was/ reinforced by announcement of an 
8.2 per cent increase in the 1969 military budget, by extension of 
draft obligations (including women in time of emergency), and by re­
activation of the civil defense and partisan command structure."
117'Based on personal observations of a high school teacher who 
was in the Vojvodina during the Czechoslovak crisis of August 1968.
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case of Rumania illustrates, it can also become a negative development 
by pitting one nationality against another.
Hungary
As the above discussion shows, Hungary is much more circum­
scribed in its international relations than either Yugoslavia or Rumania.
The more restricted international posture is due primarily to Hungary's
118traumatic reincorporation into the bloc after the revolt of 1956.
This event not only inundated the country with Soviet troops, but it 
made the countrys leaders dependent on these troops for their exercise 
of power. As opposed to this, neither Rumania nor Yugoslavia are 
presently occupied by Soviet Troops. Furthermore in both these latter 
instances the leaders have created their own control-systems indepen­
dent of the Soviet Union.
Hungarian dependence on the U.S.S.R. is evident not only in its 
political statements in the United Nations and its role in the Warsaw 
Pact, but also in its economic relations. Its foreign trade is 
dominated completely by the U.S.S.R. In fact, in the 1960's Hungary's 
dependence on the U.S.S.R. has been increased rather than reduced. In
^Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, p. 112, defines this depen­
dent status in the following way: "Hungary . . . has perhaps more
national claims and grievances than any other nation of the region.
Yet the Hungarian government handles these questions in the most 
gingerly way. Despite considerable provocation, it is very careful not 
to stir up the Hungarian people over the treatment of the Magyar 
minority in Rumania. The Hungarian press is full of warnings against 
'bourgeois nationalism' . . . Undoubtedly the Hungarian leaders have 
in mind the outburst of nationalism in 1956 . . . /which/ sought to 
liberate Hungary not only from Soviet control but from the Communist 
system as well."
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1960, 31 per cent of its imports and 29.3 per cent of its exports
were tied to the Soviet Union. In 1965 this figure rose to 36.4 per
119cent and 34.8 per cent respectively. By 1970, it was estimated at
40 per cent and 42 per cent respectively.^® In the case of both
Yugoslavia and Rumania, the opposite trend is observable, although
Rumania is also heavily dependent on its trade with the U.S.S.R,
In spite of Hungary's excessive dependence on the U.S.S.R.,
it too has attempted to undertake policies motivated by national
interest. In relation to Yugoslavia and Rumania this is evident in
Hungary's increased concern for the Hungarians of the Vojvodina and
19 1Transylvania respectively.  ̂ The increased concern is demonstrated 
by Hungary's policies toward its own minority nationalities, by its 
commitment to expand tourism with Yugoslavia and Rumania, and the 
growing popularity in Hungary of federalist schemes for re-ordering 
East-Central Europe.
Since the beginning of the 1960's Hungary has been interested 
in expanding tourism. In general, this concerns mainly increasing the 
attractiveness of Hungary to tourists from other lands. But in the
H^Vardy, History of the Hungarian Nation, Part Two, Table XIV,
P . 409.
^®A. L. "A Nemzeti Erz^s Magyarorszagon ^s a Szdtszortsigban," 
Itt-Ott, I (Feb. 1, 1968), p. 13. Also see Joseph Wechsberg,
"Hungary Today: An Arrangement with the Present," Saturday Review
(Nov. 28, 1970), p. 22.
121As two examples of this concern see; Domonkos Varga, "A 
Megmaradds Irodalma." Valdsig, XIII (Aug., 1970), pp. 84-86; Akos 
BenkfJ, "A Jugszlaviai Magyar Pr<4za 'Uj HullAma'" ForrAs, No. 4 
(July-Aug., 1970), pp. 44-54.
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case of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia this interest is also
motivated by the desire to increase the opportunities of Hungarians in
each of these countries to visit their relatives in Hungary or vice-
versa. With Czechoslovakia an extensive tourist exchange has been
possible. In the case of Yugoslavia, such exchange has been re-
123stricted— primarily by the Hungarian government. However, since the 
early 1960!s the number of tourists in both directions has been on the 
increase. Many of these tourists are Hungarians visiting their rela­
tive s.
Only in the case of Rumania has the question of tourism been
a source of friction in recent years. While in 1962 as much as 15.7%
of Hungary's tourists went to Rumania, in 1964 their percentage dropped 
125to 5.3%. This decline was due to Rumania's unwillingness to liber­
alize its visa requirements vis-a-vis Hungarian citizens. Hungary was 
able to get such liberalized treatment from Bulgaria, Poland,
•*-^As the Table on "Destination of Hungarians Traveling Abroad" 
in Facts About Hungary: The Fight for Freedom, p. 359, indicates,
Czechslovakia leads all other countries as the destination of 
Hungarian "tourists." In 1964, 71.9 per cent of the Hungarians 
traveling abroad went to Czechoslovakia.
123Throughout the 1950's fear of ideological "contamination" 
was responsible for the Hungarian government's strict limitations.
•*-^No exact statistics are available which indicate the per­
centage of the tourists that visit with relatives. However, the fact 
that many choose the Vojvodina rather than the scenic Adriatic as their 
destination, indicates that their motives include more than vacation­
ing. Based on personal observations, during the summer of 1966.
Impacts About Hungary: The Fight for Freedom, p. 359.
R eprod u ced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
4 0 3
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (in the form of no visa requirement)
while Rumania was even hesitant in allowing an increase in the number
of Hungarian tourists under stringent visa requirements. Finally in
September 1967, a Rumanian-Hungarian agreement was signed relative to
tourism which would raise to 100,000 the number of visitors allowed
126in both directions. However, this agreement referred primarily to
increasing the number of tourist groups and omitted any reference to
127facilitating trips by individuals between the two countries.- Thus, 
as late as August 1968 (before the Czechoslovak tragedy), the Hun­
garians were still one of the most restricted source of tourists for 
128Rumania. However, policy makers in Budapest continue to exert
pressure to have the existing restrictions removed.
Another area where the Hungarian government wants less restric­
tion is in the opportunities for cultural exchange. As we have had 
occasion to see in relation to Rumanian and Yugoslavian domestic 
policies, in the latter country more opportunities exist for the 
Hungarians. To support its arguments for more cultural exchange and 
opportunities the Hungarian government has held up its own "nation­
ality policy" as an example.
Hungary’s national minorities composed only 1.8 per cent of
•*-^Hory, "A RomcJn-Magyar Viszony es Erd^ly Magyarsaga," p. 80.
127T, . ,Ibid.
l28Tatu, "A Rom^nosit^s Uteme Erd^lyben," p. 22.
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its population in 1 9 6 0 . Thai is, only 175,000 individuals declared 
themselves as having a non-Hungarian mother-language. For the more 
numerous of these nationalities the state upholds an extensive system 
of public schools and cultural opportunities which ensure the preserva­
tion of their national heritage. The German, Croatian, Serbian, 
Slovenian, Rumanian and Slovak minorities all have primary and secon­
dary schools, teacher-training institutions and cultural organizations
1 onand periodicals. They even have certain television and radio 
programs in their own language or devoted to their folk culture.
In giving these politically insignificant minorities— they are 
geographically scattered and few in number--extensive cultural oppor­
tunities, Hungary is trying to set an example for its neighbors which 
have large and geographically concentrated minorities living within
1 ̂ 9their borders. J That this is not without its effects is demonstrated 
by Tito's visit to Hungary in 1967. On this occasion, both he and his 
wife visited Hungarian educational institutions near Budapest for the 
Serbian minority. -^3 fate of the Hungarians in Transylvania
shows, reciprocity in such policies does not always follow. However,
129p. "A Mi Nemzetisdgeink," Magyar Hirek, p. 3.
130Ibid.; Jdzsef Mdrtin, "Nemzetisdgek Magyarorszdgon," Magyar 
Nemzet, Jan. 12, 1969, p. 2.
\ "A Mi Nemzetisdgeink," Magyar Hirek, p. 3.
-L̂ M^rtin, "Nemzetisdgek Magyarorsz^gon," p. 2.
133npresident Tito's Visit to Hungary," Borba, Feb. 5, 1967, 
trans. in "State Visits 1966-1969," Yugoslav Survey, XI (May, 1970), 
141-142.
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the impeccable nature of Budapest's policies makes it more difficult 
for neighboring states to rationalize intolerance and discrimination.
The Soviet Union can find nothing--or very little— in these 
relatively passive policies, that would endanger its control over East- 
Central Europe. The policies do not incite national antagonisms in 
the area. Probably, the U.S.S.R.'s tight control over Hungary keeps 
the latter's policies passive vis-k-vis Rumania and Yugoslavia. Only 
in one area is it possible to discern potential conflict between 
Soviet and Hungarian policies. This involves the Hungarian desire for 
a more integrated East-Central Europe as an independent entity. Hun­
garian thinking concerning East-Central Europe's "federation" has not 
gone past the speculative stage, although it is a very popular theme 
in the writings of many prominent Hungarians. They concur, that 
only a multi-national unified and socialist East-Central Europe can 
resolve the national antagonisms that still prevail in areas like 
Transylvania. However, in practice the Hungarian government continues 
to be one of the firmest pillars in Soviet integration efforts within
the bloc. It actively supports both the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, which
1 ̂ 5envision an East-Central Europe dependent on the U.S.S.R.
l-^'Imre Kovacs, "The Establishment in Hungary," East Europe, 
XIV (May, 1965), p. 7; Vardy, History of the Hungarian Nation, part 
Two, pp. 355-360.
135"az Xntegrdcid Feld; A KGST Rendkiviili Moszkvai Uldsszaka 
Utdn," Magyar Hirek, p. 3; "Losonczi EiniSk Mongolidban Elk&telezte 
Magyarorsz^got Kina Ellen?" News From Hungary - Magyarorszigi Hirek 
XVI (Radio Free Europe), July 17, 1970, p. 1.
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III
The political conflicts which have arisen in East-Central 
Europe since the end of World War II have affected and in turn have 
been affected by the nationality policies which have been adhered to.
In conclusion, we will reflect on some of the foregoing observations 
related to these policies.
In the case of Rumania's treatment of the Hungarians, the 
country's international involvement has had ambivalent consequences. 
While Rumania was totally dependent on the U.S.S.R., it treated the 
Hungarians much more liberally than after it began to undertake a more 
"independent" international posture. This independent posture 
developed parallel to the internal shift of power which strengthened 
the ethnic Rumanian dominance of the CPR. The dual nature of these 
developments should caution us not to impute the repressive nationality 
policies to only one or the other of these causes. Rather, it would 
be more accurate to conclude that the more permissive "polycentric" 
setting has enabled the Rumanians to follow a policy that is now more 
in accord with what they believe to be their national interest.
The above observation is supported by the sequence of develop­
ments in the Party power structure, in the shifts in nationality poli­
cies and in the political changes which led Rumania to a more 
independent posture internationally. It will be remembered that the 
power shift (favoring the dominant nationality) within the CPR took 
place between 1952 and 1957. The earliest overtly disadvantageous 
policies toward the Hungarians became evident already in the 1956-57
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academic year, when many nationality educational facilities were 
"integrated” with the schools of the majority nationality. However, 
the major repressive policies against the Hungarians took place only 
after the Hungarian Revolt of 1956. This event shifted Soviet favor 
away from Hungary and in favor of Rumania. It led, in 1958, to the 
evacuation of the Red Army from Rumania. This removed the last major 
restraint against repressive nationality policies. Only in 1968 does 
this repression slacken somewhat, when in the wake of the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, a similar fate becomes feasible for 
Rumania as well.
That external and internal political developments both have a 
bearing on nationality policy is also born out by the treatment of 
the Hungarians in the Vojvodina. As previous chapters have pointed 
out, the Hungarians were considered undependable until about 1955.
This was the case because they were identified with the disintegrative 
forces which destroyed Yugoslavia in 1941, and also because in the 
Yugoslav struggle against the Cominform, the Communist Hungarian 
Rakosi regime tried to sow discontent among the population of the 
Vojvodina.
The Yugoslav treatment of Hungarians in the period between 1945 
and 1955 was consequently more repressive than Rumania's treatment of 
the Transylvanian Hungarians during that time. However, the Yugoslavs 
have, since about 1955, extended rather than restricted the opportuni­
ties of the Hungarians to further their national development. This 
Shift reflected the growing influence of Hungarian and other minority
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representatives within the Yugoslav League of Communists, and also the 
precarious international position of Yugoslavia between two power 
blocs. Both these developments required more cooperation among the 
various nationalities of the country. And, since no nationality was 
strong enough to dominate the Party by itself, the rights of all na­
tionalities received protection. In Rumania no similar situation ever 
had the chance to develop because by 1958 the artificial balance which 
had been imposed by a direct Soviet military presence was eroded.
The different policies pursued by Yugoslavia and Rumania also 
indicate Hungary's relative political impotence. Due to its excessive 
dependence on the U.S.S.R., it has had to follow a cautious policy 
toward its neighbors. It has been compelled to follow a passive 
policy which does not stir up national antagonisms. Hungary has, 
therefore, succeeded in getting better treatment for Hungarian 
minorities only in Yugoslavia, where domestic politics had already 
decreed that they should be treated well. In Rumania, on the other 
hand, where nationalism came into conflict with the rights of the 
Hungarians, the government in Budapest has not been able to influence 
nationality policies. Only the prospects of a Czechoslovak-type 
Soviet intervention has eased the Rumanian policies toward the Tran­
sylvanian Hungarians.
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CHAPTER VI
NATIONALITIES WITHOUT NATION-STATES 
UNDER COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS
In the assimilationist settings which have produced both the 
American and Soviet man, there is very little sympathy for the cultural 
uniqueness and developmental distinctiveness of any East-Central 
European national group. In considering the oppression or systematic 
de-nationalization of certain ethnic groups, the response of many is 
to say "so what?" These individuals usually consider nationalities a 
negative, or at least an anachronistic phenomenon. In part, this is 
due to the belief that the conflicts among these nationalities have 
produced the major political confrontations of our century.
This study has not tried to disprove the above view. However, 
it does point out that policies of forced de-nationalization lead 
directly to nationality conflicts which could mushroom into political 
confrontations as well. This is born out by the observations of the 
present study in relation to Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality poli­
cies. It would seem, therefore, that an awareness of nationality 
problems, rather than an escapist "so what," is more likely to 
produce constructive thought concerning the peace and the future of 
East-Central Europe.
I
We have attempted to reflect on these problems by asking a
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number of questions. Is the Communist workers' class solidarity a 
"solution" of the Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality problems? Why or 
why not? Or to what extent? If it is not, then what considerations 
guide the nationality policies of these states? How are the policies 
of these states similar? How are they different? Why are they differ­
ent?
The answers to these questions are summarized and discussed in 
the following pages. Before turning to them directly, some general 
preliminary observations are in order. These concern the second reason 
why many representatives of a "melting-pot" setting refuse to consider 
the question of minority nationalities with any other than a negative 
attitude. It involves the belief that nationalities as such, especial­
ly minorities, are fated to become absorbed. Furthermore, absorption 
is considered not only "natural" but also "desirable."
This view is understandable in the United States and the 
Soviet Union where assimilation of some sort is needed to produce the 
American or the Soviet man.-*- However, it should be noted, that 
neither the Soviet nor the American man is devoid of nationality or of
*-In the present chapter "assimilatiori' is given a narrower 
meaning than in the preceding ones. Assimilation will be defined as 
absorption, a process whereby one nationality or culture is dissolved 
and completely mixed into another nationality or culture. It is a 
process similar to the dissolution of aspirin in water. "Integration," 
on the other hand, is defined as the uniting of two or more nationali­
ties or cultures without destroying the identity of the components 
making up the mixture. To use a physical analogy, it is very much like 
a grafted tree or a mosaic in a church window. For the American mind 
this difference is not foreign. White Americans rarely talk of assimi­
lating the black Americans, they think rather of integrating them.
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a national language. So, nations are perpetuated even by the melting- 
pot environments. But, in the American case, at least, the assimila­
tion is usually a voluntary process, not one that is forced onto the 
inhabitants. In this sense it is a "natural" process. Whether or not 
it is a "desirable" process depends totally on the perspective of the 
viewer. It is good or desirable if it can be proved that the nation­
ality which absorbs is superior to the nationality that is being 
absorbed and that the product is a more peace-loving, more humane and 
more rational being.
This study has not tried to prove any of the above. On the 
other hand, it has pointed out that the process of assimilation which 
is being fostered in Transylvania is neither "natural" nor "desir­
able." It is not natural because it is being forced. It is not 
desirable because it enhances the possibility for further conflict. 
Furthermore, these policies are based on the questionable assumption 
that the more powerful, or the more numerous nationality is superior 
to the less numerous nationalities.
The East-F.uronean setting is not like the American melting-pot. 
It is composed of culturally compact areas, where nationalities living 
side by side speak different languages, follow different customs and 
enjoy different types of food and wine. The tolerance and understand­
ing of these differences, rather than the systematic destruction of 
them, provides the only sane and humane solution to existing nationality 
conflicts. A pluralistic conception allowing for divers cultural 
developments does not rule out the possibility of political unity in
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the area. Quite the contrary, such a conception presupposes political 
unification whether that be "Carpathian," "Danubian," or "Central- 
European" in scope.
II
The comparison of Rumanian and Yugoslav policies indicates that 
a minority can be treated in one of three ways. It can be excluded or 
isolated from the general life of the national community as a whole 
(e.g., Jewish ghettos). A second alternative is to try to assimilate 
or absorb the minority into the national community in such a way that 
it will abandon its own identity for the national identity of the 
majority nationality (e.g., Russification, Magyarization, Rumaniza- 
tion). Finally, the third alternative is to integrate or fuse the 
minority with the majority to create a union that is more than its 
component parts. In the latter case both minority and majority retain 
their own identities, but also identify with each other through the 
realization of certain common interests (e.g., Yugoslav policies in 
the 1960's, policies in Switzerland). Rumanian and Yugoslav policies 
can be identified with the second and third alternatives respectively-- 
although both countries have resorted to all of these policy alterna­
tives since the close of World War II.
In Transylvania
Rumanian policies toward the Hungarians were initially guided 
by the spirit of proletarian internationalism imposed by Stalin. It 
envisaged a relationship between Rumanians and Hungarians which would
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not necessitate the abandonment of their respective national cultures.
It demanded only that the two peoples live together within one state 
as "co-inhabiting nationalities" striving "shoulder to shoulder" to 
defeat the "forces of reaction" and inaugurate the new socialist 
millenium. This definition of the place of the Transylvanian Hungarians 
transformed them into partners of the majority nationality. They were 
given every opportunity to preserve their cultural identity, as long as 
they supported the process of Socialist transformation and the Soviet 
Union's hegemonial interests. These opportunities were spelled out 
both in the country's ideological commitments and its constitutional 
objectives. Until October 1956, these opportunities were also put 
into practice. Schools, publications, even some "national autonomy" 
in the Magyar Autonomous Region reflected this "integrationist" 
approach.
Changes in Rumania's internal and external political relations 
have turned it away from the "integrationist" solution. In the years 
between 1952-1957 the CPR lost its cosmopolitan character and became 
primarily an ethnic Rumanian organization, both in membership and 
leadership. This ethnic Rumanian nationalization of the Parfv paral­
leled the period of de-Stalinization in the bloc, which loosened Soviet 
hegemonial controls. The Hungarian Revolt of 1956 led to unrest among 
the Hungarians in Transylvania. This made the Hungarians suspect in
OThat Stalin was thinking along these lines is also indicated 
by his abortive plan to have Rumania and Hungary federated. See 
Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin trans. Michael B. Petrovich 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), pp. 177-178.
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the eyes of both Rumanian and Soviet policy-makers. Rumanian efforts 
to help quell this unrest as well as the Hungarian revolt, increased 
Soviet confidence in Rumania's dependability to such an extent that in 
1958 all Soviet troops were removed from the country. This military 
withdrawal gave Rumanian leaders more control over their internal 
policies. By the beginning of the 1960's they also gained more con­
trol over their foreign relations as the Soviet Union became more and 
more embroiled in its ideological and political dispute with China.
By 1963, Rumanian policies began to reflect openly the coun­
try's more nationalist orientation both internally and in the inter­
national arena. Defiance of COMECON integration efforts reflected 
this new Rumanian nationalism on the international front. Internally, 
the shift to an assimilationist nationality policy became its most 
concrete expression. The reduction of Hungarian educational and 
cultural opportunities, as well as their symbolic self-government in 
the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region, reflected the new Rumanian 
"socialist patriotism" on the domestic front. Only at the end of 
1968, following the Czechoslovak crisis, did Rumanian assimilationist 
policies slacken in momentum. Thus, Rumanian nationality policy can
be summarized as integrationist from 1945 to 1958.^ Since the with­
drawal of Soviet troops it has become assimilationist. In light of
the 1968 events, it remains to be seen whether or not the
OJIn the area of education, the turn toward assimilationist 
policies was evident already in the 1956-57 academic year. Along this 
line see Chapter IV above.
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assimilationist policies will be continued. As of 1970, they have 
been toned down.
In the Vojvodina
The Yugoslav policies were at first "exclusivist" in nature. 
The Hungarians— as well as seme other non-South Slav nationalities-- 
were treated as former enemies. They were held responsible for Yugo­
slavia's dismemberment during the war. In the years immediately 
after the War they were openly persecuted, thereby signifying that 
they were excluded from the national community. As Communist rule 
became more firmly established this separation was slowly replaced 
by tolerance for Hungarian cultural development. As in the case of 
Rumania, internal and external political pressures provided the 
impetus for alterations in Yugoslavia's nationality policy. The 
external threat of Stalinist intervention was, perhaps, the most 
important catalyst. It signified to the Yugoslav leaders that they 
had to win the support of all the peoples of the country if they were 
to ward off successfully the Stalinist threat. The CPY, therefore, 
began to put into practice in the years 1948-1950 the nationality 
policy which the country's constitution and the Party's ideology 
demanded. Expansion of cultural and educational opportunities, as 
well as local self-government, has characterized this policy. It has 
become an "integrationist" policy, uniting all the peoples of the 
land, by granting them the opportunity to preserve their diversity.
Internal political factors have reinforced this trend. The 
traditional antagonism which existed between Serbs and Croats, the
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conflicting economic interests of northern and southern Yugoslavia, 
and the divided emotional loyalty of border nationalities, auto­
matically ruled out an assimilationist policy. (Which nationality 
would or could provide the standards for assimilation? Since Yugo­
slavia does not have one majority nationality no such standard is 
4available.) Furthermore, the fear of the revival of ethnic nation­
alisms made Tito and the other leaders of the CPY/LYC extremely sensi­
tive about the correct application of their nationality policy. They 
want to perpetuate the trans-ethnic Yugoslav character of the state. 
They have been able to do this only by giving all nationalities a 
certain representation in the Party (League) without any one gaining 
a predominant position. Parallel to this, all nationalities have also 
been guaranteed opportunities for their own cultural development.
Thus, Yugoslavia has followed since about 1948, but more consistently 
since 1955, an "integrationist" nationality policy."*
The major reason for the different treatment of nationalities
4This generalization is true only for Yugoslavia as a whole.
On the Republic level there are standards of assimilation. In Serbia
one can become Serbianized and in Croatia it is possible to be
Croatianized. But mixed marriages usually tend to produce individuals 
who claim to be Yugoslavs rather than Croats or Serbs. For non-South
Slav nationalities Yugoslavianization in this sense is assimilationist 
rather than integrationist. As of the present, however, this trend is 
not widespread.
^Integrationist policies were already evident during World War
II in the relations of the South Slav peoples. However, these inte­
grationist policies were not practiced vis-h-vis the Hungarians (and 
other non-South Slav nationalities) until 1948. Until that time the 
Hungarians were "excluded" from full membership in Yugoslavism.
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in the two areas is that the setting and the problems faced by Yugo­
slavia and Rumania have been unique. In both countries the Hungarian 
inhabitants have posed similar yet different domestic and international 
problems. While in both the internal unity of the country has guided 
nationality policies, the different internal political situations and 
the unlike international posture of the two countries, produced differ­
ent results. Consequently, in Rumania the Hungarians have lost many 
of their former national-cultural institutions and opportunities.
They have been suffering real repression. In Yugoslavia the opposite 
has happened. Over the years nationality policies have become more 
permissive.
Ill
The above observations lead us to a number of conclusions.
First and foremost, that it is national needs and developmental pecu­
liarities rather than ideology and class solidarity that guide both 
Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality policies. In other words, nation­
alism has been more important than Communist ideology and its claim 
that class solidarity unites peoples regardless of their national 
backgrounds. Power relations and the demands of "national interest" 
have guided the formulation of nationality policies in practice. This 
is reflected both by Rumania's contradiction of Communist nationality 
theory and Yugoslavia's adherence to it.6 In Rumania, Communist
£
Both states claim that they follow Communist nationality 
policy based on proletarian internationalism. Only the difference in 
the actual policies of the two states indicates that Rumania is merely 
paying lip-service to these ideals.
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nationality theory does not adequately serve the leaders of the coun­
try, so they ignore it in practice. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, 
it does serve the leaders of the country in furthering unity. Thus, 
in the latter country theory is followed.
The observation that power relations rather than ideology now 
guide the treatment of the Hungarians in both areas, leads to the 
further conclusion that the problem is a political one requiring a 
political solution. However, political solutions may be both far­
sighted and near-sighted. (In the present context, by "far-sighted" 
we mean a policy that contributes to the well being of the greatest 
number of people--across national lines— and to the peace and security 
of all the peoples living in the area. By "near-sighted" we mean a 
policy that contributes to the well-being of only one nationality at 
the expense of other nationalities. In the latter case unity is 
always imposed rather than a c c e p t e d . W e  have indicated that Yugo­
slavia has a more far-sighted nationality policy than Rumania. In 
recent years Yugoslavia has made a real effort to balance the interests 
of all its nationalities. In this way it has ensured that the 
citizens of all nationalities will be able to live in peace with one 
another. In Rumania the opposite now prevails. The latter become 
more conscious of their disadvantaged position and tend to view the 
state as their enemy. Cooperative and peaceful co-existence is almost
7"Near-sighted" policies are also distinguishable by their 
definition of national interest in terms of the interests of the 
dominant ethnic group. This means that national interest becomes 
merely race interest.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
4 1 9
impossible in this setting. Furthermore, it leads to the exact 
opposite of what was intended. Instead of increasing unity in the 
country it encourages conflict and weakens the country both internally
Q
and internationally.
The above difference in ethnic policies leads to yet another 
conclusion, that far-sighted policies take into account a balancing of 
the interests of all nationalities. Furthermore, such a balancing of 
interests is a result of an existing balance of power. Where a 
balance of power prevails among nationalities, as in Yugoslavia, there 
can also be found a balancing of interests. Where no such political 
balance exists, there will also fail to be a balance of interests.
The above conclusions hold true as long as there is no external 
interference in either the political or the interest balances (e.g., 
Soviet troops on Rumanian soil prior to 1958), or if the role of an 
individual leader (or a group of leaders) does not intervene in 
spite of the existing imbalance of power to create a balance of 
interests. (In the latter category the role of Petru Groza in Rumania 
and the role of Tito in Yugoslavia are particularly noteworthy, i.e., 
their roles as "balancers.")
QRumanian realization of the weakening impact of such policies 
was indicated by the numerous pacifying speeches made to Hungarian 
audiences in Transylvania in the wake of the Czechoslovakian crisis. 
See as examples the speeches of Ceausescu, Maurer, Fazekas and 
Patilinet in "Party and State Leaders Visit Brasov, Covasna and 
Harghita Counties," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania,
No. 21 (Aug. 27, 1968), pp. 2-38.
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I V
The future prospects for both the Transylvanian and the 
Vojvodinian Hungarians depend as much on international as on intra- 
national developments. However, while no major shifts take place in 
the international alignment of states, it is safe to say that the con­
dition of those in both Rumania and Yugoslavia will remain as at 
present. That is, in Rumania continued repression will prevail while 
in Yugoslavia more opportunities in national-cultural matters may be 
expected. But even here changes are apt to take place, particularly 
after Tito is no longer on the scene. So it is really impossible to 
say more than that if things remain as they are, nationality policies 
will remain as they are. But since change is the only certainty in 
the world, it is not out of place to consider how the ethnic relations 
of Eastern Europe could be placed into a far-sighted policy perspective.
As we have shown, an integrationist rather than an assimila­
tionist nationality policy can prevail only where a balance of power 
favors it. The solution is to foster the ability of all nationalities 
to defend themselves. Only in this way will interests be considered 
by the majority nationality or nationalities. However, the creation 
of such a balance is extremely difficult (without external intervention) 
when one nationality numerically overshadows its minorities, as is the 
case in Rumania. In the latter instance other solutions should be con­
sidered as a check on the unrest and national animosities which are 
being produced.
A complete re-thinking is required to solve the problem. As the
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preceding discussion indicates, ideological commitment to better 
nationality policies is considered seriously only when such policies 
correspond to the interests of the state concerned. Thus, tolerant 
nationality policies are only possible in a state which is multi-
qnational. Unfortunately, the trend in East-Central Europe has been 
to strengthen the new nation-states rather than to attempt a larger 
multi-national state based on both economic and political realism. The 
emotional sunk cost in petty ethnic nationalisms has been too strong.
As a consequence, the post-World War II re-ordering has perpetuated 
the political fragmentation of the area.
Political developments supported the strengthening of this 
fragmentation. Two in particular deserve mention: the expansion of
Soviet hegemonial control over the area and the drastic reduction of 
minority populations through deportations, territorial transfers, popu­
lation exchanges and exterminations. Soviet hegemonial control led 
to a freezing of the fragmented nation-state system inherited from the 
interwar years. This was reinforced by the drastic reduction of the 
minority populations of East-Central Europe. As Professor Leszek 
Kosinski has pointed out, in 1930 out of about 94 million people living
^A multi-national composition is by itself no guarantee of 
tolerant nationality policies. Policies in the U.S.S.R. and some 
other states (including Czechoslovakia until the second half of the 
1960's) testify to this fact. However, where no one nationality has 
a majority, as in the case of Yugoslavia, the chances for tolerance 
seem to improve immeasurably.
•*-®See Chapter I above for a discussion of some of these develop­
ments .
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in East-Central Europe (he included seven countries under this desig­
nation: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia
and Albania) 24 million (26%) were members of minority groups.'*''*'
World War II and its consequences altered this picture completely.
Due to deportations, territorial transfers, etc., the minority popu­
lation of the same seven countries was reduced to 7.1 million or 7.2% 
of the 99 million inhabitants in 1960.*"^
Most of the changes in this ethnic picture took place in the 
northern areas of East-Central Europe, particularly in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. The German and Jewish minorities were reduced most 
drastically. While in the interwar period they represented 5,878,000 
and 4,096,000 of the minority population respectively, in the postwar
period they have become an insignificant part of the population in all
1 ̂states except Rumania.■LJ Only the minorities of the southern areas
of East-Central Europe remain in significant numbers. Of these, the
Hungarians are the most numerous, with 1,604,000 in Rumania, 504,000
in Yugoslavia, 517,000 in Czechoslovakia and about 200,000 in the
U.S.S.R. (Carpatho-Ukraine). Aside from the Hungarians, only the
Albanians have a numerous representation. There are 915,000 Albanians 
in the Kosmet of Yugoslavia.
•*■•*•'"Changes in the Ethnic Structure in Countries of East-Central 
Europe," Lecture delivered at Louisiana State University on February 
29, 1968, under the auspices of the Geography and Anthropology and 
the History Departments. Taken from a copy of the speech's text, p. 7.
12Ibid., pp. 7, 11.
•*~̂ Ibid., Tables 3 and 4, between pp. 11 and 12.
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The revised ethnic make-up of the area has a number of note­
worthy consequences. The German minorities are no longer an effective 
lever of German foreign policy in the area. The Jews have lost thcxr 
important--even dominant--position in the commercial and intellectual 
life of these countries. As a consequence, only the Hungarians remain 
as a significant "link" between the various nation-states of East- 
Central Europe. They, on the other hand, are less cosmopolitan in 
their perspective, but also more directly tied to the destiny of the 
area than either the Germans or the J e ws.^
The continued existence of the Hungarian minorities, however, 
is viewed by nationalists with frustration. Hungarian nationalists 
would prefer to solve the problem by re-annexing the areas where these 
fellow nationals reside. Rumanian and Slovak nationalities, on the 
other hand, would like to eliminate their existence by assimilation 
or expulsion. They cannot conceive of these minorities as "links" 
between the various peoples, playing a mediating role between them.
■^Germans envisioned East-Central Europe as part of their 
sphere of incluence. They were concerned only in extending their 
power over it so as to increase the wealth and power of Germany 
generally. The Jews, on the other hand, were (relatively) newcomers 
in the area. Most (although by no means all) moved into the area in 
the last two centuries. Many of them stayed briefly, continuing their 
journey further West. The persecutions imposed in these countries 
were at times just more of what had been their fate in Czarist Russia. 
Furthermore, even recent Soviet policies (due to the Arab-Israeli con­
flict) have made them less than enthusiastic about their stay in East- 
Central Europe. The existence of Israel, moreover, has provided them 
with an alternative homeland that is more hospitable. Unlike the 
Jews and the Germans, the Hungarians cannot move to areas outside East- 
Central Europe if conditions do not favor them. Nor do they want to, 
since their national fate is directly tied to this area.
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Only the Yugoslavs have come to accept this latter view.
Expulsion fortunately is now less likely than in the period 
right after World War II. Population exchange, however, must certainly 
have crossed the mind of policy makers in the area. In the case of 
the Transylvanian Hungarians this is not a rational option. First of 
all there are only a handful of Rumanians in Hungary. This means that 
a fair trade would be impossible. Second, present-day Hungary could 
not absorb an influx of almost two million additional inhabitants. 
Together with Czechoslovakia, Hungary has the greatest population 
density in East-Central Europe.^ Its population density of 282 per 
square mile compares unfavorably with Rumania's 208 per square mile 
and Yugoslavia's 188 per square mile.^
Such an exchange of populations would be possible only if it 
were tied to some sort of territorial exchange. Here the experience 
of the Second Vienna Award would be instructive.-^ However, partition 
is a "solution" geared to a nation-state system. As such it is already 
an anachronism. Yet, if the peoples of East-Central Europe continue 
to think emotionally as ethnic nationalists, then this may become the 
only feasible solution. It is not resorted to at present, since the 
Soviet Union does not want to re-open the question of ceded and annexed
15In this study East Germany is not considered part of East- 
Central Europe. It, of course, has even a greater population density 
than Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
•̂ The New York Times Encyclopedic Almanac 1970 ed. Seymour 
Kurtz (New York:' The New York Times, 1969), pp. 799, 858, 898.
■^See Chapter I, above.
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territories. A discussion of such questions would place the U.S.S.R. 
in an embarrassing position in view of its own territorial expansion 
following World War II.
The disadvantage of partition would be that it would continue 
the hostility between Rumanians and Hungarians. On the other hand, it 
would definitely eliminate the persecution of minorities. The 
persecution would end because both states would have to frame their 
nationality policies with a view to reciprocity. That is, Hungarians 
would treat their Rumanian minority well in order that the Hungarian 
minority in Rumania would be treated well, also. Thus, an external 
balance of power between the two states would ensure that in their 
internal policies they would attempt to integrate rather than assimi­
late their respective minorities.
Setting-up a federal independent Transylvania has been a 
popular suggestion put forward in the past. This suggestion, however, 
is also geared to a nation-state system. It is thus less realistic 
than partition, though more humane than the "population transfers" 
suggested by some. All these methods, however, contain the weakness 
of conceptualizing the present as if it still followed the rules of 
the European "sovereign" nation-states. This federated Transylvania 
solution would make sense only as a transition to a more inclusive 
federal state including both Rumania and Hungary.
The European Common Market, Nato, Comecon and the Warsaw Pact 
indicate that new and larger units are needed to meet modern problems 
in the political as well as economic field. Regarding the fate of the
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Hungarians in Transylvania, the solution of their plight also seems to 
lie in such a greater unit which can end the conflicts among member 
nationalities. To the present writing, however, Comecon and the 
Warsaw Pact have not proved up to this task in the question of Tran­
sylvania. The reason for this is probably that they are more instru­
ments of hegemonial control than of a community of nations welded 
together by common interests.
V
A more imaginative alternative to partitions is the political
unification of all, or of parts, of East-Central Europe. No matter
how utopian this may seem at first glance, it is probably the only
solution that could bring an end to ethnic repression as it exists in
Rumania today. The artificial attempt to create nation-states in this
area, has from its inception led only to conflict. East-Central
Europe is multi-national and most nation-states within it (excepting
only present-day Hungary, Poland and Albania) are likewise multi- 
18national. ° As the preceding discussion has shown, even the most 
judicious partitions and boundary rectifications can only hope to even 
out the number of minorities that will fall under the rule of other 
nationalities. The unification of the area under a multi-national 
government, however, would make all peoples minorities, as in
Poland will become even more homogeneous ethnically as a 
consequence of the Bonn-Warsaw treaty signed recently. See "Poland 
Reportedly to Let 90,000 Germans Depart," The (Toledo) Blade, Dec. 6 , 
1970, p. 3.
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present-day Yugoslavia. This would allow for a balance of power among 
nationalities which would ensure a balance of interests among them as 
well.
The peoples of East-Central Europe have innumerable common 
interests. Politically they are in the shatter-belt region of Europe, 
hemmed in by the German (today Western powers) and the Russian (today 
Soviet) power blocs. Their disunity and weakness make them subject to 
the imperialism of both. By becoming a united independent federation, 
neutral of both blocs, they could serve the interests of themselves 
as well as world peace. Of course, their present position within the 
Soviet sphere of influence makes such a union highly unlikely if not 
impossible.
In spite of the fact that such a union is faced by seemingly 
unsurmountable obstacles, it has fascinated and occupied the atten­
tion of numerous outstanding individuals of almost all East-Central 
European peoples. From the middle of the 19th century to the present,
these individuals have attempted to demonstrate not only the need for
19such a unification, but also its feasibility. Even the Communist
leaders of the area have toyed with the idea. In their formulations
a central consideration was always the final resolution of nationality 
20problems.
■^%Iiroslav Lazarovich, "Regional Federalism or a New Catalysm," 
Studies for a New Central Europe, Series 2, No. 1 (1967-68), pp.
20-30.
^Steven Bela Vardy, History of the Hungarian Nation, Part II 
(Astor Patk, Florida: Danubian Press, 1969), pp. 355-360.
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While obstacles to such a multi-national federation seem great, 
the emergence of a distinctively East-Central European culture, the 
apparent common interests of these people versus German and Soviet 
encroachments, and the technological unification of the area, have 
drawn most of them closer to one another than at any time in their past 
history. What remains now is a concerted process of bridge-building 
among the respective nationalities. In this role the minorities of 
the present have a particularly significant role. They provide the 
area with the people that are bilingual or multilingual, the people 
who live within two or more cultures.
The area is also closer to such unity for yet two other reasons. 
First, the elimination of the vast German minorities has meant that 
German political influence has been trimmed. It is still important, 
but it can no longer use large sections of the local populations to 
further its foreign policy goals. In other words, the unification of 
the East-Central Europeans could proceed independently of German 
aspirations. Second, the imperialism of the U.S.S.R. in 1948, 1956 
and 1968, has demonstrated dramatically the conflict of political 
interests between Moscow and the states of East-Central Europe. The 
two developments taken together mean that Germany is unable to impose 
its authority and Soviet assistance has become less desirable to ward 
off German influence. In other words, there is a new realization of 
the need for independence from both Eastern and Western power centers.
Under Soviet hegemony the peoples of East-Central Europe have 
only limited opportunities to work for political unification among
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
4 2 9
themselves. However, much of their cooperation through COMECON and 
other Soviet sponsored agencies has provided them with invaluable 
experience in working together. Eventually, these lessons in coopera­
tion could be utilized to establish a federal republic along the 
Yugoslav pattern--a republic which would provide for economic and 
political unity while it preserved cultural diversity.
The artificiality of existing nation-states would be replaced 
with a multi-national state which could guarantee cultural autonomy 
to all nationalities, while providing them wl;v_h common political 
leadership. This alternative to partition is at present merely a 
utopian delineation of what would be the best solution for the peace 
and security of East-Central Europe. But it realistically points out 
that if a political re-arranging takes place in the area, to last, it 
would have to safe-guard cultural diversity. For the Hungarians in 
Transylvania and the Vojvodina, as for all the peoples of the area, 
this is the solution that holds the most promise.
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APPENDIX A
SERBO-CROATIAN, RUMANIAN, HUNGARIAN AND GERMAN GEOGRAPHIC AND 
HISTORIC PLACE NAMES IN TRANSYLVANIA AND THE VOJVODINA
Rumanian Hungarian German
I. Major Geographic Subdivisions and Rivers of Transylvania
SiebenbtlrgenArdeal 
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As ini Aszonynepe --
Bagara BogdrteIke --
Baia de Arie§ Aranyosbdnya --
Baia Mare Nagybanya Neustadt
Baida Bald --
Baraolt Bardt --
Batani Mici Kisbaczon --
Bazia^ Bazias Bazias
Beelean Eethlen —  -





















Cehu Silvaniei Szil^gycseh --
Chiesd Szil^gykdvesd --
Ciacova CsAk --
Cimpia Turzii Aranyosgyeres --
Cincu Nagysink Gross Schenk
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Martinus Homor odszentm^rton --
Medias Medgyes Mediasch
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Zlatna Zalatna _ _ _
Serbo-Croatian Hungarian German
III. Major Geographic Subdivisions and Rivers of the Vojvodina 
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  Baranya ---
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Zabalj Boldoga s s z ony fa lva --
Zemun Zimony Semlin
Zrenjanin Nagybecskerek Gross Betschk
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APPENDIX B
The Second Vienna Award: Some Reflections on an
Attempted Compromise
The Second Vienna Award has been maligned not only in the West,
but also in Rumania and Hungary.'*’ It was a compromise agreement and
2by its nature was unable to satisfy everyone. Yet, a second look at 
this agreement is in order. It represents the first concrete attempt
Oto find some way to an equitable Transylvanian adjustment.
Through this award the Rumanians returned to Hungary an area
4of 19,300 square miles with a population of 2,385,987. This area
^Western reaction to the Second Vienna Award was mainly anti- 
Hungarian. First, because many Westerners were unaware of the issues 
involved; second, because the Rumanians had a better outlet to the 
Western press. See R. C. Waldeck, Athene Palace (New York: Robert M.
McBride & Co., 1942), p. 141; C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth (Edin­
burgh, England: The Edinburgh University Press, 1961), I, 375, II, 179.
OCharles Upson Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania1s Case /n.p.: 
n.n., 1941/, p. 16.
■^Many Western observers saw the Second Vienna Award as a mani­
festation of Hitler's policy of divide et impera. That this was not 
the case is convincingly argued by both Waldeck and Macartney. Waldeck, 
Athene Palace, p. 296, states that ". . .as Hungary and Rumania could 
not do anything to Germany even if united, this argument did not hold. 
What Hitler needed in his Southeastern Grossraum was not the tension 
which goes with a policy of divide and rule, but a measure of quiet 
and peace." Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 444, also maintains that 
the motive was not divide and rule, but the desire to find a settle­
ment that would keep Rumania and Hungary from fighting each other, at 
least until the end of the war.
^"Nicholas Kallay, Hungarian Premier (New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 1954), footnote 28, p. 59. Clark, Racial Aspects of Roma­
nia's Case, p. 1, gives slightly different figures. He estimates the 
territory as 17,000 square miles, and the population as 2,400,000. For 
a thorough analysis see Andres Ronai, "Erddly Tajai <±s az Uj Hat^r," 
Fdldraizi KOzlemdnyek, LXVIII (1940), 240.
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covered the northern two-fifths of Transylvania.^ its population was
c.mixed, but it did contain a relative majority (plurality) of Magyars. 
The exact figures according to the census of 1910, 1930 and 1941 gives 
the breakdown presented by Table la. The statistics indicate that the 
award left with Hungary approximately one million Rumanians.^ This 
compares favorably with the Trianon "solution" which left 1,704,000-
O1,356,675 Magyars under Rumania. The Vienna Award saw both countries 
on more or less equal terms, while at Trianon Hungary was the defeated 
state that had to accept the diktat of the Entente.^ The Vienna Award 
could, therefore, bring about a real compromise which was not all
%aldeck, Athene Palace, p. 150, refers to Hungary receiving the 
"lion's share" of Transylvania. This was a widely held misconception 
in the West, but it is discouraging to see that even someone so close 
to the events should make such a mistake. Not only in population and 
area, but also in natural wealth and industrial capacity, Hungary 
received far less than what was left to Rumania. See Rrfnai, "Erddly 
T^jai ds az uj Hatdr," pp. 239-50.
^See Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 59, and Table la. Philip E. 
Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," Foreign Affairs, XIX (Oct., 1940), 
p. 241, and Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania1s Case, pp. 16-20, disagree 
with this statement and with Kallay. The dependability of the latter 
two is questionable, however, since both are guilty of using figures too 
loosely. Mosely, for example (pp. 242-43), alternates carelessly 
between 1910 and 1930 statistics.
^Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 423; Kallay, Hungarian 
Premier, p. 59.
^Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 143. The figures are those 
of the 1910 and 1930 census respectively.
^Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," 
Foreign Affairs, VI (April, 1923), p. 435, admits as much in spite of 
the status quo bias of his article.
























THE NATIONALITY PORTRAIT OF THE TRANSYLVANIAN PARTITION OF 1940*
Nationality** 1910 1930 1941
1,125,732 Area re-ceded to HungaryMagyars 911,550 1,380,506






Slovaks 12,807 99,585 19,584






Magyars 533,004 441,720 363,206
Rumanians 1,895,505 2,031,447 2,274,561
Germans 
Jews (Yiddish; 465,814 475,158 490,640
Other 152,820 150,934 204,491
Total 3,047,143 3,099,259 3,332,898
*This Table is based on C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary 
1929-1945 (Second Edition; Edinburgh: At the University Press, 1961), I, 423; Recensamantul General 
A1 Romaniei Din 1941 (> Aprilie; Date Sumare Provizorii (Bucuresti: Institutul Central De Statistica,
1944), Table 1, p. IX; "Rezultatele Recensamantului Maghiar 1941," Comunicari Statisti.ce, No. 1 
(Jan. 15, 1945), Table 18, pp. 14-15.
**Nationality is determined by census takers either on the basis of mother language or accord­
ing to declared nationality. The Hungarian census of 1910 was based on mother-language, while the 
Rumanian censuses of 1930 and 1941 were based on declared nationality. The Hungarian census of 1941 
was based on both mother-language and declared nationality, but for the sake of simplicity only the 
declared nationality statistics are used in this Table.
***See footnote 42 in this chapter. 495
o n e - s i d e d . T h i s  can be seen in the gains and losses of the respec­
tive states.
In terms of population, Hungary’s Rumanian minority grew from
25,000 to one million. As opposed to this, Rumania's Magyar minority
of 1,704,000-1,353,675 was reduced to 533,004-441,720.^  Territorial
changes make the compromise even clearer. In this category, Hungary
received the poorer half not only in terms of area, but also in
19regard to natural resources and industrial capacity. Thus, the 
compromise was a real one, although neither side saw it in this light; 
both alleged that the other received the "better end of the deal."
This decision has been presented to indicate that under unique 
circumstances, the existing balance of power makes real compromises 
possible. In short, it reveals that not all "bourgeois" solutions 
have been dictates of victor to victim.
However, it was short lived. The Vienna Award did not survive 
the war. It was annulled by the Allies, who transferred the Hungarian
share of the Award to Rumania as a reward for her prior defection from
the Axis.^
■'•^Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 56.
■^Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 423. The figures are those 
of the 1910 and 1930 census respectively.
•^Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," pp. 241-42; Rdnai, 
"Erddly Tajai ds az Uj Hatdr," pp. 241-50.
■^By August 23, 1944 when Rumania switched sides, the Axis no 
longer existed since Italy had already surrendered.
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